NOTICE: This is an unofficial transcript of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board Auditor Independence Tax Services Roundtable that was convened by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board at the Capitol Hilton on July 14, 2004. The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board does not certify the accuracy of this unofficial transcript. The transcript has not been edited, may contain typographical or other errors or omissions, and is presented for convenience only. An archive of the webcast of this program can be found on the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board's website at www.pcaobus.org.

		Page 1
1		
2		
3		
4		
5		
6		
7	Public Company Accounting Oversight Board	
8	(PCAOB)	
9		
10	Auditor Independence Tax Services Roundtable	
11		
12		
13		
14	July 14, 2004	
15	10:02 a.m 3:58 p.m.	
16		
17	Capitol Hilton	
18	1001 16th Street, N.W.	
19	Presidential Ballroom	
20	Washington, D.C. 20036	
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		

		gton,	
	Page 2		Page 4
1	A T T E N D A N C E	1	P R O C E E D I N G S
2	WILLIAM J. McDONOUGH, Chairman, PCAOB	2	[Beginning time: 10:02 a.m.]
3	CHARLES D. NIEMEIER, Member, PCAOB	3	MR. McDONOUGH: Ladies and gentlemen, would
4	DANIEL L. GOELZER, Member, PCAOB	4	you take your seats, please? Ladies and gentlemen,
5	ROBERT BURNS, SEC	5	would you please take your seats?
6	DONALD NICOLAISEN, SEC	6	Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. It's my
7	ANDREW BAILEY, SEC	7	pleasure, Bill McDonough, the Chairman of the PCAOB, to
8	TOM OCHSENSCHLAGER, American Institute of Certified		welcome you to this Roundtable Discussion on Auditor
9	Public Accountants	9	Independence and Tax Services.
10	JAMES L. BROWN, Crowe Chizek and Company LLC	10	In creating the Public Company Accounting
11	DAMON SILVERS, AFL-CIO	11	Oversight Board, Congress gave the Board the job of
12	RICHARD ANGELONE, American Bankers Association	12	overseeing the auditors of public companies in order to
13	DEAN UMINSKI, Crowe Chizek and Company LLC	13	restore the public's confidence in the fairness and
14	PATRICIA WALTERS, CFA Institute	14	objectivity of auditors' opinions. After a number of
15	MARK ANSON, CALPERS	15	accounting and other financial reporting scandals, the
	LYNN E. TURNER, Glass Lewis	16	public had good reason to doubt the credibility of the
17	MICHAEL GAGNON, PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP	17	profession, and, in particular, to doubt whether
18	BELLA RIVSHIN, PCAOB	18	accounting firms showed appropriate objectivity in
19	GREG SCATES, PCAOB	19	their audit work.
20	DOUGLAS CARMICHAEL, PCAOB	20	Shortly after the Congress passed the
21	THOMAS RAY, PCAOB	21	Sarbanes-Oxley Act, in early 2003, the Securities and
22	NICK CYPRUS, Interpublic Group of Companies	22	Exchange Commission responded to those concerns by
23	DAVID SHEDLARZ, Pfizer, Inc.	23	amending its rules related to auditor independence.
24	JIM BRASHER, KPMG LLP	24	You'll recall, the Act was passed at the end of July
25	CONO NAMORATO, Internal Revenue Service	25	'02, and the SEC responded very quickly.
	Page 3		Page 5
1		1	
1	ATTENDANCE	$\frac{1}{2}$	Consistent with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, these
2	A T T E N D A N C E MARK EVERSON, Internal Revenue Service	2	Consistent with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, these rules of the SEC prohibit auditors from performing
2 3	A T T E N D A N C E MARK EVERSON, Internal Revenue Service PAUL KOREN, Goldstein Golub Kessler	2 3	Consistent with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, these rules of the SEC prohibit auditors from performing certain non-audit services for their public-company
2 3 4	A T T E N D A N C E MARK EVERSON, Internal Revenue Service PAUL KOREN, Goldstein Golub Kessler COLLEEN SAYTHER, Financial Executives International	2 3 4	Consistent with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, these rules of the SEC prohibit auditors from performing certain non-audit services for their public-company audit clients. And the Commission's new rules also
2 3	A T T E N D A N C E MARK EVERSON, Internal Revenue Service PAUL KOREN, Goldstein Golub Kessler COLLEEN SAYTHER, Financial Executives International MARK WEINBERGER, Ernst & Young LLP	2 3 4 5	Consistent with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, these rules of the SEC prohibit auditors from performing certain non-audit services for their public-company audit clients. And the Commission's new rules also require that all other audit and non-audit services,
2 3 4 5 6	A T T E N D A N C E MARK EVERSON, Internal Revenue Service PAUL KOREN, Goldstein Golub Kessler COLLEEN SAYTHER, Financial Executives International MARK WEINBERGER, Ernst & Young LLP WALTER McNAIRY, Dixon Hughes	2 3 4 5 6	Consistent with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, these rules of the SEC prohibit auditors from performing certain non-audit services for their public-company audit clients. And the Commission's new rules also require that all other audit and non-audit services, including tax services, be approved by the company's
2 3 4 5	A T T E N D A N C E MARK EVERSON, Internal Revenue Service PAUL KOREN, Goldstein Golub Kessler COLLEEN SAYTHER, Financial Executives International MARK WEINBERGER, Ernst & Young LLP	2 3 4 5	Consistent with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, these rules of the SEC prohibit auditors from performing certain non-audit services for their public-company audit clients. And the Commission's new rules also require that all other audit and non-audit services,
2 3 4 5 6 7	A T T E N D A N C E MARK EVERSON, Internal Revenue Service PAUL KOREN, Goldstein Golub Kessler COLLEEN SAYTHER, Financial Executives International MARK WEINBERGER, Ernst & Young LLP WALTER McNAIRY, Dixon Hughes SCOTT BAYLESS, Deloitte	2 3 4 5 6 7	Consistent with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, these rules of the SEC prohibit auditors from performing certain non-audit services for their public-company audit clients. And the Commission's new rules also require that all other audit and non-audit services, including tax services, be approved by the company's audit committee.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	A T T E N D A N C E MARK EVERSON, Internal Revenue Service PAUL KOREN, Goldstein Golub Kessler COLLEEN SAYTHER, Financial Executives International MARK WEINBERGER, Ernst & Young LLP WALTER McNAIRY, Dixon Hughes SCOTT BAYLESS, Deloitte BRUCE WEBB, McGladrey & Pullen, LLP	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	Consistent with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, these rules of the SEC prohibit auditors from performing certain non-audit services for their public-company audit clients. And the Commission's new rules also require that all other audit and non-audit services, including tax services, be approved by the company's audit committee. Since the Commission adopted these rules, new
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	A T T E N D A N C E MARK EVERSON, Internal Revenue Service PAUL KOREN, Goldstein Golub Kessler COLLEEN SAYTHER, Financial Executives International MARK WEINBERGER, Ernst & Young LLP WALTER MCNAIRY, Dixon Hughes SCOTT BAYLESS, Deloitte BRUCE WEBB, McGladrey & Pullen, LLP ELLIOT SCHWARTZ, Council of Institutional Investors	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	Consistent with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, these rules of the SEC prohibit auditors from performing certain non-audit services for their public-company audit clients. And the Commission's new rules also require that all other audit and non-audit services, including tax services, be approved by the company's audit committee. Since the Commission adopted these rules, new concerns relating to auditor independence have come to
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	A T T E N D A N C E MARK EVERSON, Internal Revenue Service PAUL KOREN, Goldstein Golub Kessler COLLEEN SAYTHER, Financial Executives International MARK WEINBERGER, Ernst & Young LLP WALTER McNAIRY, Dixon Hughes SCOTT BAYLESS, Deloitte BRUCE WEBB, McGladrey & Pullen, LLP ELLIOT SCHWARTZ, Council of Institutional Investors BARBARA ROPER, Consumer Federation of America JEFFREY C. STEINHOFF, U.S. Government Accountability Office	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	Consistent with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, these rules of the SEC prohibit auditors from performing certain non-audit services for their public-company audit clients. And the Commission's new rules also require that all other audit and non-audit services, including tax services, be approved by the company's audit committee. Since the Commission adopted these rules, new concerns relating to auditor independence have come to public attention. These new concerns relate to the tax services and products that audit firms provide to their clients and to senior executives of those clients,
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	A T T E N D A N C E MARK EVERSON, Internal Revenue Service PAUL KOREN, Goldstein Golub Kessler COLLEEN SAYTHER, Financial Executives International MARK WEINBERGER, Ernst & Young LLP WALTER McNAIRY, Dixon Hughes SCOTT BAYLESS, Deloitte BRUCE WEBB, McGladrey & Pullen, LLP ELLIOT SCHWARTZ, Council of Institutional Investors BARBARA ROPER, Consumer Federation of America JEFFREY C. STEINHOFF, U.S. Government Accountability Office BILL GRADISON, Member, PCAOB	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	Consistent with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, these rules of the SEC prohibit auditors from performing certain non-audit services for their public-company audit clients. And the Commission's new rules also require that all other audit and non-audit services, including tax services, be approved by the company's audit committee. Since the Commission adopted these rules, new concerns relating to auditor independence have come to public attention. These new concerns relate to the tax services and products that audit firms provide to their clients and to senior executives of those clients, including extremely aggressive, if not abusive, tax
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	A T T E N D A N C E MARK EVERSON, Internal Revenue Service PAUL KOREN, Goldstein Golub Kessler COLLEEN SAYTHER, Financial Executives International MARK WEINBERGER, Ernst & Young LLP WALTER McNAIRY, Dixon Hughes SCOTT BAYLESS, Deloitte BRUCE WEBB, McGladrey & Pullen, LLP ELLIOT SCHWARTZ, Council of Institutional Investors BARBARA ROPER, Consumer Federation of America JEFFREY C. STEINHOFF, U.S. Government Accountability Office	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	Consistent with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, these rules of the SEC prohibit auditors from performing certain non-audit services for their public-company audit clients. And the Commission's new rules also require that all other audit and non-audit services, including tax services, be approved by the company's audit committee. Since the Commission adopted these rules, new concerns relating to auditor independence have come to public attention. These new concerns relate to the tax services and products that audit firms provide to their clients and to senior executives of those clients, including extremely aggressive, if not abusive, tax strategies that may, by their nature, impair the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	A T T E N D A N C E MARK EVERSON, Internal Revenue Service PAUL KOREN, Goldstein Golub Kessler COLLEEN SAYTHER, Financial Executives International MARK WEINBERGER, Ernst & Young LLP WALTER McNAIRY, Dixon Hughes SCOTT BAYLESS, Deloitte BRUCE WEBB, McGladrey & Pullen, LLP ELLIOT SCHWARTZ, Council of Institutional Investors BARBARA ROPER, Consumer Federation of America JEFFREY C. STEINHOFF, U.S. Government Accountability Office BILL GRADISON, Member, PCAOB	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	Consistent with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, these rules of the SEC prohibit auditors from performing certain non-audit services for their public-company audit clients. And the Commission's new rules also require that all other audit and non-audit services, including tax services, be approved by the company's audit committee. Since the Commission adopted these rules, new concerns relating to auditor independence have come to public attention. These new concerns relate to the tax services and products that audit firms provide to their clients and to senior executives of those clients, including extremely aggressive, if not abusive, tax strategies that may, by their nature, impair the objectivity of the auditor.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	A T T E N D A N C E MARK EVERSON, Internal Revenue Service PAUL KOREN, Goldstein Golub Kessler COLLEEN SAYTHER, Financial Executives International MARK WEINBERGER, Ernst & Young LLP WALTER McNAIRY, Dixon Hughes SCOTT BAYLESS, Deloitte BRUCE WEBB, McGladrey & Pullen, LLP ELLIOT SCHWARTZ, Council of Institutional Investors BARBARA ROPER, Consumer Federation of America JEFFREY C. STEINHOFF, U.S. Government Accountability Office BILL GRADISON, Member, PCAOB	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	Consistent with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, these rules of the SEC prohibit auditors from performing certain non-audit services for their public-company audit clients. And the Commission's new rules also require that all other audit and non-audit services, including tax services, be approved by the company's audit committee. Since the Commission adopted these rules, new concerns relating to auditor independence have come to public attention. These new concerns relate to the tax services and products that audit firms provide to their clients and to senior executives of those clients, including extremely aggressive, if not abusive, tax strategies that may, by their nature, impair the objectivity of the auditor. I believe I can speak for all our Board
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	A T T E N D A N C E MARK EVERSON, Internal Revenue Service PAUL KOREN, Goldstein Golub Kessler COLLEEN SAYTHER, Financial Executives International MARK WEINBERGER, Ernst & Young LLP WALTER McNAIRY, Dixon Hughes SCOTT BAYLESS, Deloitte BRUCE WEBB, McGladrey & Pullen, LLP ELLIOT SCHWARTZ, Council of Institutional Investors BARBARA ROPER, Consumer Federation of America JEFFREY C. STEINHOFF, U.S. Government Accountability Office BILL GRADISON, Member, PCAOB	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	Consistent with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, these rules of the SEC prohibit auditors from performing certain non-audit services for their public-company audit clients. And the Commission's new rules also require that all other audit and non-audit services, including tax services, be approved by the company's audit committee. Since the Commission adopted these rules, new concerns relating to auditor independence have come to public attention. These new concerns relate to the tax services and products that audit firms provide to their clients and to senior executives of those clients, including extremely aggressive, if not abusive, tax strategies that may, by their nature, impair the objectivity of the auditor. I believe I can speak for all our Board members when I say that we have not yet determined
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	A T T E N D A N C E MARK EVERSON, Internal Revenue Service PAUL KOREN, Goldstein Golub Kessler COLLEEN SAYTHER, Financial Executives International MARK WEINBERGER, Ernst & Young LLP WALTER McNAIRY, Dixon Hughes SCOTT BAYLESS, Deloitte BRUCE WEBB, McGladrey & Pullen, LLP ELLIOT SCHWARTZ, Council of Institutional Investors BARBARA ROPER, Consumer Federation of America JEFFREY C. STEINHOFF, U.S. Government Accountability Office BILL GRADISON, Member, PCAOB	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	Consistent with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, these rules of the SEC prohibit auditors from performing certain non-audit services for their public-company audit clients. And the Commission's new rules also require that all other audit and non-audit services, including tax services, be approved by the company's audit committee. Since the Commission adopted these rules, new concerns relating to auditor independence have come to public attention. These new concerns relate to the tax services and products that audit firms provide to their clients and to senior executives of those clients, including extremely aggressive, if not abusive, tax strategies that may, by their nature, impair the objectivity of the auditor. I believe I can speak for all our Board members when I say that we have not yet determined what, if any, changes in the rules on auditor
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	A T T E N D A N C E MARK EVERSON, Internal Revenue Service PAUL KOREN, Goldstein Golub Kessler COLLEEN SAYTHER, Financial Executives International MARK WEINBERGER, Ernst & Young LLP WALTER McNAIRY, Dixon Hughes SCOTT BAYLESS, Deloitte BRUCE WEBB, McGladrey & Pullen, LLP ELLIOT SCHWARTZ, Council of Institutional Investors BARBARA ROPER, Consumer Federation of America JEFFREY C. STEINHOFF, U.S. Government Accountability Office BILL GRADISON, Member, PCAOB	$\begin{array}{c} 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13 \\ 14 \\ 15 \\ 16 \\ 17 \\ 18 \\ 19 \end{array}$	Consistent with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, these rules of the SEC prohibit auditors from performing certain non-audit services for their public-company audit clients. And the Commission's new rules also require that all other audit and non-audit services, including tax services, be approved by the company's audit committee. Since the Commission adopted these rules, new concerns relating to auditor independence have come to public attention. These new concerns relate to the tax services and products that audit firms provide to their clients and to senior executives of those clients, including extremely aggressive, if not abusive, tax strategies that may, by their nature, impair the objectivity of the auditor. I believe I can speak for all our Board members when I say that we have not yet determined what, if any, changes in the rules on auditor independence are needed to address these new concerns;
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	A T T E N D A N C E MARK EVERSON, Internal Revenue Service PAUL KOREN, Goldstein Golub Kessler COLLEEN SAYTHER, Financial Executives International MARK WEINBERGER, Ernst & Young LLP WALTER McNAIRY, Dixon Hughes SCOTT BAYLESS, Deloitte BRUCE WEBB, McGladrey & Pullen, LLP ELLIOT SCHWARTZ, Council of Institutional Investors BARBARA ROPER, Consumer Federation of America JEFFREY C. STEINHOFF, U.S. Government Accountability Office BILL GRADISON, Member, PCAOB	$\begin{array}{c} 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13 \\ 14 \\ 15 \\ 16 \\ 17 \\ 18 \\ 19 \\ 20 \end{array}$	Consistent with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, these rules of the SEC prohibit auditors from performing certain non-audit services for their public-company audit clients. And the Commission's new rules also require that all other audit and non-audit services, including tax services, be approved by the company's audit committee. Since the Commission adopted these rules, new concerns relating to auditor independence have come to public attention. These new concerns relate to the tax services and products that audit firms provide to their clients and to senior executives of those clients, including extremely aggressive, if not abusive, tax strategies that may, by their nature, impair the objectivity of the auditor. I believe I can speak for all our Board members when I say that we have not yet determined what, if any, changes in the rules on auditor independence are needed to address these new concerns; rather, we are holding these this roundtable
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	A T T E N D A N C E MARK EVERSON, Internal Revenue Service PAUL KOREN, Goldstein Golub Kessler COLLEEN SAYTHER, Financial Executives International MARK WEINBERGER, Ernst & Young LLP WALTER McNAIRY, Dixon Hughes SCOTT BAYLESS, Deloitte BRUCE WEBB, McGladrey & Pullen, LLP ELLIOT SCHWARTZ, Council of Institutional Investors BARBARA ROPER, Consumer Federation of America JEFFREY C. STEINHOFF, U.S. Government Accountability Office BILL GRADISON, Member, PCAOB	$\begin{array}{c} 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13 \\ 14 \\ 15 \\ 16 \\ 17 \\ 18 \\ 19 \\ 20 \\ 21 \end{array}$	Consistent with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, these rules of the SEC prohibit auditors from performing certain non-audit services for their public-company audit clients. And the Commission's new rules also require that all other audit and non-audit services, including tax services, be approved by the company's audit committee. Since the Commission adopted these rules, new concerns relating to auditor independence have come to public attention. These new concerns relate to the tax services and products that audit firms provide to their clients and to senior executives of those clients, including extremely aggressive, if not abusive, tax strategies that may, by their nature, impair the objectivity of the auditor. I believe I can speak for all our Board members when I say that we have not yet determined what, if any, changes in the rules on auditor independence are needed to address these new concerns; rather, we are holding these this roundtable discussion to explore the various types of tax services
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	A T T E N D A N C E MARK EVERSON, Internal Revenue Service PAUL KOREN, Goldstein Golub Kessler COLLEEN SAYTHER, Financial Executives International MARK WEINBERGER, Ernst & Young LLP WALTER McNAIRY, Dixon Hughes SCOTT BAYLESS, Deloitte BRUCE WEBB, McGladrey & Pullen, LLP ELLIOT SCHWARTZ, Council of Institutional Investors BARBARA ROPER, Consumer Federation of America JEFFREY C. STEINHOFF, U.S. Government Accountability Office BILL GRADISON, Member, PCAOB	$\begin{array}{c} 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13 \\ 14 \\ 15 \\ 16 \\ 17 \\ 18 \\ 19 \\ 20 \\ 21 \\ 22 \end{array}$	Consistent with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, these rules of the SEC prohibit auditors from performing certain non-audit services for their public-company audit clients. And the Commission's new rules also require that all other audit and non-audit services, including tax services, be approved by the company's audit committee. Since the Commission adopted these rules, new concerns relating to auditor independence have come to public attention. These new concerns relate to the tax services and products that audit firms provide to their clients and to senior executives of those clients, including extremely aggressive, if not abusive, tax strategies that may, by their nature, impair the objectivity of the auditor. I believe I can speak for all our Board members when I say that we have not yet determined what, if any, changes in the rules on auditor independence are needed to address these new concerns; rather, we are holding these this roundtable discussion to explore the various types of tax services that accounting firms offer and to examine whether
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	A T T E N D A N C E MARK EVERSON, Internal Revenue Service PAUL KOREN, Goldstein Golub Kessler COLLEEN SAYTHER, Financial Executives International MARK WEINBERGER, Ernst & Young LLP WALTER McNAIRY, Dixon Hughes SCOTT BAYLESS, Deloitte BRUCE WEBB, McGladrey & Pullen, LLP ELLIOT SCHWARTZ, Council of Institutional Investors BARBARA ROPER, Consumer Federation of America JEFFREY C. STEINHOFF, U.S. Government Accountability Office BILL GRADISON, Member, PCAOB	$\begin{array}{c} 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13 \\ 14 \\ 15 \\ 16 \\ 17 \\ 18 \\ 19 \\ 20 \\ 21 \\ 22 \\ 23 \end{array}$	Consistent with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, these rules of the SEC prohibit auditors from performing certain non-audit services for their public-company audit clients. And the Commission's new rules also require that all other audit and non-audit services, including tax services, be approved by the company's audit committee. Since the Commission adopted these rules, new concerns relating to auditor independence have come to public attention. These new concerns relate to the tax services and products that audit firms provide to their clients and to senior executives of those clients, including extremely aggressive, if not abusive, tax strategies that may, by their nature, impair the objectivity of the auditor. I believe I can speak for all our Board members when I say that we have not yet determined what, if any, changes in the rules on auditor independence are needed to address these new concerns; rather, we are holding these this roundtable discussion to explore the various types of tax services that accounting firms offer and to examine whether those services have an impact on the objectivity and
$\begin{array}{c} 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13 \\ 14 \\ 15 \\ 16 \\ 17 \\ 18 \\ 19 \\ 20 \\ 21 \\ 22 \\ 23 \\ 24 \end{array}$	A T T E N D A N C E MARK EVERSON, Internal Revenue Service PAUL KOREN, Goldstein Golub Kessler COLLEEN SAYTHER, Financial Executives International MARK WEINBERGER, Ernst & Young LLP WALTER McNAIRY, Dixon Hughes SCOTT BAYLESS, Deloitte BRUCE WEBB, McGladrey & Pullen, LLP ELLIOT SCHWARTZ, Council of Institutional Investors BARBARA ROPER, Consumer Federation of America JEFFREY C. STEINHOFF, U.S. Government Accountability Office BILL GRADISON, Member, PCAOB	$\begin{array}{c} 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13 \\ 14 \\ 15 \\ 16 \\ 17 \\ 18 \\ 19 \\ 20 \\ 21 \\ 22 \\ 23 \\ 24 \end{array}$	Consistent with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, these rules of the SEC prohibit auditors from performing certain non-audit services for their public-company audit clients. And the Commission's new rules also require that all other audit and non-audit services, including tax services, be approved by the company's audit committee. Since the Commission adopted these rules, new concerns relating to auditor independence have come to public attention. These new concerns relate to the tax services and products that audit firms provide to their clients and to senior executives of those clients, including extremely aggressive, if not abusive, tax strategies that may, by their nature, impair the objectivity of the auditor. I believe I can speak for all our Board members when I say that we have not yet determined what, if any, changes in the rules on auditor independence are needed to address these new concerns; rather, we are holding these this roundtable discussion to explore the various types of tax services that accounting firms offer and to examine whether those services have an impact on the objectivity and the appearance of objectivity of an auditor who
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	A T T E N D A N C E MARK EVERSON, Internal Revenue Service PAUL KOREN, Goldstein Golub Kessler COLLEEN SAYTHER, Financial Executives International MARK WEINBERGER, Ernst & Young LLP WALTER McNAIRY, Dixon Hughes SCOTT BAYLESS, Deloitte BRUCE WEBB, McGladrey & Pullen, LLP ELLIOT SCHWARTZ, Council of Institutional Investors BARBARA ROPER, Consumer Federation of America JEFFREY C. STEINHOFF, U.S. Government Accountability Office BILL GRADISON, Member, PCAOB	$\begin{array}{c} 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13 \\ 14 \\ 15 \\ 16 \\ 17 \\ 18 \\ 19 \\ 20 \\ 21 \\ 22 \\ 23 \end{array}$	Consistent with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, these rules of the SEC prohibit auditors from performing certain non-audit services for their public-company audit clients. And the Commission's new rules also require that all other audit and non-audit services, including tax services, be approved by the company's audit committee. Since the Commission adopted these rules, new concerns relating to auditor independence have come to public attention. These new concerns relate to the tax services and products that audit firms provide to their clients and to senior executives of those clients, including extremely aggressive, if not abusive, tax strategies that may, by their nature, impair the objectivity of the auditor. I believe I can speak for all our Board members when I say that we have not yet determined what, if any, changes in the rules on auditor independence are needed to address these new concerns; rather, we are holding these this roundtable discussion to explore the various types of tax services that accounting firms offer and to examine whether those services have an impact on the objectivity and

2 (Pages 2 to 5)

	Page 6		Page 8
1	For example, we want to know whether tax-	1	services.
2	shelter work and tax-compliance work produce different	2	If you would indulge me and let me put my
3	auditor independence implications. We also want to	3	investor hat back on for a second, I think it's quite
4	understand better how tax and audit functions interact,	4	clear to say that there's probably no other single
5	both in small audit firms and in large audit firms.	5	accounting or auditing issue as important to investors
6	This should be a very engaging and productive	6	than that of auditor independence. And why is that?
7	discussion, and we are delighted that so many	7	Well, it's really very simple. If an auditor's opinion
8	participants from such a variety of backgrounds are	8	is not based on an independent, objective, and
9	here today to contribute.	9	professionally skeptical examination of the financial
10	I want to say a special thanks to my friend	10	statements, then there's no reason for anyone to in
11	Commissioner Everson, and Cono Namorato, of the IRS,	11	the investment community or otherwise, to believe the
12	for participating in our discussion. We are very	12	numbers. Moreover, if you ask investors, most of them
13	fortunate to have the benefit of your special expertise	13	would say that they simply do not believe that a firm
14	here today.	14	can be truly independent, objective, or appropriately
15	I also want to thank our colleagues from the	15	skeptical when they have a large economic incentive, by
16	SEC Chief Accountant Don Nicolaisen, as well as Bob	16	ways of fees for non-audit services, to make the client
17	Burns and Andy Bailey for joining us today. On the	17	happy.
18	issue of auditor independence, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act	18	The next opinion I give, I have to publicly
19	makes us partners in our efforts to restore confidence	19	acknowledge that it's based on a somewhat biased
20	and to protect the interests of investors. I believe	20	perspective, but I cannot pass up the opportunity to
21 22	it's very important that the SEC and the PCAOB work	21 22	acknowledge the efforts of my former colleagues in this area. It's often very easy for individuals at
$\frac{22}{23}$	together on this issue, and your presence here today helps us join cause in that effort.	22	organizations to talk a good game about corporate
23	I'll be turning the discussion over to Doug	24	governance. It's the "cool" thing these days to be a
25	Carmichael, who will chair today's meeting, who will	25	corporate governance expert. But, at some point, in my
	Page 7		Page 9
1	guide us through our program. But, before I do that,	1	opinion, they either have to put up or shut up. And,
2	guide us through our program. But, before I do that, I'd like to ask my fellow Board member and dear friend	2	opinion, they either have to put up or shut up. And, too many times, internal or external pressures keep
2 3	guide us through our program. But, before I do that, I'd like to ask my fellow Board member and dear friend Kayla Gillan to offer a few opening remarks.	2 3	opinion, they either have to put up or shut up. And, too many times, internal or external pressures keep these people from following through on their
2 3 4	guide us through our program. But, before I do that, I'd like to ask my fellow Board member and dear friend Kayla Gillan to offer a few opening remarks. Kayla.	2 3 4	opinion, they either have to put up or shut up. And, too many times, internal or external pressures keep these people from following through on their principles. Well, despite much controversy and
2 3 4 5	guide us through our program. But, before I do that, I'd like to ask my fellow Board member and dear friend Kayla Gillan to offer a few opening remarks. Kayla. MS. GILLAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, my	2 3 4 5	opinion, they either have to put up or shut up. And, too many times, internal or external pressures keep these people from following through on their principles. Well, despite much controversy and criticism, CALPERS has put up, casting thousands of
2 3 4 5 6	guide us through our program. But, before I do that, I'd like to ask my fellow Board member and dear friend Kayla Gillan to offer a few opening remarks. Kayla. MS. GILLAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, my fellow Board members and all of our wonderful guests	2 3 4 5 6	opinion, they either have to put up or shut up. And, too many times, internal or external pressures keep these people from following through on their principles. Well, despite much controversy and criticism, CALPERS has put up, casting thousands of proxy votes in opposition to directors who think it's
2 3 4 5 6 7	guide us through our program. But, before I do that, I'd like to ask my fellow Board member and dear friend Kayla Gillan to offer a few opening remarks. Kayla. MS. GILLAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, my fellow Board members and all of our wonderful guests here today.	2 3 4 5 6 7	opinion, they either have to put up or shut up. And, too many times, internal or external pressures keep these people from following through on their principles. Well, despite much controversy and criticism, CALPERS has put up, casting thousands of proxy votes in opposition to directors who think it's okay to allow an auditor to also be a consultant.
2 3 4 5 6	guide us through our program. But, before I do that, I'd like to ask my fellow Board member and dear friend Kayla Gillan to offer a few opening remarks. Kayla. MS. GILLAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, my fellow Board members and all of our wonderful guests here today. First of all, I really would like thank all	2 3 4 5 6	opinion, they either have to put up or shut up. And, too many times, internal or external pressures keep these people from following through on their principles. Well, despite much controversy and criticism, CALPERS has put up, casting thousands of proxy votes in opposition to directors who think it's okay to allow an auditor to also be a consultant. Now, I'm not here to pass judgement on
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	guide us through our program. But, before I do that, I'd like to ask my fellow Board member and dear friend Kayla Gillan to offer a few opening remarks. Kayla. MS. GILLAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, my fellow Board members and all of our wonderful guests here today. First of all, I really would like thank all of you for taking the time to be with us today to	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	opinion, they either have to put up or shut up. And, too many times, internal or external pressures keep these people from following through on their principles. Well, despite much controversy and criticism, CALPERS has put up, casting thousands of proxy votes in opposition to directors who think it's okay to allow an auditor to also be a consultant. Now, I'm not here to pass judgement on whether every negative vote was one that I would have
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	guide us through our program. But, before I do that, I'd like to ask my fellow Board member and dear friend Kayla Gillan to offer a few opening remarks. Kayla. MS. GILLAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, my fellow Board members and all of our wonderful guests here today. First of all, I really would like thank all of you for taking the time to be with us today to discuss this important topic. We know how valuable	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	opinion, they either have to put up or shut up. And, too many times, internal or external pressures keep these people from following through on their principles. Well, despite much controversy and criticism, CALPERS has put up, casting thousands of proxy votes in opposition to directors who think it's okay to allow an auditor to also be a consultant. Now, I'm not here to pass judgement on whether every negative vote was one that I would have made if the decision had been mine alone to make, but I
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	guide us through our program. But, before I do that, I'd like to ask my fellow Board member and dear friend Kayla Gillan to offer a few opening remarks. Kayla. MS. GILLAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, my fellow Board members and all of our wonderful guests here today. First of all, I really would like thank all of you for taking the time to be with us today to discuss this important topic. We know how valuable your time is, and we really greatly appreciate your	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	opinion, they either have to put up or shut up. And, too many times, internal or external pressures keep these people from following through on their principles. Well, despite much controversy and criticism, CALPERS has put up, casting thousands of proxy votes in opposition to directors who think it's okay to allow an auditor to also be a consultant. Now, I'm not here to pass judgement on whether every negative vote was one that I would have
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	guide us through our program. But, before I do that, I'd like to ask my fellow Board member and dear friend Kayla Gillan to offer a few opening remarks. Kayla. MS. GILLAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, my fellow Board members and all of our wonderful guests here today. First of all, I really would like thank all of you for taking the time to be with us today to discuss this important topic. We know how valuable	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	opinion, they either have to put up or shut up. And, too many times, internal or external pressures keep these people from following through on their principles. Well, despite much controversy and criticism, CALPERS has put up, casting thousands of proxy votes in opposition to directors who think it's okay to allow an auditor to also be a consultant. Now, I'm not here to pass judgement on whether every negative vote was one that I would have made if the decision had been mine alone to make, but I do strongly believe that these actions are making a
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	guide us through our program. But, before I do that, I'd like to ask my fellow Board member and dear friend Kayla Gillan to offer a few opening remarks. Kayla. MS. GILLAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, my fellow Board members and all of our wonderful guests here today. First of all, I really would like thank all of you for taking the time to be with us today to discuss this important topic. We know how valuable your time is, and we really greatly appreciate your willingness to give us a bit of your time and a bit of your wisdom. The issue of auditor independence is one that	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	opinion, they either have to put up or shut up. And, too many times, internal or external pressures keep these people from following through on their principles. Well, despite much controversy and criticism, CALPERS has put up, casting thousands of proxy votes in opposition to directors who think it's okay to allow an auditor to also be a consultant. Now, I'm not here to pass judgement on whether every negative vote was one that I would have made if the decision had been mine alone to make, but I do strongly believe that these actions are making a difference in the market. And one need only look at last week's Wall Street Journal to see how actions by investors can
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	guide us through our program. But, before I do that, I'd like to ask my fellow Board member and dear friend Kayla Gillan to offer a few opening remarks. Kayla. MS. GILLAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, my fellow Board members and all of our wonderful guests here today. First of all, I really would like thank all of you for taking the time to be with us today to discuss this important topic. We know how valuable your time is, and we really greatly appreciate your willingness to give us a bit of your time and a bit of your wisdom. The issue of auditor independence is one that has been near and dear to the hearts of many people in	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	opinion, they either have to put up or shut up. And, too many times, internal or external pressures keep these people from following through on their principles. Well, despite much controversy and criticism, CALPERS has put up, casting thousands of proxy votes in opposition to directors who think it's okay to allow an auditor to also be a consultant. Now, I'm not here to pass judgement on whether every negative vote was one that I would have made if the decision had been mine alone to make, but I do strongly believe that these actions are making a difference in the market. And one need only look at last week's Wall Street Journal to see how actions by investors can change corporate behavior. According to the Investor
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	guide us through our program. But, before I do that, I'd like to ask my fellow Board member and dear friend Kayla Gillan to offer a few opening remarks. Kayla. MS. GILLAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, my fellow Board members and all of our wonderful guests here today. First of all, I really would like thank all of you for taking the time to be with us today to discuss this important topic. We know how valuable your time is, and we really greatly appreciate your willingness to give us a bit of your time and a bit of your wisdom. The issue of auditor independence is one that has been near and dear to the hearts of many people in this room. In my previous life, I was general counsel	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	opinion, they either have to put up or shut up. And, too many times, internal or external pressures keep these people from following through on their principles. Well, despite much controversy and criticism, CALPERS has put up, casting thousands of proxy votes in opposition to directors who think it's okay to allow an auditor to also be a consultant. Now, I'm not here to pass judgement on whether every negative vote was one that I would have made if the decision had been mine alone to make, but I do strongly believe that these actions are making a difference in the market. And one need only look at last week's Wall Street Journal to see how actions by investors can change corporate behavior. According to the Investor Responsibility Research Center, the IRRC, we've seen a
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	guide us through our program. But, before I do that, I'd like to ask my fellow Board member and dear friend Kayla Gillan to offer a few opening remarks. Kayla. MS. GILLAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, my fellow Board members and all of our wonderful guests here today. First of all, I really would like thank all of you for taking the time to be with us today to discuss this important topic. We know how valuable your time is, and we really greatly appreciate your willingness to give us a bit of your time and a bit of your wisdom. The issue of auditor independence is one that has been near and dear to the hearts of many people in this room. In my previous life, I was general counsel of CALPERS, and, in that role, strongly advocated	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	opinion, they either have to put up or shut up. And, too many times, internal or external pressures keep these people from following through on their principles. Well, despite much controversy and criticism, CALPERS has put up, casting thousands of proxy votes in opposition to directors who think it's okay to allow an auditor to also be a consultant. Now, I'm not here to pass judgement on whether every negative vote was one that I would have made if the decision had been mine alone to make, but I do strongly believe that these actions are making a difference in the market. And one need only look at last week's Wall Street Journal to see how actions by investors can change corporate behavior. According to the Investor Responsibility Research Center, the IRRC, we've seen a sharp decline in fees that companies are paying their
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	guide us through our program. But, before I do that, I'd like to ask my fellow Board member and dear friend Kayla Gillan to offer a few opening remarks. Kayla. MS. GILLAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, my fellow Board members and all of our wonderful guests here today. First of all, I really would like thank all of you for taking the time to be with us today to discuss this important topic. We know how valuable your time is, and we really greatly appreciate your willingness to give us a bit of your time and a bit of your wisdom. The issue of auditor independence is one that has been near and dear to the hearts of many people in this room. In my previous life, I was general counsel of CALPERS, and, in that role, strongly advocated strengthening of auditor independence. In fact, during	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	opinion, they either have to put up or shut up. And, too many times, internal or external pressures keep these people from following through on their principles. Well, despite much controversy and criticism, CALPERS has put up, casting thousands of proxy votes in opposition to directors who think it's okay to allow an auditor to also be a consultant. Now, I'm not here to pass judgement on whether every negative vote was one that I would have made if the decision had been mine alone to make, but I do strongly believe that these actions are making a difference in the market. And one need only look at last week's Wall Street Journal to see how actions by investors can change corporate behavior. According to the Investor Responsibility Research Center, the IRRC, we've seen a sharp decline in fees that companies are paying their auditors for non-audit services. In 2001, for example,
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	guide us through our program. But, before I do that, I'd like to ask my fellow Board member and dear friend Kayla Gillan to offer a few opening remarks. Kayla. MS. GILLAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, my fellow Board members and all of our wonderful guests here today. First of all, I really would like thank all of you for taking the time to be with us today to discuss this important topic. We know how valuable your time is, and we really greatly appreciate your willingness to give us a bit of your time and a bit of your wisdom. The issue of auditor independence is one that has been near and dear to the hearts of many people in this room. In my previous life, I was general counsel of CALPERS, and, in that role, strongly advocated strengthening of auditor independence. In fact, during the legislative process that led to the enactment,	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	opinion, they either have to put up or shut up. And, too many times, internal or external pressures keep these people from following through on their principles. Well, despite much controversy and criticism, CALPERS has put up, casting thousands of proxy votes in opposition to directors who think it's okay to allow an auditor to also be a consultant. Now, I'm not here to pass judgement on whether every negative vote was one that I would have made if the decision had been mine alone to make, but I do strongly believe that these actions are making a difference in the market. And one need only look at last week's Wall Street Journal to see how actions by investors can change corporate behavior. According to the Investor Responsibility Research Center, the IRRC, we've seen a sharp decline in fees that companies are paying their auditors for non-audit services. In 2001, for example, it was reported that 72 percent of the fees audit firms
$\begin{array}{c} 2\\ 3\\ 4\\ 5\\ 6\\ 7\\ 8\\ 9\\ 10\\ 11\\ 12\\ 13\\ 14\\ 15\\ 16\\ 17\\ 18\\ 19\\ 20\\ \end{array}$	guide us through our program. But, before I do that, I'd like to ask my fellow Board member and dear friend Kayla Gillan to offer a few opening remarks. Kayla. MS. GILLAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, my fellow Board members and all of our wonderful guests here today. First of all, I really would like thank all of you for taking the time to be with us today to discuss this important topic. We know how valuable your time is, and we really greatly appreciate your willingness to give us a bit of your time and a bit of your wisdom. The issue of auditor independence is one that has been near and dear to the hearts of many people in this room. In my previous life, I was general counsel of CALPERS, and, in that role, strongly advocated strengthening of auditor independence. In fact, during the legislative process that led to the enactment, Sarbanes-Oxley, investor advocates focused on the need	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	opinion, they either have to put up or shut up. And, too many times, internal or external pressures keep these people from following through on their principles. Well, despite much controversy and criticism, CALPERS has put up, casting thousands of proxy votes in opposition to directors who think it's okay to allow an auditor to also be a consultant. Now, I'm not here to pass judgement on whether every negative vote was one that I would have made if the decision had been mine alone to make, but I do strongly believe that these actions are making a difference in the market. And one need only look at last week's Wall Street Journal to see how actions by investors can change corporate behavior. According to the Investor Responsibility Research Center, the IRRC, we've seen a sharp decline in fees that companies are paying their auditors for non-audit services. In 2001, for example, it was reported that 72 percent of the fees audit firms recovered from their audit clients were for non-audit
$\begin{array}{c} 2\\ 3\\ 4\\ 5\\ 6\\ 7\\ 8\\ 9\\ 10\\ 11\\ 12\\ 13\\ 14\\ 15\\ 16\\ 17\\ 18\\ 19\\ 20\\ 21\\ \end{array}$	guide us through our program. But, before I do that, I'd like to ask my fellow Board member and dear friend Kayla Gillan to offer a few opening remarks. Kayla. MS. GILLAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, my fellow Board members and all of our wonderful guests here today. First of all, I really would like thank all of you for taking the time to be with us today to discuss this important topic. We know how valuable your time is, and we really greatly appreciate your willingness to give us a bit of your time and a bit of your wisdom. The issue of auditor independence is one that has been near and dear to the hearts of many people in this room. In my previous life, I was general counsel of CALPERS, and, in that role, strongly advocated strengthening of auditor independence. In fact, during the legislative process that led to the enactment, Sarbanes-Oxley, investor advocates focused on the need for the auditor to be as independent as possible from	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	opinion, they either have to put up or shut up. And, too many times, internal or external pressures keep these people from following through on their principles. Well, despite much controversy and criticism, CALPERS has put up, casting thousands of proxy votes in opposition to directors who think it's okay to allow an auditor to also be a consultant. Now, I'm not here to pass judgement on whether every negative vote was one that I would have made if the decision had been mine alone to make, but I do strongly believe that these actions are making a difference in the market. And one need only look at last week's Wall Street Journal to see how actions by investors can change corporate behavior. According to the Investor Responsibility Research Center, the IRRC, we've seen a sharp decline in fees that companies are paying their auditors for non-audit services. In 2001, for example, it was reported that 72 percent of the fees audit firms recovered from their audit clients were for non-audit services. In 2002, the IRRC reported that this dropped
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	guide us through our program. But, before I do that, I'd like to ask my fellow Board member and dear friend Kayla Gillan to offer a few opening remarks. Kayla. MS. GILLAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, my fellow Board members and all of our wonderful guests here today. First of all, I really would like thank all of you for taking the time to be with us today to discuss this important topic. We know how valuable your time is, and we really greatly appreciate your willingness to give us a bit of your time and a bit of your wisdom. The issue of auditor independence is one that has been near and dear to the hearts of many people in this room. In my previous life, I was general counsel of CALPERS, and, in that role, strongly advocated strengthening of auditor independence. In fact, during the legislative process that led to the enactment, Sarbanes-Oxley, investor advocates focused on the need for the auditor to be as independent as possible from his or her audit client. And there's no doubt, in my	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	opinion, they either have to put up or shut up. And, too many times, internal or external pressures keep these people from following through on their principles. Well, despite much controversy and criticism, CALPERS has put up, casting thousands of proxy votes in opposition to directors who think it's okay to allow an auditor to also be a consultant. Now, I'm not here to pass judgement on whether every negative vote was one that I would have made if the decision had been mine alone to make, but I do strongly believe that these actions are making a difference in the market. And one need only look at last week's Wall Street Journal to see how actions by investors can change corporate behavior. According to the Investor Responsibility Research Center, the IRRC, we've seen a sharp decline in fees that companies are paying their auditors for non-audit services. In 2001, for example, it was reported that 72 percent of the fees audit firms recovered from their audit clients were for non-audit services. In 2002, the IRRC reported that this dropped to 55 percent. And last year it dropped to 42 percent.
$\begin{array}{c} 2\\ 3\\ 4\\ 5\\ 6\\ 7\\ 8\\ 9\\ 10\\ 11\\ 12\\ 13\\ 14\\ 15\\ 16\\ 17\\ 18\\ 19\\ 20\\ 21\\ 22\\ 23\\ \end{array}$	guide us through our program. But, before I do that, I'd like to ask my fellow Board member and dear friend Kayla Gillan to offer a few opening remarks. Kayla. MS. GILLAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, my fellow Board members and all of our wonderful guests here today. First of all, I really would like thank all of you for taking the time to be with us today to discuss this important topic. We know how valuable your time is, and we really greatly appreciate your willingness to give us a bit of your time and a bit of your wisdom. The issue of auditor independence is one that has been near and dear to the hearts of many people in this room. In my previous life, I was general counsel of CALPERS, and, in that role, strongly advocated strengthening of auditor independence. In fact, during the legislative process that led to the enactment, Sarbanes-Oxley, investor advocates focused on the need for the auditor to be as independent as possible from his or her audit client. And there's no doubt, in my mind at least, that this support from the investor	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	opinion, they either have to put up or shut up. And, too many times, internal or external pressures keep these people from following through on their principles. Well, despite much controversy and criticism, CALPERS has put up, casting thousands of proxy votes in opposition to directors who think it's okay to allow an auditor to also be a consultant. Now, I'm not here to pass judgement on whether every negative vote was one that I would have made if the decision had been mine alone to make, but I do strongly believe that these actions are making a difference in the market. And one need only look at last week's Wall Street Journal to see how actions by investors can change corporate behavior. According to the Investor Responsibility Research Center, the IRRC, we've seen a sharp decline in fees that companies are paying their auditors for non-audit services. In 2001, for example, it was reported that 72 percent of the fees audit firms recovered from their audit clients were for non-audit services. In 2002, the IRRC reported that this dropped to 55 percent. And last year it dropped to 42 percent. It seems very clear to me that the reason for
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	guide us through our program. But, before I do that, I'd like to ask my fellow Board member and dear friend Kayla Gillan to offer a few opening remarks. Kayla. MS. GILLAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, my fellow Board members and all of our wonderful guests here today. First of all, I really would like thank all of you for taking the time to be with us today to discuss this important topic. We know how valuable your time is, and we really greatly appreciate your willingness to give us a bit of your time and a bit of your wisdom. The issue of auditor independence is one that has been near and dear to the hearts of many people in this room. In my previous life, I was general counsel of CALPERS, and, in that role, strongly advocated strengthening of auditor independence. In fact, during the legislative process that led to the enactment, Sarbanes-Oxley, investor advocates focused on the need for the auditor to be as independent as possible from his or her audit client. And there's no doubt, in my	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	opinion, they either have to put up or shut up. And, too many times, internal or external pressures keep these people from following through on their principles. Well, despite much controversy and criticism, CALPERS has put up, casting thousands of proxy votes in opposition to directors who think it's okay to allow an auditor to also be a consultant. Now, I'm not here to pass judgement on whether every negative vote was one that I would have made if the decision had been mine alone to make, but I do strongly believe that these actions are making a difference in the market. And one need only look at last week's Wall Street Journal to see how actions by investors can change corporate behavior. According to the Investor Responsibility Research Center, the IRRC, we've seen a sharp decline in fees that companies are paying their auditors for non-audit services. In 2001, for example, it was reported that 72 percent of the fees audit firms recovered from their audit clients were for non-audit services. In 2002, the IRRC reported that this dropped to 55 percent. And last year it dropped to 42 percent.

	Page 10		Page 12
$\begin{array}{c}1\\2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\\23\\24\\25\end{array}$	owners of their companies simply see too great a risk that the auditor may provide a wink and a nod on financial statements in exchange for additional consulting work. Investors have spoken, and the market has heard them, and now it's time for this Board to do our job. And that's what today is all about, to hear your views as to whether, if anything, additional work is necessary. And, again, I thank you all for your time and your commitment and your candor today. MR. McDONOUGH: You will not be surprised to hear that each of our Board members has very strong views on a variety of topics. And the wonderful thing is that on every major policy issue, we have voted 5-0 in favor. The debates can be rather intense (Laughter.) MR. McDONOUGH: before we've reached that point. We have the great good fortune to have with us, as I mentioned, Don Nicolaisen. The Office of Chief Accountant is the major point of contact between the SEC and the PCAOB, and we're very fortunate to have such a sensible, reasonable gentleman as the Chief Accountant. Don.	$\begin{array}{c}1\\2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\\23\\24\\25\end{array}$	issues. As the PCAOB engages additional staff with expertise in these areas, I expect that a great number of the independence interpretive issues that currently are handled by my office appropriately will migrate to the PCAOB. The roundtable today is a welcome introduction to the PCAOB's involvement in auditor independence. By choosing to begin with the area of tax services, PCAOB is showing its willingness to address, in a public forum, controversial issues that are of interest to investors, and the PCAOB should be commended for doing so. Tax services have been a fundamental part of the accounting firms since the inception of the profession. In recent years, however, the nature and extent of these services changed. Firms began formulating highly engineered tax products that were not designed for a particular client, but, instead, were marketed to numerous potential buyers, with the firm taking a percentage of each buyer's profits from the product. Over time, the IRS and others have found several of these products to be overly aggressive, or outright abusive, tax shelters. Personally, I believe that no accounting firm should be in the business of selling these kinds of tax products to their audit
	Page 11		Page 13
$ \begin{array}{c} 1\\2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\end{array} $	MR. NICOLAISEN: Thank you, Chairman McDonough, members of the Board, panelists. I'm delighted to be with you this morning. I think everyone knows that auditor independence is an important component to restoring investor confidence, and I sincerely do appreciate the invitation to participate in today's public roundtable on the auditor independence implications of an accounting firm providing tax services for an SEC audit client. As you know, the Commission historically has adopted its own rules and interpretations regarding auditor independence issues. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 emphasized the importance of auditor independence, codified many of the positions expressed by the Commission in 2000, and gave the PCAOB, subject to SEC oversight, the authority to make auditor independence part of its standard-setting inspection and disciplinary programs. While the Commission's staff my staff, in particular will continue to provide companies and endit or independence	$ \begin{array}{c} 1\\2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\end{array} $	clients. I look forward to the discussion today. I have to tell you, I'm particularly interested in understanding the views of the participants on the issues of an accounting firm providing tax services to executives of audit clients in a firm marketing aggressive tax shelters to its audit clients. As always, these remarks and any others from the SEC staff today, are our own individual comments, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or our colleagues on the staff. Thank you, once again, for allowing us to participate. MR. McDONOUGH: Thank you, Don. We are also very grateful that the GAO, an important ally of ours in good causes, is here, Jeff Steinhoff, representing them. Jeff, welcome. Thank you for being here. And now I will turn the floor over to our very distinguished chief auditor, Doug Carmichael. Doug will manage the meeting for the rest of the day.
22 23 24 25	audit committees with guidance on auditor independence issues, I look forward to the PCAOB expanding its role in becoming the primary standard-setter and the primary source of advice and guidance to auditors on these	22 23 24 25	Doug, to you. MR. CARMICHAEL: Thank you, Chairman McDonough. We do want to get the views of everyone at

	Page 14		Page 16
$ \begin{array}{c} 1\\2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\\23\end{array} $	the table on the important topics we're going to discuss. Talking with some of you beforehand, I know there's no shortage of views on this topic. In order to have an orderly discussion, though, we are going to follow our normal roundtable- discussion procedures. We prepared a briefing paper, in anticipation of the roundtable, that includes the subjects and questions we're going to cover. Greg Scates, the associate chief auditor, and Bella Rivshin, assistant chief auditor, will briefly introduce each of these topics and related questions, and then we'll invite you to make a comment or and any other remarks you want. We're also going to project each question on two screens in the room to that everybody will see what they are. If you'd like to speak, we'd ask you that you please indicate that by standing your name card on end so that we can call on you. There are a lot of people around the table, and we'll need to do that to proceed in an orderly fashion. When you do speak, please identify yourself. It's going to be important for the other people that	$ \begin{array}{c} 1\\2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\\23\end{array} $	The Board's primary mission is to oversee auditors of public companies, protect the interest of investors. And as Don Nicolaisen mentioned in his remarks, auditor independence is a most important component of restoring investor confidence. We certainly share this view on the importance of auditor independence. Traditionally, the SEC has promulgated rules describing independence requirements concerning accountants who perform financial-statement audits in public companies or issuers. The current SEC rules on auditor independence are based on four overarching principles, which state that an auditor's independence may be impaired if the relationship, one, creates a mutual or conflicting interest between the accountant and the audit client; two, places the accountant in the position of auditing his or her own work; three, results in the accountant acting as management or an employee of the audit clients; or, four, places the accountant in a position of being an advocate for the audit client. The SEC reiterated the importance of those guiding principles in its February 2003 rulemaking release.
23 24	are in the room, not at the table, to understand who is speaking, and for those who are listening online to	23 24	So throughout the discussion, we would ask that you consider the following points in each specific
25	understand that. So while it might seem a little Page 15	25	tax-service area that's discussed. Are these Page 17
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	redundant to do that since your name tag's right in front of you, please do identify yourself when you speak. Try to cover the topics as efficiently as you can. We do have a lot of people, and we do want to hear from all of them. We're going to divide our discussion today into three sessions. After we get started, momentarily, we're going to continue until noon. We're going to take a one-hour break for lunch, and then we're going to resume the discussion at 1:00. We will have an afternoon break. We anticipate that around 2:45, for five minutes. And we will conclude on time, at 4:30. During the last 10 to 15 minutes of the program, we're going to provide people that are in the audience an opportunity to ask any roundtable participants that they want questions, and we're going to ask that, to indicate their desire to do that, they	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	overarching principles useful in considering the appropriateness of tax services performed by the auditor for its audit client? Are there other overarching principles that should be applied to tax services? Before we move ahead and discuss specific tax services, would anyone like to comment on the overarching principles and their applicability? (No response.) MR. CARMICHAEL: Okay, let's move, then, into the discussion. Okay. Sorry, Barbara. Barbara Roper. MS. ROPER: Barbara Roper, with Consumer Federation of America. I'll jump in here, and I may talk at some length, because I probably am not going to have that much to say once you get into the details of specific services, where I have less expertise. The argument that tax services are somehow
19 20 21 22 23 24 25	fill out an index card. Those will be provided. And you can return the index cards, with your name, e-mail address, and question, at any time during the day. One last item for those of you who have cell phones and Blackberries, which I think is most people. Please make sure that they're silenced. Now they want to get started.	19 20 21 22 23 24 25	operate outside these basic principles, I think, is based on a completely flawed and faulty premise. The first argument that puts forward is that Congress specifically singled out tax services as permissible. This is a misreading of the legislative history. Congress specifically singled out tax services as being in need of review by the audit

	w asinington, DC		
Page 18	Page 20		
 committee. There was a recognition on Congress's part, based on the hearings that they'd held leading up to the legislation, that tax services were complicated, that some of them were fairly straightforward and didn't appear to create independence problems, and that some of them created potentially serious independence problems. And Congress used some restraint in not trying to draw that line itself, recognizing that that was probably not appropriate to try to do through legislation, but they singled out tax services as requiring careful review by audit committees for this very purpose, that audit committees would apply the standards of the basic principles of auditor independence to these services. That was the context in which this provision was added to the legislation. It was based on the letter that Chairman Levitt had written to audit committees asking them to you know, urging them to review non-audit services in light of these principles and other factors. It was based on testimony that indicated that that was a service that the audit committee preapproval process could, and should, serve. The second argument that gets put forward is that there is a long history of auditors providing 	 that that was my and so I have it's somewhat of a question. I guess that was my premise in arriving and that since no one seemed to object to these the next question, my understanding was (inaudible) principles. And so in some sense, given the previous remarks, I would like some confirmation that that is the case. I certainly believe that these principles apply to tax services, and that we should use those principles in analyzing the issues that are coming forward. And if that isn't an agreed premise in this roundtable, I think (inaudible). So I actually (inaudible) question (inaudible). MR. CARMICHAEL: Yeah, I think that we can confirm that we'd like to apply the basic principles. Past practice indicates that there may be differences in views on how that should be applied. So I think one of the things that we're going to ask is that, in considering these overarching principles, we'd like your views on whether their application to certain tax services indicates that there is an impairment of the auditor's independence, and your reasoning in that process, as we take up each of the individual tax services. 		
Page 19	Page 21		
 is that, as has already been mentioned, the nature of the services now being provided under the name tax services has significantly changed. The other is that the audit just simply doesn't have value if it's not independent. And it doesn't matter if these services have been provided a long time, if they compromise independence, they need to be banned. The third argument that gets put forward is that these services are subject to particular unique laws and regulations, and that they're subject to the potential for a government audit, and that that should give us extra assurance. It does no such thing. Those laws are designed to protect the tax process, not the audit. And it may provide some assurance that conducting the audit doesn't interfere with providing the tax services, but they provide no comparable assurance that providing tax services does not interfere with the audit. And so the basis for saying that these services are, sort of, specifically outside those principles, I think, is completely flawed, and just needs to be completely reevaluated. MR. CARMICHAEL: Patricia Walters. MS. WALTERS: I would definitely agree with 	Prage 211MR. WEBB: Bruce Webb, Director of Auditing2and Independence for McGladrey & Pullen.3I agree that the overarching principles would4apply to all services provided by the auditor.5However, I think we need to bear a few additional6things in mind as we think our way through that, how7they apply. And I'm not begging for a different8application. I'm simply stating that CPAs are experts9in accounting, auditing, and taxes.10That the tax services are subject to the11general requirements of ethics interpretation 101-3,12which was adopted by the Board as part of the interim13independence standards, and under those requirements,14all non-audit services, including tax services, would15impair independence unless they are overseen by16management, and they would impair independence if the17auditor were to perform any management functions or18make any management decisions.19It is my belief that issuer-specific20transaction-based tax compliance and tax advisory21services will generally fall within the overarching22principles.23MR. CARMICHAEL: Okay, thank you.24I do want to remind people to directly speak25into the microphone; otherwise, the your voice won't		

6 (Pages 18 to 21)

	Page 22		Page 24
1		1	
1 2	be heard on the online Webcast or to some people in the room, for that matter.	1 2	effectiveness of that process. MR. CARMICHAEL: Lynn Turner.
$\frac{2}{3}$	Michael Gagnon.	$\frac{2}{3}$	MR. TURNER: Thanks, Douglas.
4	MR. GAGNON: Thank you. My name is Mike	4	I actually like the four principles. Having
5	Gagnon. I'm from PricewaterhouseCoopers. My	5	been one of the people involved in actually writing
6	background and responsibility in the firm is risk	6	them, I thought they were actually really good.
7	management compliance, which includes independence	7	(Laughter.)
8	Is that better? Sorry. I feel like I'm	8	MR. TURNER: But they actually really don't
9	about to lean over the table here.	9	come from the SEC rules. If you go back to the AICPA's
10	I think it's a very interesting and, I think,	10	Code of Professional Conduct, that's where they all
11	a very important discussion to have about how to apply	11	came from. They actually come out of the profession.
12	the principles to tax services broadly. Whether it's	12	And I think, to that extent, the AICPA and profession
13	compliance services, planning services, advisory-type	13	had done an excellent job of establishing what those
14	tax services, I think it's very important to start with	14	principles should be.
15	the framework of the principles.	15	So I think the principles are good. There
16	I think that it is also important, as I think	16	was no question that when we initially adopted the
17	the certainly the Commission espoused in its rules	17	four principles, that they were to apply to work that
18	in 2002/2003 that the context and facts and	18	the auditor did in the tax area. I think that Mr.
19	circumstances associated with the provision of tax	19	Carmichael raised the appropriate question. The
20	services be considered and evaluated. It is very	20	question is, then, How do you implement them in the tax
21 22	important and, I think, different today than we	21 22	area and make the proper determination?
22	have experienced up to at least recent history, to recognize the responsibility of audit committees as	22	To that extent, in the last year or so, the SEC staff has done, I think, a very good job of
23	they consider and evaluate and, in fact, pre-approve	23	outlining the type of information that should be going
25	the services that auditors provide. I think it's	25	to the audit committees for their consideration, the
	Page 23		Page 25
1	Page 23 important that audit committees are provided with	1	Page 25 things that Mr. Gagnon just mentioned. I think they do
2	important that audit committees are provided with information, full disclosure for the context, the facts	1 2	things that Mr. Gagnon just mentioned. I think they do play an important role with respect to that. I'm not
2 3	important that audit committees are provided with information, full disclosure for the context, the facts and circumstances associated with the provision of		things that Mr. Gagnon just mentioned. I think they do play an important role with respect to that. I'm not sure the audit committees today are getting that level
2 3 4	important that audit committees are provided with information, full disclosure for the context, the facts and circumstances associated with the provision of these services, as well as the framework of the	2 3 4	things that Mr. Gagnon just mentioned. I think they do play an important role with respect to that. I'm not sure the audit committees today are getting that level of detail information in what's coming up to them, and
2 3 4 5	important that audit committees are provided with information, full disclosure for the context, the facts and circumstances associated with the provision of these services, as well as the framework of the principles so they can properly evaluate it. I think	2 3 4 5	things that Mr. Gagnon just mentioned. I think they do play an important role with respect to that. I'm not sure the audit committees today are getting that level of detail information in what's coming up to them, and I hope that that becomes part of the PCAOB inspection
2 3 4 5 6	important that audit committees are provided with information, full disclosure for the context, the facts and circumstances associated with the provision of these services, as well as the framework of the principles so they can properly evaluate it. I think all of that is critically important.	2 3 4 5 6	things that Mr. Gagnon just mentioned. I think they do play an important role with respect to that. I'm not sure the audit committees today are getting that level of detail information in what's coming up to them, and I hope that that becomes part of the PCAOB inspection process, to see if, in fact, the auditors are providing
2 3 4 5 6 7	important that audit committees are provided with information, full disclosure for the context, the facts and circumstances associated with the provision of these services, as well as the framework of the principles so they can properly evaluate it. I think all of that is critically important. But I do think, certainly in a direct	2 3 4 5 6 7	things that Mr. Gagnon just mentioned. I think they do play an important role with respect to that. I'm not sure the audit committees today are getting that level of detail information in what's coming up to them, and I hope that that becomes part of the PCAOB inspection process, to see if, in fact, the auditors are providing that level of detail up to the audit committee so that
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	important that audit committees are provided with information, full disclosure for the context, the facts and circumstances associated with the provision of these services, as well as the framework of the principles so they can properly evaluate it. I think all of that is critically important. But I do think, certainly in a direct response to some of the commentary, there is an	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	things that Mr. Gagnon just mentioned. I think they do play an important role with respect to that. I'm not sure the audit committees today are getting that level of detail information in what's coming up to them, and I hope that that becomes part of the PCAOB inspection process, to see if, in fact, the auditors are providing that level of detail up to the audit committee so that they can exercise the type of oversight and involvement
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	important that audit committees are provided with information, full disclosure for the context, the facts and circumstances associated with the provision of these services, as well as the framework of the principles so they can properly evaluate it. I think all of that is critically important. But I do think, certainly in a direct response to some of the commentary, there is an important relationship between the provision of tax	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	things that Mr. Gagnon just mentioned. I think they do play an important role with respect to that. I'm not sure the audit committees today are getting that level of detail information in what's coming up to them, and I hope that that becomes part of the PCAOB inspection process, to see if, in fact, the auditors are providing that level of detail up to the audit committee so that they can exercise the type of oversight and involvement in the process and judgement, that Mike just
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	important that audit committees are provided with information, full disclosure for the context, the facts and circumstances associated with the provision of these services, as well as the framework of the principles so they can properly evaluate it. I think all of that is critically important. But I do think, certainly in a direct response to some of the commentary, there is an important relationship between the provision of tax services and the auditor's responsibility, which I	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	things that Mr. Gagnon just mentioned. I think they do play an important role with respect to that. I'm not sure the audit committees today are getting that level of detail information in what's coming up to them, and I hope that that becomes part of the PCAOB inspection process, to see if, in fact, the auditors are providing that level of detail up to the audit committee so that they can exercise the type of oversight and involvement in the process and judgement, that Mike just mentioned, which I think was appropriate because I
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	important that audit committees are provided with information, full disclosure for the context, the facts and circumstances associated with the provision of these services, as well as the framework of the principles so they can properly evaluate it. I think all of that is critically important. But I do think, certainly in a direct response to some of the commentary, there is an important relationship between the provision of tax services and the auditor's responsibility, which I think, in the context of the basic principles, needs to	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	things that Mr. Gagnon just mentioned. I think they do play an important role with respect to that. I'm not sure the audit committees today are getting that level of detail information in what's coming up to them, and I hope that that becomes part of the PCAOB inspection process, to see if, in fact, the auditors are providing that level of detail up to the audit committee so that they can exercise the type of oversight and involvement in the process and judgement, that Mike just mentioned, which I think was appropriate because I actually don't think audit committees are getting that
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	important that audit committees are provided with information, full disclosure for the context, the facts and circumstances associated with the provision of these services, as well as the framework of the principles so they can properly evaluate it. I think all of that is critically important. But I do think, certainly in a direct response to some of the commentary, there is an important relationship between the provision of tax services and the auditor's responsibility, which I think, in the context of the basic principles, needs to be understood and recognized.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	things that Mr. Gagnon just mentioned. I think they do play an important role with respect to that. I'm not sure the audit committees today are getting that level of detail information in what's coming up to them, and I hope that that becomes part of the PCAOB inspection process, to see if, in fact, the auditors are providing that level of detail up to the audit committee so that they can exercise the type of oversight and involvement in the process and judgement, that Mike just mentioned, which I think was appropriate because I actually don't think audit committees are getting that level of detail that the SEC specified, which was
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	important that audit committees are provided with information, full disclosure for the context, the facts and circumstances associated with the provision of these services, as well as the framework of the principles so they can properly evaluate it. I think all of that is critically important. But I do think, certainly in a direct response to some of the commentary, there is an important relationship between the provision of tax services and the auditor's responsibility, which I think, in the context of the basic principles, needs to be understood and recognized. I do think I do believe and we're going	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	things that Mr. Gagnon just mentioned. I think they do play an important role with respect to that. I'm not sure the audit committees today are getting that level of detail information in what's coming up to them, and I hope that that becomes part of the PCAOB inspection process, to see if, in fact, the auditors are providing that level of detail up to the audit committee so that they can exercise the type of oversight and involvement in the process and judgement, that Mike just mentioned, which I think was appropriate because I actually don't think audit committees are getting that level of detail that the SEC specified, which was actually excellent.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	important that audit committees are provided with information, full disclosure for the context, the facts and circumstances associated with the provision of these services, as well as the framework of the principles so they can properly evaluate it. I think all of that is critically important. But I do think, certainly in a direct response to some of the commentary, there is an important relationship between the provision of tax services and the auditor's responsibility, which I think, in the context of the basic principles, needs to be understood and recognized.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	things that Mr. Gagnon just mentioned. I think they do play an important role with respect to that. I'm not sure the audit committees today are getting that level of detail information in what's coming up to them, and I hope that that becomes part of the PCAOB inspection process, to see if, in fact, the auditors are providing that level of detail up to the audit committee so that they can exercise the type of oversight and involvement in the process and judgement, that Mike just mentioned, which I think was appropriate because I actually don't think audit committees are getting that level of detail that the SEC specified, which was actually excellent. But, overall, no question, when we passed the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	important that audit committees are provided with information, full disclosure for the context, the facts and circumstances associated with the provision of these services, as well as the framework of the principles so they can properly evaluate it. I think all of that is critically important. But I do think, certainly in a direct response to some of the commentary, there is an important relationship between the provision of tax services and the auditor's responsibility, which I think, in the context of the basic principles, needs to be understood and recognized. I do think I do believe and we're going to touch upon it, I think, during the course of the day	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	things that Mr. Gagnon just mentioned. I think they do play an important role with respect to that. I'm not sure the audit committees today are getting that level of detail information in what's coming up to them, and I hope that that becomes part of the PCAOB inspection process, to see if, in fact, the auditors are providing that level of detail up to the audit committee so that they can exercise the type of oversight and involvement in the process and judgement, that Mike just mentioned, which I think was appropriate because I actually don't think audit committees are getting that level of detail that the SEC specified, which was actually excellent.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	 important that audit committees are provided with information, full disclosure for the context, the facts and circumstances associated with the provision of these services, as well as the framework of the principles so they can properly evaluate it. I think all of that is critically important. But I do think, certainly in a direct response to some of the commentary, there is an important relationship between the provision of tax services and the auditor's responsibility, which I think, in the context of the basic principles, needs to be understood and recognized. I do think I do believe and we're going to touch upon it, I think, during the context of an 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	things that Mr. Gagnon just mentioned. I think they do play an important role with respect to that. I'm not sure the audit committees today are getting that level of detail information in what's coming up to them, and I hope that that becomes part of the PCAOB inspection process, to see if, in fact, the auditors are providing that level of detail up to the audit committee so that they can exercise the type of oversight and involvement in the process and judgement, that Mike just mentioned, which I think was appropriate because I actually don't think audit committees are getting that level of detail that the SEC specified, which was actually excellent. But, overall, no question, when we passed the rule, these were meant to apply to the tax service. Then the question became, Where do you turn around and cut the sausage, so to speak?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	 important that audit committees are provided with information, full disclosure for the context, the facts and circumstances associated with the provision of these services, as well as the framework of the principles so they can properly evaluate it. I think all of that is critically important. But I do think, certainly in a direct response to some of the commentary, there is an important relationship between the provision of tax services and the auditor's responsibility, which I think, in the context of the basic principles, needs to be understood and recognized. I do think I do believe and we're going to touch upon it, I think, during the course of the day as we discuss tax services in the context of an auditor's responsibilities I do think the fundamental provision of tax services does, in fact, enhance the audit process. And I think we'll get into 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	things that Mr. Gagnon just mentioned. I think they do play an important role with respect to that. I'm not sure the audit committees today are getting that level of detail information in what's coming up to them, and I hope that that becomes part of the PCAOB inspection process, to see if, in fact, the auditors are providing that level of detail up to the audit committee so that they can exercise the type of oversight and involvement in the process and judgement, that Mike just mentioned, which I think was appropriate because I actually don't think audit committees are getting that level of detail that the SEC specified, which was actually excellent. But, overall, no question, when we passed the rule, these were meant to apply to the tax service. Then the question became, Where do you turn around and cut the sausage, so to speak? MR. CARMICHAEL: Mark Weinberger.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	 important that audit committees are provided with information, full disclosure for the context, the facts and circumstances associated with the provision of these services, as well as the framework of the principles so they can properly evaluate it. I think all of that is critically important. But I do think, certainly in a direct response to some of the commentary, there is an important relationship between the provision of tax services and the auditor's responsibility, which I think, in the context of the basic principles, needs to be understood and recognized. I do think I do believe and we're going to touch upon it, I think, during the course of the day as we discuss tax services in the context of an auditor's responsibilities I do think the fundamental provision of tax services does, in fact, enhance the audit process. And I think we'll get into that during the course of the day. But in the context 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	things that Mr. Gagnon just mentioned. I think they do play an important role with respect to that. I'm not sure the audit committees today are getting that level of detail information in what's coming up to them, and I hope that that becomes part of the PCAOB inspection process, to see if, in fact, the auditors are providing that level of detail up to the audit committee so that they can exercise the type of oversight and involvement in the process and judgement, that Mike just mentioned, which I think was appropriate because I actually don't think audit committees are getting that level of detail that the SEC specified, which was actually excellent. But, overall, no question, when we passed the rule, these were meant to apply to the tax service. Then the question became, Where do you turn around and cut the sausage, so to speak? MR. CARMICHAEL: Mark Weinberger. MR. WEINBERGER: Thank you. My name's Mark
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	 important that audit committees are provided with information, full disclosure for the context, the facts and circumstances associated with the provision of these services, as well as the framework of the principles so they can properly evaluate it. I think all of that is critically important. But I do think, certainly in a direct response to some of the commentary, there is an important relationship between the provision of tax services and the auditor's responsibility, which I think, in the context of the basic principles, needs to be understood and recognized. I do think I do believe and we're going to touch upon it, I think, during the course of the day as we discuss tax services in the context of an auditor's responsibilities I do think the fundamental provision of tax services does, in fact, enhance the audit process. And I think we'll get into that during the course of the day. But in the context and the framework of the principles, I believe it's 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	things that Mr. Gagnon just mentioned. I think they do play an important role with respect to that. I'm not sure the audit committees today are getting that level of detail information in what's coming up to them, and I hope that that becomes part of the PCAOB inspection process, to see if, in fact, the auditors are providing that level of detail up to the audit committee so that they can exercise the type of oversight and involvement in the process and judgement, that Mike just mentioned, which I think was appropriate because I actually don't think audit committees are getting that level of detail that the SEC specified, which was actually excellent. But, overall, no question, when we passed the rule, these were meant to apply to the tax service. Then the question became, Where do you turn around and cut the sausage, so to speak? MR. CARMICHAEL: Mark Weinberger. MR. WEINBERGER: Thank you. My name's Mark Weinberger. I'm with Ernst & Young. And I'm a tax
$\begin{array}{c} 2\\ 3\\ 4\\ 5\\ 6\\ 7\\ 8\\ 9\\ 10\\ 11\\ 12\\ 13\\ 14\\ 15\\ 16\\ 17\\ 18\\ 19\\ 20\\ 21\\ \end{array}$	 important that audit committees are provided with information, full disclosure for the context, the facts and circumstances associated with the provision of these services, as well as the framework of the principles so they can properly evaluate it. I think all of that is critically important. But I do think, certainly in a direct response to some of the commentary, there is an important relationship between the provision of tax services and the auditor's responsibility, which I think, in the context of the basic principles, needs to be understood and recognized. I do think I do believe and we're going to touch upon it, I think, during the course of the day as we discuss tax services in the context of an auditor's responsibilities I do think the fundamental provision of tax services does, in fact, enhance the audit process. And I think we'll get into that during the course of the day. But in the context and the framework of the principles, I believe it's very important to understand that backdrop, that the 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	things that Mr. Gagnon just mentioned. I think they do play an important role with respect to that. I'm not sure the audit committees today are getting that level of detail information in what's coming up to them, and I hope that that becomes part of the PCAOB inspection process, to see if, in fact, the auditors are providing that level of detail up to the audit committee so that they can exercise the type of oversight and involvement in the process and judgement, that Mike just mentioned, which I think was appropriate because I actually don't think audit committees are getting that level of detail that the SEC specified, which was actually excellent. But, overall, no question, when we passed the rule, these were meant to apply to the tax service. Then the question became, Where do you turn around and cut the sausage, so to speak? MR. CARMICHAEL: Mark Weinberger. MR. WEINBERGER: Thank you. My name's Mark Weinberger. I'm with Ernst & Young. And I'm a tax guy, so my firm is probably squirming that I'm
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	 important that audit committees are provided with information, full disclosure for the context, the facts and circumstances associated with the provision of these services, as well as the framework of the principles so they can properly evaluate it. I think all of that is critically important. But I do think, certainly in a direct response to some of the commentary, there is an important relationship between the provision of tax services and the auditor's responsibility, which I think, in the context of the basic principles, needs to be understood and recognized. I do think I do believe and we're going to touch upon it, I think, during the course of the day as we discuss tax services in the context of an auditor's responsibilities I do think the fundamental provision of tax services does, in fact, enhance the audit process. And I think we'll get into that during the course of the day. But in the context and the framework of the principles, I believe it's very important to understand that backdrop, that the two are connected, but that the auditor has the 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	things that Mr. Gagnon just mentioned. I think they do play an important role with respect to that. I'm not sure the audit committees today are getting that level of detail information in what's coming up to them, and I hope that that becomes part of the PCAOB inspection process, to see if, in fact, the auditors are providing that level of detail up to the audit committee so that they can exercise the type of oversight and involvement in the process and judgement, that Mike just mentioned, which I think was appropriate because I actually don't think audit committees are getting that level of detail that the SEC specified, which was actually excellent. But, overall, no question, when we passed the rule, these were meant to apply to the tax service. Then the question became, Where do you turn around and cut the sausage, so to speak? MR. CARMICHAEL: Mark Weinberger. MR. WEINBERGER: Thank you. My name's Mark Weinberger. I'm with Ernst & Young. And I'm a tax guy, so my firm is probably squirming that I'm commenting on this independence issue right now. But I
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 important that audit committees are provided with information, full disclosure for the context, the facts and circumstances associated with the provision of these services, as well as the framework of the principles so they can properly evaluate it. I think all of that is critically important. But I do think, certainly in a direct response to some of the commentary, there is an important relationship between the provision of tax services and the auditor's responsibility, which I think, in the context of the basic principles, needs to be understood and recognized. I do think I do believe and we're going to touch upon it, I think, during the course of the day as we discuss tax services in the context of an auditor's responsibilities I do think the fundamental provision of tax services does, in fact, enhance the audit process. And I think we'll get into that during the course of the day. But in the context and the framework of the principles, I believe it's very important to understand that backdrop, that the two are connected, but that the auditor has the ultimate and primary responsibility for the report on 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	things that Mr. Gagnon just mentioned. I think they do play an important role with respect to that. I'm not sure the audit committees today are getting that level of detail information in what's coming up to them, and I hope that that becomes part of the PCAOB inspection process, to see if, in fact, the auditors are providing that level of detail up to the audit committee so that they can exercise the type of oversight and involvement in the process and judgement, that Mike just mentioned, which I think was appropriate because I actually don't think audit committees are getting that level of detail that the SEC specified, which was actually excellent. But, overall, no question, when we passed the rule, these were meant to apply to the tax service. Then the question became, Where do you turn around and cut the sausage, so to speak? MR. CARMICHAEL: Mark Weinberger. MR. WEINBERGER: Thank you. My name's Mark Weinberger. I'm with Ernst & Young. And I'm a tax guy, so my firm is probably squirming that I'm commenting on this independence issue right now. But I would agree with what Lynn Turner just said, and
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	 important that audit committees are provided with information, full disclosure for the context, the facts and circumstances associated with the provision of these services, as well as the framework of the principles so they can properly evaluate it. I think all of that is critically important. But I do think, certainly in a direct response to some of the commentary, there is an important relationship between the provision of tax services and the auditor's responsibility, which I think, in the context of the basic principles, needs to be understood and recognized. I do think I do believe and we're going to touch upon it, I think, during the course of the day as we discuss tax services in the context of an auditor's responsibilities I do think the fundamental provision of tax services does, in fact, enhance the audit process. And I think we'll get into that during the course of the day. But in the context and the framework of the principles, I believe it's very important to understand that backdrop, that the two are connected, but that the auditor has the 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	things that Mr. Gagnon just mentioned. I think they do play an important role with respect to that. I'm not sure the audit committees today are getting that level of detail information in what's coming up to them, and I hope that that becomes part of the PCAOB inspection process, to see if, in fact, the auditors are providing that level of detail up to the audit committee so that they can exercise the type of oversight and involvement in the process and judgement, that Mike just mentioned, which I think was appropriate because I actually don't think audit committees are getting that level of detail that the SEC specified, which was actually excellent. But, overall, no question, when we passed the rule, these were meant to apply to the tax service. Then the question became, Where do you turn around and cut the sausage, so to speak? MR. CARMICHAEL: Mark Weinberger. MR. WEINBERGER: Thank you. My name's Mark Weinberger. I'm with Ernst & Young. And I'm a tax guy, so my firm is probably squirming that I'm commenting on this independence issue right now. But I

-			
	Page 26		Page 28
1	con. These principles, as I understood, and always	1	while I do think the four principles have to be
2	understood it, were clearly part of the 2000 rulemaking	2	applied, and applied with reason, you also have to come
3	the SEC did. They were part of the discussion,	3	back and say, "It wasn't that these things are okay so
4	obviously, in Sarbanes-Oxley. They were part of the	4	you can just vote and approve it," it was, "You have to
5	rulemaking most recently by the SEC in determining what	5	exercise judgement, using those four principles, and
6	is and is not a committed service.	6	then decide whether it's in the investor interest that
7	And so, we would agree the real question is	7	these services get provided or not provided."
8	I would agree the real question is, How do you apply	8	MR. CARMICHAEL: Jim Brasher.
9	it to tax services? And Scott Traub recently wrote a	9	MR. BRASHER: (Inaudible.)
10	letter and said, you know, it's the tax services,	10	On behalf of the KPMG, I would like to thank
11	the application is tempered by the arguments that	11	the Board for hosting today's roundtable discussion.
12	Barbara laid out in when she started talking. And	12	We believe the public interest is well-served by having
13	for all of us around the room to have this debate is	13	a public dialogue about the auditor's responsibilities
14 15	helpful, but, as Lynn said, when the audit committees sit down to try and apply these principles to tax	14 15	in connection with the auditing of public registrants. We also believe that the provision of tax advice, tax
16	services, which are explicitly allowed in the rule, it	16	services, of public registrants serves the public
17	becomes much more complicated as they try and do it.	17	interest by permitting the auditor to conduct an
18	And if there's any guidance or clarity, I think that's	18	efficient audit in respect to tax matters. We believe
19	foremost importance in terms of this new process that	19	the public interest is well-served because the audit
20	was set up by Sarbanes-Oxley and the SEC rules working,	20	committee has to review and approve the provision of
21	because as others have said previously, the audit	21	all tax services rendered by the audit firm, which may
22	committees are taking their responsibilities extremely	22	not be the case with respect to tax services rendered
23	seriously, for good reason, and they're trying to work	23	by other tax-service providers.
24	through all these issues. And the more clarity, I	24	We look forward to an exchange of views of
25	think, the better. So	25	how we can further improve the integrity of the system
	Page 27		Page 29
1		1	
$\frac{1}{2}$	MR. CARMICHAEL: Lynn, did you want to	$\frac{1}{2}$	and to strengthen public confidence.
2	MR. CARMICHAEL: Lynn, did you want to respond to that?	2	and to strengthen public confidence. MR. CARMICHAEL: Okay.
	MR. CARMICHAEL: Lynn, did you want to respond to that? MR. TURNER: Well, I'd just like to follow up		and to strengthen public confidence. MR. CARMICHAEL: Okay. Jim Brown.
2 3	MR. CARMICHAEL: Lynn, did you want to respond to that?	2 3	and to strengthen public confidence. MR. CARMICHAEL: Okay.
2 3 4	MR. CARMICHAEL: Lynn, did you want to respond to that? MR. TURNER: Well, I'd just like to follow up on one thing that both Mark and Barbara mentioned that I think is important. As audit committee member, I've gotten brochures and information from the firms that	2 3 4	 and to strengthen public confidence. MR. CARMICHAEL: Okay. Jim Brown. MR. BROWN: Jim Brown, Crowe Chizek. I just wanted to mention, there's one other area in which these four principles are very useful.
2 3 4 5 6 7	MR. CARMICHAEL: Lynn, did you want to respond to that? MR. TURNER: Well, I'd just like to follow up on one thing that both Mark and Barbara mentioned that I think is important. As audit committee member, I've gotten brochures and information from the firms that has explicitly said that Sarbanes-Oxley, in essence,	2 3 4 5 6 7	 and to strengthen public confidence. MR. CARMICHAEL: Okay. Jim Brown. MR. BROWN: Jim Brown, Crowe Chizek. I just wanted to mention, there's one other area in which these four principles are very useful. And in my firm, we agree with them, we think they're
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	MR. CARMICHAEL: Lynn, did you want to respond to that? MR. TURNER: Well, I'd just like to follow up on one thing that both Mark and Barbara mentioned that I think is important. As audit committee member, I've gotten brochures and information from the firms that has explicitly said that Sarbanes-Oxley, in essence, approved and said you could do all this tax work, and	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	 and to strengthen public confidence. MR. CARMICHAEL: Okay. Jim Brown. MR. BROWN: Jim Brown, Crowe Chizek. I just wanted to mention, there's one other area in which these four principles are very useful. And in my firm, we agree with them, we think they're very relevant. When we took a look at the services we
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	MR. CARMICHAEL: Lynn, did you want to respond to that? MR. TURNER: Well, I'd just like to follow up on one thing that both Mark and Barbara mentioned that I think is important. As audit committee member, I've gotten brochures and information from the firms that has explicitly said that Sarbanes-Oxley, in essence, approved and said you could do all this tax work, and there's nothing wrong with it. I think those	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	 and to strengthen public confidence. MR. CARMICHAEL: Okay. Jim Brown. MR. BROWN: Jim Brown, Crowe Chizek. I just wanted to mention, there's one other area in which these four principles are very useful. And in my firm, we agree with them, we think they're very relevant. When we took a look at the services we provided to registrants, we said, "We need to go
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	MR. CARMICHAEL: Lynn, did you want to respond to that? MR. TURNER: Well, I'd just like to follow up on one thing that both Mark and Barbara mentioned that I think is important. As audit committee member, I've gotten brochures and information from the firms that has explicitly said that Sarbanes-Oxley, in essence, approved and said you could do all this tax work, and there's nothing wrong with it. I think those statements are actually grossly misleading to audit	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	 and to strengthen public confidence. MR. CARMICHAEL: Okay. Jim Brown. MR. BROWN: Jim Brown, Crowe Chizek. I just wanted to mention, there's one other area in which these four principles are very useful. And in my firm, we agree with them, we think they're very relevant. When we took a look at the services we provided to registrants, we said, "We need to go through and scrutinize and screen everything we do."
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	MR. CARMICHAEL: Lynn, did you want to respond to that? MR. TURNER: Well, I'd just like to follow up on one thing that both Mark and Barbara mentioned that I think is important. As audit committee member, I've gotten brochures and information from the firms that has explicitly said that Sarbanes-Oxley, in essence, approved and said you could do all this tax work, and there's nothing wrong with it. I think those statements are actually grossly misleading to audit committee members.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	 and to strengthen public confidence. MR. CARMICHAEL: Okay. Jim Brown. MR. BROWN: Jim Brown, Crowe Chizek. I just wanted to mention, there's one other area in which these four principles are very useful. And in my firm, we agree with them, we think they're very relevant. When we took a look at the services we provided to registrants, we said, "We need to go through and scrutinize and screen everything we do." So, as a policy issue, we used these four in deciding,
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	MR. CARMICHAEL: Lynn, did you want to respond to that? MR. TURNER: Well, I'd just like to follow up on one thing that both Mark and Barbara mentioned that I think is important. As audit committee member, I've gotten brochures and information from the firms that has explicitly said that Sarbanes-Oxley, in essence, approved and said you could do all this tax work, and there's nothing wrong with it. I think those statements are actually grossly misleading to audit committee members. What Sarbanes-Oxley says is that these things	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	 and to strengthen public confidence. MR. CARMICHAEL: Okay. Jim Brown. MR. BROWN: Jim Brown, Crowe Chizek. I just wanted to mention, there's one other area in which these four principles are very useful. And in my firm, we agree with them, we think they're very relevant. When we took a look at the services we provided to registrants, we said, "We need to go through and scrutinize and screen everything we do." So, as a policy issue, we used these four in deciding, as our first step, what we could and couldn't do. So
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	MR. CARMICHAEL: Lynn, did you want to respond to that? MR. TURNER: Well, I'd just like to follow up on one thing that both Mark and Barbara mentioned that I think is important. As audit committee member, I've gotten brochures and information from the firms that has explicitly said that Sarbanes-Oxley, in essence, approved and said you could do all this tax work, and there's nothing wrong with it. I think those statements are actually grossly misleading to audit committee members. What Sarbanes-Oxley says is that these things are, in fact, subject to the judgement of the audit	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	 and to strengthen public confidence. MR. CARMICHAEL: Okay. Jim Brown. MR. BROWN: Jim Brown, Crowe Chizek. I just wanted to mention, there's one other area in which these four principles are very useful. And in my firm, we agree with them, we think they're very relevant. When we took a look at the services we provided to registrants, we said, "We need to go through and scrutinize and screen everything we do." So, as a policy issue, we used these four in deciding, as our first step, what we could and couldn't do. So they're also very useful in that regard, and we would
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	MR. CARMICHAEL: Lynn, did you want to respond to that? MR. TURNER: Well, I'd just like to follow up on one thing that both Mark and Barbara mentioned that I think is important. As audit committee member, I've gotten brochures and information from the firms that has explicitly said that Sarbanes-Oxley, in essence, approved and said you could do all this tax work, and there's nothing wrong with it. I think those statements are actually grossly misleading to audit committee members. What Sarbanes-Oxley says is that these things are, in fact, subject to the judgement of the audit committee. It's not that Sarbanes-Oxley said they were	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	 and to strengthen public confidence. MR. CARMICHAEL: Okay. Jim Brown. MR. BROWN: Jim Brown, Crowe Chizek. I just wanted to mention, there's one other area in which these four principles are very useful. And in my firm, we agree with them, we think they're very relevant. When we took a look at the services we provided to registrants, we said, "We need to go through and scrutinize and screen everything we do." So, as a policy issue, we used these four in deciding, as our first step, what we could and couldn't do. So they're also very useful in that regard, and we would support continuing with these principles.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	MR. CARMICHAEL: Lynn, did you want to respond to that? MR. TURNER: Well, I'd just like to follow up on one thing that both Mark and Barbara mentioned that I think is important. As audit committee member, I've gotten brochures and information from the firms that has explicitly said that Sarbanes-Oxley, in essence, approved and said you could do all this tax work, and there's nothing wrong with it. I think those statements are actually grossly misleading to audit committee members. What Sarbanes-Oxley says is that these things are, in fact, subject to the judgement of the audit committee. It's not that Sarbanes-Oxley said they were okay, or not okay; it's that we're going to subject	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	 and to strengthen public confidence. MR. CARMICHAEL: Okay. Jim Brown. MR. BROWN: Jim Brown, Crowe Chizek. I just wanted to mention, there's one other area in which these four principles are very useful. And in my firm, we agree with them, we think they're very relevant. When we took a look at the services we provided to registrants, we said, "We need to go through and scrutinize and screen everything we do." So, as a policy issue, we used these four in deciding, as our first step, what we could and couldn't do. So they're also very useful in that regard, and we would support continuing with these principles. MR. CARMICHAEL: Jeff Steinhoff.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	MR. CARMICHAEL: Lynn, did you want to respond to that? MR. TURNER: Well, I'd just like to follow up on one thing that both Mark and Barbara mentioned that I think is important. As audit committee member, I've gotten brochures and information from the firms that has explicitly said that Sarbanes-Oxley, in essence, approved and said you could do all this tax work, and there's nothing wrong with it. I think those statements are actually grossly misleading to audit committee members. What Sarbanes-Oxley says is that these things are, in fact, subject to the judgement of the audit committee. It's not that Sarbanes-Oxley said they were okay, or not okay; it's that we're going to subject them to the judgement of the audit committee, which I	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	and to strengthen public confidence. MR. CARMICHAEL: Okay. Jim Brown. MR. BROWN: Jim Brown, Crowe Chizek. I just wanted to mention, there's one other area in which these four principles are very useful. And in my firm, we agree with them, we think they're very relevant. When we took a look at the services we provided to registrants, we said, "We need to go through and scrutinize and screen everything we do." So, as a policy issue, we used these four in deciding, as our first step, what we could and couldn't do. So they're also very useful in that regard, and we would support continuing with these principles. MR. CARMICHAEL: Jeff Steinhoff. MR. STEINHOFF: Jeff Steinhoff, from the new
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	MR. CARMICHAEL: Lynn, did you want to respond to that? MR. TURNER: Well, I'd just like to follow up on one thing that both Mark and Barbara mentioned that I think is important. As audit committee member, I've gotten brochures and information from the firms that has explicitly said that Sarbanes-Oxley, in essence, approved and said you could do all this tax work, and there's nothing wrong with it. I think those statements are actually grossly misleading to audit committee members. What Sarbanes-Oxley says is that these things are, in fact, subject to the judgement of the audit committee. It's not that Sarbanes-Oxley said they were okay, or not okay; it's that we're going to subject	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	 and to strengthen public confidence. MR. CARMICHAEL: Okay. Jim Brown. MR. BROWN: Jim Brown, Crowe Chizek. I just wanted to mention, there's one other area in which these four principles are very useful. And in my firm, we agree with them, we think they're very relevant. When we took a look at the services we provided to registrants, we said, "We need to go through and scrutinize and screen everything we do." So, as a policy issue, we used these four in deciding, as our first step, what we could and couldn't do. So they're also very useful in that regard, and we would support continuing with these principles. MR. CARMICHAEL: Jeff Steinhoff.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	MR. CARMICHAEL: Lynn, did you want to respond to that? MR. TURNER: Well, I'd just like to follow up on one thing that both Mark and Barbara mentioned that I think is important. As audit committee member, I've gotten brochures and information from the firms that has explicitly said that Sarbanes-Oxley, in essence, approved and said you could do all this tax work, and there's nothing wrong with it. I think those statements are actually grossly misleading to audit committee members. What Sarbanes-Oxley says is that these things are, in fact, subject to the judgement of the audit committee. It's not that Sarbanes-Oxley said they were okay, or not okay; it's that we're going to subject them to the judgement of the audit committee, which I think is why it's so important that the PCAOB make sure	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	and to strengthen public confidence. MR. CARMICHAEL: Okay. Jim Brown. MR. BROWN: Jim Brown, Crowe Chizek. I just wanted to mention, there's one other area in which these four principles are very useful. And in my firm, we agree with them, we think they're very relevant. When we took a look at the services we provided to registrants, we said, "We need to go through and scrutinize and screen everything we do." So, as a policy issue, we used these four in deciding, as our first step, what we could and couldn't do. So they're also very useful in that regard, and we would support continuing with these principles. MR. CARMICHAEL: Jeff Steinhoff. MR. STEINHOFF: Jeff Steinhoff, from the new Government Accountability Office. Our name was
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	MR. CARMICHAEL: Lynn, did you want to respond to that? MR. TURNER: Well, I'd just like to follow up on one thing that both Mark and Barbara mentioned that I think is important. As audit committee member, I've gotten brochures and information from the firms that has explicitly said that Sarbanes-Oxley, in essence, approved and said you could do all this tax work, and there's nothing wrong with it. I think those statements are actually grossly misleading to audit committee members. What Sarbanes-Oxley says is that these things are, in fact, subject to the judgement of the audit committee. It's not that Sarbanes-Oxley said they were okay, or not okay; it's that we're going to subject them to the judgement of the audit committee, which I think is why it's so important that the PCAOB make sure that the audit committees are getting the information at the level of detail that the SEC has said, so that they can make informed decisions.	$\begin{array}{c} 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13 \\ 14 \\ 15 \\ 16 \\ 17 \\ 18 \\ 19 \\ 20 \end{array}$	and to strengthen public confidence. MR. CARMICHAEL: Okay. Jim Brown. MR. BROWN: Jim Brown, Crowe Chizek. I just wanted to mention, there's one other area in which these four principles are very useful. And in my firm, we agree with them, we think they're very relevant. When we took a look at the services we provided to registrants, we said, "We need to go through and scrutinize and screen everything we do." So, as a policy issue, we used these four in deciding, as our first step, what we could and couldn't do. So they're also very useful in that regard, and we would support continuing with these principles. MR. CARMICHAEL: Jeff Steinhoff. MR. STEINHOFF: Jeff Steinhoff, from the new Government Accountability Office. Our name was changed, last Thursday, from the General Accounting Office. So we have a new name. The same initials, though.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	MR. CARMICHAEL: Lynn, did you want to respond to that? MR. TURNER: Well, I'd just like to follow up on one thing that both Mark and Barbara mentioned that I think is important. As audit committee member, I've gotten brochures and information from the firms that has explicitly said that Sarbanes-Oxley, in essence, approved and said you could do all this tax work, and there's nothing wrong with it. I think those statements are actually grossly misleading to audit committee members. What Sarbanes-Oxley says is that these things are, in fact, subject to the judgement of the audit committee. It's not that Sarbanes-Oxley said they were okay, or not okay; it's that we're going to subject them to the judgement of the audit committee, which I think is why it's so important that the PCAOB make sure that the audit committees are getting the information at the level of detail that the SEC has said, so that they can make informed decisions. And I think it is misleading when the firms	$\begin{array}{c} 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13 \\ 14 \\ 15 \\ 16 \\ 17 \\ 18 \\ 19 \\ 20 \\ 21 \end{array}$	and to strengthen public confidence. MR. CARMICHAEL: Okay. Jim Brown. MR. BROWN: Jim Brown, Crowe Chizek. I just wanted to mention, there's one other area in which these four principles are very useful. And in my firm, we agree with them, we think they're very relevant. When we took a look at the services we provided to registrants, we said, "We need to go through and scrutinize and screen everything we do." So, as a policy issue, we used these four in deciding, as our first step, what we could and couldn't do. So they're also very useful in that regard, and we would support continuing with these principles. MR. CARMICHAEL: Jeff Steinhoff. MR. STEINHOFF: Jeff Steinhoff, from the new Government Accountability Office. Our name was changed, last Thursday, from the General Accounting Office. So we have a new name. The same initials, though. (Laughter.)
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	MR. CARMICHAEL: Lynn, did you want to respond to that? MR. TURNER: Well, I'd just like to follow up on one thing that both Mark and Barbara mentioned that I think is important. As audit committee member, I've gotten brochures and information from the firms that has explicitly said that Sarbanes-Oxley, in essence, approved and said you could do all this tax work, and there's nothing wrong with it. I think those statements are actually grossly misleading to audit committee members. What Sarbanes-Oxley says is that these things are, in fact, subject to the judgement of the audit committee. It's not that Sarbanes-Oxley said they were okay, or not okay; it's that we're going to subject them to the judgement of the audit committee, which I think is why it's so important that the PCAOB make sure that the audit committees are getting the information at the level of detail that the SEC has said, so that they can make informed decisions. And I think it is misleading when the firms come out and go to the audit committees and say,	$\begin{array}{c} 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13 \\ 14 \\ 15 \\ 16 \\ 17 \\ 18 \\ 19 \\ 20 \\ 21 \\ 22 \end{array}$	and to strengthen public confidence. MR. CARMICHAEL: Okay. Jim Brown. MR. BROWN: Jim Brown, Crowe Chizek. I just wanted to mention, there's one other area in which these four principles are very useful. And in my firm, we agree with them, we think they're very relevant. When we took a look at the services we provided to registrants, we said, "We need to go through and scrutinize and screen everything we do." So, as a policy issue, we used these four in deciding, as our first step, what we could and couldn't do. So they're also very useful in that regard, and we would support continuing with these principles. MR. CARMICHAEL: Jeff Steinhoff. MR. STEINHOFF: Jeff Steinhoff, from the new Government Accountability Office. Our name was changed, last Thursday, from the General Accounting Office. So we have a new name. The same initials, though. (Laughter.) MR. STEINHOFF: I support the four
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	MR. CARMICHAEL: Lynn, did you want to respond to that? MR. TURNER: Well, I'd just like to follow up on one thing that both Mark and Barbara mentioned that I think is important. As audit committee member, I've gotten brochures and information from the firms that has explicitly said that Sarbanes-Oxley, in essence, approved and said you could do all this tax work, and there's nothing wrong with it. I think those statements are actually grossly misleading to audit committee members. What Sarbanes-Oxley says is that these things are, in fact, subject to the judgement of the audit committee. It's not that Sarbanes-Oxley said they were okay, or not okay; it's that we're going to subject them to the judgement of the audit committee, which I think is why it's so important that the PCAOB make sure that the audit committees are getting the information at the level of detail that the SEC has said, so that they can make informed decisions. And I think it is misleading when the firms come out and go to the audit committees and say, "Sarbanes-Oxley has said this is okay, so you can just	$\begin{array}{c} 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13 \\ 14 \\ 15 \\ 16 \\ 17 \\ 18 \\ 19 \\ 20 \\ 21 \\ 22 \\ 23 \end{array}$	and to strengthen public confidence. MR. CARMICHAEL: Okay. Jim Brown. MR. BROWN: Jim Brown, Crowe Chizek. I just wanted to mention, there's one other area in which these four principles are very useful. And in my firm, we agree with them, we think they're very relevant. When we took a look at the services we provided to registrants, we said, "We need to go through and scrutinize and screen everything we do." So, as a policy issue, we used these four in deciding, as our first step, what we could and couldn't do. So they're also very useful in that regard, and we would support continuing with these principles. MR. CARMICHAEL: Jeff Steinhoff. MR. STEINHOFF: Jeff Steinhoff, from the new Government Accountability Office. Our name was changed, last Thursday, from the General Accounting Office. So we have a new name. The same initials, though. (Laughter.) MR. STEINHOFF: I support the four principles. I think they set a high bar. I think the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	MR. CARMICHAEL: Lynn, did you want to respond to that? MR. TURNER: Well, I'd just like to follow up on one thing that both Mark and Barbara mentioned that I think is important. As audit committee member, I've gotten brochures and information from the firms that has explicitly said that Sarbanes-Oxley, in essence, approved and said you could do all this tax work, and there's nothing wrong with it. I think those statements are actually grossly misleading to audit committee members. What Sarbanes-Oxley says is that these things are, in fact, subject to the judgement of the audit committee. It's not that Sarbanes-Oxley said they were okay, or not okay; it's that we're going to subject them to the judgement of the audit committee, which I think is why it's so important that the PCAOB make sure that the audit committees are getting the information at the level of detail that the SEC has said, so that they can make informed decisions. And I think it is misleading when the firms come out and go to the audit committees and say,	$\begin{array}{c} 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13 \\ 14 \\ 15 \\ 16 \\ 17 \\ 18 \\ 19 \\ 20 \\ 21 \\ 22 \end{array}$	and to strengthen public confidence. MR. CARMICHAEL: Okay. Jim Brown. MR. BROWN: Jim Brown, Crowe Chizek. I just wanted to mention, there's one other area in which these four principles are very useful. And in my firm, we agree with them, we think they're very relevant. When we took a look at the services we provided to registrants, we said, "We need to go through and scrutinize and screen everything we do." So, as a policy issue, we used these four in deciding, as our first step, what we could and couldn't do. So they're also very useful in that regard, and we would support continuing with these principles. MR. CARMICHAEL: Jeff Steinhoff. MR. STEINHOFF: Jeff Steinhoff, from the new Government Accountability Office. Our name was changed, last Thursday, from the General Accounting Office. So we have a new name. The same initials, though. (Laughter.) MR. STEINHOFF: I support the four

8 (Pages 26 to 29)

	Page 30		Page 32
$ \begin{array}{c} 1\\2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\\23\end{array} $	Page 30 principles themselves, or saying, "Where is that bar to be set?" What I think is difficult here is that the auditor can bring lots of expertise, and they could bring expertise in bookkeeping, but they're not permitted to "keep the books." So I think, in looking here, at tax services, one must look at how that bar is to be applied here, and so that boards have very clear guidance as to what that means. And none of these really speak to who is the best to provide a tax service, or who is the most efficient, or who knows the most about it. They really deal with relationships. And in setting the bar, I think that these provide a very good foundation for applying against that particular service, or against any service. MR. CARMICHAEL: Thank you. We certainly are going to be taking up the application of the principles as we go through the services, so I'll just ask Mark Anson to make the final comment on this topic. MR. ANSON: Douglas, thank you. I'm Mark Anson. I'm here today to represent the California Public Employees Retirement System.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	Page 32 This brings us to our first question. Who prepares the tax schedules and related documentation: the issuer, a third party, or a combination of professionals? And the next question, Do the answers to these questions differ depending on the relative size of the company? Comments? MR. KOREN: My name's Paul Koren. I'm a partner at Goldstein Golub Kessler. We are a medium- sized accounting firm in New York City, a small, but important, SEC practice. That question is particularly sensitive to our practice. MR. CARMICHAEL: Could you speak more directly into your mic, Paul, please? MR. KOREN: That question, obviously, is extremely significant to our practice. Our clients generally don't have sophisticated in-house tax specialists. Nevertheless, we are very cautious with regard to accumulations of data, and we insist that our clients, or a third party, would always produce the information. So it would be it would be something that we would feel challenged if we were to go past the
24	I think the final comment I'd like to make,	24	principle of you know, of doing bookkeeping or
25	as we go through this introductory period, is that Page 31	25	auditing our own work.
$ \begin{array}{c} 1\\2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\end{array} $	 integrity of the financial statements is paramount to investors. I'm here representing one of the largest investors, not only in the United States, but around the world. Investors, creditors, regulators, we must be able to rely upon the information that's contained in the financial statements. Anything that impinges upon the independence of the auditor impairs the integrity of the financial statements. And as we review the 16 questions that are teed up today, I think we should keep in mind that auditor independence is synonymous with financial-statement integrity. Thank you. MR. CARMICHAEL: Okay, I'd like to move to the first question. So, Greg, can you lead us through that? MR. SCATES: Thank you, Doug. As many of you are aware, companies calculate their liability for various federal, state, and local taxes on tax schedules that form a basis for the 	$ \begin{array}{c} 1\\2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\end{array} $	MR. SCATES: Lynn Turner. MR. TURNER: On this one, I've seen it done a number of ways. Back where when I was at a CFO, we actually had our own tax people who prepared the tax schedules and all the related tax documentation. We did our own tax return, but then had the accounting firm, who also did the audit work, actually then review the tax return in conjunction with their review on the tax accrual, although they usually got around to reviewing the tax return subsequent to the actual tax accrual, because of timing. So the process would be, we'd do the tax accrual, do all the schedules, they'd review that, then we'd do the tax return, and they'd come in and review the tax return when we were done. Where I'm currently at as a board member, the process works pretty much the same, because the company has their own sophisticated tax department. I think the larger the companies get, that's pretty much the way my experience has been with the process. On the other hand, when I was with my former firm, I was in
20 21 22 23 24 25	taxes on tax schedules that form a basis for the amounts appearing in a company's annual financial statements. In auditing these income tax accounts, the auditor is required to obtain reasonable assurance that all tax accounts are fairly stated, with appropriate disclosures, in the financial statements.	20 21 22 23 24 25	offices where there were only nine or ten of us in the office, or just 30 of us in the office, much like a smaller firm more so out in Heartland America. And in some of those cases, we would actually go through and do the audit; and then, quite frankly, at the same

Page 34 Page 34 1 Tim not certain the answer depends on the size of the firm, the audit firm. I bink it is more day and tax return, although that really wasn't as relevant for a public companies. Most public companies of any size and the degree that the companies that I've worked on a san audit partner where we would do that as accrual and tax return, and help them out to that extent. Tim not certain the audit firm. I bink it is firmerand and tax return, and help them out to that extent. 3 more degree that the company wasn't to do it. The one since that you get - can get into, kind of, a 10 concern about is when the larger company decides to 13 very careful there to make sure that's not going to your auditor. So the you direly one on somebody typically, in 4 the sale size of the company would rely one on somebody typically, in 10 tatest to the accuracy of the numbers in the 11 content of the sale size of the company. As 1 think 4 more careful there to make sure that's not going to 12 outsource that function to someone. (You have to be 13 very careful there to make sure that's not going to 13 maintering, as someone cited eartier, the integrity of 14 maintering as someone cited eartier, the integrity of 15 maintering, as someone cited eartier, the integrity of 14 maintering as someone cited eartier, the integrity of 15 maintering, as someone cited eartier, the integrity of 14 that thas a high degree of specialization and 2 capability in the jobal tax is matters that houch us, 3 given the nature of our worldwide operations. 14 that has a high degree of specialization and 2 capability in the jobal tax is matters. 14 to attax accounting firm. 3 given the nature of our worldwide operations. 14 that has a high degree of specialization and 3 caroouting inve bobal tax on the region speciton 3 mavesthat have bene given,				
2 tax return, although that really wasn't as relevant for public companies of any size 2 size of the firm, the andit firm. Think it's much 3 public companies don't size of the company. As 1 think 1 4 had the sophistication to do that on their own. But first the Scale of the company. As 1 think 6 as an audit pattern where we would do the tax accruat first the RS rules are very complicated, and many small 7 and the degree that the company wants to do it. The first the RS rules are very complicated, and many small 9 and the degree that the company wants to do it. The first the RS rules are very complicated, and many small 10 once issue that you get - car get ruto, kind d, a first the RS rules are very complicated, and has the responsibility 11 concern about is when the larger company decides to first the additor who's in the 12 outsource that function to someobe. You have to be first the respective on thas the first some additor. 12 outsource that function to someobe. You have the first as a contain statements. first the respective on the additor. 13 wery careful there to make sure that's not going to first as a contain statements. first as a contain statements. 14 max		Page 34		Page 36
2 tax return, although that really wasn't as relevant for public companies of any size 2 size of the firm, the andit firm. Think it's much 3 public companies don't size of the company. As 1 think 1 4 had the sophistication to do that on their own. But first the Scale of the company. As 1 think 6 as an audit pattern where we would do the tax accruat first the RS rules are very complicated, and many small 7 and the degree that the company wants to do it. The first the RS rules are very complicated, and many small 9 and the degree that the company wants to do it. The first the RS rules are very complicated, and many small 10 once issue that you get - car get ruto, kind d, a first the RS rules are very complicated, and has the responsibility 11 concern about is when the larger company decides to first the additor who's in the 12 outsource that function to someobe. You have to be first the respective on thas the first some additor. 12 outsource that function to someobe. You have the first as a contain statements. first the respective on the additor. 13 wery careful there to make sure that's not going to first as a contain statements. first as a contain statements. 14 max	1	time we were doing the tax accrual, we'd almost do the	1	I'm not certain the answer depends on the
3 public companies. Most public companies of any size hand the ophysication to do that on their own. But marked there were some smaller companies that I've worked on a are audit partner where we would do the tax accrual and tax return, and help them out to that extent. 3 more dependent on the size of the company. As 1 think 4 Mr. Eversom would acknowledge, or anybody lesk here, companies don't have the expertise to properly figure out how they should comply with the tax laws. 8 So I think it differentiates based on size and the degree that the company wasts to do it. The loc concern about is when the larger company decides to very careful there to make sure that's not going to your auditor. 5 So they would rely more on someone sec. 10 one issue that you get - can get into, kind of, a very careful there to make sure that's not going to your auditor. 1 Taken a look at the numbers, and has the responsibility to atset to the accurrent or on someone else. 1 11 outset, this is a complex undertaking, and one maintaining, as someone cicel earlier, the integrity of maintaining, asomeone cinthe earlier to the complanical statements. So in some		6		
4Mr. Fverson would acknowledge, or anybody else here, or any addition to work of the two work of the two property7and tax return, and help them out to that extern. a son addit partner where we would do the tax accrual a man data return, and help them out to that extern. and the degree that the company wants to do it. The one issue that you get - can get into, kind of, a 10 concern about is when the larger company decides to 13 very careful there to make sure that's not going to your additor.5that the RS rules are very compalies don't have the expensibility to any the very careful there to someone. You have to be to autsource that function to someone. You have to be your additor.5the the additor why ho's in there and has to the accuracy of the numbers in the to autsource that function to someone. You have to be to autsource that function to someone. You have to be your additor.10the financial statements. They would rely on the additor.16MR. SCATES: David Shedlarz. The size of the objectives.11compains don't have the expertise, frankly, to get it to done right. And if we want proper compliance with the ta kays, they need help from someplace. So it really 1920objectives.11staff that has a high degree of specialization and capability in the global tax matters that touch us, sig importan admid-sized companies, this is a d difficult undertaking, and this, it's critically important admid-sized forms. The same that, for smaller and mid-sized firms, the accurating firm.1112staff that has a high degree of specialization and capability in the global tax matters, and laks in terms of ensuing the integrity of the financial statements of that, for smaller and mid-sized firms, the acc				
 there were some smaller companies that I've worked on aize an audit partner where we would do the tax accural and max return, and help them out to that extent. So I think it differentiates based on size and the degree that the company state to do it. The degree that the company waters to do it. The degree that the company decides to do it. The degree to the company decides to do it. The degree that the company decides to do it. The degree to the degree that the company decides to do it. The degree to the degree that the degree of the company decides to do that the degree that the degree of the degree that the degree of the degree that the degree that the degree of the degree of the degree that the degree of the degree that the degree of the degree that the degree of the degree of the degree that the degree of the degree that the degree of the degree that the degree of the degree of the degree that the				
6 as an audit partner where we would do the tax accrula and tax return, and help them out to that extent. 6 public companies don't have the expertise to properly 7 and tax ferrentiates based on size and the degree that the company wants to do it. The one issue that you get - can get into, kind of, a concern about is when the larger company decides to outsource that function to someone. You have to be your auditor. 5 b the past, it's been the auditor who's in there and has to and the degree that the company wants to do it. The accounting is a complex undertaking, and one which is critically important to get right. And having the expertise on hand to do that properly, in terms of the financial statements, is clearly one of the objectives. 10 And I think there's a very clear mombers. So it really the expertise on hand to do that properly, in terms of the financial statements, is clearly one of the objectives. 1 staff that has a high degree of specialization and capability in the global tax matters that touch us, given the nature of our worldwide operations. 1 chartered financial-analyst designation. 2 represent that, for smaller and mid-sized firms, it is more evenly distributed, in terms of the accounting firm? 1 chartered financial-analyst designation. 1 chartered financial-analyst designation. 2 1 chartered financial-analyst designation. 2 accounting firm. The and given the nature of our worldwide operations. 1 that for smal			5	
 and tax return, and help them out to that extent. so think it differentiates based on size and the degree that the company wants to do it. The one issue that you get - can get into, kind of, a concern about is when the larger company decides to very careful there to make sure that's not going to very careful there to make sure that's not going to very careful there to make sure that's not going to which at sure that's not going to which at sure that's not going to very careful there to make sure that's not going to which is a complex undertaking, and one which is a complex undertaking and one the financial statements. is clearly one of the objectives. To ray arg firm, like PTizer, we have the internal resources, as Lym has highlighted, that, for smaller and mid-sized firms, given the awater, and also in terms of people who that, for smaller and mid-sized firms, the participation of ther orstical accounting firm. the counting the integrity of the financial stat				
8 So 1 think it differentiates based on size 8 So they would rely more on somebody typically, in 10 one issue that you get can get into, kind of, a 1 1 11 concern about is when the larger company decides to 1 taken a look at the numbers, and has the responsibility 12 onters out to someco. You have to be 1 taken a look at the numbers, and has the responsibility 13 very careful there to make sure that's not going to 1 taken a look at the numbers, and has the responsibility 14 is accountient. the size ofference. Large companies don't have that 14 is accountificence. Large companies don't have that 15 MR. SCATES: Parkit Shedlarz. 16 MR. SCATES: Na, when a dealtior on someplace. So it really 17 objectives. 23 For a large firm, like Pfizer, we have the 24 interant resources, as Lynn has outlined, to do hat 25 for our own account. And so we have a fairly large 7 12 salarge that has a high degree of specialization and 2 25 tasta fifs hat has a high degree of specialization and 2 <t< td=""><td></td><td></td><td>7</td><td></td></t<>			7	
 9 and the degree that the company wants to do it. The 10 one issue that you get can get into, kind of, a 11 concern about is when the larger company decides to 12 outsource that function to someone. You have to be 13 target fill there to make sure that's not going to 14 your auditor. 13 MR, SCATES: David Shedlarz. 16 MR, SCATES: David Shedlarz. 17 appreciate, this is a complex undertaking, and one 18 which is critically important to get right. And having 19 the expertise on hand to do that properly, in terms of 10 maintaining, as some cited earlier, the integrity of 21 the financial statements, is clearly one of the 22 objectives. 23 For a large firm, like Pfizer, we have the 24 internal resources, as Lynn has outlined, to do that 25 ro our own account. And so we have a fairly large Page 35 1 staff that has a high degree of specialization and 2 capability in the global tax matters that touch us, 3 given the nature of our worldwide operations. 4 It also can imagine, as Lynn has highlighted, 5 that, for smaller and mid-sized firms, 10 indealing with these tax matters, and also in terms of 11 can well imagine that, for smaller and mid-sized firms, 12 can well inagine that, for smaller and mid-sized firms, 13 is more evenly distributed, in terms of pople who 14 have the expertise in blace to balance our tagainst the complexities which are inherent 10 in dealing with these tax matters, and also in terms of 11 ensuring the integrity of the financial statements. I 12 can well imagine that, for smaller and mid-sized firms, 13 kard first these are maters, and also in terms of 14 have the expertise in this particular area, including 15 more evenly distributed, in terms of people who 16 accounting fir	8		8	
11 concern about is when the larger company decides to 12 outsource that function to someone. You have to be 13 concern about is when the larger company decides to 14 concern about is when the larger company decides to 15 MR. SCATES: David Shedlarz. 16 MR. SCATES: David Shedlarz. 17 appreciate, this is a complex undertaking, and one 18 were conclusted in the expersise in hand to do that properly, in terms of 19 the expertise on hand to do that properly, in terms of 20 objectives. 21 the financial statements, is clearly one of the 23 For a large firm, like Pfizer, we have the 24 internal resources, as Lynn has outlined, to do that 25 represent the CFA Institute, formerly known as the 24 ataf that has a high degree of specialization and 2 capability in the global tax matters that touch us, 3 given the nature of our worldwide operations. 1 cantered financial-analyst designation. 2 uages that, for smaller and mid-sized firms, 3 tastaff that has a high degree of specialization and 2 cawel inagine that, for sma	9	and the degree that the company wants to do it. The	9	the past, it's been the auditor who's in there and has
12 outsource that function to someone. You have to be 13 very careful there to make sure that's not going to 14 your auditor. 15 MR. SCATES: David Shedlarz. 16 MR. SCATES: David Shedlarz. 17 appreciate, this is a complex undertaking, and one 18 which is critically important to get right. And having 19 the spectise on hand to do that properly, in terms of 20 maintaining, as someone cited earlier, the integrity of 21 the financial statements, is clearly one of the 20 objectives. 23 For a large firm, like Pfizer, we have the 24 internal resources, as J. Lynn has outlined, to do that 25 for our own account. And so we have a fairly large Page 37 1 staff that has a high degree of specialization and 2 capability in the global tax matters that touch us, 3 given the nature of our wordivide operations. 4 I also can imagine, as Lynn has highlighted, 5 that, for smaller and mid-sized firms, 10 indealing with these tax matters, and also in terms of 112 can well imagine tha	10	one issue that you get can get into, kind of, a	10	taken a look at the numbers, and has the responsibility
13very careful there to make sure that's not going to13And I think there's a very clear ecognition that there14your auditor.13And I think there's a very clear ecognition that there15MR. SCATES: David Shedlarz.14is a size difference. Large companies don't have that16MR. SCATES: Now all can probably16companies don't have the small17appreciation that properly, in terms of16companies don't have the size of the company, not the firm.18which is critically important to get right. And having19depends on the size of the company, not the firm.20objectives.21MS. WALTERS: Fat Walters.21the financial statements, is clearly one of the23MS. WALTERS: Fat Walters.23For a large firm, like Pfizer, we have the24internal resources, as Lym has outlined, to do that25for our own account. And so we have a fairly large21MS. WALTERS: The Walters.24internal resources, as Lym has outlined, to do that23Ansociation for Investment Mangement and Research. We25arad professional sord wide operations.1chartered financial-analyst designation.26talso can imagine, as Lym has highlighted,1chartered financial-analyst designation.3tis more evenly distributed, in terms of1chartered financial-analyst designation.3tis more evenly distributed, in terms of people who1chartered financial-analyst designation.18is more evenly distributed, in terms of people who1 <td>11</td> <td>concern about is when the larger company decides to</td> <td>11</td> <td>to attest to the accuracy of the numbers in the</td>	11	concern about is when the larger company decides to	11	to attest to the accuracy of the numbers in the
14 your auditor. 15 MR. SCATES: David Shedlarz. 16 MR. SHEDLARZ: As we all can probably 17 appreciate, this is a complex undertaking, and one 18 which is critically important to get right. And having 19 the expertise on hand to do that properly, in terms of 20 maintaining, as someone cited earlier, the integrity of 21 the financial statements, is clearly one of the 22 objectives. 23 For a large firm, like Pfizer, we have the 24 internal resources, as Lynn has outlined, to do that 25 for our own account. And so we have a fairly large 7 regast 7 staff that has a high degree of specialization and 2 capability in the global tax matters that touch us, 3 given the nature of our worldwide operations. 4 I also can imagine, as Lynn has highlighted, 5 that, for smaller and mid-sized companies, this is a 6 difficult undertaking. And I think it's important, as 7 we go through this, to understand that it's critically 8 important of the routside accounting firm. 10 indea	12		12	financial statements. They would rely on the auditor.
15MR. SCATES: David Shedlarz. MR. SHEDLARZ: As we all can probably appreciate, this is a complex undertaking, and one 18 which is critically important to get right. And having 19 the expertise on hand to do that properly, in terms of omaintaining, as someone cited earlier, the integrity of 21 the financial statements, is clearly one of the 23 For a large firm, like Pfizer, we have the 24 internal resources, as Lynn has outlined, to do that 25 for our own account. And so we have a fairly large15 reliance on the aditor or no someone else. The small companies dn't have the expertise, frankly, to get it done right. And if we want proper compliance with the tat alws, they need help from someplace. So it really depends on the size of the company, not the firm. 20 MR. SCATES: Pat Walters. I 21 the financial statements, is clearly one of the 23 For a large firm, like Pfizer, we have the 24 internal resources, as Lynn has outlined, to do that 25 for our own account. And so we have a fairly large15 reliance on the aditor or no someone else. The small companies dn't have the expertise. Finally, to get it done right. And if we want proper compliance with the tassociation for Investment Management and Research. We 24 are a professional organization of approximately 70.000 25 investment professional organization of approximately 70.000 25 investment professional organization. 2 Usually, I have lots of opinions about the 3 questions before me. Today, I feel like I'm going to 4 have a lot more questions, although, I would expect, by the 6 end of the day. I'll have a leve opinions. 7 There seems to be an assumption in the answers that have been given, with respect to this 9 particular question, that the third party or external 10 rodening with these tax matters, and also in terms of 11 ensuring the integrity of the financial statements. I 12 can well i		very careful there to make sure that's not going to	13	
16MR. SHEDLARZ: As we all can probably appreciate, this is a complex undertaking, and one which is critically important to get right. And having the expertise on hand to do that properly, in terms of objectives.16companies don't have the expertise, frankly, to get it done right. And if we want proper compliance with the It as cause. So it really depends on the size of the company, not the firm.20maintaining, as someone cited carlier, the integrity of 21 the financial statements, is clearly one of the objectives.16companies don't have the expertise on hand to do that properly, in terms of poptions.16companies don't have the actor of our own account. And so we have a fairly large20Tor a large firm, like Pfizer, we have the internal resources, as Lynn has outlined, to do that 2 capability in the global tax matters that touch us, 3 given the nature of our worldwide operations.11chartered financial-analyst designation.231staff that has a high degree of specialization and 2 capability in the global tax matters that touch us, 3 given the nature of our worldwide operations.1chartered financial-analyst designation.24I also can imagine, as Lynn has highlighted, that, for smaller and mid-sized to palance out against the complexities in place to plalance out against the complexities which are inherent 101have a lot more questions for people around this table that, if simoria al statements. I can well imagine that, for smaller and mid-sized firms, if is more evenly distributed, in terms of people who have the expertise in this particular area, including the participation of their outside accounting firm.101016MR, SCATES: Permit me				
17appreciate, this is a complex undertaking, and one17done right. And having18which is critically important to get right. And having16the financial statements is clearly orporpty, in trems of20maintaining, as someone cited earlier, the integrity ofthe financial statements, is clearly one of the17done right. And heving21the financial statements, is clearly one of the18Was, SchTES: Pat Walters.1023For a large firm, like Pfizer, we have the23Association for Investment Management and Research. We24internal resources, as Lynn has outlined, to do that2represent the CFA Institute, formerly known as the25Tor our own account. And so we have a fairly large2MR. SCATES: Pat Walters.26Labo can imagine, as Lynn has highlighted,1chartered financial-analyst designation.2capability in the global tax matters that touch us,2Usually, I have lots of opinions about the3given the nature of our worldwide operations.2Usually, I have lots of opinions about the4taks on imagine, as Lynn has highlighted,5that, for smaller and mid-sized firms,15that, for smaller and mid-sized firms,2Usually, I have lots of opinions about the6eind fifticult undertaking. And I think it's important, as7There seems to be an assumption in the8asocanting with these tax matters, and also in terms of11accounting imm.10in dealing with these tax matters, and also in terms of12acco				
 18 which is critically important to get right. And having the expertise on hand to do that properly, in terms of maintaining, as someone cited earlier, the integrity of the financial statements, is clearly one of the 20 objectives. 18 tax laws, they need help from someplace. So it really 19 depends on the size of the company, not the firm. 20 MR. SCATES: Pat Walters. I 18 tax laws, they need help from someplace. So it really 19 depends on the size of the company, not the firm. 20 MR. SCATES: Pat Walters. I 18 tax laws, they need help from someplace. So it really 19 depends on the size of the company, not the firm. 20 MR. SCATES: Pat Walters. I 18 tax laws, they need help from someplace. So it really 19 depends on the size of the company, not the firm. 20 MR. SCATES: Pat Walters. I 19 the participation of their outside companies, this is a it's more evenly distributed, in terms of people who have the right expertise in the integrity of the financial statements. I 11 can well imagine that, for smaller and mid-sized firms, 13 it's more evenly distributed, in terms of people who thave the expertise in this topic here. Do the asouring firm? Does that have an impact, the size of the accounting firm? 11 MR. SCATES: No, the actual accounting firm. 22 of the assuer? 23 MR. SCATES: No, the actual accounting firm. 24 Jim Brown. 				
19the expertise on hand to do that properly, in terms of maintaining, as someone cited earlier, the integrity of the financial statements, is clearly one of the objectives.19depends on the size of the company, not the firm. MR. SCATES: Pat Walters.20MR. SCATES: Pat Walters.11MS. WALTERS: Hi, I'm Pat Walters.1221MS. WALTERS: Hi, I'm Pat Walters.122122objectives.21MS. WALTERS: Hi, I'm Pat Walters.1223For a large firm, like Pfizer, we have the internal resources, as Lynn has outlined, to do that for our own account. And so we have a fairly large22Page 371staff that has a high degree of specialization and capability in the global tax matters that touch us, 3 given the nature of our worldwide operations.1chartered financial-analyst designation.2Lisco can imagine, as Lynn has highlighted, that, for smaller and mid-sized companies, this is a important to have the right expertise in place to 9 balance out against the complexities which are inherent 10 in dealing with these tax matters, and also in terms of paticipation of their outside accounting firm.1Chartered financial statements, 1 that participation of their outside accounting firm.13it's more evenly distributed, in terms of people who have the expertise in this particular aci, including the participation of their outside accounting firm.11professional swoking for a tax accountant.14MR. SCATES: No, the actual accounting firm vers18So in some sense, in response to a statement13the accounting firm?201114acase firm, firm				
 maintaining, as someone cited earlier, the integrity of the financial statements, is clearly one of the objectives. For a large firm, like Pfizer, we have the internal resources, as Lynn has outlined, to do that for our own account. And so we have a fairly large Page 35 staff that has a high degree of specialization and capability in the global tax matters that touch us, given the nature of our worldwide operations. I also can imagine, as Lynn has highlighted, that, for smaller and mid-sized companies, this is a difficult undertaking. And I think it's important, as we go through this, to understand that it's critically i mortant to have the right expertise in place to balance out against the complexities which are inherent 10 in dealing with these tax matters, and also in terms of 11 ensuring the integrity of the financial statements. I can well imagine that, for smaller and mid-sized firms. it's more evenly distributed, in terms of people who have the expertise in this particular area, including the participation of their outside accounting firm. MR, SCATES: No, the actual accounting firm? MR, SCATES: No, the actual accounting firm or the size of the accounting firm? MR, SCATES: No, the actual accounting firm or the size of the accounting firm? MR, SCATES: No, the actual accounting firm or the size of the fissuer? MR, SCATES: No, the actual accounting firm or the size of the fissuer? MR, SCATES: No, the actual accounting firm or the size of the issuer? MR, SCATES: No, the actual accounting firm or the size of the accounting firm? MR, SCATES: No, the actual accounting firm or the size of the fissuer? MR, SCATES: No, the actual accounting firm or the size of the accounting firm? MR, SCATES: No, the actual accounting firm or the size of the fissuer? MR, SCATES: No, the actual accounting firm or the size of the fissuer? MR, SCATES: No, the actual				
21 the financial statements, is clearly one of the 21 MS. WALTERS: Hi, I'm Pat Walters. I 22 objectives. 21 represent the CFA Institute, formerly known as the 23 For a large firm, like Pfizer, we have the 21 represent the CFA Institute, formerly known as the 24 internal resources, as Lynn has outlined, to do that 25 sassociation for Investment Management and Research. We 25 Page 35 Page 37 1 staff that has a high degree of specialization and 2 Usually, I have lots of opinions about the 2 usetions before me. Today, I feel like I'm going to 4 4 4 I also can imagine, as Lynn has highlighted, 5 than I have options, although, I would expect, by the 6 difficult undertaking. And I think it's important, as 7 There seems to be an assumption in the 8 answers that have been given, with respect to this 9 particular question, that the third party or external 10 in dealing with these tax matters, and also in terms of 1 accounting experience I have, personally, other than 11 can well imagine that, for smaller and mid-sized firms, 1 tacaching accounting its woric exeron this topic here. Do the <t< td=""><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></t<>				
 22 objectives. 23 For a large firm, like Pfizer, we have the 24 internal resources, as Lynn has outlined, to do that 25 for our own account. And so we have a fairly large 26 represent the CFA Institute, formerly known as the 27 Association for Investment Management and Research. We 28 are a professional organization of approximately 70,000 29 investment professionals worldwide. We award the 20 Page 37 21 staff that has a high degree of specialization and 2 capability in the global tax matters that touch us, 3 given the nature of our worldwide operations. 4 I also can imagine, as Lynn has highlighted, 5 that, for smaller and mid-sized companies, this is a 6 difficult undertaking. And I think it's rimortant, as 7 we go through this, to understand that it's critically 8 important to have the right expertise in place to 9 balance out against the complexities which are inherent 10 in dealing with these tax matters, and also in terms of 11 ensuring the integrity of the financial statements. I 12 can well imagine that, for smaller and mid-sized firms, 14 if more evenly distributed, in terms of people who 14 have the expertise in this particular area, including 15 the participation of their outside accounting firm. 16 MR. SCATES: Permit me to ask another 19 accounting firm? 21 MR. GAGNON: The size of the firm or the size of 22 of the issuer? 23 MR. SCATES: No, the actual accounting firm. 24 Jim Brown. 				
23For a large firm, like Pfizer, we have the internal resources, as Lynn has outlined, to do that for our own account. And so we have a fairly large23Association for Investment Management and Research. We are a professional organization of approximately 70,000 investment professionals worldwide. We award thePage 351staff that has a high degree of specialization and capability in the global tax matters that touch us, given the nature of our worldwide operations. I also can imagine, as Lynn has highlighted, that, for smaller and mid-sized companies, this is a 6 difficult undertaking. And I think it's important, as we go through this, to understand that it's critically balance out against the complexities which are inherent in dealing with these tax matters, and also in terms of ensuring the integrity of the financial statements. I 12 can well imagine that, for smaller and mid-sized firms, it's more evenly distributed, in terms of people who tha we the expertise in this particular area, including the participation of their outside accounting firm.23Association for Investment Management and Research. We are a professional sworldwide. We award the 2512capability in the global tax matters that touch us, difficult undertaking. And I think it's important, as we go through this, to understra, and also in terms of ensuring the integrity of the financial statements. I tax accounting firm.112can well inage in the sate, and also in terms of ensuring the integrity of the financial statements. I tax accounting firm?112MR. SCATES: Permit me to ask another question alog these - on this topic here. Do the accounting firm?113MR. SCATES: No, the actual accounting firm. 24<				
24internal resources, as Lynn has outlined, to do that for our own account. And so we have a fairly large24are a professional organization of approximately 70,000 investment professionals worldwide. We award the25Page 35Page 371staff that has a high degree of specialization and capability in the global tax matters that touch us, given the nature of our worldwide operations.1chartered financial-analyst designation.3given the nature of our worldwide operations.1chartered financial-analyst designation.4I also can imagine, as Lynn has highlighted, that, for smaller and mid-sized companies, this is a difficult undertaking. And I think it's important, as we go through this, to understand that it's critically1chartered financial-analyst designation.7we go through this, to understand that it's critically3uestions before me. Today, I feel like I'm going to thave a lot more questions for people around this table that and the vapertise in place to balance out against the complexities which are inherent to in dealing with these tax matters, and also in terms of resuring the integrity of the financial statements. I the particular one their outside accounting firm.7There seems to be an assumption in the answers to these questions depend on the size of the taccounting firm?16MR. SCATES: Permit me to ask another question along these on this topic here. Do the answers to these questions depend on the size of the faccounting firm?1121MR. GAGNON: The size of the firm or the size of the accounting firm?1822MR. SCATES: No, the actual accounting firm. Jim Brown.19 </td <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td>				
25for our own account. And so we have a fairly large25investment professionals worldwide. We award thePage 35Page 371staff that has a high degree of specialization and1chartered financial-analyst designation.2capability in the global tax matters that touch us,13given the nature of our worldwide operations.14I also can imagine, as Lynn has highlighted,15that, for smaller and mid-sized companies, this is a66difficult undertaking. And I think it's important, as67we go through this, to understand that it's critically78balance out against the complexities which are inherent910in dealing with these tax matters, and also in terms of711can well imagine that, for smaller and mid-sized firms,712can well imagine that, for smaller and mid-sized firms,1114have the expertise in this particular area, including1515the participation of their outside accounting firm.1116MR. SCATES: Permit me to ask another1617question along these on this topic here. Do the1818answers to these questions depend on the size of the1819by a gentleman across the room from me, whose name I20MR. SCATES: No, the actual accounting firm.2021MR. SCATES: No, the actual accounting firm.2122of the issuer?2323MR. SCATES: No, the actual accounting firm.				
Page 35Page 371staff that has a high degree of specialization and capability in the global tax matters that touch us, given the nature of our worldwide operations.1chartered financial-analyst designation.2Iso can imagine, as Lynn has highlighted, that, for smaller and mid-sized companies, this is a 61chartered financial-analyst designation.3I also can imagine, as Lynn has highlighted, that, for smaller and mid-sized companies, this is a 61chartered financial-analyst designation.4I also can imagine, as Lynn has highlighted, that, for smaller and mid-sized companies, this is a 61chartered financial-analyst designation.7We go through this, to understand that it's critically in dealing with these tax matters, and also in terms of balance out against the complexities which are inherent 107There seems to be an assumption in the answers that have been given, with respect to this particular question, that the third party or external 1010role submit of the financial statements. I 1211your tax returns must be the audit firm. The only accounting itrm?11two the expertise in this particular area, including 1511to only did that until he got his CPA, and then he went to 1716MR. SCATES: Permit me to ask another 1918So in some sense, in response to a statement 1919by a gentleman across the room from me, whose name I 202021MR. GAGNON: The size of the firm or the size 211822MR. SCATES: No, the actual accounting firm. 241824MR. SC				
 1 staff that has a high degree of specialization and 2 capability in the global tax matters that touch us, 3 given the nature of our worldwide operations. 4 I also can imagine, as Lynn has highlighted, 5 that, for smaller and mid-sized companies, this is a 6 difficult undertaking. And I think it's important, as 7 we go through this, to understand that it's critically 8 important to have the right expertise in place to 9 balance out against the complexities which are inherent 10 in dealing with these tax matters, and also in terms of 11 chartered financial-analyst designation. 2 Usually, I have lots of opinions about the 3 questions before me. Today, I feel like I'm going to have a lot more questions for people around this table 5 than I have opinions. 7 There seems to be an assumption in the answers that have bare given, with respect to this 9 particular question, that the third party or external 10 professionals who are assisting the issuer in preparing 11 chartered financial-analyst designation. 2 Usually, I have lots of opinions about the 3 questions before me. Today, I feel like I'm going to 4 have a lot more questions for people around this table 5 than I have opinions. 7 There seems to be an assumption in the answers that have been given, with respect to this 9 particular question, that the third party or external 10 professionals who are assisting the issuer in preparing 11 the participation of their outside accounting firm. 13 the participation of their outside accounting firm. 14 have the expertise in this particular area, including 15 the participation of the size of the 16 MR. SCATES: Permit me to ask another 17 do the assuer? 18 answers to these questions depend on the size of the 	23	for our own account. And so we have a fairly large	23	investment professionals worldwide. We award the
 1 staff that has a high degree of specialization and 2 capability in the global tax matters that touch us, 3 given the nature of our worldwide operations. 4 I also can imagine, as Lynn has highlighted, 5 that, for smaller and mid-sized companies, this is a 6 difficult undertaking. And I think it's important, as 7 we go through this, to understand that it's critically 8 important to have the right expertise in place to 9 balance out against the complexities which are inherent 10 in dealing with these tax matters, and also in terms of 11 chartered financial-analyst designation. 2 Usually, I have lots of opinions about the 3 questions before me. Today, I feel like I'm going to have a lot more questions for people around this table 5 than I have opinions. 7 There seems to be an assumption in the answers that have bare given, with respect to this 9 particular question, that the third party or external 10 professionals who are assisting the issuer in preparing 11 chartered financial-analyst designation. 2 Usually, I have lots of opinions about the 3 questions before me. Today, I feel like I'm going to 4 have a lot more questions for people around this table 5 than I have opinions. 7 There seems to be an assumption in the answers that have been given, with respect to this 9 particular question, that the third party or external 10 professionals who are assisting the issuer in preparing 11 the participation of their outside accounting firm. 13 the participation of their outside accounting firm. 14 have the expertise in this particular area, including 15 the participation of the size of the 16 MR. SCATES: Permit me to ask another 17 do the assuer? 18 answers to these questions depend on the size of the 		Page 35		Page 37
 2 capability in the global tax matters that touch us, 3 given the nature of our worldwide operations. 4 I also can imagine, as Lynn has highlighted, 5 that, for smaller and mid-sized companies, this is a 6 difficult undertaking. And I think it's important, as 7 we go through this, to understand that it's critically 8 important to have the right expertise in place to 9 balance out against the complexities which are inherent 10 in dealing with these tax matters, and also in terms of 11 ensuring the integrity of the financial statements. I 12 can well imagine that, for smaller and mid-sized firms, 13 it's more evenly distributed, in terms of people who 14 have the expertise in this particular area, including 15 the participation of their outside accounting firm. 16 MR. SCATES: Permit me to ask another 17 question along these on this topic here. Do the answers to these questions depend on the size of 10 the accounting firm? 21 MR. GAGNON: The size of the firm or the size 22 of the issuer? 23 MR. SCATES: No, the actual accounting firm. 24 Jim Brown. 24 Jim Brown. 	1	•	1	· · · · ·
 3 given the nature of our worldwide operations. 4 I also can imagine, as Lynn has highlighted, 5 that, for smaller and mid-sized companies, this is a 6 difficult undertaking. And I think it's important, as 7 we go through this, to understand that it's critically 8 important to have the right expertise in place to 9 balance out against the complexities which are inherent 10 in dealing with these tax matters, and also in terms of 11 ensuring the integrity of the financial statements. I 12 can well imagine that, for smaller and mid-sized firms, 13 it's more evenly distributed, in terms of people who 14 have the expertise in this particular area, including 15 the participation of their outside accounting firm. 16 MR. SCATES: Permit me to ask another 19 accounting firm? 20 the accounting firm? 21 MR. GAGNON: The size of the firm or the size 22 of the issuer? 23 MR. SCATES: No, the actual accounting firm. 24 Jim Brown. 3 questions before me. Today, I feel like I'm going to 4 have a lot more questions for people around this table 4 have opinions, although, I would expect, by the end of the day, I'll have a few opinions. 7 There seems to be an assumption in the answers to the expertise in this particular area, including 15 the participation of their outside accounting firm. 20 the accounting firm? 21 MR. GAGNON: The size of the firm or the size 22 of the issuer? 23 MR. SCATES: No, the actual accounting firm. 24 Jim Brown. 				
4I also can imagine, as Lynn has highlighted, 54have a lot more questions for people around this table5that, for smaller and mid-sized companies, this is a 6difficult undertaking. And I think it's important, as 74have a lot more questions for people around this table6difficult undertaking. And I think it's important, as 7we go through this, to understand that it's critically 85than I have opinions, although, I would expect, by the end of the day, I'll have a few opinions.7we go through this, to understand that it's critically 87There seems to be an assumption in the 88important to have the right expertise in place to 99answers that have been given, with respect to this 99balance out against the complexities which are inherent 10in dealing with these tax matters, and also in terms of 11711ensuring the integrity of the financial statements. I 1210professionals who are assisting the issuer in preparing 1112can well imagine that, for smaller and mid-sized firms, 1311your tax returns must be the audit firm. The only 1213it's more evenly distributed, in terms of people who the have the expertise in this particular area, including 1511your tax returns must be the audit firm. The only 1214have the expertise in of their outside accounting firm.16MR. SCATES: Permit me to ask another 171116MR. GAGNON: The size of the firm or the size 22of the issuer?18So in some sense, in response to a statement 191				
 5 that, for smaller and mid-sized companies, this is a 6 difficult undertaking. And I think it's important, as 7 we go through this, to understand that it's critically 8 important to have the right expertise in place to 9 balance out against the complexities which are inherent 10 in dealing with these tax matters, and also in terms of 11 ensuring the integrity of the financial statements. I 12 can well imagine that, for smaller and mid-sized firms, 13 it's more evenly distributed, in terms of people who 14 have the expertise in this particular area, including 15 the participation of their outside accounting firm. 16 MR. SCATES: Permit me to ask another 17 question along these on this topic here. Do the 18 answers to these questions depend on the size of 19 accounting firm? 21 MR. GAGNON: The size of the firm or the size 22 of the issuer? 23 MR. SCATES: No, the actual accounting firm. 24 Jim Brown. 5 than I have opinions, although, I would expect, by the end of the day, I'l have a few opinions. 7 There seems to be an assumption in the answers to the supervise in this particular area, including 15 the participation of their outside accounting firm. 16 MR. SCATES: No, the actual accounting firm. 21 MR. GAGNON: The size of the firm or the size 22 of the issuer? 23 MR. SCATES: No, the actual accounting firm. 24 Jim Brown. 25 than I have opinions, although, I would expect, by the 26 end of the day, I'l have a few opinions. 27 There seems to be an assumption in the 28 answers that have opinions attements of people who know tax, and they have people who know how 24 Jim Brown. 				
 6 difficult undertaking. And I think it's important, as 7 we go through this, to understand that it's critically 8 important to have the right expertise in place to 9 balance out against the complexities which are inherent 10 in dealing with these tax matters, and also in terms of 11 ensuring the integrity of the financial statements. I 12 can well imagine that, for smaller and mid-sized firms, 13 it's more evenly distributed, in terms of people who 14 have the expertise in this particular area, including 15 the participation of their outside accounting firm. 16 MR. SCATES: Permit me to ask another 17 question along these on this topic here. Do the answers to these questions depend on the size of 20 the accounting firm? 21 MR. GAGNON: The size of the firm or the size 23 MR. SCATES: No, the actual accounting firm. 24 Jim Brown. 6 end of the day, I'll have a few opinions. 7 There seems to be an assumption in the answers that have been given, with respect to this 9 particular question, that the third party or external 10 professionals who are assisting the issuer in preparing 11 your tax returns must be the audit firm. 12 accounting size of the 13 atteracting accounting firm? 24 Jim Brown. 				
 7 we go through this, to understand that it's critically 8 important to have the right expertise in place to 9 balance out against the complexities which are inherent 10 in dealing with these tax matters, and also in terms of 11 ensuring the integrity of the financial statements. I 12 can well imagine that, for smaller and mid-sized firms, 13 it's more evenly distributed, in terms of people who 14 have the expertise in this particular area, including 15 the participation of their outside accounting firm. 16 MR. SCATES: Permit me to ask another 17 question along these on this topic here. Do the 18 answers to these questions depend on the size of 19 accounting firm? 21 MR. GAGNON: The size of the firm or the size 23 MR. SCATES: No, the actual accounting firm. 24 Jim Brown. 7 There seems to be an assumption in the 8 answers that have been given, with respect to this 9 particular question, that the third party or external 10 professionals who are assisting the issuer in preparing 11 your tax returns must be the audit firm. The only 12 accounting experience I have, personally, other than 13 teaching accounting, is working for a tax accountant. 14 This tax accountant did nothing but taxes, and he would 15 shudder at the thought of having to do an audit. He 16 only did that until he got his CPA, and then he went to 17 duestion along firm? 21 MR. GAGNON: The size of the firm or the size 23 MR. SCATES: No, the actual accounting firm. 24 Jim Brown. 				
 8 important to have the right expertise in place to 9 balance out against the complexities which are inherent 10 in dealing with these tax matters, and also in terms of 11 ensuring the integrity of the financial statements. I 12 can well imagine that, for smaller and mid-sized firms, 13 it's more evenly distributed, in terms of people who 14 have the expertise in this particular area, including 15 the participation of their outside accounting firm. 16 MR. SCATES: Permit me to ask another 17 question along these on this topic here. Do the 18 answers to these questions depend on the size of the 19 accounting firm? 21 MR. GAGNON: The size of the firm or the size 23 MR. SCATES: No, the actual accounting firm. 24 Jim Brown. 8 answers that have been given, with respect to this 9 particular question, that the third party or external 10 professionals who are assisting the issuer in preparing 11 your tax returns must be the audit firm. The only 12 accounting experience I have, personally, other than 13 teaching accounting, is working for a tax accountant. 14 This tax accountant did nothing but taxes, and he would 15 shudder at the thought of having to do an audit. He 16 only did that until he got his CPA, and then he went to 17 do what he thought, what was interesting. 18 So in some sense, in response to a statement 19 by a gentleman across the room from me, whose name I 20 can't read from here, I agree that audit firms or 21 MR. SCATES: No, the actual accounting firm. 23 MR. SCATES: No, the actual accounting firm. 24 Jim Brown. 				
 9 balance out against the complexities which are inherent in dealing with these tax matters, and also in terms of ensuring the integrity of the financial statements. I 12 can well imagine that, for smaller and mid-sized firms, 13 it's more evenly distributed, in terms of people who 14 have the expertise in this particular area, including 15 the participation of their outside accounting firm. 16 MR. SCATES: Permit me to ask another 17 question along these on this topic here. Do the 18 answers to these questions depend on the size of the 19 accounting firm? 21 MR. GAGNON: The size of the firm or the size 23 MR. SCATES: No, the actual accounting firm. 24 Jim Brown. 9 particular question, that the third party or external 10 professionals who are assisting the issuer in preparing 10 your tax returns must be the audit firm. The only 12 accounting experience I have, personally, other than 13 teaching accounting, is working for a tax accountant. 14 This tax accountant did nothing but taxes, and he would 15 shudder at the thought of having to do an audit. He 16 only did that until he got his CPA, and then he went to 17 do what he thought, what was interesting. 18 So in some sense, in response to a statement 19 by a gentleman across the room from me, whose name I 20 can't read from here, I agree that audit firms or 21 accounting firm? 22 have people who know tax, and they have people who know 23 MR. SCATES: No, the actual accounting firm. 24 Jim Brown. 	-			
10in dealing with these tax matters, and also in terms of ensuring the integrity of the financial statements. I can well imagine that, for smaller and mid-sized firms, it's more evenly distributed, in terms of people who have the expertise in this particular area, including the participation of their outside accounting firm.10professionals who are assisting the issuer in preparing your tax returns must be the audit firm. The only 				U
 ensuring the integrity of the financial statements. I can well imagine that, for smaller and mid-sized firms, it's more evenly distributed, in terms of people who have the expertise in this particular area, including the participation of their outside accounting firm. MR. SCATES: Permit me to ask another question along these on this topic here. Do the answers to these questions depend on the size of the accounting firm? MR. GAGNON: The size of the firm or the size MR. SCATES: No, the actual accounting firm. MR. SCATES: No, the actual accounting firm. Jim Brown. 				
 12 can well imagine that, for smaller and mid-sized firms, 13 it's more evenly distributed, in terms of people who 14 have the expertise in this particular area, including 15 the participation of their outside accounting firm. 16 MR. SCATES: Permit me to ask another 17 question along these on this topic here. Do the 18 answers to these questions depend on the size of 19 accounting firm? 21 MR. GAGNON: The size of the firm or the size 22 of the issuer? 23 MR. SCATES: No, the actual accounting firm. 24 Jim Brown. 12 accounting experience I have, personally, other than 13 teaching accounting, is working for a tax accountant. 14 This tax accountant did nothing but taxes, and he would 15 shudder at the thought of having to do an audit. He 16 only did that until he got his CPA, and then he went to 17 do what he thought, what was interesting. 18 So in some sense, in response to a statement 19 by a gentleman across the room from me, whose name I 20 can't read from here, I agree that audit firms or 21 accounting firm. 23 MR. SCATES: No, the actual accounting firm. 24 Jim Brown. 				
 have the expertise in this particular area, including the participation of their outside accounting firm. MR. SCATES: Permit me to ask another question along these on this topic here. Do the answers to these questions depend on the size of the accounting firm? Does that have an impact, the size of the accounting firm? MR. GAGNON: The size of the firm or the size of the issuer? MR. SCATES: No, the actual accounting firm. Jim Brown. Have the expertise in this particular area, including the participation of their outside accounting firm. This tax accountant did nothing but taxes, and he would shudder at the thought of having to do an audit. He only did that until he got his CPA, and then he went to do what he thought, what was interesting. So in some sense, in response to a statement by a gentleman across the room from me, whose name I can't read from here, I agree that audit firms or accounting firms have lots of expertise in them. They have people who know tax, and they have people who know to do audits. Those people are generally not the same 	12		12	accounting experience I have, personally, other than
 the participation of their outside accounting firm. MR. SCATES: Permit me to ask another question along these on this topic here. Do the answers to these questions depend on the size of the accounting firm? Does that have an impact, the size of the accounting firm? MR. GAGNON: The size of the firm or the size of the issuer? MR. SCATES: No, the actual accounting firm. Jim Brown. the participation of their outside accounting firm. Jim Brown. the participation of their outside accounting firm. the participation of their outside accounting firm. the participation of their outside accounting firm. the accounting firm? the accounting firm? the accounting firm? the accounting firm or the size of the accounting firm? the accounting firm or the size of the accounting firm or the size of the firm or the size the accounting firm. the ac	13	it's more evenly distributed, in terms of people who	13	teaching accounting, is working for a tax accountant.
16MR. SCATES: Permit me to ask another16only did that until he got his CPA, and then he went to17question along these on this topic here. Do the16only did that until he got his CPA, and then he went to18answers to these questions depend on the size of the17do what he thought, what was interesting.19accounting firm?18So in some sense, in response to a statement10the accounting firm?19by a gentleman across the room from me, whose name I21MR. GAGNON: The size of the firm or the size20can't read from here, I agree that audit firms or23MR. SCATES: No, the actual accounting firm.23financial reporting, and they have people who know tax.24Jim Brown.24to do audits. Those people are generally not the same			14	
 question along these on this topic here. Do the answers to these questions depend on the size of the accounting firm? Does that have an impact, the size of the accounting firm? MR. GAGNON: The size of the firm or the size MR. SCATES: No, the actual accounting firm. Jim Brown. Mather thought, what was interesting. do what he thought, what was interesting. do what he thought, what was interesting. So in some sense, in response to a statement by a gentleman across the room from me, whose name I can't read from here, I agree that audit firms or accounting firms have lots of expertise in them. They have people who know tax, and they have people who know financial reporting, and they have people who know how to do audits. Those people are generally not the same 			15	
 18 answers to these questions depend on the size of the 19 accounting firm? Does that have an impact, the size of 20 the accounting firm? 21 MR. GAGNON: The size of the firm or the size 23 MR. SCATES: No, the actual accounting firm. 24 Jim Brown. 25 Anterior Content of the size of the firm or the size 26 Anterior Content of the size of the firm or the size 27 Anterior Content of the size of the firm or the size 28 Anterior Content of the size of the firm or the size 29 Anterior Content of the size of the firm or the size 20 Can't read from here, I agree that audit firms or 21 accounting firms have lots of expertise in them. They 22 have people who know tax, and they have people who know 23 MR. SCATES: No, the actual accounting firm. 24 Jim Brown. 				
 accounting firm? Does that have an impact, the size of the accounting firm? MR. GAGNON: The size of the firm or the size of the issuer? MR. SCATES: No, the actual accounting firm. Jim Brown. Jim Brown. by a gentleman across the room from me, whose name I can't read from here, I agree that audit firms or accounting firms have lots of expertise in them. They have people who know tax, and they have people who know financial reporting, and they have people who know how to do audits. Those people are generally not the same 				
 20 the accounting firm? 21 MR. GAGNON: The size of the firm or the size 22 of the issuer? 23 MR. SCATES: No, the actual accounting firm. 24 Jim Brown. 20 can't read from here, I agree that audit firms or 20 accounting firms have lots of expertise in them. They 21 have people who know tax, and they have people who know 22 to do audits. Those people are generally not the same 				
 MR. GAGNON: The size of the firm or the size of the issuer? of the issuer? MR. SCATES: No, the actual accounting firm. Jim Brown. MR. SCATES: No, the actual accounting firm. Jim Brown. MR. SCATES: No, the actual accounting firm. Jim Brown. MR. SCATES: No, the actual accounting firm. Jim Brown. MR. SCATES: No, the actual accounting firm. Jim Brown. MR. SCATES: No, the actual accounting firm. Jim Brown. MR. SCATES: No, the actual accounting firm. Jim Brown. MR. SCATES: No, the actual accounting firm. Jim Brown. MR. SCATES: No, the actual accounting firm. Jim Brown. MR. SCATES: No, the actual accounting firm. Jim Brown. MR. SCATES: No, the actual accounting firm. Jim Brown. J				
22of the issuer?22have people who know tax, and they have people who know23MR. SCATES: No, the actual accounting firm.23financial reporting, and they have people who know how24Jim Brown.24to do audits. Those people are generally not the same				
23MR. SCATES: No, the actual accounting firm.23financial reporting, and they have people who know how24Jim Brown.23for audits. Those people are generally not the same				
24Jim Brown.24to do audits. Those people are generally not the same				
123 IVIN. DRUWIN, JIII DIOWII, ALCIOWE UMZEK. 123 DEISON, AND THAT HOSE WHO SDEND THE FEADING THE				
	23	wik. BROWIN: Jilli Brown, at Crowe Chizek.	23	person, and that those who spend their time reading the

-	Washington, DC		
	Page 38		Page 40
$ \begin{array}{c} 1\\2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\\23\\24\end{array} $	Journal of Taxation really aren't good at answering audit questions, and aren't good at answering financial- reporting questions. They know how to do taxes. So it's a question for the people around the table who have been responding so far, Why can't a firm why can't an issuer contract with someone else, other than their auditor, to provide the expertise that they may need in preparing their tax returns? As an individual, I go out, and I have a tax accountant, and I have to rely on the fact that that person is a tax professional. If I wanted someone to do my audit, I don't see why that would have to be the same person. So I'd like a little elucidation from the auditors and tax accountants around the table. MR. SCATES: Mark Weinberger. MR. WEINBERGER: Thank you. Patricia, in answer to your question specifically, I guess, you know, I think it's a commonly held view that the registrars have to prepare their own statements, their tax accounts, and, for financial purposes, the auditors cannot prepare them and then audit them. And as was said already, in the larger companies, you're finding internal expertise that can do that. We are seeing, in the smaller	$ \begin{array}{c} 1\\2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\\23\\24\end{array} $	the schedules that form the basis of the return, itself. I think those are different activities and would have different rules. However, I will say that, in our firm, which is, you know, a substantial firm, we have a lot of auditors who are also very expert in tax services, and generally supervise both services for clients, whether they be issuers or not issuers. I think the smaller the firm, the more likely it is that the CPA wears more than one hat. I think the larger the firm, the more likely it is that you'd find yourself either in an auditing or a tax auditing and accounting or tax niche. So that's for what that's worth. MR. SCATES: The reference to the tax schedules is those schedules that are prepared in connection with a financial-statement audit. Scott Bayless. MR. BAYLESS: Scott Bayless, with Deloitte. Having participated with Lynn Turner in drafting the principles, I certainly endorse use of those principles. And I think, in our experience, we've seen that audit committees are using those principles in their evaluation of tax services. With respect to the issue of who's preparing
25	companies and smaller is not small, like five	25	the schedules and returns, I think it's important to
	Page 39		Page 41
$ \begin{array}{c} 1\\2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\\23\\24\\25\end{array} $	persons; smaller is a billion to five billion, we're talking lower-, you know, middle-market kind of companies are actually having to go out where they don't want to, or can't, spend the resources to have an internal resource to do that going out and finding a third party, and the third party is not their auditors. In many cases in all cases, I assume if they're going to have a third party, it's not their auditor. So there are actual firms that do this, specifically whether they're law firms or CPA firms or firms that do auditing for other clients that is going on in practice. MR. SCATES: Bruce Webb. MR. WEBB: Bruce Webb, McGladrey & Pullen. I think I'm the name Pat couldn't read. I would just like to, sort of, comment in response to Greg's question, and something that Pat said, regarding, you know, Does size of firm make a difference? I don't think size of firm necessarily makes a difference, in terms of whether or not the auditor prepares the tax schedules. And I'm a little confused, by the way, by the question, as to whether we're talking about schedules that are involved in doing the computation and making the provision for the financial statements, or whether we're talking about	$\begin{array}{c}1\\2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\\23\\24\\25\end{array}$	remember that, one, auditors are required, by their professional standards, to ensure that management has the appropriate expertise to do their own tax-return preparation, and that's an important element that the audit committee and the auditors take into consideration in consultation regarding the provision of services. Secondly, in terms of the importance of having the auditor involved in the tax services, is the notion that the auditor, by that involvement, enhances audit quality. And the consultations and the issues with respect to tax compliance are certainly issues that are everyday issues. They're not issues that can be decided once a year, at the end of the year, but that involve continuous consultation as the company undertakes transactions and business events during the year. And, although the tax expertise may differ by the size of the company, each company has particular issues that they need to seek out the professional advice of tax experts. The worst scenario that you could end up with, though, is a scenario in which the auditor, having been consulted at the end of the year by a third- party tax preparer, disagrees with that tax preparer's views, and ends up in a scenario where you have a

	Page 42		Page 44
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 3 3	financial-statement restatement or a difference in the application of taxes at a subsequent period of time. MR. SCATES: Lynn Turner. MR. TURNER: We just at Glass Lewis, we've done a couple surveys of tax services that relates to audit services, both on the Fortune 500 companies, as well as 1800 companies that go down below that, so you're getting pretty well into the Russell 3000, which would probably take you down to companies of a couple- hundred million in market caps. So you're starting to get down into from a public-company perspective, definitely smaller-sized companies, well beyond the Fortune 1,000, even. And some of our findings were interesting, in that I expected to actually see the smaller companies using their auditors more for tax services, because just my experience had indicated that was what I thought I would see. And yet when we actually ran the statistics, based on 2002 and 2003 data, that's not what we found. We found about a quarter of the Fortune 500 companies that we looked at we looked at 461 out of the 500, which were most of the public ones and the audit the tax work was very nominal, or zero, at about a quarter of those.	$ \begin{array}{c} 1\\2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\\23\\14\end{array} $	coming to the markets, frequently a client will come to us and say, "We're planning initial public offering. Our auditor is a local firm, doesn't have sophisticated auditing experience. And we would like you to consider being our auditor for our SEC work. But because we've had a long-term relationship with our local firm, we want them to continue to do the tax work." And that, of course, make sense. We find, though, after a number of years, the client typically will come to us and say, "We think we'd like you to do the tax work, too, because we think it would be more efficient. You understand us better, you have more insight into what we are doing." And so it tends to morph into where we actually begin to do both services. MR. SCATES: Barbara Roper. MS. ROPER: Just briefly responding to something Mr. Bayless said, I can actually imagine a worse scenario, which is that, at the end of the year, the auditor disagrees with the advice given by the tax expert, but doesn't say anything, because the tax expert's from his own firm, and to do so would be to call into question the work of his firm, which is why I
23 24 25	And I doubt anyone around the table is going to turn around and tell us that those audits that they were	23 24 25	think auditor independence is an important consideration for these services.
1	Page 43 doing on a quarter of those weren't high-quality	1	Page 45 MR. SCATES: Tom Ochsenschlager.
2 3 4 5	audits. So I don't know that you've got to do this to ensure a quality audit, because there are a quarter, and that percent is growing. But when we looked at that for the other 1800	2 3 4 5	MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: Yes, thank you. I'm Tom Ochsenschlager, with the AICPA. I'm the Vice President of Taxation. And previously, as recently as last year, I was with Grant Thornton for almost 25 years. So I've
6 7 8	companies, that number had gone up a little bit more, to about 31 percent were actually using their audit firm for very little or nominal tax work, and actually	6 7 8	had some practical experience, and also some experience from the association side of things. I just want to, sort of, circle back, tagging
9 10 11	the tax work on the 1800, as percentage of the audit fee, was lower than it was for the Fortune 500 companies. So it was not, quite frankly, what we	9 10 11 12	onto to what Scott had said a few moments ago, and also I think in response to what the issue that Pat had raised, that why we don't use why companies don't it's not better to use an outside consultant on tax
12 13 14 15	expected to find; and, if anything, not what you'd expect in relation to the Fortune 500 companies, who tend to have that expertise in-house. And the fact that you've got 500 over 550 of those companies that	12 13 14 15	matters, rather than the auditor. And Scott mentioned, and just to elaborate on that a bit, the advantage first of all, you can do that, of course, and many
16 17 18 19 20	use their auditor for nominal tax work out of about 1800 clearly indicates that you were able to do this without using your auditor to provide that expertise in- house. It's either that or we've got a lot of lousy audits out there, and I don't think we have a lot of	16 17 18 19 20	firms to, and there are statistics that we've alluded to here that show that that's an increasing trend, perhaps because audit committees are being more diligent in their duties, to use outside consultants. But so that's clearly a choice, and I think we'll
20 21 22 23	lousy audits out there. MR. SCATES: Paul Koren. MR. KOREN: I actually see that statistic	20 21 22 23	see it being made maybe more often in the future. But one of the primary reasons for using the auditor for these functions is the point that Scott
24	from another viewpoint. Anecdotally, since we're an	24	brought up, and that is that there's a continuous

	Page 46		Page 48
1	because they're required to do quarterly financial	1	for me to see how an audit partner wouldn't really rely
2	statements, there will be tax reviews that are done on	$\frac{2}{2}$	and use the expertise.
3 4	a quarterly basis, so issues tax issues will be much more likely to be spotted during the during the	3 4	I think there's also one last point of transparency, in the sense that where that is that
5	course of the examination by the auditor than they	5	expertise embedded in an organization, particularly in
6	would be if it was relied if we relied totally on	6	a when a when that organization is involved in
7	the management of the firm to spot the issues and then	7	the audit of a very large, complex, global
8	call in an outside third advisor.	8	organization, the transparency involved in the early
9	Now, when an audit firm does spot an issue, a	9	notice, the timely notice of issues, in terms of the
10	tax issue whether it be favorable or unfavorable for	10	audit process, also enhances the tax-reporting process.
11	the client during their quarterly reviews, they	11	So I think there's there is that benefit, as well.
12	would bring that up before the audit committee, and	12	MR. SCATES: Well, we have four more people
13	presumably the audit committee could then, even after	13	that would like to speak. We'll start with David
14	the issue has been identified, farm it out to a third	14	Shedlarz, and we'll conclude with Bruce Webb, and then
15	party, an independent third party. But the advantage	15	we'll move on with the next topic.
16	of having the auditor onboard with the tax expertise is	16	David.
17 18	that these issues are much more likely to be spotted	17 18	MR. SHEDLARZ: From the issuer's-community perspective, I guess I would second a lot of the things
10 19	much earlier in the process, and eliminate a lot of the year-end confusion, which Scott had referred to	18 19	that Mike just went through. In fact, I'd be pretty
20	earlier.	20	concerned if the outside audit firm didn't know, pretty
20	MR. SCATES: Mike Gagnon.	20	intimately, about the tax structure, especially of a
22	MR. GAGNON: Thank you.	22	global, complex concern. And that's not something you
23	The just want to address the statistics	23	can do from afar. There is great utility, in terms of
24	that Lynn mentioned a short while ago, where, I think,	24	certain tax advice, which is actually given to the
25	a quarter of large companies and about a almost a	25	company, that enhances the working knowledge, the
	Page 47		Page 49
1	third, 31 percent, of the, sort of, mid-cap companies	1	integrity, and the level of comfort we should all have,
2	do not use their auditor for tax services. Maybe	2	in terms of the ability to deal with inherited
3	unlike Lynn, I don't find that is particularly	3	complexity of tax matters, not only in the United
4	surprising. I don't think it impacts the point of	4	States, but also on a global basis. And so I think
5	enhancement of the audit process in auditor	5	there is a tremendous benefit here we can't lose sight
6	effectiveness where tax services are provided by an	6	of, we can't let the statistics run counter to, and
7	auditor, and it doesn't mean that, in the one quarter	7	that is the involvement of the outside accounting firm.
8	or one third that the audits are not effective. And I	8	And anything of this level of sophistication is highly desirable, in terms of getting the end result we all
9 10	know you weren't suggesting that. But it is enhanced. It's difficult for me to imagine an audit	9 10	want, and are all looking for, on an ongoing basis,
11	partner, who is responsible for the audited financial	11	which is transparency, timeliness, and integrity to the
12	statements, not relying upon tax expertise within the	12	accounting and financial statements.
13	global organization, particularly for large companies,	13	If my outside accounting firm is too far
14	where the environments are very, very complex, very	14	afield of what's going on, from a complex tax
15	difficult. And the transparency involved, where deeply	15	perspective, then I think their ability to deal with
16	credentialed experts in the area of taxation, in the	16	those dimensions is going to be significantly
17	many areas of taxation, in advising and helping and	17	curtailed. You could provide for those services on the
18	assisting the auditor in the audit process, has to	18	outside. I think, to a certain extent, you run the
19	enhance the audit process. And I think there's also an	19	consequence, in terms of not having as close an
20 21	efficiency point, from clients' perspective, where that expertise is also brought to bear from an organization	20 21	association that you need to have, in terms of understanding the inherent complexities of what goes
21	where there is deep knowledge, deep expertise of the	21	on, especially as it relates to global tax matters.
22	organization, and the two work together. So I wouldn't	22	MR. SCATES: Colleen Sayther.
24	I wouldn't suggest that the audit quality is	23	MS. SAYTHER: Thank you, Greg.
1	<i>66 </i>		······································
25	detracted when they're not involved, but it's difficult	25	First, I wanted to say that I think most

		1	
	Page 50		Page 52
1	companies agree that having auditor independence is	1	final word. We'll need to move on then.
2	important for a high-quality audit. Also, I think most	2	MR. WEBB: Bruce Webb, McGladrey & Pullen.
3	companies agree that having the auditor, as David so	3	I just wanted to follow up on a comment that
4	articulately put, perform some of the tax services,	4	Tom Ochsenschlager made. And I think it's important,
5	creates a better quality, and is more efficient.	5	as we deal with this subject matter, to recognize that
6	However, I think we may be confusing those	6	audits are done in a different fashion than they were
7	points with what the question says. And I think, Greg,	7	20 years ago, or perhaps even ten years ago. With the
8	when you mentioned that it's talking about tax schedules and related documentation associated with the	8	increased responsibility for management and the
9 10	financial statements, I know of no instance where the	9 10	auditors for the quarterly financial statements and the responsibility to assert and attest to the
10	audit firm would prepare the tax schedules associated	10	effectiveness of internal control over financial
12	with the financial statements, and then audit that. So	12	reporting, audits are becoming much more of a
13	I just wanted to make sure that we were clear. And I	13	continuous process. And an auditor is foolish if they
14	think Mark made that point earlier, that there is a	14	don't get out and examine, not only the accounting, but
15	definite I see a definite distinction between, you	15	the tax implications of transactions, sort of on a
16	know, other tax services and the preparation of	16	contemporaneous basis, as well as internal control.
17	schedules to support the financial statements.	17	And, clearly, the SEC independence standards, nor
18	MR. SCATES: Jim Brown.	18	standard number 2, neither preclude the auditor from
19	MR. BROWN: Jim Brown, Crowe Chizek.	19	consulting with the issuer or providing advice as to
20	I agree we've, sort of, perhaps, moved away	20	the application of accounting principles or advice as
21 22	from the issue up there that we see, about tax	21 22	to improvements that could be made in internal
22	schedules. But when we're talking about statistics, I guess you could look there's a lot of statistics out	22	accounting control. Similarly, I think providing advice as to the tax implications of specific
23 24	there, and you can argue that, well, the cup's half	23	transactions is part of that process.
25	full or the cup's half empty. Or, I guess, in the	25	MR. SCATES: Lynn Turner.
			5
	Page 51		Page 53
1	-	1	· · · · · ·
1 2	statistics that we heard a moment ago, the cup's two-	1 2	MR. TURNER: Just coming back to the question
	-		MR. TURNER: Just coming back to the question you asked about, Who does the schedules? Again, I have seen, on the smaller companies, where the auditor has
2 3 4	statistics that we heard a moment ago, the cup's two- thirds full and one-third empty in the relationships, because some companies do it, and have a successful audit, and others don't. Regardless of where the	2	MR. TURNER: Just coming back to the question you asked about, Who does the schedules? Again, I have seen, on the smaller companies, where the auditor has done the schedules and has done the tax accrual, and
2 3 4 5	statistics that we heard a moment ago, the cup's two- thirds full and one-third empty in the relationships, because some companies do it, and have a successful audit, and others don't. Regardless of where the statistics work out, I think we'll all be able to deal	2 3	MR. TURNER: Just coming back to the question you asked about, Who does the schedules? Again, I have seen, on the smaller companies, where the auditor has done the schedules and has done the tax accrual, and then has done the tax return, because the small company
2 3 4 5 6	statistics that we heard a moment ago, the cup's two- thirds full and one-third empty in the relationships, because some companies do it, and have a successful audit, and others don't. Regardless of where the statistics work out, I think we'll all be able to deal with whatever the circumstances are.	2 3 4 5 6	MR. TURNER: Just coming back to the question you asked about, Who does the schedules? Again, I have seen, on the smaller companies, where the auditor has done the schedules and has done the tax accrual, and then has done the tax return, because the small company just doesn't have that expertise in-house. So I think
2 3 4 5 6 7	statistics that we heard a moment ago, the cup's two- thirds full and one-third empty in the relationships, because some companies do it, and have a successful audit, and others don't. Regardless of where the statistics work out, I think we'll all be able to deal with whatever the circumstances are. But I did want to mention to throw some	2 3 4 5 6 7	MR. TURNER: Just coming back to the question you asked about, Who does the schedules? Again, I have seen, on the smaller companies, where the auditor has done the schedules and has done the tax accrual, and then has done the tax return, because the small company just doesn't have that expertise in-house. So I think it does vary by the size of the company as to how much
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	statistics that we heard a moment ago, the cup's two- thirds full and one-third empty in the relationships, because some companies do it, and have a successful audit, and others don't. Regardless of where the statistics work out, I think we'll all be able to deal with whatever the circumstances are. But I did want to mention to throw some more statistics in here. There's an interesting study	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	MR. TURNER: Just coming back to the question you asked about, Who does the schedules? Again, I have seen, on the smaller companies, where the auditor has done the schedules and has done the tax accrual, and then has done the tax return, because the small company just doesn't have that expertise in-house. So I think it does vary by the size of the company as to how much is done until they're able to get their own people on
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	statistics that we heard a moment ago, the cup's two- thirds full and one-third empty in the relationships, because some companies do it, and have a successful audit, and others don't. Regardless of where the statistics work out, I think we'll all be able to deal with whatever the circumstances are. But I did want to mention to throw some more statistics in here. There's an interesting study by three academicians that's coming out soon in a	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	MR. TURNER: Just coming back to the question you asked about, Who does the schedules? Again, I have seen, on the smaller companies, where the auditor has done the schedules and has done the tax accrual, and then has done the tax return, because the small company just doesn't have that expertise in-house. So I think it does vary by the size of the company as to how much is done until they're able to get their own people on staff that has that expertise.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	statistics that we heard a moment ago, the cup's two- thirds full and one-third empty in the relationships, because some companies do it, and have a successful audit, and others don't. Regardless of where the statistics work out, I think we'll all be able to deal with whatever the circumstances are. But I did want to mention to throw some more statistics in here. There's an interesting study by three academicians that's coming out soon in a journal, and they're well-respected academicians. They	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	MR. TURNER: Just coming back to the question you asked about, Who does the schedules? Again, I have seen, on the smaller companies, where the auditor has done the schedules and has done the tax accrual, and then has done the tax return, because the small company just doesn't have that expertise in-house. So I think it does vary by the size of the company as to how much is done until they're able to get their own people on staff that has that expertise. MR. GRADISON: Lynn, could you repeat that?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	statistics that we heard a moment ago, the cup's two- thirds full and one-third empty in the relationships, because some companies do it, and have a successful audit, and others don't. Regardless of where the statistics work out, I think we'll all be able to deal with whatever the circumstances are. But I did want to mention to throw some more statistics in here. There's an interesting study by three academicians that's coming out soon in a journal, and they're well-respected academicians. They actually came up with a conclusion here, and they said	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	MR. TURNER: Just coming back to the question you asked about, Who does the schedules? Again, I have seen, on the smaller companies, where the auditor has done the schedules and has done the tax accrual, and then has done the tax return, because the small company just doesn't have that expertise in-house. So I think it does vary by the size of the company as to how much is done until they're able to get their own people on staff that has that expertise. MR. GRADISON: Lynn, could you repeat that? I couldn't hear you. I couldn't hear
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	statistics that we heard a moment ago, the cup's two- thirds full and one-third empty in the relationships, because some companies do it, and have a successful audit, and others don't. Regardless of where the statistics work out, I think we'll all be able to deal with whatever the circumstances are. But I did want to mention to throw some more statistics in here. There's an interesting study by three academicians that's coming out soon in a journal, and they're well-respected academicians. They	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	MR. TURNER: Just coming back to the question you asked about, Who does the schedules? Again, I have seen, on the smaller companies, where the auditor has done the schedules and has done the tax accrual, and then has done the tax return, because the small company just doesn't have that expertise in-house. So I think it does vary by the size of the company as to how much is done until they're able to get their own people on staff that has that expertise. MR. GRADISON: Lynn, could you repeat that?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	statistics that we heard a moment ago, the cup's two- thirds full and one-third empty in the relationships, because some companies do it, and have a successful audit, and others don't. Regardless of where the statistics work out, I think we'll all be able to deal with whatever the circumstances are. But I did want to mention to throw some more statistics in here. There's an interesting study by three academicians that's coming out soon in a journal, and they're well-respected academicians. They actually came up with a conclusion here, and they said that if I can just read this "third, we find tax	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	MR. TURNER: Just coming back to the question you asked about, Who does the schedules? Again, I have seen, on the smaller companies, where the auditor has done the schedules and has done the tax accrual, and then has done the tax return, because the small company just doesn't have that expertise in-house. So I think it does vary by the size of the company as to how much is done until they're able to get their own people on staff that has that expertise. MR. GRADISON: Lynn, could you repeat that? I couldn't hear you. I couldn't hear MR. TURNER: I'd be happy to.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	statistics that we heard a moment ago, the cup's two- thirds full and one-third empty in the relationships, because some companies do it, and have a successful audit, and others don't. Regardless of where the statistics work out, I think we'll all be able to deal with whatever the circumstances are. But I did want to mention to throw some more statistics in here. There's an interesting study by three academicians that's coming out soon in a journal, and they're well-respected academicians. They actually came up with a conclusion here, and they said that if I can just read this "third, we find tax services fees are typically negatively associated with restatements, and that the association is statistically significant." What they mean by "negatively	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	MR. TURNER: Just coming back to the question you asked about, Who does the schedules? Again, I have seen, on the smaller companies, where the auditor has done the schedules and has done the tax accrual, and then has done the tax return, because the small company just doesn't have that expertise in-house. So I think it does vary by the size of the company as to how much is done until they're able to get their own people on staff that has that expertise. MR. GRADISON: Lynn, could you repeat that? I couldn't hear you. I couldn't hear MR. TURNER: I'd be happy to. (Laughter.) MR. TURNER: My and I apologize my experience has been, as you get into the smaller
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	statistics that we heard a moment ago, the cup's two- thirds full and one-third empty in the relationships, because some companies do it, and have a successful audit, and others don't. Regardless of where the statistics work out, I think we'll all be able to deal with whatever the circumstances are. But I did want to mention to throw some more statistics in here. There's an interesting study by three academicians that's coming out soon in a journal, and they're well-respected academicians. They actually came up with a conclusion here, and they said that if I can just read this "third, we find tax services fees are typically negatively associated with restatements, and that the association is statistically significant." What they mean by "negatively associated" is that the higher the tax-services fee,	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	MR. TURNER: Just coming back to the question you asked about, Who does the schedules? Again, I have seen, on the smaller companies, where the auditor has done the schedules and has done the tax accrual, and then has done the tax return, because the small company just doesn't have that expertise in-house. So I think it does vary by the size of the company as to how much is done until they're able to get their own people on staff that has that expertise. MR. GRADISON: Lynn, could you repeat that? I couldn't hear you. I couldn't hear MR. TURNER: I'd be happy to. (Laughter.) MR. TURNER: My and I apologize my experience has been, as you get into the smaller companies, including the smaller public companies
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	statistics that we heard a moment ago, the cup's two- thirds full and one-third empty in the relationships, because some companies do it, and have a successful audit, and others don't. Regardless of where the statistics work out, I think we'll all be able to deal with whatever the circumstances are. But I did want to mention to throw some more statistics in here. There's an interesting study by three academicians that's coming out soon in a journal, and they're well-respected academicians. They actually came up with a conclusion here, and they said that if I can just read this "third, we find tax services fees are typically negatively associated with restatements, and that the association is statistically significant." What they mean by "negatively associated" is that the higher the tax-services fee, the more tax services obtained, the fewer restatements	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	MR. TURNER: Just coming back to the question you asked about, Who does the schedules? Again, I have seen, on the smaller companies, where the auditor has done the schedules and has done the tax accrual, and then has done the tax return, because the small company just doesn't have that expertise in-house. So I think it does vary by the size of the company as to how much is done until they're able to get their own people on staff that has that expertise. MR. GRADISON: Lynn, could you repeat that? I couldn't hear you. I couldn't hear MR. TURNER: I'd be happy to. (Laughter.) MR. TURNER: My and I apologize my experience has been, as you get into the smaller companies, including the smaller public companies and keep in mind, your own annual report just said we
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	statistics that we heard a moment ago, the cup's two- thirds full and one-third empty in the relationships, because some companies do it, and have a successful audit, and others don't. Regardless of where the statistics work out, I think we'll all be able to deal with whatever the circumstances are. But I did want to mention to throw some more statistics in here. There's an interesting study by three academicians that's coming out soon in a journal, and they're well-respected academicians. They actually came up with a conclusion here, and they said that if I can just read this "third, we find tax services fees are typically negatively associated with restatements, and that the association is statistically significant." What they mean by "negatively associated" is that the higher the tax-services fee, the more tax services obtained, the fewer restatements in those companies. Said the other way, the companies	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	MR. TURNER: Just coming back to the question you asked about, Who does the schedules? Again, I have seen, on the smaller companies, where the auditor has done the schedules and has done the tax accrual, and then has done the tax return, because the small company just doesn't have that expertise in-house. So I think it does vary by the size of the company as to how much is done until they're able to get their own people on staff that has that expertise. MR. GRADISON: Lynn, could you repeat that? I couldn't hear you. I couldn't hear MR. TURNER: I'd be happy to. (Laughter.) MR. TURNER: My and I apologize my experience has been, as you get into the smaller companies, including the smaller public companies and keep in mind, your own annual report just said we have about 15,000 companies out there. By the time you
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	statistics that we heard a moment ago, the cup's two- thirds full and one-third empty in the relationships, because some companies do it, and have a successful audit, and others don't. Regardless of where the statistics work out, I think we'll all be able to deal with whatever the circumstances are. But I did want to mention to throw some more statistics in here. There's an interesting study by three academicians that's coming out soon in a journal, and they're well-respected academicians. They actually came up with a conclusion here, and they said that if I can just read this "third, we find tax services fees are typically negatively associated with restatements, and that the association is statistically significant." What they mean by "negatively associated" is that the higher the tax-services fee, the more tax services obtained, the fewer restatements in those companies. Said the other way, the companies that had more restatements didn't use their auditor for	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	MR. TURNER: Just coming back to the question you asked about, Who does the schedules? Again, I have seen, on the smaller companies, where the auditor has done the schedules and has done the tax accrual, and then has done the tax return, because the small company just doesn't have that expertise in-house. So I think it does vary by the size of the company as to how much is done until they're able to get their own people on staff that has that expertise. MR. GRADISON: Lynn, could you repeat that? I couldn't hear you. I couldn't hear MR. TURNER: I'd be happy to. (Laughter.) MR. TURNER: My and I apologize my experience has been, as you get into the smaller companies, including the smaller public companies and keep in mind, your own annual report just said we have about 15,000 companies out there. By the time you get past the Russell 3,000, you are into small
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	statistics that we heard a moment ago, the cup's two- thirds full and one-third empty in the relationships, because some companies do it, and have a successful audit, and others don't. Regardless of where the statistics work out, I think we'll all be able to deal with whatever the circumstances are. But I did want to mention to throw some more statistics in here. There's an interesting study by three academicians that's coming out soon in a journal, and they're well-respected academicians. They actually came up with a conclusion here, and they said that if I can just read this "third, we find tax services fees are typically negatively associated with restatements, and that the association is statistically significant." What they mean by "negatively associated" is that the higher the tax-services fee, the more tax services obtained, the fewer restatements in those companies. Said the other way, the companies that had more restatements didn't use their auditor for tax services as much.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	MR. TURNER: Just coming back to the question you asked about, Who does the schedules? Again, I have seen, on the smaller companies, where the auditor has done the schedules and has done the tax accrual, and then has done the tax return, because the small company just doesn't have that expertise in-house. So I think it does vary by the size of the company as to how much is done until they're able to get their own people on staff that has that expertise. MR. GRADISON: Lynn, could you repeat that? I couldn't hear you. I couldn't hear MR. TURNER: I'd be happy to. (Laughter.) MR. TURNER: My and I apologize my experience has been, as you get into the smaller companies, including the smaller public companies and keep in mind, your own annual report just said we have about 15,000 companies out there. By the time you get past the Russell 3,000, you are into small companies these days. And not much of the market cap
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	statistics that we heard a moment ago, the cup's two- thirds full and one-third empty in the relationships, because some companies do it, and have a successful audit, and others don't. Regardless of where the statistics work out, I think we'll all be able to deal with whatever the circumstances are. But I did want to mention to throw some more statistics in here. There's an interesting study by three academicians that's coming out soon in a journal, and they're well-respected academicians. They actually came up with a conclusion here, and they said that if I can just read this "third, we find tax services fees are typically negatively associated with restatements, and that the association is statistically significant." What they mean by "negatively associated" is that the higher the tax-services fee, the more tax services obtained, the fewer restatements in those companies. Said the other way, the companies that had more restatements didn't use their auditor for tax services as much. So that's an interesting article that you	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	MR. TURNER: Just coming back to the question you asked about, Who does the schedules? Again, I have seen, on the smaller companies, where the auditor has done the schedules and has done the tax accrual, and then has done the tax return, because the small company just doesn't have that expertise in-house. So I think it does vary by the size of the company as to how much is done until they're able to get their own people on staff that has that expertise. MR. GRADISON: Lynn, could you repeat that? I couldn't hear you. I couldn't hear MR. TURNER: I'd be happy to. (Laughter.) MR. TURNER: My and I apologize my experience has been, as you get into the smaller companies, including the smaller public companies and keep in mind, your own annual report just said we have about 15,000 companies out there. By the time you get past the Russell 3,000, you are into small companies these days. And not much of the market cap is there, but, in terms of numbers, it's a large number
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	statistics that we heard a moment ago, the cup's two- thirds full and one-third empty in the relationships, because some companies do it, and have a successful audit, and others don't. Regardless of where the statistics work out, I think we'll all be able to deal with whatever the circumstances are. But I did want to mention to throw some more statistics in here. There's an interesting study by three academicians that's coming out soon in a journal, and they're well-respected academicians. They actually came up with a conclusion here, and they said that if I can just read this "third, we find tax services fees are typically negatively associated with restatements, and that the association is statistically significant." What they mean by "negatively associated" is that the higher the tax-services fee, the more tax services obtained, the fewer restatements in those companies. Said the other way, the companies that had more restatements didn't use their auditor for tax services as much. So that's an interesting article that you know, like anything, you have to deal with all the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	MR. TURNER: Just coming back to the question you asked about, Who does the schedules? Again, I have seen, on the smaller companies, where the auditor has done the schedules and has done the tax accrual, and then has done the tax return, because the small company just doesn't have that expertise in-house. So I think it does vary by the size of the company as to how much is done until they're able to get their own people on staff that has that expertise. MR. GRADISON: Lynn, could you repeat that? I couldn't hear you. I couldn't hear MR. TURNER: I'd be happy to. (Laughter.) MR. TURNER: My and I apologize my experience has been, as you get into the smaller companies, including the smaller public companies and keep in mind, your own annual report just said we have about 15,000 companies out there. By the time you get past the Russell 3,000, you are into small companies these days. And not much of the market cap is there, but, in terms of numbers, it's a large number of companies being subjected to audits.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	statistics that we heard a moment ago, the cup's two- thirds full and one-third empty in the relationships, because some companies do it, and have a successful audit, and others don't. Regardless of where the statistics work out, I think we'll all be able to deal with whatever the circumstances are. But I did want to mention to throw some more statistics in here. There's an interesting study by three academicians that's coming out soon in a journal, and they're well-respected academicians. They actually came up with a conclusion here, and they said that if I can just read this "third, we find tax services fees are typically negatively associated with restatements, and that the association is statistically significant." What they mean by "negatively associated" is that the higher the tax-services fee, the more tax services obtained, the fewer restatements in those companies. Said the other way, the companies that had more restatements didn't use their auditor for tax services as much. So that's an interesting article that you know, like anything, you have to deal with all the different elements back and forth, and come up with a	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	MR. TURNER: Just coming back to the question you asked about, Who does the schedules? Again, I have seen, on the smaller companies, where the auditor has done the schedules and has done the tax accrual, and then has done the tax return, because the small company just doesn't have that expertise in-house. So I think it does vary by the size of the company as to how much is done until they're able to get their own people on staff that has that expertise. MR. GRADISON: Lynn, could you repeat that? I couldn't hear you. I couldn't hear MR. TURNER: I'd be happy to. (Laughter.) MR. TURNER: My and I apologize my experience has been, as you get into the smaller companies, including the smaller public companies and keep in mind, your own annual report just said we have about 15,000 companies out there. By the time you get past the Russell 3,000, you are into small companies these days. And not much of the market cap is there, but, in terms of numbers, it's a large number of companies being subjected to audits. In those, because they don't have the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	statistics that we heard a moment ago, the cup's two- thirds full and one-third empty in the relationships, because some companies do it, and have a successful audit, and others don't. Regardless of where the statistics work out, I think we'll all be able to deal with whatever the circumstances are. But I did want to mention to throw some more statistics in here. There's an interesting study by three academicians that's coming out soon in a journal, and they're well-respected academicians. They actually came up with a conclusion here, and they said that if I can just read this "third, we find tax services fees are typically negatively associated with restatements, and that the association is statistically significant." What they mean by "negatively associated" is that the higher the tax-services fee, the more tax services obtained, the fewer restatements in those companies. Said the other way, the companies that had more restatements didn't use their auditor for tax services as much. So that's an interesting article that you know, like anything, you have to deal with all the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	MR. TURNER: Just coming back to the question you asked about, Who does the schedules? Again, I have seen, on the smaller companies, where the auditor has done the schedules and has done the tax accrual, and then has done the tax return, because the small company just doesn't have that expertise in-house. So I think it does vary by the size of the company as to how much is done until they're able to get their own people on staff that has that expertise. MR. GRADISON: Lynn, could you repeat that? I couldn't hear you. I couldn't hear MR. TURNER: I'd be happy to. (Laughter.) MR. TURNER: My and I apologize my experience has been, as you get into the smaller companies, including the smaller public companies and keep in mind, your own annual report just said we have about 15,000 companies out there. By the time you get past the Russell 3,000, you are into small companies these days. And not much of the market cap is there, but, in terms of numbers, it's a large number of companies being subjected to audits.

	Page 54		Page 56
$ \begin{array}{c} 1\\2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\\23\\24\end{array} $	I would say that, once you get up probably over about a half a oh, maybe 300 million, half a billion in revenues, you start to build your own internal tax people that have the expertise in-house and be able to stay on top of things that are going on, and do the planning and all that you need to do. But before you hit that size, when you're smaller, it's just more efficient and easier to and most people most companies, I think, do, in fact, then just go to their accounting firm, or to an accounting firm, to get that expertise. And I think you can get the expertise and have people stay on top of it for you regardless of whether you're doing tax or not. I've had situations where we did audit work, but not the tax work, quite often, quite frankly, was probably better than us at servicing and keeping them up to speed on the tax work than we could have been doing in a big firm. And so we'd do the audit, take on that piece of it; they'd do the tax work, and other firm turned around and did the	$ \begin{array}{c} 1\\2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\\23\\24\end{array} $	MR. SCATES: Let's go ahead and move to the next topic. We would like to have a discussion of the various types of tax services that an accounting firm might provide. Although these services are grouped in general categories, there is an overlap among the various types of tax services. Let's first take a look at tax compliance. Tax compliance generally involves preparation of federal, state, and local income tax returns. Tax compliance also includes payroll and sales tax returns, as well as returns for employee benefit plans. Our first question, or group of questions: If a public company does not have the in-house expertise to prepare tax returns and related documents, are there benefits to the company and its investors to engage the auditor to perform such work? Are there disadvantages to engaging a tax specialist other than the auditor? And our third question, What kinds of fee structures are used for tax compliance services? Damon Silvers. MR. SILVERS: I'm Damon Silvers. I'm associate general counsel at the AFL-CIO.
24 25	audit work. And, in both cases, I think the auditors and tax people both did a very good job.	24 25	This discussion, kind of, already happened, to some degree, and I want to, sort of, treat it as
	Page 55		Page 57
$ \begin{array}{c} 1\\2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\\23\\24\\25\end{array} $	Page 55 I don't think that you have to have the same firm doing both audit and tax to stay on top of things and get a good service provided to the company. But as you get into those smaller companies, as you get past the Russell 3,000, certainly once you get past the top, probably four to five-thousand public companies, then you're into situations where I think you'll find that if the auditor is doing the tax work, they're also probably doing the tax accrual, and they're doing the schedule, and they go through the audit, and as they wrap it up, they'll wrap up the tax return. They're probably doing the tax work for the owners of the business, as well, if they're doing it all. And so it's probably, in those situations, a situation where they would have to figure out what they were going to do if it wasn't their auditor turning around and doing it. That's why I was surprised by the statistics, that as we moved out of the Fortune 500 and 1,000, we actually saw that they were going out to in even a larger percentage, to someone other than their auditor for the tax firm, although I've got to tell you, I've seen some small firms, boutique firms that operate in tax that are just superb and excellent. And perhaps that why they're doing it.	$ \begin{array}{c} 1\\2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\\23\\24\\25\end{array} $	Page 57 though it was somewhat continuous. We have heard the concept, I think, this morning, already, that there are small companies small, like five billion market cap that don't have in-house expertise on their tax problems. We have heard that there are big companies that are so big that their tax problems are so complex that no company could have internal expertise, and that they have to go get external expertise because they are so big. We have heard that the auditor needs to do the tax work to be able to understand enough about the company to be able to do the audit. This these sorts of statements trouble me, because when Sarbanes-Oxley was in the process of being adopted, the AFL-CIO was extremely concerned about the general subject of auditor independence, but believed that the sort of tax preparation and compliance services that are the subject of this question really did seem to be, kind of, sensible things for the auditor's expertise to be used in. And we were prepared to support an approach that allowed, in general, tax consulting to continue after Sarbanes- Oxley, because there would be a series of limiting principles that would ensure that this type of consulting was narrowly applied to tax compliance.

	w asimi	ston,	
	Page 58		Page 60
$ \begin{array}{c} 1\\2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\\23\\24\\25\end{array} $	I think, frankly, we were naive. And I think that the list of questions that follows this one, and the types of things described as, quote, "tax consulting," shows the depth of our naivete in accepting this approach and the way in which it's, sort of, been carried off into the wild blue yonder; notwithstanding the sorts of limitations that that we had thought, at that time, were in place. I think that those limitations have not been explicated enough to give them real teeth. And we're now having this discussion about the necessity whether there is a necessity of doing the sort of services that we originally thought were rather innocent. And I don't think anyone can deny that there is some benefit to companies in consolidating professional services, that having two having one firm try to understand your firm your company, the issuer, is cheaper than having two of them trying to do so. Although, I think that the more heavily structured the audit firm is, the more the tax practice and the audit practice begin to resemble two firms, in any case. The real issue is, What is the price you're paying? The real I think there are two issues. One is, How serious is that benefit, really? And some of	$\begin{array}{c}1\\2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\\23\\24\\25\end{array}$	I will say that it gets down, in many cases, to the degree. The comment Bruce made before about providing routine advice is much different than actually carrying out the function. And I think the standards and the four principles here would permit routine advice. There is no question that the knowledge of the auditor and the knowledge of the business, in doing the audit, would provide a real advantage to the auditor in providing this service, and perhaps to management. But, as I mentioned earlier, you can take this to many areas. We faced this in GAO when we were establishing our independence standards, and we had a lot of very small local governments, small nonprofits, where they basically said the following, "These entities are so small, they can't really keep their own books. So it's better for the auditor to do that. They can't really make their own payroll disbursements; it's better for the auditor to do that for them, too." And on and on and on. And, at the end of the day, they were saying, "Federal Government, you're getting a better result because you've got trained professionals making sure the books and records are being properly maintained. They're also doing the audit, but that's all right, because they've made sure it's done right."
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	Page 59 the arguments that I just went through in the beginning of my remarks make me doubt the seriousness of the benefit, because I don't those arguments just don't sound credible to me, and it sounds like people are exaggerating things. And that is worrisome. And the and then the second question is there is some because there is some benefit. I don't doubt that. And I think that the existence of that benefit was what led us to be more accepting of this approach originally. If there is this benefit, what is the cost? What is the cost, in terms of both the overall independence of the auditor and the audit process. And what is the cost of it with respect to the independence and the effectiveness of the audit of	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	Page 61 And I think what you have to really make a determination here is, are these four overarching principles going to be applied differently to tax services than they are to every other service that a an accounting firm can provide? And I think you're going to have to take the maybe 15 10, 15, 20, whatever the different types of services being provided and look at each type of service, because I think there certainly are some that clearly fall into the routine advice. And I would even say sometimes helping the client prepare the return, if the client doesn't know what line to put the numbers on, I think that's more of a ministerial duty, personally, and would be what I would call routine technical advice. But I
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	particular aspects of the company's financials that are related to the tax work? MR. SCATES: Jeff Steinhoff. MR. STEINHOFF: I want to first state that, in the discussion this morning, there's been a very broad brush placed on tax services, and I think there's many services being provided. And to the extent the board can lay out all the types of services, which I think with these first two questions you were trying to get to, I think you can be in a position to really	15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	think you're going to have to take the different types of services and probably address each type of service. MR. SCATES: Nick Cyprus. MR. CYPRUS: Yeah. Nick Cyprus, controller, Interpublic Group. First, let me just make myself clear that I'm really addressing tax-compliance services, because there's other services we'll talk about later. But if I think about an auditor preparing original tax returns or schedules, and we all, I think, agreed that we agree

	Page 62		Page 64
$\begin{array}{c}1\\2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\\23\\24\\25\end{array}$	doesn't put the independent accountant in a position of an advocate for the client, in a position of management, and even in a position of potentially doing their own work. So if I think about compliance services, actual preparing returns on behalf of the client, you know, I think I'd come out and this is my personal view that says it's probably not the thing I'd want my auditor to do. I think that's very different and I think it's our job either to provide in-house expertise or third-party expertise to help us do that. At the Interpublic Group, we do have a tax department that does that work. But if we go on to futures and I won't talk about it yet, but when we go on, later on, to advisory services and knowledge of where we do need our auditors, I would say, just like if I have a tax issue or an accounting issue, just like I go to my auditors to get an accounting policy, even if I come up with, "I think this is the kind of accounting we need to do," I like to know, from my auditors, "Do you agree with me?" It would be the same thing on a tax event if I'm doing a merger, if I'm thinking about a tax strategy and this is the position I want, I want to make sure that, at the beginning, not at the end, I consult my auditor, just like I do with my accounting,	$\begin{array}{c}1\\2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\\23\\24\\25\end{array}$	analogy, but last night was the All Star game that, in the past, the tie goes to the runner in baseball. If you get to the base at the same time as the ball, you the tie goes to the runner and you're safe. And I think the auditor got the call every time there was a tie in the past, generally, because of the relationships, the efficiencies, the understanding of the business. Now, as the audit committees are evaluating all the services in more depth, with their new responsibilities, we're seeing the trends that we talked about earlier, where more and more audit committees are deciding when it is and is not appropriate to use the auditor for what services. And we're seeing that in the numbers that have been suggested. In some cases, it will absolutely not be in the interest of the issuer to use their auditor, if for no other reason, the process is much more elongated. Obviously, you have to go in for preapproval, you have walk through the the tax function has to bring the idea to the audit committee, they have to go through it all, the audit committee has to bless it, then it goes to the proxy statement; the numbers are then put into proxy, if you're the auditor and you do the work;
$\begin{array}{c}1\\1\\2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\\23\\24\\25\end{array}$	Page 63 to make sure that we're in sync on this, that these are the right things to do. And so I see it very differently when I think about the compliance services than when I think about tax planning and advice services. MR. SCATES: Mark Weinberger. MR. WEINBERGER: Thanks, Greg. This really goes to this question, in particular, and a series of questions that we have coming up, which is where we evaluate or attempt to talk about the advantages and disadvantages of using your auditor for tax services. And, Damon, you said that some of the claims about the benefits seem exaggerated to you. And when you talk about it in the abstract, it's very hard to come out with a specific answer, because it is abstract and there are no, you know, across-the-board rules that are going to address every situation. But Sarbanes-Oxley, with vesting the power in the audit committee, who has all the facts and circumstances before them to make this determination, really puts those people and the audit committee in the on the line to make these decisions. And, frankly, I'll be honest, from what we see going on in the marketplace I apologize, I'll use a baseball	$ \begin{array}{c} 1\\2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\\23\\24\\25\end{array} $	Page 65 you're going to get public scrutiny from investor groups. That is a good thing. Sarbanes-Oxley thought that was a good thing. But maybe an issuer will think that that's something that's just takes too long, and so maybe if we don't use the auditor, we don't have to go through those processes. But, in some circumstances, they're still going to decide to use the auditor, and, principally, it could be because geographically they're located in countries across the world where they're better able to serve them, and they have to make sure they have risk policies in place in each of those countries; and other firms may not have the operations in each of those areas to be able to serve them all across the globe. Certain firms have more expertise; in particular, regulated industries and the like. And to get the best knowledge and expertise, they may want to go to a firm that has that, even if it is their auditor; and, in other cases, they won't. So what I would say is this. When we talk about the advantages and disadvantages, I think it's right to say it's hard here to sit and say what they are, but when you know the facts and circumstances, applying it to your individual issuer, it becomes easier.

17 (Pages 62 to 65)

	Page 66		Page 68
1	MR. SCATES: Dean Uminski.	1	very close to what I intend to say, which is, we have
2	MR. UMINSKI: Dean Uminski, with Crowe	2	established a very bright-line test, which is to say
3	Chizek. I'm in charge of our state and local tax	3	that, the appropriate non-audit services that an audit
4	practice. And I've been on both sides of the fence, as	4	firm ought to provide are zero, that the benefit of
5	a consultant and, in industry, as a buyer of services.	5	having a very clearly independent audit, one that can
6 7	And I guess, when I look at the issue here, with tax compliance, I'm focusing on the word	6 7	be trusted, one that establishes, you know, a clear level of independence, is very great. And any small
8	"expertise." And as a buyer and as a previous buyer	8	cost associated with not having the benefit of auditor
9	and as a provider of services, I think that's a key	9	providing non-audit services is really relatively small
10	word. Who brings the right expertise to the table?	10	compared to that higher level.
11	Tax laws are becoming very complicated not only	11	I also want to associate myself with Mr.
12	federal, but state and local. And I agree with what	12	Steinhoff's comments about auditor independence.
13	Mark just said, over there, in that geography plays a	13	Although he suggested that we were, in essence, I
14	role. There's a lot of things that play a role in this	14	think, standing on an slippery slope, where we're about
15	cost, efficiencies. But I think the underlying	15	to differentiate between many, many different kinds of
16	concept is, Who has the right expertise to get this	16	non-audit services, whether it's tax planning or advice
17 18	work done, and in the right manner, that you're complying with the law?	17 18	or compliance or whatever it is. As I said, our standard is that there should be really no non-audit
18	MR. SCATES: Mark Anson.	10 19	services. I am very leery of the idea that we'll be
20	MR. SOATES: Mark Anson, from CALPERS.	20	able to differentiate and find shades of gray, put one
$\frac{-5}{21}$	A moment ago, Damon Silvers mentioned cost,	21	service over the line and one service on the other side
22	and I think that's a good thing to focus on,	22	of the line. And so as we go through these services, I
23	particularly since it's a question that's posed here at	23	think we ought to be aware that they don't always have
24	the end of question number 2, Are there disadvantages	24	very clear borders.
25	to engaging a tax specialist other than the auditor?	25	MR. SCATES: Lynn Turner.
	Page 67		Page 69
1		1	Page 69 MR. TURNER: The Mark actually brought up
2	Well, certainly one of the issues we hear frequently from corporations with whom we hold dialogues is that	2	MR. TURNER: The Mark actually brought up a good analogy with respect to baseball and last
2 3	Well, certainly one of the issues we hear frequently from corporations with whom we hold dialogues is that it's less efficient to hire someone other than the	2 3	MR. TURNER: The Mark actually brought up a good analogy with respect to baseball and last night's game, despite who won.
2 3 4	Well, certainly one of the issues we hear frequently from corporations with whom we hold dialogues is that it's less efficient to hire someone other than the auditor, more costly. This same question, by the way,	2 3 4	MR. TURNER: The Mark actually brought up a good analogy with respect to baseball and last night's game, despite who won. (Laughter.)
2 3 4 5	Well, certainly one of the issues we hear frequently from corporations with whom we hold dialogues is that it's less efficient to hire someone other than the auditor, more costly. This same question, by the way, comes up, jumping ahead of it to question number 4, in	2 3 4 5	MR. TURNER: The Mark actually brought up a good analogy with respect to baseball and last night's game, despite who won. (Laughter.) MR. TURNER: But the notion that the tie goes
2 3 4 5 6	Well, certainly one of the issues we hear frequently from corporations with whom we hold dialogues is that it's less efficient to hire someone other than the auditor, more costly. This same question, by the way, comes up, jumping ahead of it to question number 4, in the next discussion.	2 3 4 5 6	MR. TURNER: The Mark actually brought up a good analogy with respect to baseball and last night's game, despite who won. (Laughter.) MR. TURNER: But the notion that the tie goes to the runner, it's interesting to listen to these
2 3 4 5 6 7	Well, certainly one of the issues we hear frequently from corporations with whom we hold dialogues is that it's less efficient to hire someone other than the auditor, more costly. This same question, by the way, comes up, jumping ahead of it to question number 4, in the next discussion. Yes, there might be a higher cost by hiring a	2 3 4 5 6 7	MR. TURNER: The Mark actually brought up a good analogy with respect to baseball and last night's game, despite who won. (Laughter.) MR. TURNER: But the notion that the tie goes to the runner, it's interesting to listen to these conversations, because we hear people start to talk
2 3 4 5 6	Well, certainly one of the issues we hear frequently from corporations with whom we hold dialogues is that it's less efficient to hire someone other than the auditor, more costly. This same question, by the way, comes up, jumping ahead of it to question number 4, in the next discussion. Yes, there might be a higher cost by hiring a tax specialist other than the auditor, but CALPERS,	2 3 4 5 6	MR. TURNER: The Mark actually brought up a good analogy with respect to baseball and last night's game, despite who won. (Laughter.) MR. TURNER: But the notion that the tie goes to the runner, it's interesting to listen to these conversations, because we hear people start to talk about whether it's more efficient, cost beneficial, et
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	Well, certainly one of the issues we hear frequently from corporations with whom we hold dialogues is that it's less efficient to hire someone other than the auditor, more costly. This same question, by the way, comes up, jumping ahead of it to question number 4, in the next discussion. Yes, there might be a higher cost by hiring a	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	MR. TURNER: The Mark actually brought up a good analogy with respect to baseball and last night's game, despite who won. (Laughter.) MR. TURNER: But the notion that the tie goes to the runner, it's interesting to listen to these conversations, because we hear people start to talk
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	Well, certainly one of the issues we hear frequently from corporations with whom we hold dialogues is that it's less efficient to hire someone other than the auditor, more costly. This same question, by the way, comes up, jumping ahead of it to question number 4, in the next discussion. Yes, there might be a higher cost by hiring a tax specialist other than the auditor, but CALPERS, over the last year, has made it very clear that if there is a higher cost, we are willing to pay that cost, as a shareowner in these public companies, to	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	MR. TURNER: The Mark actually brought up a good analogy with respect to baseball and last night's game, despite who won. (Laughter.) MR. TURNER: But the notion that the tie goes to the runner, it's interesting to listen to these conversations, because we hear people start to talk about whether it's more efficient, cost beneficial, et cetera. But I think, at the end of the day, we've got to come back to how this meeting started, and that is maintaining the investor confidence in the integrity of
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	Well, certainly one of the issues we hear frequently from corporations with whom we hold dialogues is that it's less efficient to hire someone other than the auditor, more costly. This same question, by the way, comes up, jumping ahead of it to question number 4, in the next discussion. Yes, there might be a higher cost by hiring a tax specialist other than the auditor, but CALPERS, over the last year, has made it very clear that if there is a higher cost, we are willing to pay that cost, as a shareowner in these public companies, to ensure the integrity of the financial statements.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	MR. TURNER: The Mark actually brought up a good analogy with respect to baseball and last night's game, despite who won. (Laughter.) MR. TURNER: But the notion that the tie goes to the runner, it's interesting to listen to these conversations, because we hear people start to talk about whether it's more efficient, cost beneficial, et cetera. But I think, at the end of the day, we've got to come back to how this meeting started, and that is maintaining the investor confidence in the integrity of the numbers in the financial statements. Because even
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	Well, certainly one of the issues we hear frequently from corporations with whom we hold dialogues is that it's less efficient to hire someone other than the auditor, more costly. This same question, by the way, comes up, jumping ahead of it to question number 4, in the next discussion. Yes, there might be a higher cost by hiring a tax specialist other than the auditor, but CALPERS, over the last year, has made it very clear that if there is a higher cost, we are willing to pay that cost, as a shareowner in these public companies, to ensure the integrity of the financial statements. So as we talk today about independence and	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	MR. TURNER: The Mark actually brought up a good analogy with respect to baseball and last night's game, despite who won. (Laughter.) MR. TURNER: But the notion that the tie goes to the runner, it's interesting to listen to these conversations, because we hear people start to talk about whether it's more efficient, cost beneficial, et cetera. But I think, at the end of the day, we've got to come back to how this meeting started, and that is maintaining the investor confidence in the integrity of the numbers in the financial statements. Because even if we have a great audit done, but there's a lack of
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	Well, certainly one of the issues we hear frequently from corporations with whom we hold dialogues is that it's less efficient to hire someone other than the auditor, more costly. This same question, by the way, comes up, jumping ahead of it to question number 4, in the next discussion. Yes, there might be a higher cost by hiring a tax specialist other than the auditor, but CALPERS, over the last year, has made it very clear that if there is a higher cost, we are willing to pay that cost, as a shareowner in these public companies, to ensure the integrity of the financial statements. So as we talk today about independence and whether it's appropriate to hire an outside tax	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	MR. TURNER: The Mark actually brought up a good analogy with respect to baseball and last night's game, despite who won. (Laughter.) MR. TURNER: But the notion that the tie goes to the runner, it's interesting to listen to these conversations, because we hear people start to talk about whether it's more efficient, cost beneficial, et cetera. But I think, at the end of the day, we've got to come back to how this meeting started, and that is maintaining the investor confidence in the integrity of the numbers in the financial statements. Because even if we have a great audit done, but there's a lack of confidence in those numbers, then what we're trying to
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	Well, certainly one of the issues we hear frequently from corporations with whom we hold dialogues is that it's less efficient to hire someone other than the auditor, more costly. This same question, by the way, comes up, jumping ahead of it to question number 4, in the next discussion. Yes, there might be a higher cost by hiring a tax specialist other than the auditor, but CALPERS, over the last year, has made it very clear that if there is a higher cost, we are willing to pay that cost, as a shareowner in these public companies, to ensure the integrity of the financial statements. So as we talk today about independence and whether it's appropriate to hire an outside tax specialist and maybe there is a higher cost	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	MR. TURNER: The Mark actually brought up a good analogy with respect to baseball and last night's game, despite who won. (Laughter.) MR. TURNER: But the notion that the tie goes to the runner, it's interesting to listen to these conversations, because we hear people start to talk about whether it's more efficient, cost beneficial, et cetera. But I think, at the end of the day, we've got to come back to how this meeting started, and that is maintaining the investor confidence in the integrity of the numbers in the financial statements. Because even if we have a great audit done, but there's a lack of confidence in those numbers, then what we're trying to achieve with the audit is totally lost.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	Well, certainly one of the issues we hear frequently from corporations with whom we hold dialogues is that it's less efficient to hire someone other than the auditor, more costly. This same question, by the way, comes up, jumping ahead of it to question number 4, in the next discussion. Yes, there might be a higher cost by hiring a tax specialist other than the auditor, but CALPERS, over the last year, has made it very clear that if there is a higher cost, we are willing to pay that cost, as a shareowner in these public companies, to ensure the integrity of the financial statements. So as we talk today about independence and whether it's appropriate to hire an outside tax specialist and maybe there is a higher cost associated with that well, what's the benefit you	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	MR. TURNER: The Mark actually brought up a good analogy with respect to baseball and last night's game, despite who won. (Laughter.) MR. TURNER: But the notion that the tie goes to the runner, it's interesting to listen to these conversations, because we hear people start to talk about whether it's more efficient, cost beneficial, et cetera. But I think, at the end of the day, we've got to come back to how this meeting started, and that is maintaining the investor confidence in the integrity of the numbers in the financial statements. Because even if we have a great audit done, but there's a lack of confidence in those numbers, then what we're trying to achieve with the audit is totally lost. So from that perspective, I think we you
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	Well, certainly one of the issues we hear frequently from corporations with whom we hold dialogues is that it's less efficient to hire someone other than the auditor, more costly. This same question, by the way, comes up, jumping ahead of it to question number 4, in the next discussion. Yes, there might be a higher cost by hiring a tax specialist other than the auditor, but CALPERS, over the last year, has made it very clear that if there is a higher cost, we are willing to pay that cost, as a shareowner in these public companies, to ensure the integrity of the financial statements. So as we talk today about independence and whether it's appropriate to hire an outside tax specialist and maybe there is a higher cost associated with that well, what's the benefit you get from that cost? What is the economic tradeoff?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	MR. TURNER: The Mark actually brought up a good analogy with respect to baseball and last night's game, despite who won. (Laughter.) MR. TURNER: But the notion that the tie goes to the runner, it's interesting to listen to these conversations, because we hear people start to talk about whether it's more efficient, cost beneficial, et cetera. But I think, at the end of the day, we've got to come back to how this meeting started, and that is maintaining the investor confidence in the integrity of the numbers in the financial statements. Because even if we have a great audit done, but there's a lack of confidence in those numbers, then what we're trying to achieve with the audit is totally lost. So from that perspective, I think we you need to keep in mind that when there's a tie, the tie
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	Well, certainly one of the issues we hear frequently from corporations with whom we hold dialogues is that it's less efficient to hire someone other than the auditor, more costly. This same question, by the way, comes up, jumping ahead of it to question number 4, in the next discussion. Yes, there might be a higher cost by hiring a tax specialist other than the auditor, but CALPERS, over the last year, has made it very clear that if there is a higher cost, we are willing to pay that cost, as a shareowner in these public companies, to ensure the integrity of the financial statements. So as we talk today about independence and whether it's appropriate to hire an outside tax specialist and maybe there is a higher cost associated with that well, what's the benefit you	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	MR. TURNER: The Mark actually brought up a good analogy with respect to baseball and last night's game, despite who won. (Laughter.) MR. TURNER: But the notion that the tie goes to the runner, it's interesting to listen to these conversations, because we hear people start to talk about whether it's more efficient, cost beneficial, et cetera. But I think, at the end of the day, we've got to come back to how this meeting started, and that is maintaining the investor confidence in the integrity of the numbers in the financial statements. Because even if we have a great audit done, but there's a lack of confidence in those numbers, then what we're trying to achieve with the audit is totally lost. So from that perspective, I think we you
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	Well, certainly one of the issues we hear frequently from corporations with whom we hold dialogues is that it's less efficient to hire someone other than the auditor, more costly. This same question, by the way, comes up, jumping ahead of it to question number 4, in the next discussion. Yes, there might be a higher cost by hiring a tax specialist other than the auditor, but CALPERS, over the last year, has made it very clear that if there is a higher cost, we are willing to pay that cost, as a shareowner in these public companies, to ensure the integrity of the financial statements. So as we talk today about independence and whether it's appropriate to hire an outside tax specialist and maybe there is a higher cost associated with that well, what's the benefit you get from that cost? What is the economic tradeoff? The economic tradeoff is preserving the integrity of	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	MR. TURNER: The Mark actually brought up a good analogy with respect to baseball and last night's game, despite who won. (Laughter.) MR. TURNER: But the notion that the tie goes to the runner, it's interesting to listen to these conversations, because we hear people start to talk about whether it's more efficient, cost beneficial, et cetera. But I think, at the end of the day, we've got to come back to how this meeting started, and that is maintaining the investor confidence in the integrity of the numbers in the financial statements. Because even if we have a great audit done, but there's a lack of confidence in those numbers, then what we're trying to achieve with the audit is totally lost. So from that perspective, I think we you need to keep in mind that when there's a tie, the tie has to go to the investor. The tie doesn't go to the company, and the tie doesn't go to the auditor; the tie goes to the investor. And, as Mark, next to me, has
$\begin{array}{c} 2\\ 3\\ 4\\ 5\\ 6\\ 7\\ 8\\ 9\\ 10\\ 11\\ 12\\ 13\\ 14\\ 15\\ 16\\ 17\\ 18\\ 19\\ 20\\ 21\\ \end{array}$	Well, certainly one of the issues we hear frequently from corporations with whom we hold dialogues is that it's less efficient to hire someone other than the auditor, more costly. This same question, by the way, comes up, jumping ahead of it to question number 4, in the next discussion. Yes, there might be a higher cost by hiring a tax specialist other than the auditor, but CALPERS, over the last year, has made it very clear that if there is a higher cost, we are willing to pay that cost, as a shareowner in these public companies, to ensure the integrity of the financial statements. So as we talk today about independence and whether it's appropriate to hire an outside tax specialist and maybe there is a higher cost associated with that well, what's the benefit you get from that cost? What is the economic tradeoff? The economic tradeoff is preserving the integrity of the financial statements, which we, as an investor, must rely upon when we decide how to invest our capital.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	MR. TURNER: The Mark actually brought up a good analogy with respect to baseball and last night's game, despite who won. (Laughter.) MR. TURNER: But the notion that the tie goes to the runner, it's interesting to listen to these conversations, because we hear people start to talk about whether it's more efficient, cost beneficial, et cetera. But I think, at the end of the day, we've got to come back to how this meeting started, and that is maintaining the investor confidence in the integrity of the numbers in the financial statements. Because even if we have a great audit done, but there's a lack of confidence in those numbers, then what we're trying to achieve with the audit is totally lost. So from that perspective, I think we you need to keep in mind that when there's a tie, the tie has to go to the investor. The tie doesn't go to the company, and the tie doesn't go to the auditor; the tie goes to the investor. And, as Mark, next to me, has mentioned, time and time again we advise investors that
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	Well, certainly one of the issues we hear frequently from corporations with whom we hold dialogues is that it's less efficient to hire someone other than the auditor, more costly. This same question, by the way, comes up, jumping ahead of it to question number 4, in the next discussion. Yes, there might be a higher cost by hiring a tax specialist other than the auditor, but CALPERS, over the last year, has made it very clear that if there is a higher cost, we are willing to pay that cost, as a shareowner in these public companies, to ensure the integrity of the financial statements. So as we talk today about independence and whether it's appropriate to hire an outside tax specialist and maybe there is a higher cost associated with that well, what's the benefit you get from that cost? What is the economic tradeoff? The economic tradeoff is preserving the integrity of the financial statements, which we, as an investor, must rely upon when we decide how to invest our capital. MR. SCATES: Elliot Schwartz.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	MR. TURNER: The Mark actually brought up a good analogy with respect to baseball and last night's game, despite who won. (Laughter.) MR. TURNER: But the notion that the tie goes to the runner, it's interesting to listen to these conversations, because we hear people start to talk about whether it's more efficient, cost beneficial, et cetera. But I think, at the end of the day, we've got to come back to how this meeting started, and that is maintaining the investor confidence in the integrity of the numbers in the financial statements. Because even if we have a great audit done, but there's a lack of confidence in those numbers, then what we're trying to achieve with the audit is totally lost. So from that perspective, I think we you need to keep in mind that when there's a tie, the tie has to go to the investor. The tie doesn't go to the company, and the tie doesn't go to the auditor; the tie goes to the investor. And, as Mark, next to me, has mentioned, time and time again we advise investors that now manage well in excess of ten trillion in capital,
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	Well, certainly one of the issues we hear frequently from corporations with whom we hold dialogues is that it's less efficient to hire someone other than the auditor, more costly. This same question, by the way, comes up, jumping ahead of it to question number 4, in the next discussion. Yes, there might be a higher cost by hiring a tax specialist other than the auditor, but CALPERS, over the last year, has made it very clear that if there is a higher cost, we are willing to pay that cost, as a shareowner in these public companies, to ensure the integrity of the financial statements. So as we talk today about independence and whether it's appropriate to hire an outside tax specialist and maybe there is a higher cost associated with that well, what's the benefit you get from that cost? What is the economic tradeoff? The economic tradeoff is preserving the integrity of the financial statements, which we, as an investor, must rely upon when we decide how to invest our capital. MR. SCATES: Elliot Schwartz. MR. SCHWARTZ: Elliot Schwartz, with the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	MR. TURNER: The Mark actually brought up a good analogy with respect to baseball and last night's game, despite who won. (Laughter.) MR. TURNER: But the notion that the tie goes to the runner, it's interesting to listen to these conversations, because we hear people start to talk about whether it's more efficient, cost beneficial, et cetera. But I think, at the end of the day, we've got to come back to how this meeting started, and that is maintaining the investor confidence in the integrity of the numbers in the financial statements. Because even if we have a great audit done, but there's a lack of confidence in those numbers, then what we're trying to achieve with the audit is totally lost. So from that perspective, I think we you need to keep in mind that when there's a tie, the tie has to go to the investor. The tie doesn't go to the company, and the tie doesn't go to the auditor; the tie goes to the investor. And, as Mark, next to me, has mentioned, time and time again we advise investors that now manage well in excess of ten trillion in capital, and time and time again they're willing to bear
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	Well, certainly one of the issues we hear frequently from corporations with whom we hold dialogues is that it's less efficient to hire someone other than the auditor, more costly. This same question, by the way, comes up, jumping ahead of it to question number 4, in the next discussion. Yes, there might be a higher cost by hiring a tax specialist other than the auditor, but CALPERS, over the last year, has made it very clear that if there is a higher cost, we are willing to pay that cost, as a shareowner in these public companies, to ensure the integrity of the financial statements. So as we talk today about independence and whether it's appropriate to hire an outside tax specialist and maybe there is a higher cost associated with that well, what's the benefit you get from that cost? What is the economic tradeoff? The economic tradeoff is preserving the integrity of the financial statements, which we, as an investor, must rely upon when we decide how to invest our capital. MR. SCATES: Elliot Schwartz.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	MR. TURNER: The Mark actually brought up a good analogy with respect to baseball and last night's game, despite who won. (Laughter.) MR. TURNER: But the notion that the tie goes to the runner, it's interesting to listen to these conversations, because we hear people start to talk about whether it's more efficient, cost beneficial, et cetera. But I think, at the end of the day, we've got to come back to how this meeting started, and that is maintaining the investor confidence in the integrity of the numbers in the financial statements. Because even if we have a great audit done, but there's a lack of confidence in those numbers, then what we're trying to achieve with the audit is totally lost. So from that perspective, I think we you need to keep in mind that when there's a tie, the tie has to go to the investor. The tie doesn't go to the company, and the tie doesn't go to the auditor; the tie goes to the investor. And, as Mark, next to me, has mentioned, time and time again we advise investors that now manage well in excess of ten trillion in capital,

		1	
	Page 70		Page 72
1	time again, where when you go to another supplier,	1	to see, Is there a direct conflict with the interest of
2	other than your auditor, including for tax work, you	2	the investors? And are you putting yourself, because
3	can get significant reductions in costs such that you	3	of the positions you're taking, into a position of
4	turn around and benefit the investor by the lower cost,	4	having to be an advocate for the company? And if
5	and you also benefit the investor by the enhanced	5	that's the case, then I don't see how you can think any
6	independence of that situation, because the auditor is	6	investor is going to view you as independent.
7	no longer doing the thing. And, in that case, I don't	7	MR. SCATES: Okay, we have four other
8 9	even think it's a tie; I think it's an automatic "go to the investor" in those situations. So this notion that	8 9	participants who would like to make remarks. I'd like to start with Damon, and we'll conclude with Colleen,
10	you always are going to have a higher cost if you	10	and we'll move into the next topic before lunch.
11	aren't with the firm that's doing your audit is, quite	11	Damon Silvers.
12	frankly, a big misnomer, and sometimes the differential	12	MR. SILVERS: Two comments, briefly. First,
13	in costs are substantial because you're trying to stay	13	just to, sort of, re-emphasize something I said
14	with one supplier. So I think you have to be careful	14	earlier, we initially looked at this area, preparation
15	with that notion.	15	of returns, in the context of, you know, genuinely very
16	When you get into these particular services,	16	small firms with limited resources, as a sort of benign
17	like, for example, the question that's back to tax	17	one. The problem, I think, with it, though, is is
18	compliance, I also think you have to understand that	18	that, while it's, sort of, practically benign, it does
19	everything's not always black and white. Even when	19	completely undermine the, sort of, conception of the
20	you're down to just doing tax returns. For example,	20	audit process as separate from the managerial process,
21	when people when the firms were doing tax returns of	21	and that's the kind of cost I was referring to earlier,
22 23	companies where they had sold shelters, they were under obligations, under the code, to make contain	22 23	which, sort of, suggests that maybe this shouldn't be done.
23 24	obligations, under the code, to make certain disclosures in those tax returns with respect to	23 24	Secondly, the question has been raised, I
25	shelters where they had taken certain positions, and	25	think, multiple times by auditors who are participating
			anni, manipro annos of anarors and are paraorparing
	Page 71		Page 73
1	•	1	
1 2	Page 71 yet we now know that, even in those situations, some of those disclosures weren't appropriately made. And so	1 2	Page 73 in this dialogue, of the need for companies in a, sort of, continuous fashion to be able to consult with their
	yet we now know that, even in those situations, some of		in this dialogue, of the need for companies in a, sort
2 3 4	yet we now know that, even in those situations, some of those disclosures weren't appropriately made. And so those raises those, in and of themselves, raise questions.	2	in this dialogue, of the need for companies in a, sort of, continuous fashion to be able to consult with their audit firm on tax issues in relation to the audit. And I would appreciate someone answering the following
2 3 4 5	yet we now know that, even in those situations, some of those disclosures weren't appropriately made. And so those raises those, in and of themselves, raise questions. So I view it not so much as whether you're	2 3	in this dialogue, of the need for companies in a, sort of, continuous fashion to be able to consult with their audit firm on tax issues in relation to the audit. And I would appreciate someone answering the following question about this.
2 3 4 5 6	yet we now know that, even in those situations, some of those disclosures weren't appropriately made. And so those raises those, in and of themselves, raise questions. So I view it not so much as whether you're doing tax compliance or something along the lines all	2 3 4 5 6	in this dialogue, of the need for companies in a, sort of, continuous fashion to be able to consult with their audit firm on tax issues in relation to the audit. And I would appreciate someone answering the following question about this. If a firm, an issuer if an issuer takes
2 3 4 5 6 7	yet we now know that, even in those situations, some of those disclosures weren't appropriately made. And so those raises those, in and of themselves, raise questions. So I view it not so much as whether you're doing tax compliance or something along the lines all the way out to tax shelters; I view it more and I	2 3 4 5 6 7	in this dialogue, of the need for companies in a, sort of, continuous fashion to be able to consult with their audit firm on tax issues in relation to the audit. And I would appreciate someone answering the following question about this. If a firm, an issuer if an issuer takes the policy of not hiring the audit firm to perform any
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	yet we now know that, even in those situations, some of those disclosures weren't appropriately made. And so those raises those, in and of themselves, raise questions. So I view it not so much as whether you're doing tax compliance or something along the lines all the way out to tax shelters; I view it more and I think at the SEC, they've typically viewed it if	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	in this dialogue, of the need for companies in a, sort of, continuous fashion to be able to consult with their audit firm on tax issues in relation to the audit. And I would appreciate someone answering the following question about this. If a firm, an issuer if an issuer takes the policy of not hiring the audit firm to perform any non-audit services, as some do, and negotiates an audit
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	yet we now know that, even in those situations, some of those disclosures weren't appropriately made. And so those raises those, in and of themselves, raise questions. So I view it not so much as whether you're doing tax compliance or something along the lines all the way out to tax shelters; I view it more and I think at the SEC, they've typically viewed it if you've got a code in place, and it's probable, it's	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	in this dialogue, of the need for companies in a, sort of, continuous fashion to be able to consult with their audit firm on tax issues in relation to the audit. And I would appreciate someone answering the following question about this. If a firm, an issuer if an issuer takes the policy of not hiring the audit firm to perform any non-audit services, as some do, and negotiates an audit fee for audit work, and, in the course of their
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	yet we now know that, even in those situations, some of those disclosures weren't appropriately made. And so those raises those, in and of themselves, raise questions. So I view it not so much as whether you're doing tax compliance or something along the lines all the way out to tax shelters; I view it more and I think at the SEC, they've typically viewed it if you've got a code in place, and it's probable, it's fairly highly likely that you could sustain your	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	in this dialogue, of the need for companies in a, sort of, continuous fashion to be able to consult with their audit firm on tax issues in relation to the audit. And I would appreciate someone answering the following question about this. If a firm, an issuer if an issuer takes the policy of not hiring the audit firm to perform any non-audit services, as some do, and negotiates an audit fee for audit work, and, in the course of their business, is interested in the audit firm's opinion
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	yet we now know that, even in those situations, some of those disclosures weren't appropriately made. And so those raises those, in and of themselves, raise questions. So I view it not so much as whether you're doing tax compliance or something along the lines all the way out to tax shelters; I view it more and I think at the SEC, they've typically viewed it if you've got a code in place, and it's probable, it's fairly highly likely that you could sustain your position with the IRS everyone, including myself, on	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	in this dialogue, of the need for companies in a, sort of, continuous fashion to be able to consult with their audit firm on tax issues in relation to the audit. And I would appreciate someone answering the following question about this. If a firm, an issuer if an issuer takes the policy of not hiring the audit firm to perform any non-audit services, as some do, and negotiates an audit fee for audit work, and, in the course of their business, is interested in the audit firm's opinion about how they will about how they would react to a
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	yet we now know that, even in those situations, some of those disclosures weren't appropriately made. And so those raises those, in and of themselves, raise questions. So I view it not so much as whether you're doing tax compliance or something along the lines all the way out to tax shelters; I view it more and I think at the SEC, they've typically viewed it if you've got a code in place, and it's probable, it's fairly highly likely that you could sustain your position with the IRS everyone, including myself, on their tax returns wants to take advantage of all the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	in this dialogue, of the need for companies in a, sort of, continuous fashion to be able to consult with their audit firm on tax issues in relation to the audit. And I would appreciate someone answering the following question about this. If a firm, an issuer if an issuer takes the policy of not hiring the audit firm to perform any non-audit services, as some do, and negotiates an audit fee for audit work, and, in the course of their business, is interested in the audit firm's opinion about how they will about how they would react to a particular tax treatment of a particular transaction,
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	yet we now know that, even in those situations, some of those disclosures weren't appropriately made. And so those raises those, in and of themselves, raise questions. So I view it not so much as whether you're doing tax compliance or something along the lines all the way out to tax shelters; I view it more and I think at the SEC, they've typically viewed it if you've got a code in place, and it's probable, it's fairly highly likely that you could sustain your position with the IRS everyone, including myself, on	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	in this dialogue, of the need for companies in a, sort of, continuous fashion to be able to consult with their audit firm on tax issues in relation to the audit. And I would appreciate someone answering the following question about this. If a firm, an issuer if an issuer takes the policy of not hiring the audit firm to perform any non-audit services, as some do, and negotiates an audit fee for audit work, and, in the course of their business, is interested in the audit firm's opinion about how they will about how they would react to a
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	yet we now know that, even in those situations, some of those disclosures weren't appropriately made. And so those raises those, in and of themselves, raise questions. So I view it not so much as whether you're doing tax compliance or something along the lines all the way out to tax shelters; I view it more and I think at the SEC, they've typically viewed it if you've got a code in place, and it's probable, it's fairly highly likely that you could sustain your position with the IRS everyone, including myself, on their tax returns wants to take advantage of all the provisions in the code to minimize their taxes. We all	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	in this dialogue, of the need for companies in a, sort of, continuous fashion to be able to consult with their audit firm on tax issues in relation to the audit. And I would appreciate someone answering the following question about this. If a firm, an issuer if an issuer takes the policy of not hiring the audit firm to perform any non-audit services, as some do, and negotiates an audit fee for audit work, and, in the course of their business, is interested in the audit firm's opinion about how they will about how they would react to a particular tax treatment of a particular transaction, and calls up their auditor you know, audit partner -
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	yet we now know that, even in those situations, some of those disclosures weren't appropriately made. And so those raises those, in and of themselves, raise questions. So I view it not so much as whether you're doing tax compliance or something along the lines all the way out to tax shelters; I view it more and I think at the SEC, they've typically viewed it if you've got a code in place, and it's probable, it's fairly highly likely that you could sustain your position with the IRS everyone, including myself, on their tax returns wants to take advantage of all the provisions in the code to minimize their taxes. We all turn around and do that. And that is fine, as long as it's clear and there's a high degree of likelihood you're going to be able to sustain that even when	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	in this dialogue, of the need for companies in a, sort of, continuous fashion to be able to consult with their audit firm on tax issues in relation to the audit. And I would appreciate someone answering the following question about this. If a firm, an issuer if an issuer takes the policy of not hiring the audit firm to perform any non-audit services, as some do, and negotiates an audit fee for audit work, and, in the course of their business, is interested in the audit firm's opinion about how they will about how they would react to a particular tax treatment of a particular transaction, and calls up their auditor you know, audit partner - - and asks them that question, what response would they get? MR. SCATES: Tom Ochsenschlager.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	yet we now know that, even in those situations, some of those disclosures weren't appropriately made. And so those raises those, in and of themselves, raise questions. So I view it not so much as whether you're doing tax compliance or something along the lines all the way out to tax shelters; I view it more and I think at the SEC, they've typically viewed it if you've got a code in place, and it's probable, it's fairly highly likely that you could sustain your position with the IRS everyone, including myself, on their tax returns wants to take advantage of all the provisions in the code to minimize their taxes. We all turn around and do that. And that is fine, as long as it's clear and there's a high degree of likelihood you're going to be able to sustain that even when you're doing tax returns. But as you move down the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	in this dialogue, of the need for companies in a, sort of, continuous fashion to be able to consult with their audit firm on tax issues in relation to the audit. And I would appreciate someone answering the following question about this. If a firm, an issuer if an issuer takes the policy of not hiring the audit firm to perform any non-audit services, as some do, and negotiates an audit fee for audit work, and, in the course of their business, is interested in the audit firm's opinion about how they will about how they would react to a particular tax treatment of a particular transaction, and calls up their auditor you know, audit partner - - and asks them that question, what response would they get? MR. SCATES: Tom Ochsenschlager. MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: Yes. Tom
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	yet we now know that, even in those situations, some of those disclosures weren't appropriately made. And so those raises those, in and of themselves, raise questions. So I view it not so much as whether you're doing tax compliance or something along the lines all the way out to tax shelters; I view it more and I think at the SEC, they've typically viewed it if you've got a code in place, and it's probable, it's fairly highly likely that you could sustain your position with the IRS everyone, including myself, on their tax returns wants to take advantage of all the provisions in the code to minimize their taxes. We all turn around and do that. And that is fine, as long as it's clear and there's a high degree of likelihood you're going to be able to sustain that even when you're doing tax returns. But as you move down the channel from being probable you know, likely to a	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	in this dialogue, of the need for companies in a, sort of, continuous fashion to be able to consult with their audit firm on tax issues in relation to the audit. And I would appreciate someone answering the following question about this. If a firm, an issuer if an issuer takes the policy of not hiring the audit firm to perform any non-audit services, as some do, and negotiates an audit fee for audit work, and, in the course of their business, is interested in the audit firm's opinion about how they will about how they would react to a particular tax treatment of a particular transaction, and calls up their auditor you know, audit partner - - and asks them that question, what response would they get? MR. SCATES: Tom Ochsenschlager. MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: Yes. Tom Ochsenschlager, with the AICPA.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	yet we now know that, even in those situations, some of those disclosures weren't appropriately made. And so those raises those, in and of themselves, raise questions. So I view it not so much as whether you're doing tax compliance or something along the lines all the way out to tax shelters; I view it more and I think at the SEC, they've typically viewed it if you've got a code in place, and it's probable, it's fairly highly likely that you could sustain your position with the IRS everyone, including myself, on their tax returns wants to take advantage of all the provisions in the code to minimize their taxes. We all turn around and do that. And that is fine, as long as it's clear and there's a high degree of likelihood you're going to be able to sustain that even when you're doing tax returns. But as you move down the channel from being probable you know, likely to a 51-to-49 cut and then to less than 50 percent that	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	in this dialogue, of the need for companies in a, sort of, continuous fashion to be able to consult with their audit firm on tax issues in relation to the audit. And I would appreciate someone answering the following question about this. If a firm, an issuer if an issuer takes the policy of not hiring the audit firm to perform any non-audit services, as some do, and negotiates an audit fee for audit work, and, in the course of their business, is interested in the audit firm's opinion about how they will about how they would react to a particular tax treatment of a particular transaction, and calls up their auditor you know, audit partner - - and asks them that question, what response would they get? MR. SCATES: Tom Ochsenschlager. MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: Yes. Tom Ochsenschlager, with the AICPA. A lot of the discussion about whether we
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	yet we now know that, even in those situations, some of those disclosures weren't appropriately made. And so those raises those, in and of themselves, raise questions. So I view it not so much as whether you're doing tax compliance or something along the lines all the way out to tax shelters; I view it more and I think at the SEC, they've typically viewed it if you've got a code in place, and it's probable, it's fairly highly likely that you could sustain your position with the IRS everyone, including myself, on their tax returns wants to take advantage of all the provisions in the code to minimize their taxes. We all turn around and do that. And that is fine, as long as it's clear and there's a high degree of likelihood you're going to be able to sustain that even when you're doing tax returns. But as you move down the channel from being probable you know, likely to a 51-to-49 cut and then to less than 50 percent that you're going to be able to sustain your position with	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	in this dialogue, of the need for companies in a, sort of, continuous fashion to be able to consult with their audit firm on tax issues in relation to the audit. And I would appreciate someone answering the following question about this. If a firm, an issuer if an issuer takes the policy of not hiring the audit firm to perform any non-audit services, as some do, and negotiates an audit fee for audit work, and, in the course of their business, is interested in the audit firm's opinion about how they will about how they would react to a particular tax treatment of a particular transaction, and calls up their auditor you know, audit partner - - and asks them that question, what response would they get? MR. SCATES: Tom Ochsenschlager. MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: Yes. Tom Ochsenschlager, with the AICPA. A lot of the discussion about whether we should use auditors for the preparation of tax returns
$\begin{array}{c} 2\\ 3\\ 4\\ 5\\ 6\\ 7\\ 8\\ 9\\ 10\\ 11\\ 12\\ 13\\ 14\\ 15\\ 16\\ 17\\ 18\\ 19\\ 20\\ 21\\ \end{array}$	yet we now know that, even in those situations, some of those disclosures weren't appropriately made. And so those raises those, in and of themselves, raise questions. So I view it not so much as whether you're doing tax compliance or something along the lines all the way out to tax shelters; I view it more and I think at the SEC, they've typically viewed it if you've got a code in place, and it's probable, it's fairly highly likely that you could sustain your position with the IRS everyone, including myself, on their tax returns wants to take advantage of all the provisions in the code to minimize their taxes. We all turn around and do that. And that is fine, as long as it's clear and there's a high degree of likelihood you're going to be able to sustain that even when you're doing tax returns. But as you move down the channel from being probable you know, likely to a 51-to-49 cut and then to less than 50 percent that you're going to be able to sustain your position with the IRS, when you drop below that 51/49 cut, I don't	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	in this dialogue, of the need for companies in a, sort of, continuous fashion to be able to consult with their audit firm on tax issues in relation to the audit. And I would appreciate someone answering the following question about this. If a firm, an issuer if an issuer takes the policy of not hiring the audit firm to perform any non-audit services, as some do, and negotiates an audit fee for audit work, and, in the course of their business, is interested in the audit firm's opinion about how they will about how they would react to a particular tax treatment of a particular transaction, and calls up their auditor you know, audit partner - - and asks them that question, what response would they get? MR. SCATES: Tom Ochsenschlager. MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: Yes. Tom Ochsenschlager, with the AICPA. A lot of the discussion about whether we should use auditors for the preparation of tax returns is focused on cost savings. And I subscribe to the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	yet we now know that, even in those situations, some of those disclosures weren't appropriately made. And so those raises those, in and of themselves, raise questions. So I view it not so much as whether you're doing tax compliance or something along the lines all the way out to tax shelters; I view it more and I think at the SEC, they've typically viewed it if you've got a code in place, and it's probable, it's fairly highly likely that you could sustain your position with the IRS everyone, including myself, on their tax returns wants to take advantage of all the provisions in the code to minimize their taxes. We all turn around and do that. And that is fine, as long as it's clear and there's a high degree of likelihood you're going to be able to sustain that even when you're doing tax returns. But as you move down the channel from being probable you know, likely to a 51-to-49 cut and then to less than 50 percent that you're going to be able to sustain your position with the IRS, when you drop below that 51/49 cut, I don't see how anyone can say that they're not being an	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	in this dialogue, of the need for companies in a, sort of, continuous fashion to be able to consult with their audit firm on tax issues in relation to the audit. And I would appreciate someone answering the following question about this. If a firm, an issuer if an issuer takes the policy of not hiring the audit firm to perform any non-audit services, as some do, and negotiates an audit fee for audit work, and, in the course of their business, is interested in the audit firm's opinion about how they will about how they would react to a particular tax treatment of a particular transaction, and calls up their auditor you know, audit partner - - and asks them that question, what response would they get? MR. SCATES: Tom Ochsenschlager. MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: Yes. Tom Ochsenschlager, with the AICPA. A lot of the discussion about whether we should use auditors for the preparation of tax returns is focused on cost savings. And I subscribe to the idea that you probably do save costs because of the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	yet we now know that, even in those situations, some of those disclosures weren't appropriately made. And so those raises those, in and of themselves, raise questions. So I view it not so much as whether you're doing tax compliance or something along the lines all the way out to tax shelters; I view it more and I think at the SEC, they've typically viewed it if you've got a code in place, and it's probable, it's fairly highly likely that you could sustain your position with the IRS everyone, including myself, on their tax returns wants to take advantage of all the provisions in the code to minimize their taxes. We all turn around and do that. And that is fine, as long as it's clear and there's a high degree of likelihood you're going to be able to sustain that even when you're doing tax returns. But as you move down the channel from being probable you know, likely to a 51-to-49 cut and then to less than 50 percent that you're going to be able to sustain your position with the IRS, when you drop below that 51/49 cut, I don't see how anyone can say that they're not being an advocate and breaking the basic principles, regardless	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	in this dialogue, of the need for companies in a, sort of, continuous fashion to be able to consult with their audit firm on tax issues in relation to the audit. And I would appreciate someone answering the following question about this. If a firm, an issuer if an issuer takes the policy of not hiring the audit firm to perform any non-audit services, as some do, and negotiates an audit fee for audit work, and, in the course of their business, is interested in the audit firm's opinion about how they will about how they would react to a particular tax treatment of a particular transaction, and calls up their auditor you know, audit partner - - and asks them that question, what response would they get? MR. SCATES: Tom Ochsenschlager. MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: Yes. Tom Ochsenschlager, with the AICPA. A lot of the discussion about whether we should use auditors for the preparation of tax returns is focused on cost savings. And I subscribe to the idea that you probably do save costs because of the efficiencies. But I think there's also a quality
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	yet we now know that, even in those situations, some of those disclosures weren't appropriately made. And so those raises those, in and of themselves, raise questions. So I view it not so much as whether you're doing tax compliance or something along the lines all the way out to tax shelters; I view it more and I think at the SEC, they've typically viewed it if you've got a code in place, and it's probable, it's fairly highly likely that you could sustain your position with the IRS everyone, including myself, on their tax returns wants to take advantage of all the provisions in the code to minimize their taxes. We all turn around and do that. And that is fine, as long as it's clear and there's a high degree of likelihood you're going to be able to sustain that even when you're doing tax returns. But as you move down the channel from being probable you know, likely to a 51-to-49 cut and then to less than 50 percent that you're going to be able to sustain your position with the IRS, when you drop below that 51/49 cut, I don't see how anyone can say that they're not being an	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	in this dialogue, of the need for companies in a, sort of, continuous fashion to be able to consult with their audit firm on tax issues in relation to the audit. And I would appreciate someone answering the following question about this. If a firm, an issuer if an issuer takes the policy of not hiring the audit firm to perform any non-audit services, as some do, and negotiates an audit fee for audit work, and, in the course of their business, is interested in the audit firm's opinion about how they will about how they would react to a particular tax treatment of a particular transaction, and calls up their auditor you know, audit partner - - and asks them that question, what response would they get? MR. SCATES: Tom Ochsenschlager. MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: Yes. Tom Ochsenschlager, with the AICPA. A lot of the discussion about whether we should use auditors for the preparation of tax returns is focused on cost savings. And I subscribe to the idea that you probably do save costs because of the

	D 74		D 7/
$ \begin{array}{c} 1\\2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\\23\\24\\25\end{array} $	Page 74 the culture, if you will, of the client, the financial information of the client, you're much more likely to get appropriate tax advice for the client than you would if you had an outside firm doing it. Not to say you don't have that option. But I'm just saying that's one of the advantages of using the internal auditor, that familiarity. And I also think that it's particularly important in most accounting firms it should be true in all of them, really if they're giving tax advice, the tax return does have to tie to the provision for the financial statements. The provision is something that's signed off by the audit staff of the accounting firm. So you have, in effect, a vetting of whatever position the tax department of the audit firm would be taking with the audit staff. That has to be tied together. That's not true if it's an outside firm that's doing it. An outside firm would just do the tax return, and come what may, and it doesn't necessarily have to it should tie to the provision, but it doesn't always. And I've been in that situation, where we did the financial statements, and reviewed the tax provision; another firm did the tax return, and we had terrible times reconciling the two, because they were taking positions on the tax return that we didn't	$ \begin{array}{c} 1\\2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\\23\\24\\25\end{array} $	Page 76 MR. SCATES: Okay, let's, before we take a break for lunch, let's move to next topic. Many of the accounting firms also offer a variety of tax services, commonly referred to as "tax planning and advice," that many of the participants this morning have already alluded to. This type of service includes advice related to treatment of mergers and acquisitions, executive compensation, employee benefit plans, proposed or pending tax legislation, and international tax requirements, such as trade and custom duties. Number four here, a group of questions, Are there benefits to the issuer and its investors to engage the auditor to perform such work? Are there disadvantages to engaging a tax specialist other than the auditor? And the last question, What kinds of fee structures are used for "tax planning and advice" services? Jim Brasher. MR. BRASHER: I think the advantage of using the auditor in this situation is that the provision of such services, you know, clearly has to be approved by the audit committee. They have oversight on behalf of the investors in this situation, and I think they can weigh, in their judgment, whether the provisions of
$ \begin{array}{c} 1\\2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\\23\\24\end{array} $	Page 75 think, frankly, were appropriate, were too aggressive. So it can there can be a quality issue in addition to a cost-savings issue by using your auditor using the auditor as the tax-return preparer. MR. SCATES: Colleen Sayther. MS. SAYTHER: Colleen Sayther, from Financial Executives International. I think I agree with Lynn's, you know, comment on using the term "always." And I think, you know, when we've used the term "always" with respect to costs and, you know, more efficient audits, et cetera. But we also have to be careful using the term "always" when we talk about all non-audit services as being creating lesser-quality audits. And I think Tom actually articulated quite well what the point I was going to make, which is basically, you know, in certain instances it makes a lot of sense to have some of the tax services prepared by the auditor. It creates it does create efficiency, and, for the reasons that Tom mentioned with respect to communication, with respect to the audit side, I think it's vital. And I think the current process of having the audit committee vet those tax services and make a determination as to what's appropriate and what's not appropriate is the way to	$ \begin{array}{c} 1\\2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\\23\\24\end{array} $	Page 77 such services is beneficial. Using a third-party provider, you know, that is not expressly provided for in the Act, that the audit committee has to approve such services. And I'm sure companies with (inaudible) probably do. There's many other situations where, frankly, tax directors and others would just as soon not go through the gauntlet of having preapproval by the audit committee. So I think that expresses the, you know, advantages and disadvantages of using the audit firm versus third party service provider. It comes back to the governance aspects of having, you know, the audit committee oversight with respect to provision of such services. MR. SCATES: Jim Brown. MR. BROWN: Jim Brown, at Crowe Chizek. I wanted to mention one disadvantage of engaging a tax specialist other than the auditor, and that's probably best expressed in the analogy of opinion shopping. What you're likely to do is, you're likely to see a rush to the lowest common denominator, where the company says, "I want to account for something very aggressively. Now, if I can get either my auditor or my tax specialist or another tax specialist to say I can do this aggressively, then I've

	D 70		D 00
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	Page 78 conservatively." So the more people that you allow involved to be able to counsel the company to say, "Here's how you need to here's how aggressively you can handle this," the more difficulty the rest of us have by saying, "You shouldn't do it that way. You should be more conservative." MR. SCATES: Damon Silvers. MR. SILVERS: Jim, I'm not sure I follow that argument. Currently, the company can get anybody they want. They can get an independent they can get a third party, they can do it internally, they can go to their auditor. The that sort of shopping is wide open today. The question is whether or not, systematically, the auditor gives the most aggressive answer and that companies move companies use the auditor in this area more than they should because of	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	Page 80 about auditor independence here and not auditor efficiency is, if you get that advice, that aggressive recommendation, from the tax department of the audit firm, how likely is the auditor to call that advice into question? And he or she significantly less likely to call that advice into question than they would be if the advice came from a third party? And so this idea that there's a special risk to going outside to third parties to and you'll get aggressive recommendations, I don't think I don't think past experience necessarily bears that out, in terms of the some of the recent scandals, but also that the question is, When push comes to shove, will the auditor call that recommendation into question? And I think that becomes significantly less likely if the recommendation came from his own firm.
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	that. I'm not certain that I know the answer to that question, but that's the question. Today you can do anything. That sort of shopping is completely available to you, I mean, as an issuer. So I just I don't follow the I don't follow that reasoning. I'd also appreciate an answer to my question before, which is, If you don't provide non-audit if you don't provide non-audit services, and you get a call asking about the tax implications from an audit	17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	The other thing, on the issue of tax advice and tax planning, I'll be honest, and I don't know exactly what gets what gets included under these various different headings. But I think there's a clear difference between getting the auditor's advice about recommendations that were made by someone else and getting the auditor's advice on how you should structure something, so that when they then come back and have to audit that issue, that I mean, it's one
	Page 79		Page 81
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	perspective, will the auditor take the call? MR. BROWN: Well Jim Brown here to get back and possibly to have quick answer on this, we're looking at what may happen. And there may be the situation where now the auditor is prohibited. PCAOB says we can't give tax advice, we can't get involved in these services. So now I'm facing the issue where I, as the auditor, have to express an opinion on the tax treatment of a transaction in the financials, but perhaps I'm prohibited from being involved in anything regarding the company's compliance with the tax law, or prohibited from giving advice. And now I'm put in a very difficult situation, where the company says, "Hey, we didn't engage you to do this. You can't give us advice on something like that." And some companies may in the world, real world out there try to use us as a lever against the auditor. So I'm trying to make certain that there's no unintended consequence here about prohibiting or restricting an audit firm from	16 17 18 19	thing to get your auditor's advice, say, early in the process. As an auditor, say, "What do you think of this treatment that we're being advised to take," versus, "How do you think we should do this?" Because then when they come back to do the audit, if they've told you how to do it, the idea that they're going to come back and then question that, I just think, doesn't bear up. And then, finally, in this discussion, we talk about efficiency and all these other issues. Our view is, independence trumps every other concern. And I'll go back to what I've said before. The audit has no value if it's not independent. And so where you have certain types of services that, maybe, sometimes create independence problems, and other times don't, I think it is perfectly appropriate to have the audit committee make that evaluation. Where you have certain types of services that are always going to require the auditor to service management or always going to
20 21 22	giving tax advice or doing tax compliance work when the company wants to use it against the audit firm and say, "I want to do something aggressively."	20 21 22	require the auditor to be an advocate for their client or have a shared interest or conflicting interest, then I think it's up to the PCAOB to say, these services inherently violate the basic principles, just as the

21 (Pages 78 to 81)

		1	
	Page 82		Page 84
1	MR. SCATES: Mark Everson.	1	products, and then, of course, the auditors. And it is
2	MR. EVERSON: Yeah, thank you. I'm,	2	impossible for me to understand how an auditor can have
3	unfortunately, not going to be here after lunch, so I	3	the same view of a transaction if the firm has an
4	did want to say a few things. And, Bill, I want to	4	economic interest in the success of the transaction,
5	thank you, of course, for putting this together and	5	which is clearly the case in many instances.
6	being able to participate in this discussion. And my	6	That having been said, I do recognize the
7	remarks, as much as anything else, from our point of	7	great difficulty in drawing the line between the
8	view, are geared towards tax administration, which is	8	services that are planning and strategic, on the one
9 10	not your charge, but I think you can play an important	9 10	hand, and compliance on the other, because, just as
10	role in improving tax administration. So I ask you to think about that.	10	many have said, the requirement for expertise in making those assessments, from an audit point of view, is
12	The IRS doesn't touch every taxpayer, nor	12	absolute and very much in our interest. So as you
13	should it. It relies on the integrity of professionals	13	grapple with this problem, I share the concerns that
14	to support the system of tax administration. I would	14	have been expressed by many that you be not arbitrary,
15	suggest to you that, just as this Board exists because	15	and that you be very careful, as you try to find where
16	of the problems in corporate governance and	16	the lines are in this thorny problem that you have and
17	manipulation of financial statements, as many, if not	17	that I know will be dealt with wisely, and in a way
18	everybody in this room is aware, there was a real	18	that will not just help the integrity of the markets,
19	problem, and has been a real problem, with the erosion	19	but, I believe, if done properly, can also further the
20	of tax compliance that has received growing attention	20	integrity of our tax administration system.
21	and, I would suggest to you, bipartisan concern in our	21	So that's, sort of, where I see this. Thank
22	capital.	22	you.
23 24	It's of such a degree that we, in	23 24	MR. SCATES: Scott Bayless.
24 25	articulating our four service-wide enforcement priorities, have singled out an element of it, this	24 25	MR. BAYLESS: Scott Bayless, Deloitte. I think those are excellent comments, and we
25	provides, have singled out an element of it, this	25	I think those are excellent confinents, and we
	Page 83		Page 85
1	-	1	· · · · · ·
1 2	issue of the role of professionals. And one of our	1 2	all appreciate those comments. Just in terms of
	-		· · · · · ·
2 3 4	issue of the role of professionals. And one of our four service-wide enforcement priorities at the IRS, which guides our resource allocation and guides our actions and is why Cono is here he's the head of our	2	all appreciate those comments. Just in terms of following up, I think you mentioned a very important
2 3	issue of the role of professionals. And one of our four service-wide enforcement priorities at the IRS, which guides our resource allocation and guides our actions and is why Cono is here he's the head of our Office of Professional Responsibility, which has been	2 3	all appreciate those comments. Just in terms of following up, I think you mentioned a very important part of this process, and this is the process that was set up by Sarbanes-Oxley, in that auditors of companies, registrants, are observing in a very robust
2 3 4 5 6	issue of the role of professionals. And one of our four service-wide enforcement priorities at the IRS, which guides our resource allocation and guides our actions and is why Cono is here he's the head of our Office of Professional Responsibility, which has been reinvigorated, doubled in size, and we're going to keep	2 3 4 5 6	all appreciate those comments. Just in terms of following up, I think you mentioned a very important part of this process, and this is the process that was set up by Sarbanes-Oxley, in that auditors of companies, registrants, are observing in a very robust fashion, and that is, the audit committee has a brake
2 3 4 5 6 7	issue of the role of professionals. And one of our four service-wide enforcement priorities at the IRS, which guides our resource allocation and guides our actions and is why Cono is here he's the head of our Office of Professional Responsibility, which has been reinvigorated, doubled in size, and we're going to keep doing more but one of our four priorities is that we	2 3 4 5 6 7	all appreciate those comments. Just in terms of following up, I think you mentioned a very important part of this process, and this is the process that was set up by Sarbanes-Oxley, in that auditors of companies, registrants, are observing in a very robust fashion, and that is, the audit committee has a brake to services. And, as you've indicated, the audit
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	issue of the role of professionals. And one of our four service-wide enforcement priorities at the IRS, which guides our resource allocation and guides our actions and is why Cono is here he's the head of our Office of Professional Responsibility, which has been reinvigorated, doubled in size, and we're going to keep doing more but one of our four priorities is that we want to assure that attorneys, accountants, and other	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	all appreciate those comments. Just in terms of following up, I think you mentioned a very important part of this process, and this is the process that was set up by Sarbanes-Oxley, in that auditors of companies, registrants, are observing in a very robust fashion, and that is, the audit committee has a brake to services. And, as you've indicated, the audit committee is a brake to the services. In the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	issue of the role of professionals. And one of our four service-wide enforcement priorities at the IRS, which guides our resource allocation and guides our actions and is why Cono is here he's the head of our Office of Professional Responsibility, which has been reinvigorated, doubled in size, and we're going to keep doing more but one of our four priorities is that we want to assure that attorneys, accountants, and other tax practitioners adhere to professional standards and	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	all appreciate those comments. Just in terms of following up, I think you mentioned a very important part of this process, and this is the process that was set up by Sarbanes-Oxley, in that auditors of companies, registrants, are observing in a very robust fashion, and that is, the audit committee has a brake to services. And, as you've indicated, the audit committee is a brake to the services. In the statistics that you've cited, Kayla, it is certainly
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	issue of the role of professionals. And one of our four service-wide enforcement priorities at the IRS, which guides our resource allocation and guides our actions and is why Cono is here he's the head of our Office of Professional Responsibility, which has been reinvigorated, doubled in size, and we're going to keep doing more but one of our four priorities is that we want to assure that attorneys, accountants, and other tax practitioners adhere to professional standards and follow the law, which has not been the case in too many	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	all appreciate those comments. Just in terms of following up, I think you mentioned a very important part of this process, and this is the process that was set up by Sarbanes-Oxley, in that auditors of companies, registrants, are observing in a very robust fashion, and that is, the audit committee has a brake to services. And, as you've indicated, the audit committee is a brake to the services. In the statistics that you've cited, Kayla, it is certainly evident that the provision of tax services, and
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	issue of the role of professionals. And one of our four service-wide enforcement priorities at the IRS, which guides our resource allocation and guides our actions and is why Cono is here he's the head of our Office of Professional Responsibility, which has been reinvigorated, doubled in size, and we're going to keep doing more but one of our four priorities is that we want to assure that attorneys, accountants, and other tax practitioners adhere to professional standards and follow the law, which has not been the case in too many instances.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	all appreciate those comments. Just in terms of following up, I think you mentioned a very important part of this process, and this is the process that was set up by Sarbanes-Oxley, in that auditors of companies, registrants, are observing in a very robust fashion, and that is, the audit committee has a brake to services. And, as you've indicated, the audit committee is a brake to the services. In the statistics that you've cited, Kayla, it is certainly evident that the provision of tax services, and certainly those services that are questionable or that
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	issue of the role of professionals. And one of our four service-wide enforcement priorities at the IRS, which guides our resource allocation and guides our actions and is why Cono is here he's the head of our Office of Professional Responsibility, which has been reinvigorated, doubled in size, and we're going to keep doing more but one of our four priorities is that we want to assure that attorneys, accountants, and other tax practitioners adhere to professional standards and follow the law, which has not been the case in too many instances. I would suggest to you that, in looking at	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	all appreciate those comments. Just in terms of following up, I think you mentioned a very important part of this process, and this is the process that was set up by Sarbanes-Oxley, in that auditors of companies, registrants, are observing in a very robust fashion, and that is, the audit committee has a brake to services. And, as you've indicated, the audit committee is a brake to the services. In the statistics that you've cited, Kayla, it is certainly evident that the provision of tax services, and certainly those services that are questionable or that tend to go against the principles, have diminished
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	issue of the role of professionals. And one of our four service-wide enforcement priorities at the IRS, which guides our resource allocation and guides our actions and is why Cono is here he's the head of our Office of Professional Responsibility, which has been reinvigorated, doubled in size, and we're going to keep doing more but one of our four priorities is that we want to assure that attorneys, accountants, and other tax practitioners adhere to professional standards and follow the law, which has not been the case in too many instances. I would suggest to you that, in looking at this issue, Barbara talked about the fact that you go	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	all appreciate those comments. Just in terms of following up, I think you mentioned a very important part of this process, and this is the process that was set up by Sarbanes-Oxley, in that auditors of companies, registrants, are observing in a very robust fashion, and that is, the audit committee has a brake to services. And, as you've indicated, the audit committee is a brake to the services. In the statistics that you've cited, Kayla, it is certainly evident that the provision of tax services, and certainly those services that are questionable or that tend to go against the principles, have diminished significantly over the last few years as the rules have
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	issue of the role of professionals. And one of our four service-wide enforcement priorities at the IRS, which guides our resource allocation and guides our actions and is why Cono is here he's the head of our Office of Professional Responsibility, which has been reinvigorated, doubled in size, and we're going to keep doing more but one of our four priorities is that we want to assure that attorneys, accountants, and other tax practitioners adhere to professional standards and follow the law, which has not been the case in too many instances. I would suggest to you that, in looking at this issue, Barbara talked about the fact that you go down a corridor where the tax auditors worry about the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	all appreciate those comments. Just in terms of following up, I think you mentioned a very important part of this process, and this is the process that was set up by Sarbanes-Oxley, in that auditors of companies, registrants, are observing in a very robust fashion, and that is, the audit committee has a brake to services. And, as you've indicated, the audit committee is a brake to the services. In the statistics that you've cited, Kayla, it is certainly evident that the provision of tax services, and certainly those services that are questionable or that tend to go against the principles, have diminished significantly over the last few years as the rules have taken weight and registrants and audit committees
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	issue of the role of professionals. And one of our four service-wide enforcement priorities at the IRS, which guides our resource allocation and guides our actions and is why Cono is here he's the head of our Office of Professional Responsibility, which has been reinvigorated, doubled in size, and we're going to keep doing more but one of our four priorities is that we want to assure that attorneys, accountants, and other tax practitioners adhere to professional standards and follow the law, which has not been the case in too many instances. I would suggest to you that, in looking at this issue, Barbara talked about the fact that you go down a corridor where the tax auditors worry about the taxes, and not they're not worrying about the book statement. I would suggestion to you, however, that	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	all appreciate those comments. Just in terms of following up, I think you mentioned a very important part of this process, and this is the process that was set up by Sarbanes-Oxley, in that auditors of companies, registrants, are observing in a very robust fashion, and that is, the audit committee has a brake to services. And, as you've indicated, the audit committee is a brake to the services. In the statistics that you've cited, Kayla, it is certainly evident that the provision of tax services, and certainly those services that are questionable or that tend to go against the principles, have diminished significantly over the last few years as the rules have
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	issue of the role of professionals. And one of our four service-wide enforcement priorities at the IRS, which guides our resource allocation and guides our actions and is why Cono is here he's the head of our Office of Professional Responsibility, which has been reinvigorated, doubled in size, and we're going to keep doing more but one of our four priorities is that we want to assure that attorneys, accountants, and other tax practitioners adhere to professional standards and follow the law, which has not been the case in too many instances. I would suggest to you that, in looking at this issue, Barbara talked about the fact that you go down a corridor where the tax auditors worry about the taxes, and not they're not worrying about the book statement. I would suggestion to you, however, that the book auditors play a role in the integrity of the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	all appreciate those comments. Just in terms of following up, I think you mentioned a very important part of this process, and this is the process that was set up by Sarbanes-Oxley, in that auditors of companies, registrants, are observing in a very robust fashion, and that is, the audit committee has a brake to services. And, as you've indicated, the audit committee is a brake to the services. In the statistics that you've cited, Kayla, it is certainly evident that the provision of tax services, and certainly those services that are questionable or that tend to go against the principles, have diminished significantly over the last few years as the rules have taken weight and registrants and audit committees understand the import and the application of these rules and the principles. When you take a model that excludes the audit
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	issue of the role of professionals. And one of our four service-wide enforcement priorities at the IRS, which guides our resource allocation and guides our actions and is why Cono is here he's the head of our Office of Professional Responsibility, which has been reinvigorated, doubled in size, and we're going to keep doing more but one of our four priorities is that we want to assure that attorneys, accountants, and other tax practitioners adhere to professional standards and follow the law, which has not been the case in too many instances. I would suggest to you that, in looking at this issue, Barbara talked about the fact that you go down a corridor where the tax auditors worry about the taxes, and not they're not worrying about the book statement. I would suggestion to you, however, that the book auditors play a role in the integrity of the tax compliance, and that we lost something through the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	all appreciate those comments. Just in terms of following up, I think you mentioned a very important part of this process, and this is the process that was set up by Sarbanes-Oxley, in that auditors of companies, registrants, are observing in a very robust fashion, and that is, the audit committee has a brake to services. And, as you've indicated, the audit committee is a brake to the services. In the statistics that you've cited, Kayla, it is certainly evident that the provision of tax services, and certainly those services that are questionable or that tend to go against the principles, have diminished significantly over the last few years as the rules have taken weight and registrants and audit committees understand the import and the application of these rules and the principles. When you take a model that excludes the audit committee from these considerations, what you've done
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	issue of the role of professionals. And one of our four service-wide enforcement priorities at the IRS, which guides our resource allocation and guides our actions and is why Cono is here he's the head of our Office of Professional Responsibility, which has been reinvigorated, doubled in size, and we're going to keep doing more but one of our four priorities is that we want to assure that attorneys, accountants, and other tax practitioners adhere to professional standards and follow the law, which has not been the case in too many instances. I would suggest to you that, in looking at this issue, Barbara talked about the fact that you go down a corridor where the tax auditors worry about the taxes, and not they're not worrying about the book statement. I would suggestion to you, however, that the book auditors play a role in the integrity of the tax compliance, and that we lost something through the rush to what Don called these highly engineered tax	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	all appreciate those comments. Just in terms of following up, I think you mentioned a very important part of this process, and this is the process that was set up by Sarbanes-Oxley, in that auditors of companies, registrants, are observing in a very robust fashion, and that is, the audit committee has a brake to services. And, as you've indicated, the audit committee is a brake to the services. In the statistics that you've cited, Kayla, it is certainly evident that the provision of tax services, and certainly those services that are questionable or that tend to go against the principles, have diminished significantly over the last few years as the rules have taken weight and registrants and audit committees understand the import and the application of these rules and the principles. When you take a model that excludes the audit committee from these considerations, what you've done is exclude an important brake to the process of these
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	issue of the role of professionals. And one of our four service-wide enforcement priorities at the IRS, which guides our resource allocation and guides our actions and is why Cono is here he's the head of our Office of Professional Responsibility, which has been reinvigorated, doubled in size, and we're going to keep doing more but one of our four priorities is that we want to assure that attorneys, accountants, and other tax practitioners adhere to professional standards and follow the law, which has not been the case in too many instances. I would suggest to you that, in looking at this issue, Barbara talked about the fact that you go down a corridor where the tax auditors worry about the taxes, and not they're not worrying about the book statement. I would suggestion to you, however, that the book auditors play a role in the integrity of the tax compliance, and that we lost something through the rush to what Don called these highly engineered tax products because of the natural braking influence that	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	all appreciate those comments. Just in terms of following up, I think you mentioned a very important part of this process, and this is the process that was set up by Sarbanes-Oxley, in that auditors of companies, registrants, are observing in a very robust fashion, and that is, the audit committee has a brake to services. And, as you've indicated, the audit committee is a brake to the services. In the statistics that you've cited, Kayla, it is certainly evident that the provision of tax services, and certainly those services that are questionable or that tend to go against the principles, have diminished significantly over the last few years as the rules have taken weight and registrants and audit committees understand the import and the application of these rules and the principles. When you take a model that excludes the audit committee from these considerations, what you've done is exclude an important brake to the process of these transactions and recommendations that are of concern in
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	issue of the role of professionals. And one of our four service-wide enforcement priorities at the IRS, which guides our resource allocation and guides our actions and is why Cono is here he's the head of our Office of Professional Responsibility, which has been reinvigorated, doubled in size, and we're going to keep doing more but one of our four priorities is that we want to assure that attorneys, accountants, and other tax practitioners adhere to professional standards and follow the law, which has not been the case in too many instances. I would suggest to you that, in looking at this issue, Barbara talked about the fact that you go down a corridor where the tax auditors worry about the taxes, and not they're not worrying about the book statement. I would suggestion to you, however, that the book auditors play a role in the integrity of the tax compliance, and that we lost something through the rush to what Don called these highly engineered tax products because of the natural braking influence that takes place when there are three parties involved in	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	all appreciate those comments. Just in terms of following up, I think you mentioned a very important part of this process, and this is the process that was set up by Sarbanes-Oxley, in that auditors of companies, registrants, are observing in a very robust fashion, and that is, the audit committee has a brake to services. And, as you've indicated, the audit committee is a brake to the services. In the statistics that you've cited, Kayla, it is certainly evident that the provision of tax services, and certainly those services that are questionable or that tend to go against the principles, have diminished significantly over the last few years as the rules have taken weight and registrants and audit committees understand the import and the application of these rules and the principles. When you take a model that excludes the audit committee from these considerations, what you've done is exclude an important brake to the process of these transactions and recommendations that are of concern in other avenues of our government and our tax regulation.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	issue of the role of professionals. And one of our four service-wide enforcement priorities at the IRS, which guides our resource allocation and guides our actions and is why Cono is here he's the head of our Office of Professional Responsibility, which has been reinvigorated, doubled in size, and we're going to keep doing more but one of our four priorities is that we want to assure that attorneys, accountants, and other tax practitioners adhere to professional standards and follow the law, which has not been the case in too many instances. I would suggest to you that, in looking at this issue, Barbara talked about the fact that you go down a corridor where the tax auditors worry about the taxes, and not they're not worrying about the book statement. I would suggestion to you, however, that the book auditors play a role in the integrity of the tax compliance, and that we lost something through the rush to what Don called these highly engineered tax products because of the natural braking influence that takes place when there are three parties involved in these discussions rather than just two. And by "three	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	all appreciate those comments. Just in terms of following up, I think you mentioned a very important part of this process, and this is the process that was set up by Sarbanes-Oxley, in that auditors of companies, registrants, are observing in a very robust fashion, and that is, the audit committee has a brake to services. And, as you've indicated, the audit committee is a brake to the services. In the statistics that you've cited, Kayla, it is certainly evident that the provision of tax services, and certainly those services that are questionable or that tend to go against the principles, have diminished significantly over the last few years as the rules have taken weight and registrants and audit committees understand the import and the application of these rules and the principles. When you take a model that excludes the audit committee from these considerations, what you've done is exclude an important brake to the process of these transactions and recommendations that are of concern in other avenues of our government and our tax regulation. If you have a continued involvement of the audit
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	issue of the role of professionals. And one of our four service-wide enforcement priorities at the IRS, which guides our resource allocation and guides our actions and is why Cono is here he's the head of our Office of Professional Responsibility, which has been reinvigorated, doubled in size, and we're going to keep doing more but one of our four priorities is that we want to assure that attorneys, accountants, and other tax practitioners adhere to professional standards and follow the law, which has not been the case in too many instances. I would suggest to you that, in looking at this issue, Barbara talked about the fact that you go down a corridor where the tax auditors worry about the taxes, and not they're not worrying about the book statement. I would suggestion to you, however, that the book auditors play a role in the integrity of the tax compliance, and that we lost something through the rush to what Don called these highly engineered tax products because of the natural braking influence that takes place when there are three parties involved in these discussions rather than just two. And by "three parties," I would mean the inside management, the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	all appreciate those comments. Just in terms of following up, I think you mentioned a very important part of this process, and this is the process that was set up by Sarbanes-Oxley, in that auditors of companies, registrants, are observing in a very robust fashion, and that is, the audit committee has a brake to services. And, as you've indicated, the audit committee is a brake to the services. In the statistics that you've cited, Kayla, it is certainly evident that the provision of tax services, and certainly those services that are questionable or that tend to go against the principles, have diminished significantly over the last few years as the rules have taken weight and registrants and audit committees understand the import and the application of these rules and the principles. When you take a model that excludes the audit committee from these considerations, what you've done is exclude an important brake to the process of these transactions and recommendations that are of concern in other avenues of our government and our tax regulation. If you have a continued involvement of the audit committee as that brake, then what you've done is,
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	issue of the role of professionals. And one of our four service-wide enforcement priorities at the IRS, which guides our resource allocation and guides our actions and is why Cono is here he's the head of our Office of Professional Responsibility, which has been reinvigorated, doubled in size, and we're going to keep doing more but one of our four priorities is that we want to assure that attorneys, accountants, and other tax practitioners adhere to professional standards and follow the law, which has not been the case in too many instances. I would suggest to you that, in looking at this issue, Barbara talked about the fact that you go down a corridor where the tax auditors worry about the taxes, and not they're not worrying about the book statement. I would suggestion to you, however, that the book auditors play a role in the integrity of the tax compliance, and that we lost something through the rush to what Don called these highly engineered tax products because of the natural braking influence that takes place when there are three parties involved in these discussions rather than just two. And by "three	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	all appreciate those comments. Just in terms of following up, I think you mentioned a very important part of this process, and this is the process that was set up by Sarbanes-Oxley, in that auditors of companies, registrants, are observing in a very robust fashion, and that is, the audit committee has a brake to services. And, as you've indicated, the audit committee is a brake to the services. In the statistics that you've cited, Kayla, it is certainly evident that the provision of tax services, and certainly those services that are questionable or that tend to go against the principles, have diminished significantly over the last few years as the rules have taken weight and registrants and audit committees understand the import and the application of these rules and the principles. When you take a model that excludes the audit committee from these considerations, what you've done is exclude an important brake to the process of these transactions and recommendations that are of concern in other avenues of our government and our tax regulation. If you have a continued involvement of the audit

22 (Pages 82 to 85)

	Page 86		Page 88
1	disclosed, and talked about, in consideration of the	1	unlikely to be sustained, but not illegal, then you
2	principles, to ensure that auditor independence and the	2	have a different set of criteria, and you would have to
$\frac{2}{3}$	importance of investors in this process is maintained	3	probably advise the client that while they can take
4	and (inaudible).	4	that position on the return, assuming they comply with
5	MR. SCATES: Walter McNairy.	5	all disclosure requirements, they may have to adjust
6	MR. SCATES: Water McNairy, with Dixon	6	their tax provision in recognition with the fact that,
7	Hughes. I'm in charge of our firm's public-company	7	in your view, it's unlikely to be sustained.
8	practice. And we don't have many clients that are even	8	So you can't dodge your audit responsibility
9	200 million in market cap. Most of our clients are	9	as a result of someone else being the tax advisor or
10	small-business and smaller than that.	10	0
11	We have been consulted quite a bit from our	10	preparer. MR. SCATES: Thank you.
12	public-company clients with respect to opportunities	12	Mike Gagnon.
12	they have for specific tax-planning strategies that are	12	MR. GAGNON: I agree with those statements.
14	pitched to them by other firms other professions,	14	And I, too, was going to address two points. One was
14		14	the response to the question of, What happens if the
16	law firms, other accounting firms. And what we see is that our clients heavily rely on us for our advice on	15	auditor gets a call, and the auditor has not
10	evaluating the opportunity, you know, what they should	17	historically been involved in tax matters in serving
17	do help them sort through the issues.	17	the client? And, obviously, an auditor has a
19	And since today's discussion is on	19	responsibility indeed, a duty to respond to those
20	independence, I think one of the reasons why they would	20	questions from the client.
20	call us, as their audit firm, and whether to not we	20	A concern that I would raise, though, is the
$\frac{21}{22}$	do their tax returns is because, in that case, we	21	quality and the depth of the response. Frequently,
23	are more independent than the party that is actually	22	questions come up, from a tax perspective, at a client
23	pitching the idea, because we would not have any	23	that are complex, that are driven by specific facts and
25	financial interest in that transaction whatsoever. We	24	circumstances at that client. And it is important to
23	material interest in that transaction whatsoever. We	25	encumstances at that enclit. And it is important to
	Page 87		Page 89
1	would ultimately have to evaluate that transaction in	1	blend the expertise of an independent auditor as well
2	terms of the audit and its impact on the audit, but I	2	as the credentialed expertise of tax advisors in
3	think that's just one example where we can assist our	3	properly responding.
4	clients throughout the year quarterly basis or what	4	So there's no question that an auditor,
5	have you on ideas that come to them, either	5	indeed, would answer and respond to the questions in a
6	internally generated or from the outside.	6	manner that would be clearly an independent and
7	MR. SCATES: Bruce Webb.	7	objective view. There is also a concern that goes with
8	MR. WEBB: Bruce Webb, McGladrey & Pullen.	8	that, of the quality and the depth of a response, and
9	I think Damon's asked a question, and he's	9	the auditor, with the tax advisors, would certainly
1 1 0			
10	asked it twice, and I think it deserves an answer.	10	need to gain an understanding of the specific facts and
11	(Laughter.)	11	circumstances associated with the question.
11 12	(Laughter.) MR. WEBB: So I'm going to give you the	11 12	circumstances associated with the question. I think the other matter I'd like to address
11 12 13	(Laughter.) MR. WEBB: So I'm going to give you the answer from my firm's perspective. And I think that I	11 12 13	circumstances associated with the question. I think the other matter I'd like to address is whether or not an auditor would call into question a
11 12 13 14	(Laughter.) MR. WEBB: So I'm going to give you the answer from my firm's perspective. And I think that I would expect my colleagues from the other firms	11 12 13 14	circumstances associated with the question. I think the other matter I'd like to address is whether or not an auditor would call into question a particular treatment for financial accounting purposes
11 12 13 14 15	(Laughter.) MR. WEBB: So I'm going to give you the answer from my firm's perspective. And I think that I would expect my colleagues from the other firms represented around the table would give you a similar	11 12 13 14 15	circumstances associated with the question. I think the other matter I'd like to address is whether or not an auditor would call into question a particular treatment for financial accounting purposes of a tax strategy or tax advice or some tax matter that
11 12 13 14 15 16	(Laughter.) MR. WEBB: So I'm going to give you the answer from my firm's perspective. And I think that I would expect my colleagues from the other firms represented around the table would give you a similar response.	11 12 13 14 15 16	circumstances associated with the question. I think the other matter I'd like to address is whether or not an auditor would call into question a particular treatment for financial accounting purposes of a tax strategy or tax advice or some tax matter that the auditor might have been involved with originally,
11 12 13 14 15 16 17	(Laughter.) MR. WEBB: So I'm going to give you the answer from my firm's perspective. And I think that I would expect my colleagues from the other firms represented around the table would give you a similar response. Of course if a client calls and says, you	11 12 13 14 15 16 17	circumstances associated with the question. I think the other matter I'd like to address is whether or not an auditor would call into question a particular treatment for financial accounting purposes of a tax strategy or tax advice or some tax matter that the auditor might have been involved with originally, because that's a very important question from an
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	(Laughter.) MR. WEBB: So I'm going to give you the answer from my firm's perspective. And I think that I would expect my colleagues from the other firms represented around the table would give you a similar response. Of course if a client calls and says, you know, "My tax advisor has advised this. What do you	11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	circumstances associated with the question. I think the other matter I'd like to address is whether or not an auditor would call into question a particular treatment for financial accounting purposes of a tax strategy or tax advice or some tax matter that the auditor might have been involved with originally, because that's a very important question from an independence perspective and from the perspective of a
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	(Laughter.) MR. WEBB: So I'm going to give you the answer from my firm's perspective. And I think that I would expect my colleagues from the other firms represented around the table would give you a similar response. Of course if a client calls and says, you know, "My tax advisor has advised this. What do you think," of course you're going to respond. You have an	11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	circumstances associated with the question. I think the other matter I'd like to address is whether or not an auditor would call into question a particular treatment for financial accounting purposes of a tax strategy or tax advice or some tax matter that the auditor might have been involved with originally, because that's a very important question from an independence perspective and from the perspective of a perception of independence, and certainly integrity of
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	(Laughter.) MR. WEBB: So I'm going to give you the answer from my firm's perspective. And I think that I would expect my colleagues from the other firms represented around the table would give you a similar response. Of course if a client calls and says, you know, "My tax advisor has advised this. What do you think," of course you're going to respond. You have an obligation, as an auditor, to consider whether that	11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	circumstances associated with the question. I think the other matter I'd like to address is whether or not an auditor would call into question a particular treatment for financial accounting purposes of a tax strategy or tax advice or some tax matter that the auditor might have been involved with originally, because that's a very important question from an independence perspective and from the perspective of a perception of independence, and certainly integrity of the financial statements.
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	(Laughter.) MR. WEBB: So I'm going to give you the answer from my firm's perspective. And I think that I would expect my colleagues from the other firms represented around the table would give you a similar response. Of course if a client calls and says, you know, "My tax advisor has advised this. What do you think," of course you're going to respond. You have an obligation, as an auditor, to consider whether that position is in compliance with the tax laws and	11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	circumstances associated with the question. I think the other matter I'd like to address is whether or not an auditor would call into question a particular treatment for financial accounting purposes of a tax strategy or tax advice or some tax matter that the auditor might have been involved with originally, because that's a very important question from an independence perspective and from the perspective of a perception of independence, and certainly integrity of the financial statements. And I do think, in talking about and
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	(Laughter.) MR. WEBB: So I'm going to give you the answer from my firm's perspective. And I think that I would expect my colleagues from the other firms represented around the table would give you a similar response. Of course if a client calls and says, you know, "My tax advisor has advised this. What do you think," of course you're going to respond. You have an obligation, as an auditor, to consider whether that position is in compliance with the tax laws and regulations. If it's not, you have in your opinion	11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	circumstances associated with the question. I think the other matter I'd like to address is whether or not an auditor would call into question a particular treatment for financial accounting purposes of a tax strategy or tax advice or some tax matter that the auditor might have been involved with originally, because that's a very important question from an independence perspective and from the perspective of a perception of independence, and certainly integrity of the financial statements. And I do think, in talking about and discussing and exploring that issue, it's important to
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	(Laughter.) MR. WEBB: So I'm going to give you the answer from my firm's perspective. And I think that I would expect my colleagues from the other firms represented around the table would give you a similar response. Of course if a client calls and says, you know, "My tax advisor has advised this. What do you think," of course you're going to respond. You have an obligation, as an auditor, to consider whether that position is in compliance with the tax laws and regulations. If it's not, you have in your opinion you obviously have illegal-act considerations and a	11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	circumstances associated with the question. I think the other matter I'd like to address is whether or not an auditor would call into question a particular treatment for financial accounting purposes of a tax strategy or tax advice or some tax matter that the auditor might have been involved with originally, because that's a very important question from an independence perspective and from the perspective of a perception of independence, and certainly integrity of the financial statements. And I do think, in talking about and discussing and exploring that issue, it's important to draw some distinctions. I think, broadly, we'd all
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	(Laughter.) MR. WEBB: So I'm going to give you the answer from my firm's perspective. And I think that I would expect my colleagues from the other firms represented around the table would give you a similar response. Of course if a client calls and says, you know, "My tax advisor has advised this. What do you think," of course you're going to respond. You have an obligation, as an auditor, to consider whether that position is in compliance with the tax laws and regulations. If it's not, you have in your opinion	11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	circumstances associated with the question. I think the other matter I'd like to address is whether or not an auditor would call into question a particular treatment for financial accounting purposes of a tax strategy or tax advice or some tax matter that the auditor might have been involved with originally, because that's a very important question from an independence perspective and from the perspective of a perception of independence, and certainly integrity of the financial statements. And I do think, in talking about and discussing and exploring that issue, it's important to

	w asining	··· /	
	Page 90		Page 92
1	have been some failures in the past, is not	1	either a penalty or result in some restatement of
2	appropriate. I think we'd agree with that. And I	2	something that's going to happen. So there's a huge
3	think we'd agree, certainly, with the notion that	3	vested interested not to let that happen.
4	having auditor involvement with some self-interest in	4	In addition, the audit practice, obviously
5	these kinds of matters is not appropriate. I think you	5	if any of you have been involved in a tax firm you
6	made that point earlier.	6	go to the auditor who's responsible for the account.
7	That, at least in my mind, is different from	7	They're protective of all the issues and the
8	what an auditor does on a global basis for global	8	professional responsibilities, and are certainly not
9	organizations, or local organization, in understanding	9	likely to roll over, at least that's not been an
10	the structure, the organization, the tax status of that	10	experience I've seen.
11	organization, and making recommendations, advising the	11	In addition, the PCAOB has begun rigorous
12	client on matters of what to do. Certainly, an auditor	12	inspection processes to look at all of our work that we
13	should and does discover matters where things may have	13	do for our audit clients, and evaluate our tax
14	been treated inappropriately. An auditor is from a	14	provisions and our tax work. And there's an additional
15	tax perspective. And an auditor clearly will bring	15	governor there. And then finally is the audit
16	that to the attention of the client. The client needs	16	committee itself, which is that, if there's a
17	to address that. I think there are benefits there,	17	transaction that's large, or any transaction, there has
18	both from an IRS from a tax perspective, as well as	18	to be preapproval, and the audit committee has to get
19	from an integrity-of-an-audit perspective. Certainly,	19	involved if the auditor does the work, which is an
20	there are ideas tax ideas that an auditor or tax	20	additional governor that, again, would not be there if
21 22	advisors may bring to a client's attention. And I do think certainly, it is absolutely true that an auditor	21 22	the auditor did not provide the work. So while maybe not terribly satisfying, I
22	signing the report on the financial statements, with	22 23	wanted to just have an opportunity to give you what my
23	audit advice, will, indeed, critically evaluate, from a	23 24	thoughts are and the governors that are in place.
25	financial-accounting perspective, how that particular	2 4 25	MR. SCATES: Tom Ochsenschlager.
	manetar accounting perspective, now that paracetar	20	Min Serri Lo. Tom Gensenseninger.
	Page 91		Page 93
1	Page 91 track tax issue should be treated from a financial	1	MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: Tom Ochsenschlager, with
2	track tax issue should be treated from a financial perspective. That's clearly important from an auditor	2	MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: Tom Ochsenschlager, with AICPA. I want to make this short, because I don't want
2 3	track tax issue should be treated from a financial perspective. That's clearly important from an auditor perspective, but I think I do think the benefits go	2 3	MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: Tom Ochsenschlager, with AICPA. I want to make this short, because I don't want to be the one that runs us into lunch here. I'm as
2 3 4	track tax issue should be treated from a financial perspective. That's clearly important from an auditor perspective, but I think I do think the benefits go both ways.	2 3 4	MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: Tom Ochsenschlager, with AICPA. I want to make this short, because I don't want to be the one that runs us into lunch here. I'm as hungry as anyone.
2 3 4 5	track tax issue should be treated from a financial perspective. That's clearly important from an auditor perspective, but I think I do think the benefits go both ways. MR. SCATES: We're going to have to limit our	2 3 4 5	MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: Tom Ochsenschlager, with AICPA. I want to make this short, because I don't want to be the one that runs us into lunch here. I'm as hungry as anyone. But it's a principle of internal controls, of
2 3 4 5 6	track tax issue should be treated from a financial perspective. That's clearly important from an auditor perspective, but I think I do think the benefits go both ways. MR. SCATES: We're going to have to limit our remarks to three more participants so we can take a	2 3 4 5 6	MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: Tom Ochsenschlager, with AICPA. I want to make this short, because I don't want to be the one that runs us into lunch here. I'm as hungry as anyone. But it's a principle of internal controls, of course, that you have more than one person sign off on
2 3 4 5 6 7	track tax issue should be treated from a financial perspective. That's clearly important from an auditor perspective, but I think I do think the benefits go both ways. MR. SCATES: We're going to have to limit our remarks to three more participants so we can take a break for lunch.	2 3 4 5 6 7	MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: Tom Ochsenschlager, with AICPA. I want to make this short, because I don't want to be the one that runs us into lunch here. I'm as hungry as anyone. But it's a principle of internal controls, of course, that you have more than one person sign off on a transaction so that you minimize the possibility of
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	track tax issue should be treated from a financial perspective. That's clearly important from an auditor perspective, but I think I do think the benefits go both ways. MR. SCATES: We're going to have to limit our remarks to three more participants so we can take a break for lunch. We'll start with Mark Weinberger.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: Tom Ochsenschlager, with AICPA. I want to make this short, because I don't want to be the one that runs us into lunch here. I'm as hungry as anyone. But it's a principle of internal controls, of course, that you have more than one person sign off on a transaction so that you minimize the possibility of incorrect a mistake, or even fraud. So I think the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	track tax issue should be treated from a financial perspective. That's clearly important from an auditor perspective, but I think I do think the benefits go both ways. MR. SCATES: We're going to have to limit our remarks to three more participants so we can take a break for lunch. We'll start with Mark Weinberger. MR. WEINBERGER: Thank you. Barbara, I'm	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: Tom Ochsenschlager, with AICPA. I want to make this short, because I don't want to be the one that runs us into lunch here. I'm as hungry as anyone. But it's a principle of internal controls, of course, that you have more than one person sign off on a transaction so that you minimize the possibility of incorrect a mistake, or even fraud. So I think the more people you have sign off on a particular
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	track tax issue should be treated from a financial perspective. That's clearly important from an auditor perspective, but I think I do think the benefits go both ways. MR. SCATES: We're going to have to limit our remarks to three more participants so we can take a break for lunch. We'll start with Mark Weinberger. MR. WEINBERGER: Thank you. Barbara, I'm going to respond to your you've asked a couple of	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: Tom Ochsenschlager, with AICPA. I want to make this short, because I don't want to be the one that runs us into lunch here. I'm as hungry as anyone. But it's a principle of internal controls, of course, that you have more than one person sign off on a transaction so that you minimize the possibility of incorrect a mistake, or even fraud. So I think the more people you have sign off on a particular transaction, the better presumably, the better off
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	track tax issue should be treated from a financial perspective. That's clearly important from an auditor perspective, but I think I do think the benefits go both ways. MR. SCATES: We're going to have to limit our remarks to three more participants so we can take a break for lunch. We'll start with Mark Weinberger. MR. WEINBERGER: Thank you. Barbara, I'm going to respond to your you've asked a couple of times, too and maybe, Mike, you were going to do	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: Tom Ochsenschlager, with AICPA. I want to make this short, because I don't want to be the one that runs us into lunch here. I'm as hungry as anyone. But it's a principle of internal controls, of course, that you have more than one person sign off on a transaction so that you minimize the possibility of incorrect a mistake, or even fraud. So I think the more people you have sign off on a particular transaction, the better presumably, the better off you are and the less likely you're going to have
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	track tax issue should be treated from a financial perspective. That's clearly important from an auditor perspective, but I think I do think the benefits go both ways. MR. SCATES: We're going to have to limit our remarks to three more participants so we can take a break for lunch. We'll start with Mark Weinberger. MR. WEINBERGER: Thank you. Barbara, I'm going to respond to your you've asked a couple of times, too and maybe, Mike, you were going to do this, as well the point you make about, How does the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: Tom Ochsenschlager, with AICPA. I want to make this short, because I don't want to be the one that runs us into lunch here. I'm as hungry as anyone. But it's a principle of internal controls, of course, that you have more than one person sign off on a transaction so that you minimize the possibility of incorrect a mistake, or even fraud. So I think the more people you have sign off on a particular transaction, the better presumably, the better off you are and the less likely you're going to have problems with it.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	track tax issue should be treated from a financial perspective. That's clearly important from an auditor perspective, but I think I do think the benefits go both ways. MR. SCATES: We're going to have to limit our remarks to three more participants so we can take a break for lunch. We'll start with Mark Weinberger. MR. WEINBERGER: Thank you. Barbara, I'm going to respond to your you've asked a couple of times, too and maybe, Mike, you were going to do this, as well the point you make about, How does the auditor come in and evaluate tax work that's done by	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: Tom Ochsenschlager, with AICPA. I want to make this short, because I don't want to be the one that runs us into lunch here. I'm as hungry as anyone. But it's a principle of internal controls, of course, that you have more than one person sign off on a transaction so that you minimize the possibility of incorrect a mistake, or even fraud. So I think the more people you have sign off on a particular transaction, the better presumably, the better off you are and the less likely you're going to have problems with it. And alluding to what I mentioned before, if
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	track tax issue should be treated from a financial perspective. That's clearly important from an auditor perspective, but I think I do think the benefits go both ways. MR. SCATES: We're going to have to limit our remarks to three more participants so we can take a break for lunch. We'll start with Mark Weinberger. MR. WEINBERGER: Thank you. Barbara, I'm going to respond to your you've asked a couple of times, too and maybe, Mike, you were going to do this, as well the point you make about, How does the auditor come in and evaluate tax work that's done by someone in the firm? How could have independence?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: Tom Ochsenschlager, with AICPA. I want to make this short, because I don't want to be the one that runs us into lunch here. I'm as hungry as anyone. But it's a principle of internal controls, of course, that you have more than one person sign off on a transaction so that you minimize the possibility of incorrect a mistake, or even fraud. So I think the more people you have sign off on a particular transaction, the better presumably, the better off you are and the less likely you're going to have problems with it. And alluding to what I mentioned before, if the auditor is also providing the tax services, you
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	track tax issue should be treated from a financial perspective. That's clearly important from an auditor perspective, but I think I do think the benefits go both ways. MR. SCATES: We're going to have to limit our remarks to three more participants so we can take a break for lunch. We'll start with Mark Weinberger. MR. WEINBERGER: Thank you. Barbara, I'm going to respond to your you've asked a couple of times, too and maybe, Mike, you were going to do this, as well the point you make about, How does the auditor come in and evaluate tax work that's done by someone in the firm? How could have independence? Aren't they just going to bless anything that's there?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: Tom Ochsenschlager, with AICPA. I want to make this short, because I don't want to be the one that runs us into lunch here. I'm as hungry as anyone. But it's a principle of internal controls, of course, that you have more than one person sign off on a transaction so that you minimize the possibility of incorrect a mistake, or even fraud. So I think the more people you have sign off on a particular transaction, the better presumably, the better off you are and the less likely you're going to have problems with it. And alluding to what I mentioned before, if the auditor is also providing the tax services, you really have four levels of review that they're looking
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	track tax issue should be treated from a financial perspective. That's clearly important from an auditor perspective, but I think I do think the benefits go both ways. MR. SCATES: We're going to have to limit our remarks to three more participants so we can take a break for lunch. We'll start with Mark Weinberger. MR. WEINBERGER: Thank you. Barbara, I'm going to respond to your you've asked a couple of times, too and maybe, Mike, you were going to do this, as well the point you make about, How does the auditor come in and evaluate tax work that's done by someone in the firm? How could have independence? Aren't they just going to bless anything that's there? And what safeguards are in place to try and deal with	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: Tom Ochsenschlager, with AICPA. I want to make this short, because I don't want to be the one that runs us into lunch here. I'm as hungry as anyone. But it's a principle of internal controls, of course, that you have more than one person sign off on a transaction so that you minimize the possibility of incorrect a mistake, or even fraud. So I think the more people you have sign off on a particular transaction, the better presumably, the better off you are and the less likely you're going to have problems with it. And alluding to what I mentioned before, if the auditor is also providing the tax services, you
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	track tax issue should be treated from a financial perspective. That's clearly important from an auditor perspective, but I think I do think the benefits go both ways. MR. SCATES: We're going to have to limit our remarks to three more participants so we can take a break for lunch. We'll start with Mark Weinberger. MR. WEINBERGER: Thank you. Barbara, I'm going to respond to your you've asked a couple of times, too and maybe, Mike, you were going to do this, as well the point you make about, How does the auditor come in and evaluate tax work that's done by someone in the firm? How could have independence? Aren't they just going to bless anything that's there? And what safeguards are in place to try and deal with that? And I'm not sure it'll be terribly satisfying to	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: Tom Ochsenschlager, with AICPA. I want to make this short, because I don't want to be the one that runs us into lunch here. I'm as hungry as anyone. But it's a principle of internal controls, of course, that you have more than one person sign off on a transaction so that you minimize the possibility of incorrect a mistake, or even fraud. So I think the more people you have sign off on a particular transaction, the better presumably, the better off you are and the less likely you're going to have problems with it. And alluding to what I mentioned before, if the auditor is also providing the tax services, you really have four levels of review that they're looking at this transaction. You have, of course, the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	track tax issue should be treated from a financial perspective. That's clearly important from an auditor perspective, but I think I do think the benefits go both ways. MR. SCATES: We're going to have to limit our remarks to three more participants so we can take a break for lunch. We'll start with Mark Weinberger. MR. WEINBERGER: Thank you. Barbara, I'm going to respond to your you've asked a couple of times, too and maybe, Mike, you were going to do this, as well the point you make about, How does the auditor come in and evaluate tax work that's done by someone in the firm? How could have independence? Aren't they just going to bless anything that's there? And what safeguards are in place to try and deal with	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: Tom Ochsenschlager, with AICPA. I want to make this short, because I don't want to be the one that runs us into lunch here. I'm as hungry as anyone. But it's a principle of internal controls, of course, that you have more than one person sign off on a transaction so that you minimize the possibility of incorrect a mistake, or even fraud. So I think the more people you have sign off on a particular transaction, the better presumably, the better off you are and the less likely you're going to have problems with it. And alluding to what I mentioned before, if the auditor is also providing the tax services, you really have four levels of review that they're looking at this transaction. You have, of course, the management itself, and tax specialist, which you have,
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	track tax issue should be treated from a financial perspective. That's clearly important from an auditor perspective, but I think I do think the benefits go both ways. MR. SCATES: We're going to have to limit our remarks to three more participants so we can take a break for lunch. We'll start with Mark Weinberger. MR. WEINBERGER: Thank you. Barbara, I'm going to respond to your you've asked a couple of times, too and maybe, Mike, you were going to do this, as well the point you make about, How does the auditor come in and evaluate tax work that's done by someone in the firm? How could have independence? Aren't they just going to bless anything that's there? And what safeguards are in place to try and deal with that? And I'm not sure it'll be terribly satisfying to you, based on your question, but I'm going to give it a	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: Tom Ochsenschlager, with AICPA. I want to make this short, because I don't want to be the one that runs us into lunch here. I'm as hungry as anyone. But it's a principle of internal controls, of course, that you have more than one person sign off on a transaction so that you minimize the possibility of incorrect a mistake, or even fraud. So I think the more people you have sign off on a particular transaction, the better presumably, the better off you are and the less likely you're going to have problems with it. And alluding to what I mentioned before, if the auditor is also providing the tax services, you really have four levels of review that they're looking at this transaction. You have, of course, the management itself, and tax specialist, which you have, whether it was the inside it was the auditor or
$\begin{array}{c} 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13 \\ 14 \\ 15 \\ 16 \\ 17 \\ 18 \\ 19 \end{array}$	track tax issue should be treated from a financial perspective. That's clearly important from an auditor perspective, but I think I do think the benefits go both ways. MR. SCATES: We're going to have to limit our remarks to three more participants so we can take a break for lunch. We'll start with Mark Weinberger. MR. WEINBERGER: Thank you. Barbara, I'm going to respond to your you've asked a couple of times, too and maybe, Mike, you were going to do this, as well the point you make about, How does the auditor come in and evaluate tax work that's done by someone in the firm? How could have independence? Aren't they just going to bless anything that's there? And what safeguards are in place to try and deal with that? And I'm not sure it'll be terribly satisfying to you, based on your question, but I'm going to give it a shot.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: Tom Ochsenschlager, with AICPA. I want to make this short, because I don't want to be the one that runs us into lunch here. I'm as hungry as anyone. But it's a principle of internal controls, of course, that you have more than one person sign off on a transaction so that you minimize the possibility of incorrect a mistake, or even fraud. So I think the more people you have sign off on a particular transaction, the better presumably, the better off you are and the less likely you're going to have problems with it. And alluding to what I mentioned before, if the auditor is also providing the tax services, you really have four levels of review that they're looking at this transaction. You have, of course, the management itself, and tax specialist, which you have, whether it was the inside it was the auditor or outside. But if it is the auditor, you have these two additional levels of review that are very, very important, I think, and we shouldn't under-emphasize
$\begin{array}{c} 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13 \\ 14 \\ 15 \\ 16 \\ 17 \\ 18 \\ 19 \\ 20 \end{array}$	track tax issue should be treated from a financial perspective. That's clearly important from an auditor perspective, but I think I do think the benefits go both ways. MR. SCATES: We're going to have to limit our remarks to three more participants so we can take a break for lunch. We'll start with Mark Weinberger. MR. WEINBERGER: Thank you. Barbara, I'm going to respond to your you've asked a couple of times, too and maybe, Mike, you were going to do this, as well the point you make about, How does the auditor come in and evaluate tax work that's done by someone in the firm? How could have independence? Aren't they just going to bless anything that's there? And what safeguards are in place to try and deal with that? And I'm not sure it'll be terribly satisfying to you, based on your question, but I'm going to give it a shot. Obviously, the audit firm has a	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: Tom Ochsenschlager, with AICPA. I want to make this short, because I don't want to be the one that runs us into lunch here. I'm as hungry as anyone. But it's a principle of internal controls, of course, that you have more than one person sign off on a transaction so that you minimize the possibility of incorrect a mistake, or even fraud. So I think the more people you have sign off on a particular transaction, the better presumably, the better off you are and the less likely you're going to have problems with it. And alluding to what I mentioned before, if the auditor is also providing the tax services, you really have four levels of review that they're looking at this transaction. You have, of course, the management itself, and tax specialist, which you have, whether it was the inside it was the auditor or outside. But if it is the auditor, you have these two additional levels of review that are very, very important, I think, and we shouldn't under-emphasize those. You'll have the review of the audit committee
$\begin{array}{c} 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13 \\ 14 \\ 15 \\ 16 \\ 17 \\ 18 \\ 19 \\ 20 \\ 21 \\ 22 \\ 23 \end{array}$	track tax issue should be treated from a financial perspective. That's clearly important from an auditor perspective, but I think I do think the benefits go both ways. MR. SCATES: We're going to have to limit our remarks to three more participants so we can take a break for lunch. We'll start with Mark Weinberger. MR. WEINBERGER: Thank you. Barbara, I'm going to respond to your you've asked a couple of times, too and maybe, Mike, you were going to do this, as well the point you make about, How does the auditor come in and evaluate tax work that's done by someone in the firm? How could have independence? Aren't they just going to bless anything that's there? And what safeguards are in place to try and deal with that? And I'm not sure it'll be terribly satisfying to you, based on your question, but I'm going to give it a shot. Obviously, the audit firm has a responsibility to the investors or the issuer, and the client is the audit committee. We are with them all the time. We serve them. We meet with them regularly.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: Tom Ochsenschlager, with AICPA. I want to make this short, because I don't want to be the one that runs us into lunch here. I'm as hungry as anyone. But it's a principle of internal controls, of course, that you have more than one person sign off on a transaction so that you minimize the possibility of incorrect a mistake, or even fraud. So I think the more people you have sign off on a particular transaction, the better presumably, the better off you are and the less likely you're going to have problems with it. And alluding to what I mentioned before, if the auditor is also providing the tax services, you really have four levels of review that they're looking at this transaction. You have, of course, the management itself, and tax specialist, which you have, whether it was the inside it was the auditor or outside. But if it is the auditor, you have these two additional levels of review that are very, very important, I think, and we shouldn't under-emphasize those. You'll have the review of the audit committee itself, presumably down into the transaction, we hope
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	track tax issue should be treated from a financial perspective. That's clearly important from an auditor perspective, but I think I do think the benefits go both ways. MR. SCATES: We're going to have to limit our remarks to three more participants so we can take a break for lunch. We'll start with Mark Weinberger. MR. WEINBERGER: Thank you. Barbara, I'm going to respond to your you've asked a couple of times, too and maybe, Mike, you were going to do this, as well the point you make about, How does the auditor come in and evaluate tax work that's done by someone in the firm? How could have independence? Aren't they just going to bless anything that's there? And what safeguards are in place to try and deal with that? And I'm not sure it'll be terribly satisfying to you, based on your question, but I'm going to give it a shot. Obviously, the audit firm has a responsibility to the investors or the issuer, and the client is the audit committee. We are with them all the time. We serve them. We meet with them regularly. The last thing we want to do is give them tax advice	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: Tom Ochsenschlager, with AICPA. I want to make this short, because I don't want to be the one that runs us into lunch here. I'm as hungry as anyone. But it's a principle of internal controls, of course, that you have more than one person sign off on a transaction so that you minimize the possibility of incorrect a mistake, or even fraud. So I think the more people you have sign off on a particular transaction, the better presumably, the better off you are and the less likely you're going to have problems with it. And alluding to what I mentioned before, if the auditor is also providing the tax services, you really have four levels of review that they're looking at this transaction. You have, of course, the management itself, and tax specialist, which you have, whether it was the inside it was the auditor or outside. But if it is the auditor, you have these two additional levels of review that are very, very important, I think, and we shouldn't under-emphasize those. You'll have the review of the audit committee itself, presumably down into the transaction, we hope to understand the transaction to make sure they
$\begin{array}{c} 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13 \\ 14 \\ 15 \\ 16 \\ 17 \\ 18 \\ 19 \\ 20 \\ 21 \\ 22 \\ 23 \end{array}$	track tax issue should be treated from a financial perspective. That's clearly important from an auditor perspective, but I think I do think the benefits go both ways. MR. SCATES: We're going to have to limit our remarks to three more participants so we can take a break for lunch. We'll start with Mark Weinberger. MR. WEINBERGER: Thank you. Barbara, I'm going to respond to your you've asked a couple of times, too and maybe, Mike, you were going to do this, as well the point you make about, How does the auditor come in and evaluate tax work that's done by someone in the firm? How could have independence? Aren't they just going to bless anything that's there? And what safeguards are in place to try and deal with that? And I'm not sure it'll be terribly satisfying to you, based on your question, but I'm going to give it a shot. Obviously, the audit firm has a responsibility to the investors or the issuer, and the client is the audit committee. We are with them all the time. We serve them. We meet with them regularly.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: Tom Ochsenschlager, with AICPA. I want to make this short, because I don't want to be the one that runs us into lunch here. I'm as hungry as anyone. But it's a principle of internal controls, of course, that you have more than one person sign off on a transaction so that you minimize the possibility of incorrect a mistake, or even fraud. So I think the more people you have sign off on a particular transaction, the better presumably, the better off you are and the less likely you're going to have problems with it. And alluding to what I mentioned before, if the auditor is also providing the tax services, you really have four levels of review that they're looking at this transaction. You have, of course, the management itself, and tax specialist, which you have, whether it was the inside it was the auditor or outside. But if it is the auditor, you have these two additional levels of review that are very, very important, I think, and we shouldn't under-emphasize those. You'll have the review of the audit committee itself, presumably down into the transaction, we hope

24 (Pages 90 to 93)

Page 94 Page 94 1 I had alluded to earlier, that addit firm that's providing the advice, the addit staff of that presentation of that. 1 Mike brough up the whole concept - whole concept of the financial reporting effect. Every tax strategy, 5 Now, we know that - we wouldn't be here to today if that worked perfectly in the past, but a lot of changes have been made, and I think well find that those four reviews will work much more effectively in the thost correr veives will work much more effectively in the future. 1 I financial arcporting effect. 1 - a de training that's anyone's percegative to do so - but using conside tax advice - to but using conside tax advice, hased on my experience. 1 I statements of every what the effect on the financial statements of every what the effect on the financial reporting advice and planning involved heavily in providing advice and planning involved heavily and providing advice and planning involved heavily in providing advice and planning involved heavily in providing advice and planning involved heavily and providing advice and planning involved heavily in providing the involved in that independence advays needs to urung these advice if i was last, because what I'd like to do is reiterate what 1					
2that's providing the advice, the audit suff of that2the financial -reporting effect. Fiver tax strategy,4firm also has to sign off on the financial statement2the financial-reporting effect. Sever tax strategy,4representation of that.2the financial-reporting effect. Sever tax strategy,6today if that worked perfectly in the past, but a lot67of changes have been made, and I think well find that68those four reviews will work much more effectively in19the future.71- and certainly that's anyone's prerogative to do so -11- an ext financial statements of every101but using outside tax advice, based on my experience.111- of having to report it on the financial111get more aggressive101experience.111experience.111experience.112MR. NALTERS: Pat Walters.2MR. SCATES: Pat Walters.2MR. SCATES: Pat Walters.2MR. SCATES: Pat Walters.2MR. SCATES: Pat Walters.3absolutely want to bab is reitrate what1The first seems to me that aduit firms2absolutely want to bab serve today.3the discussion son trone today.4The first seems to me that aduit firms4absolutely want to bab serve today.5The first seems to me that aduit firms4absolutely want t		Page 94		Page 96	
2that's providing the advice, the audit suff of that2the financial -reporting effect. Fively tax strategy,4firm also has to sign off on the financial statement2the financial-reporting effect. Second match4firm also has to sign off othat.3every tax strategy,6today if that worked perfectly in the past, but a lot6financial reporting effect. Second match7of changes have been made, and I think well find thatthose four reviews will work much more effectively ina time-tail-a -a new financial -eporting atfand -9the future and certainly that's anyone's percegative to do so -thus affancial -a new financial -a new financial -eporting atfand -10- and certainly that's anyone's percegative to do so -thus affancial -a new financial -eporting atfand -11- and certainly that's anyone's percegative to do so -thus affancial -a new financial -eporting effect.12but using outside tax advice, based on my experience.It is statements. So they can tak a much more aggressive13where Ive had the clients in that situation .you willthe aduitor will be in that14be to aduitor would permit their own tax staff to take.the aduitor will be in that15reparter, because, frankly, they don't have thethus aduitor16reparter, because, frankly, they don't have thethus financial -eporting effect, the aduitor will be in that17that sheen my experience.That's been my experience.21Mark Sub Abacture Mark Mark Mark Mark Mark Mark Mark Mark	1	I had alluded to earlier, that if it is the audit firm	1	Mike brought up the whole concept whole concept of	
 a firm also has to sign off on the financial statement presentation of that. b reserve tax decision, has a financial-reporting effect. b to faure. c today if hat workd perfectly in the past, but a lot in the financial statements of every the hose four reviews will work much more effectively in the financial statements of every in the financial statements of every data the effect on the financial statements of every data the effect on the financial statements of every decision they make is important. a contractive bad the clients in that situation, you will see more aggressive positions from the outside tax advice, based on my experience. b reparer, because, frankly, they don't have the francial statements of every out all of these sisues, then invariably they will be in that their own tox. Once the client begins to take the france independence always needs to trump these other issues. That's been my experience. math's been my experience. math's been my experience. math's basing their the principle that they shouldn't a be independence always needs to trump these other issues. That's been my experience. math's been my experience. math's basing the first commented, at the beginning arise in the discussion here today. The farst seems to me that a duit firms a absolutely want to be able to provide tax services to their aduit clients. It also seems to me that a math's rout a commany. It all firm woild become familiar with a company. It all firm woild become familiar with a company. It all firm woild become familiar with a company. It all firm woild become familiar with a company. It all all dependence advice them with a lot due to make a disadvantage in the respect in the discussions and when is a secally as a way and the tar-expression to management, and there services on that an additor woild bee in a basel fevident that an auditor would be the advice than when aregulate thang.<					
4 It's inconceivable to me that companies do not want to 5 Now, we know that we wouldn't be here 6 today if that worked perfectly in the past, but a lot 7 of changes have been made, and 1 think we'll find that 8 those four reviews will work much more effectively 9 the future. 1 - and certainly that's anyone's prerogative to do so - 12 totos go usids deta advice, based on ny experience 13 where I've had the clients in that situation, you will 14 get more aggressive positions from the outside 15 preparer, because, frankly, they don't have the 16 responsibility or the onus or whatever you want to 12 totol generice. 22 MR, SCATES: Pat Walters, 23 MR, SCATES: Pat Walters, 24 Thick Nm last. And it would be nice if I 25 was last, because what 7d like to do is reiterate what 7 fittink the company just as casily as a new andit 11 fitting pendence will be violated, then the best 26 othing, Faniliari with a could be come fitti 28 sabolut					
 Sow, we know that we wouldn't be here to today if that worked prefect is, that at the fleat on the there fleat. Is Certainly, any issuer that if you use outside tax advice - and that if you use outside tax advice - and that if you use outside tax advice - and that if you use outside tax advice - and the fleat on the financial statements of every determining divide and advice, has a divide on the financial statements of a divide and all of these issues, then invariably they will get more aggressive positions from the outside get more aggressive positions from the outside tax services to that shale to do is reiterate what get more aggressive position to mange appearence. That's why we're around this table today. The get more aggressive as a set more agressive to a service to the advice that the adv			4		
6 today if that worked perfectly in the past, but a lot 7 of changes have been made, and 1 think well find that 8 those four reviews will work much more effectively in 9 the future. 1 - and certainly, that anyone's prerogative to do so - 11 - and certainly that's anyone's prerogative to do so - 12 but using outside tax advice, based on my experience 13 where I've had the clients in that situation, you will 14 get more aggressive positions from the outside 15 responsibility - or the ouns or whatever you want to 16 responsibility - or the ouns or whatever you want to 17 call it - of having to report it on the financial 18 statements. So they can take a much more aggressive 19 position. 20 MR. SCATES: Pat Walters. 21 MR. SCATES: Pat Walters. 23 MS. WALTERSE? Pat Walters. 24 Thein sees more that an outside tax services to the arguing maduli firms 5 assolutely want to be able to provide tax services to firm the anoutside tax services to firm the discussion. So far, a few themes have 25 more that an outside tax sepecialist could becomef <tr< td=""><td></td><td>1</td><td>5</td><td></td></tr<>		1	5		
 7 of changes have been made, and I think well find that those stores the table for when arguing about a this those will work much more effectively in the future. 9 the future. 1 submit that if you use outside tax advice - in a difference statements of every 1 and creating that's anyone's prerogative to do so - it is easient to me that if the auditor is is that statements of every 10 and creating that's anyone's prerogative to do so - it is easient to me that if the auditor is is that statution, you will the preparence. 11 benefits the internal than the auditor would permit their own tas staff to take. 12 bits the store may esperience. 13 and thave staff to take. 14 bits KCATES: Pat Walters. 14 bits KCATES: Pat Walters. 15 was last, because what I/d like to do is reiterate what 15 aboutely want to be able to provide tax services to their audit firms of the arguments that have been put forth are not very convincing. Familiarity, for example. So it would be to provide the and other obably, a state want with a company. It all contracts for from the various external parties with third-party tax specialist could be toop is not that an outside tax specialist could be come familiar with a company. It all different is a continuing relationship, providing alk independence and a laming as well as a tax services. 11 bracks bears and than anditor would beer is any risk that to be able to provide tax services to the store of the additor who ther outside that specialist could be come familiar with a company. It all addity as an ewa and there at the table. It would seem to me and it movid by a third-party tax specialist could be the familiar. 12 dependence and planning, as well as tax-compliance and planning thad a for the extress the in and alfor would be form the and alfor would be form the table, that it is allows self-evidem that an anditor would be form the table with a thory or the pareners wit	6	today if that worked perfectly in the past, but a lot	6	financial reporting effect is. Certainly, any issuer	
9whe furure.9what the effect on the financial statements of every10I submit that if you use outside tax advice.9what the effect on the financial statements of every11involved heavily in providing advice and planning12involved heavily in providing advice and planning11get more aggressive positions from the outside13around all of these issues, then invariably they will14get more aggressive positions from the outside14be violating their the principle that they shouldn't16responsibility or the onus or whatever you want to13around all of these issues, then invariably they will15audit their own work. Once the client begins to take1416responsibility or the onus or whatever you want to1517call it of having to report it on the financial1418statements. So they can take a much more aggressive1619position.1721That's by we're around this table today. The22MR. SCATES: Fat Walters.2223MS. WALTERS: Fat Walters.2224Tthis tring to the firancial statements relies on the25absolutely want to be able to provide tax services to3arisen in the discussion here today.4The first seems to me that andifi firms5absolutely want to be able to provide tax services to6their audit clients. It also seems to me that state could's the expect in10familiar with the company just as easily as a new audit <t< td=""><td>7</td><td>of changes have been made, and I think we'll find that</td><td>7</td><td>that I have sat across the table for when arguing about</td></t<>	7	of changes have been made, and I think we'll find that	7	that I have sat across the table for when arguing about	
10 I submit that if you use outside tax advice. 11 - and certainly that's anyone's perrogative to do so 12 but using outside tax advice, based on my experience 13 where I've had the clients in that situation, you will 14 get more aggressive positions from the outside 15 preparer, because, frankly, they don't have the 16 responsibility or the nous or whatever you want to 17 call it of having to report it on the financial 18 statements. So they can take a much more aggressive 19 position than the internal thant the auditor r that 19 position than the internal thant the auditor r. than 10 the auditor would permit their own tax staff to take. 11 That's been my experience. 12 MR. SCATES: Pat Walters, CFA Institute. 14 their addit clients. It also seems to me that audit frms 16 their addit clients. It also seems to me that audit frms 2 of this particular session. So far, a few themes have 3 arisen in the discussion here today. 4 The first seems to me that audit frms 5 absolutely want to be able to provide tax services to		those four reviews will work much more effectively in	8	a financial a new financial-reporting standard	
11 - and certainly that's anyone's prerogative to do so 12 but using outside tax advice, based on my experience. 13 involved heavily in providing advice and planning 14 get more aggressive positions from the outside 15 preparer, because, frankly, they don't have the 16 responsibility - or the onus or whatever you want to 17 call it of having to report it on the financial 18 statements. So they can take a much more aggressive 19 position than the internal than 21 That's been my experience. 23 MR. SCATES: Pat Walters. 23 MS. WALTERS: Pat Walters. 24 T think l'm last. And it would be nice if 1 25 was last, because what I'd like to do is reiterate what 26 The first seems to me that aduit firms 3 asisen in the discussion here today. 28 The first seems to me that aduit firms 3 assolutely want to be able to provide tax services to 6 their aduit clients. It also seems to me that some of the rawing relationskice and planning, as well as tax-compliance 3 Taks why a brid-party tax specialist could become familiar with the company ust as easily as a new au			-		
12 but using outside tax advice, based on my experience. 13 where I've had the clients in that situation, you will 14 get more aggressive positions from the outside 15 preparer, because, frankly, they don't have the 16 responsibility - or the onus or whatever you want to 17 call it of having to report it on the financial 18 statements. So they can take a much more aggressive 19 position than the internal - than the aduitor - than 10 the auditor would permit their own tax staff to take. 17 Thar's been my experience. 20 MR. SCATES: Pat Walters. CFA Institute. 21 MS. WALTERS: Pat Walters. CFA Institute. 21 Think I'm last. And it would be nice if 1 23 marka said when she first commented, at the beginning 2 of this particular session. So far, a few themes have 3 arisen in the discussion here today. 4 The first seems to me that aduit firms 5 absolutely want to be able to provide tax services to 6 their particular session. So far, a few themes have 10 familiar with the company just as easily as a new aduit 11 <td< td=""><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></td<>					
13 where T've had the clients in that situation, you will 14 get more aggressive positions from the outside 15 get more aggressive positions from the outside 16 responsibility or the onus or whatever you want to 17 and the client be gins to take 18 statements. So they can take a much more aggressive 19 position than the internal than the auditor than 10 the audior would permit their own tax staff to take. 21 That's been my experience. 22 MS. WALTERS: Pat Walters. 23 MS. WALTERS: Pat Walters. 24 I think I'm last. And it would be nice if I 25 was last, because what I'd like to do is reiterate what 26 of this particular session. So far, a few themes have 3 arisen in the discussion here today. 3 arisen in the discussion here today. 4 The first seems to me that audit firms 5 absolutely want to be able to provide tax services to 16 their aguinerita with the company just as easily as a new audit 17 the arguments that have been put forth are not very 6 onvincing. Familiarity, for example. So it would <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td>					
14 get more aggressive positions from the outside 15 preparer, because, frankly, they don't have the 16 responsibility or the onus or whatever you want to 17 call it of having to report it on the financial 18 statements. So they can take a much more aggressive 19 position than the internal than the auditor - than 20 the auditor would permit their own tax staff to take. 21 That's been my experience. 23 MS. WALTERS: Pat Walters. CFA Institute. 24 Thin's final st. And it would be nice if I 25 was last, because what I'd like to do is reiterate what 26 of this particular session. So far, a few themes have a arisen in the discussion here today. 1 4 The first seems to me that andit firms 5 absolutely want to be able to provide tax services to 10 familiar with the company just as easily as a new audit 11 transpecial would beerome finiliar with a company. It all 12 depends on what the issuer wants and expectiat 14 they induct that an auditor would be in a 15 There is no doesn't seems to me that 16 t					
15 preparer, because, frankly, they don't have the 15 audit their own work. Once the client begins to take 16 responsibility - or the onus or whatever you want to 16 the advice that thevent that advice that the advice that the					
16 responsibility or the onus or whatever you want to 17 call it of having to report it on the financial 18 statements. So they can take a much more aggressive 19 position than the internal than the auditor than 20 the auditor would permit their own tax staff to take. 21 That's been my experience. 22 MR. SCATES: Pat Walters. 23 MS. WALTERS: Pat Walters, CFA Institute. 24 I think I'm last. And it would be nice if I 25 was last, because what I'd like to do is reiterate what 26 of this patricular session. So far, a few themes have arise in the discussion here today. 2 of this patricular session. So far, a few themes have arise in the discussion here today. 3 The first seems to me that audit firms 4 The first seems to me that audit firms 5 absolutely want to be able to provide tax services to 6 finaliarity, for example. So it would 9 seem to me that an outside tax specialist could become familiar with a company. It all 10 depends on what the issuer wants and expects and 11 there audit cliensts, for form the various external partits with 16 of ad					
17 call it - of having to report it on the financial 17 particular financial-reporting effect, as well as a particular tax effect, the auditor will be in that 18 statements. So they can take a much more aggressive ip position than the internal - than the auditor - than 20 the auditor would permit their own tax staff to take. 21 That's been my experience. 22 MR. SCATES: Pat Walters, CFA Institute. 23 MS. WALTERS: Pat Walters, CFA Institute. 24 I think Tn last. And it would be nice if I 25 was last, because what I'd like to do is reiterate what 2 Of this particular session. So far, a few themes have arisen in the discussion here today. 3 arisen in the discussion here today. 4 The first seems to me that audit firms to absolutely want to be able to provide tax services to their audit clients. It also seems to me that an outside tax specialist could become familiar with a company. It all contracts for from the various external parties with whom it does business. 15 There is no doesn't seem to me any reason the discussion around the table, that it is advice and planning, as well as tax-compliance and planning had a fee-structure element					
18 statements. So they can take a much more aggressive 19 position than the internal than the auditor than 19 position. 21 That's been my experience. 21 That's why we're around this table today. 11 21 21 That's why we're around this table today. 21 12 13 14 14 14 </td <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td>					
 19 position than the internal than the auditor than 20 the auditor would permit their own tax staff to take. 21 That's been my experience. 22 MR. SCATES: Pat Walters. 23 MS. WALTERS: Pat Walters. CFA Institute. 24 I think I'm last. And it would be nice if I 25 was last, because what I'd like to do is reiterate what 26 Page 95 27 Page 97 1 Barbara said when she first commented, at the beginning 2 of this particular session. So far, a few themes have 3 arisen in the discussion here today. 3 arisen in the discussion here today. 3 absolutely want to be able to provide tax services to 6 their audit clients. It also seems to me that audit frms 4 subsolutely want to be able to provide tax services to 6 their audit clients. It also seems to me that some of 7 the arguments that have been put forth are not very 8 convincing. Familiarity, for example. So it would 9 seem to me that an outside tax specialist could become 11 firm would become familiar with a company. It all 12 depends on what the issuer wants and expects and 13 contracts for from the various external parties with 4 whom it does business. 14 whom it does business. 15 There is no - doesn't seem to me any reason 16 why a third-party tax specialist couldn't be expected 16 why a third-party tax specialist couldn't be expected 17 to have a continuing relationship, providing all kinds 18 of advice and planning, as well as tax-compliance 19 services, to the issuer. It also seems to me that 20 from the discussions around the table, that it is 21 almost self-evident that an adviter would be in a 22 better position to argue against tax advice, tax 23 almost self-evident that an advice would be from 24 ther internes within a firm. 25					
 20 the auditor would permit their own tax staff to take. 21 That's been my experience. 22 MR. SCATES: Pat Walters. 23 MS. WALTERS: Pat Walters. 24 I think I'm last. And it would be nice if I 25 was last, because what I'd like to do is reiterate what 26 Page 97 1 Barbara said when she first commented, at the beginning 20 of this particular session. So far, a few themes have 21 also think, finally, that we are putting 22 of this particular session. So far, a few themes have 23 absolutely want to be able to provide tax services to 24 the arguments that have been put forth are not very 25 convincing. Familiarity, for example. So it would 26 seem to me that an outside tax specialist could become 27 firm would become familiar with the company just as easily as a new audit 28 of advice and planning, as well as tax-compliance 29 from the discussions around the table, that its 20 advices to form the various external parties with 21 this point, the only one, in addition to meaudit 22 contracts for from the various external parties with 29 why a third-party tax specialist couldify the expected 20 from the discussions around the table, that it is 21 almost self-evident that an auditor would be in a 22 better position to argue against tax advice, tax 23 attategy, from an external party than it would be form 24 their partners within a firm. 					
21 That's been my experience. 21 thing that Barbara said. It would seem to me that 22 MR. SCATES: Pat Walters. 23 That's why we're around this table today. The 24 I think I'm last. And it would be nice if I 23 That's why we're around this table today. The 24 I think I'm last. And it would be nice if I 23 That's why we're around this table today. The 25 was last, because what I'd like to do is reiterate what 26 Page 97 1 Barbara said when she first commented, at the beginning 20 of this particular session. So far, a few themes have 3 arisen in the discussion here today. 1 that independence will be violated, then the best 2 course of action is to not take that stance. 1 that independence, in addition to these four 7 the arguments that have been put forth are not very 3 audit committees in very difficult situations if we do 9 seem to me that an outside tax specialist could become 10 taks-services contract? Other outside parties are not 11 there a continuing relationship, providing all kinds 13 contracts for from the various external parties with 15 There is no doesn't seem to me any reason 14					
22 MR. SCATES: Pat Walters. 22 independence always needs to trump these other issues. 23 MS. WALTERS: Pat Walters. CFA Institute. 23 Thaf's mly we're around this table today. The 24 Ithink I'm last. And it would be nice if I 24 integrity of the financial statements relies on the 25 was last, because what I'd like to do is reiterate what 26 independence always needs to trump these other issues. 26 think I'm last. And it would be nice if I 24 integrity of the financial statements relies on the 25 of this particular session. So far, a few themes have 25 course of action is to not take that stance. 3 arisen in the discussion here today. 1 that independence will be violated, then the best 4 The first seems to me that audit firms 3 1 also think, finally, that we are putting 4 audit committees in very difficult situations if we do 5 not provide them with a lot of information about how to 9 seem to me that an outside tax specialist could become 1 this particular setsion to management, 16 familiar with the company just as easily as a new audit 11 tax-services contract? Other outside parties are not 12 depends on what the i					
23MS. WALTERS: Pat Walters, CFA Institute.23That's why we're around this table to'day. The24I think I'm last. And it would be nice if Iintegrity of the financial statements relies on the25was last, because what I'd like to do is reiterate what23That's why we're around this table to'day. The24I think I'm last. And it would be nice if I24integrity of the financial statements relies on the25was last, because what I'd like to do is reiterate what25Page 971Barbara said when she first commented, at the beginning21that independence will be violated, then the best2course of action is to not take that stance.3I also think, finally, that we are putting3ansolutely want to be able to provide tax services to3I also think, finally, that we are putting4audit committees in very difficult situations if we do5absolutely want to be able to provide tax services to56their audit clients. It also seems to me that some of7familiar with de company. It all11firm would become familiar with a company. It all12depends on what the issuer wants and expects and13contracts for from the various external parties with14whom it does business.15There is no doesn't seem to me any reason16why a third-party tax specialist couldn't be expected17there and planning, as well as tax-compliance18of advice and planning, as well as tax-compliance19eerr				6	
24I think I'm last. And it would be nice if I24integrity of the financial statements relies on the25was last, because what I'd like to do is reiterate what24integrity of the financial statements relies on the26Page 95Page 971Barbara said when she first commented, at the beginning212of this particular session. So far, a few themes have3arisen in the discussion here today.3arisen in the discussion here today.1that independence will be violated, then the best4The first seems to me that audit firms3audit committees in very difficult situations if we do5absolutely want to be able to provide tax services to5not provide them with a lot of information about how to6the arguments that have been put forth are not very7principles. What kinds of questions should they ask a8convincing. Familiarity, for example. So it would9at this point, the only one, in addition to maagement,10familiar with the company just as easily as a new audit10arguing that they should be the firm who is given the11third-party tax specialist couldn't be expected11tax-services contract? Other outside parties are not12depends on what the issuer watts and expects and12there at the table. It would seem to me audit13contracts for from the various external parties with14whom it does business.15There is no doesn't seem to me any reason14determining whether or not the independence of that					
25 was last, because what I'd like to do is reiterate what 25 independence of the auditor. If there is any risk that Page 95 1 Barbara said when she first commented, at the beginning arisen in the discussion here today. 1 that independence will be violated, then the best course of action is to not take that stance. Page 97 1 The first seems to me that andit firms absolutely want to be able to provide tax services to their audit clients. It also seems to me that some of 7 1 that independence will be violated, then the best 2 audit committees in very difficult situations if we do 5 2 ont provide tax services to the arguments that have been put forth are not very convincing. Familiarity, for example. So it would 9 audit committees in very difficult situations should they ask a particular auditor who comes to them and is probably, 9 audit committees in very difficult situations in probably, 9 11 firm would become familiar with a company. It all 12 arguing that they should be the firm who is given the 11 12 there is no doesn't seem to me any reason 16 may a continuing relationship, providing all kinds of advice and planning, as well as tax-compliance 12 14 determining whether or not the independence of that 13 auditor will be best served by providing them with 14 16 19 services, to the issuer. It also seems to me that 19 17 MR. CARMICHAEL: Thank you. They're both					
Page 95Page 971Barbara said when she first commented, at the beginning of this particular session. So far, a few themes have arisen in the discussion here today.1that independence will be violated, then the best course of action is to not take that stance.3arisen in the discussion here today.1laso think, finally, that we are putting4The first seems to me that audit firms absolutely want to be able to provide tax services to their audit Clients. It also seems to me that some of the arguments that have been put forth are not very seem to me that an outside tax specialist could become 101laso think, finally, that we are putting audit committees in very difficult situations if we do to their audit clients. It also seems to me that some of familiar with the company just as easily as a new audit 11110familiar with the company just as easily as a new audit 11audit committees in very seem to me that an outside tax specialist could become 12911firm would become familiar with a company. It all depends on what the issuer wants and expects and 131014whom it does business.1115There is no doesn't seem to me any reason why a third-party tax specialist couldn't be expected to have a continuing relationship, providing all kinds 161718of advice and planning, as well as tax-compliance almost self-evident that an auditor would be in a 221819fee-structure element that whaven't touched on. So right after lunch, what I'd like to do is go to those questions for both services, see if we can get some information on whether there's commonality of fee stru					
1Barbara said when she first commented, at the beginning2of this particular session. So far, a few themes have3arisen in the discussion here today.4The first seems to me that audit firms5absolutely want to be able to provide tax services to6their audit clients. It also seems to me that some of7the arguments that have been put forth are not very8convincing. Familiarity, for example. So it would9seem to me that an outside tax specialist could become10familiar with the company just as easily as a new audit11firm would become familiar with a company. It all12depends on what the issuer wants and expects and13contracts for from the various external parties with14whom it does business.15There is no doesn't seem to me any reason16why a third-party tax specialist couldn't be expected17to have a continuing relationship, providing all kinds18of advice and planning, as well as tax-compliance21almost self-evident that an auditor would be in a22almost self-evident that an auditor would be in a23strategy, from an external party than it would be from24strategy, from an external party than it would be from24their partners within a firm.					
 2 of this particular session. So far, a few themes have arisen in the discussion here today. 4 The first seems to me that audit firms 5 absolutely want to be able to provide tax services to 6 their audit clients. It also seems to me that some of 7 the arguments that have been put forth are not very 8 convincing. Familiarity, for example. So it would 9 seem to me that an outside tax specialist could become 10 familiar with the company just as easily as a new audit 11 firm would become familiar with a company. It all 12 depends on what the issuer wants and expects and 13 contracts for from the various external parties with 14 whom it does business. 15 There is no doesn't seem to me any reason 16 why a third-party tax specialist couldn't be expected 17 to have a continuing relationship, providing all kinds 18 of advice and planning, as well as tax-compliance 19 services, to the issuer. It also seems to me that 20 from the discussions around the table, that it is 21 almost self-evident that an auditor would be in a 22 better position to argue against tax advice, tax 23 strategy, from an external party than it would be from 24 their partners within a firm. 2 of the partners within a firm. 2 of the partners within a firm. 2 of the ir partners within a firm. 2 of the partners within a firm. 2 of the partners within a firm. 3 of advice and planning, as well as tax-compliance 4 their partners within a firm. 4 their partners within a firm. 5 of advice and planning had a moutor would be firm 2 better position to argue against tax advice, tax 3 strategy, from an external party than it would be firm 4 their partners within a firm. 5 of advice and planning had a moutor would be firm 6 their partners within a firm. 7 MR CARMICHAEL: Thank you. They're both 8 of advice and planning, as well as tax-compliance 9 fee-structure element that we haven't tou		Page 95		Page 97	
 arisen in the discussion here today. The first seems to me that audit firms absolutely want to be able to provide tax services to their audit clients. It also seems to me that some of their audit clients. It also seems to me that some of their audit clients. It also seems to me that some of seem to me that an outside tax specialist could become familiar with the company just as easily as a new audit firm would become familiar with a company. It all depends on what the issuer wants and expects and contracts for from the various external parties with whom it does business. There is no doesn't seem to me any reason why a third-party tax specialist couldn't be expected for the discussions around the table, that it is services, to the issuer. It also seems to me that form the discussions around the table, that it is almost self-evident that an auditor would be in a better position to argue against tax advice, tax strategy, from an external party than it would be from. their partners within a firm. attraction and the firm. their partners within a firm. attraction and the firm. attraction an			1		
4The first seems to me that audit firms5absolutely want to be able to provide tax services to6their audit clients. It also seems to me that some of7the arguments that have been put forth are not very8convincing. Familiarity, for example. So it would9seem to me that an outside tax specialist could become10familiar with the company just as easily as a new audit11firm would become familiar with a company. It all12depends on what the issuer wants and expects and13contracts for from the various external parties with14whom it does business.15There is no doesn't seem to me any reason16why a third-party tax specialist couldn't be expected17to have a continuing relationship, providing all kinds18of advice and planning, as well as tax-compliance19services, to the issuer. It also seems to me that20from the discussions around the table, that it is21almost self-evident that an auditor would be in a22better position to argue against tax advice, tax23strategy, from an external party than it would be from24their partners within a firm.					
 5 absolutely want to be able to provide tax services to 6 their audit clients. It also seems to me that some of 7 the arguments that have been put forth are not very 8 convincing. Familiarity, for example. So it would 9 seem to me that an outside tax specialist could become 10 familiar with the company just as easily as a new audit 11 firm would become familiar with a company. It all 12 depends on what the issuer wants and expects and 13 contracts for from the various external parties with 14 whom it does business. 15 There is no doesn't seem to me any reason 16 why a third-party tax specialist couldn't be expected 17 to have a continuing relationship, providing all kinds 18 of advice and planning, as well as tax-compliance 19 services, to the issuer. It also seems to me that 20 from the discussions around the table, that it is 21 almost self-evident that an auditor would be in a 22 better position to argue against tax advice, tax 23 strategy, from an external party than it would be from 24 their partners within a firm. 5 		•			
 6 their audit clients. It also seems to me that some of 7 the arguments that have been put forth are not very 8 convincing. Familiarity, for example. So it would 9 seem to me that an outside tax specialist could become 10 familiar with the company just as easily as a new audit 11 firm would become familiar with a company. It all 12 depends on what the issuer wants and expects and 13 contracts for from the various external parties with 14 whom it does business. 15 There is no doesn't seem to me any reason 16 why a third-party tax specialist couldn't be expected 17 to have a continuing relationship, providing all kinds 18 of advice and planning, as well as tax-compliance 19 services, to the issuer. It also seems to me that 20 from the discussions around the table, that it is 21 almost self-evident that an auditor would be in a 22 better position to argue against tax advice, tax 23 strategy, from an external party than it would be from 24 their partners within a firm. 					
 7 the arguments that have been put forth are not very 8 convincing. Familiarity, for example. So it would 9 seem to me that an outside tax specialist could become 10 familiar with the company just as easily as a new audit 11 firm would become familiar with a company. It all 12 depends on what the issuer wants and expects and 13 contracts for from the various external parties with 14 whom it does business. 15 There is no doesn't seem to me any reason 16 why a third-party tax specialist couldn't be expected 17 to have a continuing relationship, providing all kinds 18 of advice and planning, as well as tax-compliance 19 services, to the issuer. It also seems to me that 10 from the discussions around the table, that it is 11 almost self-evident that an auditor would be in a 20 better position to argue against tax advice, tax 21 almost self-evident that an auditor would be from 22 better position to argue against tax advice, tax 23 strategy, from an external party than it would be from 24 their partners within a firm. 					
 8 convincing. Familiarity, for example. So it would 9 seem to me that an outside tax specialist could become 10 familiar with the company just as easily as a new audit 11 firm would become familiar with a company. It all 12 depends on what the issuer wants and expects and 13 contracts for from the various external parties with 14 whom it does business. 15 There is no doesn't seem to me any reason 16 why a third-party tax specialist couldn't be expected 17 to have a continuing relationship, providing all kinds 18 of advice and planning, as well as tax-compliance 19 services, to the issuer. It also seems to me that 10 from the discussions around the table, that it is 11 almost self-evident that an auditor would be in a 20 better position to argue against tax advice, tax 21 almost self-evident that an auditor would be from 22 better position to argue against tax advice, tax 23 strategy, from an external party than it would be from 24 their partners within a firm. 			-		
 9 seem to me that an outside tax specialist could become familiar with the company just as easily as a new audit 11 firm would become familiar with a company. It all 12 depends on what the issuer wants and expects and 13 contracts for from the various external parties with 14 whom it does business. 15 There is no doesn't seem to me any reason 16 why a third-party tax specialist couldn't be expected 17 to have a continuing relationship, providing all kinds 18 of advice and planning, as well as tax-compliance 19 services, to the issuer. It also seems to me that 20 from the discussions around the table, that it is 21 almost self-evident that an auditor would be in a 22 better position to argue against tax advice, tax 23 strategy, from an external party than it would be from 24 their partners within a firm. 9 at this point, the only one, in addition to management, 10 arguing that they should be the firm who is given the 11 tax-services contract? Other outside parties are not 12 there at the table. It would seem to me audit 13 contracts for from the various external party than it would be from 24 their partners within a firm. 			-		
 10 familiar with the company just as easily as a new audit 11 firm would become familiar with a company. It all 12 depends on what the issuer wants and expects and 13 contracts for from the various external parties with 14 whom it does business. 15 There is no doesn't seem to me any reason 16 why a third-party tax specialist couldn't be expected 17 to have a continuing relationship, providing all kinds 18 of advice and planning, as well as tax-compliance 19 services, to the issuer. It also seems to me that 20 from the discussions around the table, that it is 21 almost self-evident that an auditor would be in a 22 better position to argue against tax advice, tax 23 strategy, from an external party than it would be from 24 their partners within a firm. 					
11firm would become familiar with a company. It all depends on what the issuer wants and expects and contracts for from the various external parties with whom it does business.11tax-services contract? Other outside parties are not there at the table. It would seem to me audit committees are at a disadvantage in that respect in determining whether or not the independence of that auditor will be best served by providing them with the discussions around the table, that it is ervices, to the issuer. It also seems to me that from the discussions around the table, that it is almost self-evident that an auditor would be in a better position to argue against tax advice, tax strategy, from an external party than it would be from 2411tax-services contract? Other outside parties are not there at the table. It would seem to me audit there at the table. It would seem to me audit there at a disadvantage in that respect in determining whether or not the independence of that auditor will be best served by providing them with 1613committees are at a disadvantage in that respect in determining whether or not the independence of that auditor will be best served by providing them with 1614why a third-party tax specialist couldn't be expected to have a continuing relationship, providing all kinds of advice and planning, as well as tax-compliance almost self-evident that an auditor would be in a better position to argue against tax advice, tax strategy, from an external party than it would be from 2424their partners within a firm.			-		
12depends on what the issuer wants and expects and contracts for from the various external parties with whom it does business.12there at the table. It would seem to me audit13contracts for from the various external parties with whom it does business.12there at the table. It would seem to me audit14whom it does business.13committees are at a disadvantage in that respect in determining whether or not the independence of that auditor will be best served by providing them with those with that contract.16why a third-party tax specialist couldn't be expected to have a continuing relationship, providing all kinds of advice and planning, as well as tax-compliance services, to the issuer. It also seems to me that 201619services, to the issuer. It also seems to me that of from the discussions around the table, that it is almost self-evident that an auditor would be in a 221922better position to argue against tax advice, tax 232123strategy, from an external party than it would be from 242224their partners within a firm.24					
 13 contracts for from the various external parties with 14 whom it does business. 15 There is no doesn't seem to me any reason 16 why a third-party tax specialist couldn't be expected 17 to have a continuing relationship, providing all kinds 18 of advice and planning, as well as tax-compliance 19 services, to the issuer. It also seems to me that 20 from the discussions around the table, that it is 21 almost self-evident that an auditor would be in a 22 better position to argue against tax advice, tax 23 strategy, from an external party than it would be from 24 their partners within a firm. 					
 whom it does business. There is no doesn't seem to me any reason why a third-party tax specialist couldn't be expected to have a continuing relationship, providing all kinds of advice and planning, as well as tax-compliance services, to the issuer. It also seems to me that from the discussions around the table, that it is almost self-evident that an auditor would be in a better position to argue against tax advice, tax strategy, from an external party than it would be from their partners within a firm. 					
15There is no doesn't seem to me any reason15auditor will be best served by providing them with16why a third-party tax specialist couldn't be expected16those with that contract.17to have a continuing relationship, providing all kinds16those with that contract.18of advice and planning, as well as tax-compliance18of the questions on tax compliance and planning had a19services, to the issuer. It also seems to me that19fee-structure element that we haven't touched on. So20from the discussions around the table, that it is20right after lunch, what I'd like to do is go to those21almost self-evident that an auditor would be in a21questions for both services, see if we can get some22better position to argue against tax advice, tax22information on whether there's commonality of fee23strategy, from an external party than it would be from23structures, what are the differences between the two24their partners within a firm.24services.					
 16 why a third-party tax specialist couldn't be expected 17 to have a continuing relationship, providing all kinds 18 of advice and planning, as well as tax-compliance 19 services, to the issuer. It also seems to me that 20 from the discussions around the table, that it is 21 almost self-evident that an auditor would be in a 22 better position to argue against tax advice, tax 23 strategy, from an external party than it would be from 24 their partners within a firm. 16 those with that contract. 17 MR. CARMICHAEL: Thank you. They're both 18 of the questions on tax compliance and planning had a 19 fee-structure element that we haven't touched on. So 20 right after lunch, what I'd like to do is go to those 21 almost self-evident that an auditor would be from 23 strategy. from an external party than it would be from 24 services. 					
17to have a continuing relationship, providing all kinds17MR. CARMICHAEL: Thank you. They're both18of advice and planning, as well as tax-compliance18of the questions on tax compliance and planning had a19services, to the issuer. It also seems to me that19fee-structure element that we haven't touched on. So20from the discussions around the table, that it is20right after lunch, what I'd like to do is go to those21almost self-evident that an auditor would be in a21questions for both services, see if we can get some22better position to argue against tax advice, tax22information on whether there's commonality of fee23strategy, from an external party than it would be from24services.				· 1 0	
18of advice and planning, as well as tax-compliance18of the questions on tax compliance and planning had a19services, to the issuer. It also seems to me that19fee-structure element that we haven't touched on. So20from the discussions around the table, that it is20right after lunch, what I'd like to do is go to those21almost self-evident that an auditor would be in a20right after lunch, what I'd like to do is go to those22better position to argue against tax advice, tax21questions for both services, see if we can get some23strategy, from an external party than it would be from23structures, what are the differences between the two24their partners within a firm.24services.					
19services, to the issuer. It also seems to me that19fee-structure element that we haven't touched on. So20from the discussions around the table, that it is20right after lunch, what I'd like to do is go to those21almost self-evident that an auditor would be in a20right after lunch, what I'd like to do is go to those22better position to argue against tax advice, tax22information on whether there's commonality of fee23strategy, from an external party than it would be from23structures, what are the differences between the two24their partners within a firm.24services.		of advice and planning, as well as tax-compliance			
 almost self-evident that an auditor would be in a better position to argue against tax advice, tax strategy, from an external party than it would be from their partners within a firm. 	19				
 better position to argue against tax advice, tax strategy, from an external party than it would be from their partners within a firm. information on whether there's commonality of fee structures, what are the differences between the two services. 	20	from the discussions around the table, that it is			
23strategy, from an external party than it would be from their partners within a firm.23structures, what are the differences between the two 2423structures, what are the differences between the two services.			21	questions for both services, see if we can get some	
24 their partners within a firm. 24 services.	21				
	21 22	better position to argue against tax advice, tax	22	information on whether there's commonality of fee	
25 It's also interesting and I'm glad that 25 I'm going to ask you to come back at 1:00	21 22 23	better position to argue against tax advice, tax strategy, from an external party than it would be from	22 23	information on whether there's commonality of fee structures, what are the differences between the two	
	21 22 23 24	better position to argue against tax advice, tax strategy, from an external party than it would be from their partners within a firm.	22 23 24	information on whether there's commonality of fee structures, what are the differences between the two services.	

25 (Pages 94 to 97)

	wasnington, DC			
	Page 98		Page 100	
1	p.m., shorten your lunchtime a little bit, in the	1	think in recent times, and I'd say over the last two	
2	interest of staying on schedule and having time to	2	years, it's on a fixed-fee basis that we see tax	
3	cover those topics.	3	services.	
4	Thank you.	4	MR. CARMICHAEL: Dean Uminski.	
5	[Luncheon recess from 12:12 to 1:03 p.m.]	5	MR. UMINSKI: Dean Uminski with Crowe Chizek.	
6	MR. CARMICHAEL: I know everybody's not back	6	I would have to agree with Mark and Scott, primarily	
7	yet, but in the interest of staying on schedule, if	7	standard hourly rates, in some cases fixed fees.	
8	you'll take your seats.	8	MR. CARMICHAEL: Any other information? Okay,	
9	The first thing is that we do want to get	9	then let's move to the next topic. Bella Rivshin is	
10	some information on fee structures and what the fee	10	going to lead us through that starting with tax	
11	structures typically are for tax-compliant services,	11	strategy services.	
12	and how they might differ, if at all, for tax planning	12	MS. RIVSHIN: Good afternoon. Our next topic,	
13	and advice services. Any volunteers before I call on	13	tax strategy services, includes a development of tax-	
14	people?	14	motivated, structured transactions, occasionally	
15	(Laughter.)	15	referred to as tax products. These tax products are	
16	MR. CARMICHAEL: Yes, Paul.	16	designed to enable a company to reduce its tax	
17	MR. KOREN: Paul Koren, Goldstein Golub	17	liability or achieve a financial accounting result.	
18	Kessler. Our answer is simple. We are a standard time	18	Let's now turn to our first question. Does	
19	charge firm and any services that we perform are billed	19	an accounting firm sale of tax strategies or tax	
20	at our standard time charges.	20	products to audit clients affect the firm's	
21	MR. CARMICHAEL: Okay. Walter McNairy.	21	independence from the audit client? Are there	
22	MR. MCNAIRY: Walter McNairy with Dixon	22	different independence considerations depending on	
23 24	Hughes. I'll echo that comment with my firm. Rightly	23 24	whether the tax strategy or product is designed to reduce tax liability or to achieve a financial	
24 25	or wrongly, we have never really believed in value- added pricing. Maybe we left something on the table	24 25	statement result?	
23	added prenig. Maybe we left something on the table	23	statement result?	
	Page 99		Page 101	
1		1	•	
1 2	there, but our rate structure is just our standard	1 2	Okay, Mike Gagnon.	
1 2 3	there, but our rate structure is just our standard hourly rates. We have one standard hourly rate for any		Okay, Mike Gagnon. MR. GAGNON: Silence is deafening. It	
2	there, but our rate structure is just our standard hourly rates. We have one standard hourly rate for any service that we perform.	2	Okay, Mike Gagnon. MR. GAGNON: Silence is deafening. It obviously is a critically important topic. I think we	
2 3	there, but our rate structure is just our standard hourly rates. We have one standard hourly rate for any	2 3	Okay, Mike Gagnon. MR. GAGNON: Silence is deafening. It	
2 3 4	there, but our rate structure is just our standard hourly rates. We have one standard hourly rate for any service that we perform. MR. CARMICHAEL: Mark Weinberger.	2 3 4	Okay, Mike Gagnon. MR. GAGNON: Silence is deafening. It obviously is a critically important topic. I think we did touch upon it a bit this morning. I do think it's important to differentiate here what I'll call tax advantage or inappropriate tax strategies, tax	
2 3 4 5 6 7	there, but our rate structure is just our standard hourly rates. We have one standard hourly rate for any service that we perform. MR. CARMICHAEL: Mark Weinberger. MR. WEINBERGER: For compliance, it's solely	2 3 4 5 6 7	Okay, Mike Gagnon. MR. GAGNON: Silence is deafening. It obviously is a critically important topic. I think we did touch upon it a bit this morning. I do think it's important to differentiate here what I'll call tax	
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	there, but our rate structure is just our standard hourly rates. We have one standard hourly rate for any service that we perform. MR. CARMICHAEL: Mark Weinberger. MR. WEINBERGER: For compliance, it's solely hourly or based on hours. Sometimes it's a fixed fee based on hours because they want to know when they sign up how much it's actually going to cost, so you	2 3 4 5 6	Okay, Mike Gagnon. MR. GAGNON: Silence is deafening. It obviously is a critically important topic. I think we did touch upon it a bit this morning. I do think it's important to differentiate here what I'll call tax advantage or inappropriate tax strategies, tax advantage transactions. I do think it impacts a firm's independence and not in a positive way. I think that	
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	there, but our rate structure is just our standard hourly rates. We have one standard hourly rate for any service that we perform. MR. CARMICHAEL: Mark Weinberger. MR. WEINBERGER: For compliance, it's solely hourly or based on hours. Sometimes it's a fixed fee based on hours because they want to know when they sign up how much it's actually going to cost, so you estimate the amount of time and then you bill a fixed	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	Okay, Mike Gagnon. MR. GAGNON: Silence is deafening. It obviously is a critically important topic. I think we did touch upon it a bit this morning. I do think it's important to differentiate here what I'll call tax advantage or inappropriate tax strategies, tax advantage transactions. I do think it impacts a firm's independence and not in a positive way. I think that kind of activity should not be performed by an audit	
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	there, but our rate structure is just our standard hourly rates. We have one standard hourly rate for any service that we perform. MR. CARMICHAEL: Mark Weinberger. MR. WEINBERGER: For compliance, it's solely hourly or based on hours. Sometimes it's a fixed fee based on hours because they want to know when they sign up how much it's actually going to cost, so you estimate the amount of time and then you bill a fixed fee, but it's based on hours.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	Okay, Mike Gagnon. MR. GAGNON: Silence is deafening. It obviously is a critically important topic. I think we did touch upon it a bit this morning. I do think it's important to differentiate here what I'll call tax advantage or inappropriate tax strategies, tax advantage transactions. I do think it impacts a firm's independence and not in a positive way. I think that kind of activity should not be performed by an audit firm, should not be provided to its audit clients. I	
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	there, but our rate structure is just our standard hourly rates. We have one standard hourly rate for any service that we perform. MR. CARMICHAEL: Mark Weinberger. MR. WEINBERGER: For compliance, it's solely hourly or based on hours. Sometimes it's a fixed fee based on hours because they want to know when they sign up how much it's actually going to cost, so you estimate the amount of time and then you bill a fixed fee, but it's based on hours. And for consulting, any work that we provide	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	Okay, Mike Gagnon. MR. GAGNON: Silence is deafening. It obviously is a critically important topic. I think we did touch upon it a bit this morning. I do think it's important to differentiate here what I'll call tax advantage or inappropriate tax strategies, tax advantage transactions. I do think it impacts a firm's independence and not in a positive way. I think that kind of activity should not be performed by an audit firm, should not be provided to its audit clients. I think the current independence rules basically touch	
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	there, but our rate structure is just our standard hourly rates. We have one standard hourly rate for any service that we perform. MR. CARMICHAEL: Mark Weinberger. MR. WEINBERGER: For compliance, it's solely hourly or based on hours. Sometimes it's a fixed fee based on hours because they want to know when they sign up how much it's actually going to cost, so you estimate the amount of time and then you bill a fixed fee, but it's based on hours. And for consulting, any work that we provide for our audit clients is hours or based on hours as	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	Okay, Mike Gagnon. MR. GAGNON: Silence is deafening. It obviously is a critically important topic. I think we did touch upon it a bit this morning. I do think it's important to differentiate here what I'll call tax advantage or inappropriate tax strategies, tax advantage transactions. I do think it impacts a firm's independence and not in a positive way. I think that kind of activity should not be performed by an audit firm, should not be provided to its audit clients. I think the current independence rules basically touch upon it in terms of the background, but point to the	
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	there, but our rate structure is just our standard hourly rates. We have one standard hourly rate for any service that we perform. MR. CARMICHAEL: Mark Weinberger. MR. WEINBERGER: For compliance, it's solely hourly or based on hours. Sometimes it's a fixed fee based on hours because they want to know when they sign up how much it's actually going to cost, so you estimate the amount of time and then you bill a fixed fee, but it's based on hours. And for consulting, any work that we provide for our audit clients is hours or based on hours as well.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	Okay, Mike Gagnon. MR. GAGNON: Silence is deafening. It obviously is a critically important topic. I think we did touch upon it a bit this morning. I do think it's important to differentiate here what I'll call tax advantage or inappropriate tax strategies, tax advantage transactions. I do think it impacts a firm's independence and not in a positive way. I think that kind of activity should not be performed by an audit firm, should not be provided to its audit clients. I think the current independence rules basically touch upon it in terms of the background, but point to the audit committee in its oversight to consider these.	
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	there, but our rate structure is just our standard hourly rates. We have one standard hourly rate for any service that we perform. MR. CARMICHAEL: Mark Weinberger. MR. WEINBERGER: For compliance, it's solely hourly or based on hours. Sometimes it's a fixed fee based on hours because they want to know when they sign up how much it's actually going to cost, so you estimate the amount of time and then you bill a fixed fee, but it's based on hours. And for consulting, any work that we provide for our audit clients is hours or based on hours as well. MR. CARMICHAEL: Scott Bayless.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	Okay, Mike Gagnon. MR. GAGNON: Silence is deafening. It obviously is a critically important topic. I think we did touch upon it a bit this morning. I do think it's important to differentiate here what I'll call tax advantage or inappropriate tax strategies, tax advantage transactions. I do think it impacts a firm's independence and not in a positive way. I think that kind of activity should not be performed by an audit firm, should not be provided to its audit clients. I think the current independence rules basically touch upon it in terms of the background, but point to the audit committee in its oversight to consider these. I would encourage a reconsideration of that,	
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	there, but our rate structure is just our standard hourly rates. We have one standard hourly rate for any service that we perform. MR. CARMICHAEL: Mark Weinberger. MR. WEINBERGER: For compliance, it's solely hourly or based on hours. Sometimes it's a fixed fee based on hours because they want to know when they sign up how much it's actually going to cost, so you estimate the amount of time and then you bill a fixed fee, but it's based on hours. And for consulting, any work that we provide for our audit clients is hours or based on hours as well. MR. CARMICHAEL: Scott Bayless. MR. BAYLESS: For Deloitte, it's fixed fee or	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	Okay, Mike Gagnon. MR. GAGNON: Silence is deafening. It obviously is a critically important topic. I think we did touch upon it a bit this morning. I do think it's important to differentiate here what I'll call tax advantage or inappropriate tax strategies, tax advantage transactions. I do think it impacts a firm's independence and not in a positive way. I think that kind of activity should not be performed by an audit firm, should not be provided to its audit clients. I think the current independence rules basically touch upon it in terms of the background, but point to the audit committee in its oversight to consider these. I would encourage a reconsideration of that, because I don't believe I think clarity in this area	
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	there, but our rate structure is just our standard hourly rates. We have one standard hourly rate for any service that we perform. MR. CARMICHAEL: Mark Weinberger. MR. WEINBERGER: For compliance, it's solely hourly or based on hours. Sometimes it's a fixed fee based on hours because they want to know when they sign up how much it's actually going to cost, so you estimate the amount of time and then you bill a fixed fee, but it's based on hours. And for consulting, any work that we provide for our audit clients is hours or based on hours as well. MR. CARMICHAEL: Scott Bayless. MR. BAYLESS: For Deloitte, it's fixed fee or time and expense.	$ \begin{array}{c} 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13 \\ 14 \\ 15 \\ 16 \\ \end{array} $	Okay, Mike Gagnon. MR. GAGNON: Silence is deafening. It obviously is a critically important topic. I think we did touch upon it a bit this morning. I do think it's important to differentiate here what I'll call tax advantage or inappropriate tax strategies, tax advantage transactions. I do think it impacts a firm's independence and not in a positive way. I think that kind of activity should not be performed by an audit firm, should not be provided to its audit clients. I think the current independence rules basically touch upon it in terms of the background, but point to the audit committee in its oversight to consider these. I would encourage a reconsideration of that, because I don't believe I think clarity in this area is better than, I'll call it flexibility, in terms of a	
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	there, but our rate structure is just our standard hourly rates. We have one standard hourly rate for any service that we perform. MR. CARMICHAEL: Mark Weinberger. MR. WEINBERGER: For compliance, it's solely hourly or based on hours. Sometimes it's a fixed fee based on hours because they want to know when they sign up how much it's actually going to cost, so you estimate the amount of time and then you bill a fixed fee, but it's based on hours. And for consulting, any work that we provide for our audit clients is hours or based on hours as well. MR. CARMICHAEL: Scott Bayless. MR. BAYLESS: For Deloitte, it's fixed fee or time and expense. MR. CARMICHAEL: Bruce Webb.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	Okay, Mike Gagnon. MR. GAGNON: Silence is deafening. It obviously is a critically important topic. I think we did touch upon it a bit this morning. I do think it's important to differentiate here what I'll call tax advantage or inappropriate tax strategies, tax advantage transactions. I do think it impacts a firm's independence and not in a positive way. I think that kind of activity should not be performed by an audit firm, should not be provided to its audit clients. I think the current independence rules basically touch upon it in terms of the background, but point to the audit committee in its oversight to consider these. I would encourage a reconsideration of that, because I don't believe I think clarity in this area is better than, I'll call it flexibility, in terms of a discussion or a dialogue with the audit committee,	
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	there, but our rate structure is just our standard hourly rates. We have one standard hourly rate for any service that we perform. MR. CARMICHAEL: Mark Weinberger. MR. WEINBERGER: For compliance, it's solely hourly or based on hours. Sometimes it's a fixed fee based on hours because they want to know when they sign up how much it's actually going to cost, so you estimate the amount of time and then you bill a fixed fee, but it's based on hours. And for consulting, any work that we provide for our audit clients is hours or based on hours as well. MR. CARMICHAEL: Scott Bayless. MR. BAYLESS: For Deloitte, it's fixed fee or time and expense. MR. CARMICHAEL: Bruce Webb. MR. WEBB: Bruce Webb, McGladrey. That would	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	Okay, Mike Gagnon. MR. GAGNON: Silence is deafening. It obviously is a critically important topic. I think we did touch upon it a bit this morning. I do think it's important to differentiate here what I'll call tax advantage or inappropriate tax strategies, tax advantage transactions. I do think it impacts a firm's independence and not in a positive way. I think that kind of activity should not be performed by an audit firm, should not be provided to its audit clients. I think the current independence rules basically touch upon it in terms of the background, but point to the audit committee in its oversight to consider these. I would encourage a reconsideration of that, because I don't believe I think clarity in this area is better than, I'll call it flexibility, in terms of a discussion or a dialogue with the audit committee, because I don't believe from an integrity perspective,	
$\begin{array}{c} 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13 \\ 14 \\ 15 \\ 16 \\ 17 \\ 18 \\ 19 \end{array}$	there, but our rate structure is just our standard hourly rates. We have one standard hourly rate for any service that we perform. MR. CARMICHAEL: Mark Weinberger. MR. WEINBERGER: For compliance, it's solely hourly or based on hours. Sometimes it's a fixed fee based on hours because they want to know when they sign up how much it's actually going to cost, so you estimate the amount of time and then you bill a fixed fee, but it's based on hours. And for consulting, any work that we provide for our audit clients is hours or based on hours as well. MR. CARMICHAEL: Scott Bayless. MR. BAYLESS: For Deloitte, it's fixed fee or time and expense. MR. CARMICHAEL: Bruce Webb. MR. WEBB: Bruce Webb, McGladrey. That would be true for our firm as well, hours at rates or fixed	$\begin{array}{c} 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13 \\ 14 \\ 15 \\ 16 \\ 17 \\ 18 \\ 19 \end{array}$	Okay, Mike Gagnon. MR. GAGNON: Silence is deafening. It obviously is a critically important topic. I think we did touch upon it a bit this morning. I do think it's important to differentiate here what I'll call tax advantage or inappropriate tax strategies, tax advantage transactions. I do think it impacts a firm's independence and not in a positive way. I think that kind of activity should not be performed by an audit firm, should not be provided to its audit clients. I think the current independence rules basically touch upon it in terms of the background, but point to the audit committee in its oversight to consider these. I would encourage a reconsideration of that, because I don't believe I think clarity in this area is better than, I'll call it flexibility, in terms of a discussion or a dialogue with the audit committee, because I don't believe from an integrity perspective, something we've talked about and at least believe that	
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	there, but our rate structure is just our standard hourly rates. We have one standard hourly rate for any service that we perform. MR. CARMICHAEL: Mark Weinberger. MR. WEINBERGER: For compliance, it's solely hourly or based on hours. Sometimes it's a fixed fee based on hours because they want to know when they sign up how much it's actually going to cost, so you estimate the amount of time and then you bill a fixed fee, but it's based on hours. And for consulting, any work that we provide for our audit clients is hours or based on hours as well. MR. CARMICHAEL: Scott Bayless. MR. BAYLESS: For Deloitte, it's fixed fee or time and expense. MR. CARMICHAEL: Bruce Webb. MR. WEBB: Bruce Webb, McGladrey. That would be true for our firm as well, hours at rates or fixed fees.	$\begin{array}{c} 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13 \\ 14 \\ 15 \\ 16 \\ 17 \\ 18 \\ 19 \\ 20 \end{array}$	Okay, Mike Gagnon. MR. GAGNON: Silence is deafening. It obviously is a critically important topic. I think we did touch upon it a bit this morning. I do think it's important to differentiate here what I'll call tax advantage or inappropriate tax strategies, tax advantage transactions. I do think it impacts a firm's independence and not in a positive way. I think that kind of activity should not be performed by an audit firm, should not be provided to its audit clients. I think the current independence rules basically touch upon it in terms of the background, but point to the audit committee in its oversight to consider these. I would encourage a reconsideration of that, because I don't believe I think clarity in this area is better than, I'll call it flexibility, in terms of a discussion or a dialogue with the audit committee, because I don't believe from an integrity perspective, something we've talked about and at least believe that very, very important to the financial markets from that	
$\begin{array}{c} 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13 \\ 14 \\ 15 \\ 16 \\ 17 \\ 18 \\ 19 \\ 20 \\ 21 \end{array}$	there, but our rate structure is just our standard hourly rates. We have one standard hourly rate for any service that we perform. MR. CARMICHAEL: Mark Weinberger. MR. WEINBERGER: For compliance, it's solely hourly or based on hours. Sometimes it's a fixed fee based on hours because they want to know when they sign up how much it's actually going to cost, so you estimate the amount of time and then you bill a fixed fee, but it's based on hours. And for consulting, any work that we provide for our audit clients is hours or based on hours as well. MR. CARMICHAEL: Scott Bayless. MR. BAYLESS: For Deloitte, it's fixed fee or time and expense. MR. CARMICHAEL: Bruce Webb. MR. WEBB: Bruce Webb, McGladrey. That would be true for our firm as well, hours at rates or fixed fees. MR. CARMICHAEL: Rich Angelone.	$\begin{array}{c} 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13 \\ 14 \\ 15 \\ 16 \\ 17 \\ 18 \\ 19 \\ 20 \\ 21 \end{array}$	Okay, Mike Gagnon. MR. GAGNON: Silence is deafening. It obviously is a critically important topic. I think we did touch upon it a bit this morning. I do think it's important to differentiate here what I'll call tax advantage or inappropriate tax strategies, tax advantage transactions. I do think it impacts a firm's independence and not in a positive way. I think that kind of activity should not be performed by an audit firm, should not be provided to its audit clients. I think the current independence rules basically touch upon it in terms of the background, but point to the audit committee in its oversight to consider these. I would encourage a reconsideration of that, because I don't believe I think clarity in this area is better than, I'll call it flexibility, in terms of a discussion or a dialogue with the audit committee, because I don't believe from an integrity perspective, something we've talked about and at least believe that very, very important to the financial markets from that perspective, I do think it is inappropriate, and would	
$\begin{array}{c} 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13 \\ 14 \\ 15 \\ 16 \\ 17 \\ 18 \\ 19 \\ 20 \\ 21 \\ 22 \end{array}$	there, but our rate structure is just our standard hourly rates. We have one standard hourly rate for any service that we perform. MR. CARMICHAEL: Mark Weinberger. MR. WEINBERGER: For compliance, it's solely hourly or based on hours. Sometimes it's a fixed fee based on hours because they want to know when they sign up how much it's actually going to cost, so you estimate the amount of time and then you bill a fixed fee, but it's based on hours. And for consulting, any work that we provide for our audit clients is hours or based on hours as well. MR. CARMICHAEL: Scott Bayless. MR. BAYLESS: For Deloitte, it's fixed fee or time and expense. MR. CARMICHAEL: Bruce Webb. MR. WEBB: Bruce Webb, McGladrey. That would be true for our firm as well, hours at rates or fixed fees. MR. CARMICHAEL: Rich Angelone. MR. ANGELONE: My name's Rich Angelone. I'm	$\begin{array}{c} 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13 \\ 14 \\ 15 \\ 16 \\ 17 \\ 18 \\ 19 \\ 20 \\ 21 \\ 22 \end{array}$	Okay, Mike Gagnon. MR. GAGNON: Silence is deafening. It obviously is a critically important topic. I think we did touch upon it a bit this morning. I do think it's important to differentiate here what I'll call tax advantage or inappropriate tax strategies, tax advantage transactions. I do think it impacts a firm's independence and not in a positive way. I think that kind of activity should not be performed by an audit firm, should not be provided to its audit clients. I think the current independence rules basically touch upon it in terms of the background, but point to the audit committee in its oversight to consider these. I would encourage a reconsideration of that, because I don't believe I think clarity in this area is better than, I'll call it flexibility, in terms of a discussion or a dialogue with the audit committee, because I don't believe from an integrity perspective, something we've talked about and at least believe that very, very important to the financial markets from that perspective, I do think it is inappropriate, and would urge a reconsideration of that.	
$\begin{array}{c} 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13 \\ 14 \\ 15 \\ 16 \\ 17 \\ 18 \\ 19 \\ 20 \\ 21 \\ 22 \\ 23 \end{array}$	there, but our rate structure is just our standard hourly rates. We have one standard hourly rate for any service that we perform. MR. CARMICHAEL: Mark Weinberger. MR. WEINBERGER: For compliance, it's solely hourly or based on hours. Sometimes it's a fixed fee based on hours because they want to know when they sign up how much it's actually going to cost, so you estimate the amount of time and then you bill a fixed fee, but it's based on hours. And for consulting, any work that we provide for our audit clients is hours or based on hours as well. MR. CARMICHAEL: Scott Bayless. MR. BAYLESS: For Deloitte, it's fixed fee or time and expense. MR. CARMICHAEL: Bruce Webb. MR. WEBB: Bruce Webb, McGladrey. That would be true for our firm as well, hours at rates or fixed fees. MR. CARMICHAEL: Rich Angelone. MR. ANGELONE: My name's Rich Angelone. I'm here on behalf of the ABA. I'm also the tax chair of	$\begin{array}{c} 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13 \\ 14 \\ 15 \\ 16 \\ 17 \\ 18 \\ 19 \\ 20 \\ 21 \\ 22 \\ 23 \end{array}$	Okay, Mike Gagnon. MR. GAGNON: Silence is deafening. It obviously is a critically important topic. I think we did touch upon it a bit this morning. I do think it's important to differentiate here what I'll call tax advantage or inappropriate tax strategies, tax advantage transactions. I do think it impacts a firm's independence and not in a positive way. I think that kind of activity should not be performed by an audit firm, should not be provided to its audit clients. I think the current independence rules basically touch upon it in terms of the background, but point to the audit committee in its oversight to consider these. I would encourage a reconsideration of that, because I don't believe I think clarity in this area is better than, I'll call it flexibility, in terms of a discussion or a dialogue with the audit committee, because I don't believe from an integrity perspective, something we've talked about and at least believe that very, very important to the financial markets from that perspective, I do think it is inappropriate, and would urge a reconsideration of that. The second question really talks about, well,	
$\begin{array}{c} 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13 \\ 14 \\ 15 \\ 16 \\ 17 \\ 18 \\ 19 \\ 20 \\ 21 \\ 22 \end{array}$	there, but our rate structure is just our standard hourly rates. We have one standard hourly rate for any service that we perform. MR. CARMICHAEL: Mark Weinberger. MR. WEINBERGER: For compliance, it's solely hourly or based on hours. Sometimes it's a fixed fee based on hours because they want to know when they sign up how much it's actually going to cost, so you estimate the amount of time and then you bill a fixed fee, but it's based on hours. And for consulting, any work that we provide for our audit clients is hours or based on hours as well. MR. CARMICHAEL: Scott Bayless. MR. BAYLESS: For Deloitte, it's fixed fee or time and expense. MR. CARMICHAEL: Bruce Webb. MR. WEBB: Bruce Webb, McGladrey. That would be true for our firm as well, hours at rates or fixed fees. MR. CARMICHAEL: Rich Angelone. MR. ANGELONE: My name's Rich Angelone. I'm	$\begin{array}{c} 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13 \\ 14 \\ 15 \\ 16 \\ 17 \\ 18 \\ 19 \\ 20 \\ 21 \\ 22 \end{array}$	Okay, Mike Gagnon. MR. GAGNON: Silence is deafening. It obviously is a critically important topic. I think we did touch upon it a bit this morning. I do think it's important to differentiate here what I'll call tax advantage or inappropriate tax strategies, tax advantage transactions. I do think it impacts a firm's independence and not in a positive way. I think that kind of activity should not be performed by an audit firm, should not be provided to its audit clients. I think the current independence rules basically touch upon it in terms of the background, but point to the audit committee in its oversight to consider these. I would encourage a reconsideration of that, because I don't believe I think clarity in this area is better than, I'll call it flexibility, in terms of a discussion or a dialogue with the audit committee, because I don't believe from an integrity perspective, something we've talked about and at least believe that very, very important to the financial markets from that perspective, I do think it is inappropriate, and would urge a reconsideration of that.	

	Daga 102		Dage 104
	Page 102	1	Page 104
1	financial accounting result. Here, I don't think	1	independent third-party opinion.
2	that's appropriate either. I think certainly tax	2	And finally, we do a post-implementation
3	advisers ought to be providing tax advice, they ought	3	review to ensure that the advice has been implemented
4	to be looking at facts and circumstances, understanding	4	properly.
5	the organization, understanding its structure, and	5	MS. RIVSHIN: Scott Bayless.
6	providing appropriate and clear tax advice on the basis	6	MR. BAYLESS: At Deloitte we follow a similar
7	of those findings.	7	procedure, have significant quality control risk
8	And I do not believe that providing that sort	8	analysis of products to ensure that, one, they're not
9	of advice with a goal to achieve a particular financial	9	provided to SEC audit clients, and two, that they go
10	accounting conclusion is appropriate.	10	through a very rigorous process as determined from
11	MS. RIVSHIN: Colleen Sayther.	11	people that are not compensated as a result of those
12	MS. SAYTHER: I actually put my card down	12	products.
13	because I just would reiterate everything that Mike	13	MS. RIVSHIN: Nick Cyprus.
14	just said, so I would answer yes and no.	14	MR. CYPRUS: I'm going to stay consistent to
15	MS. RIVSHIN: Okay. Jeff Steinhoff.	15	where I was this morning, as unpopular as it might have
16	MR. STEINHOFF: I will reiterate the same	16	been. I think anything that puts the auditor in the
17	thing, but to say that it seems to me fairly clear from	17	form of originating, so tax strategy, if they're
18	the current four overarching principles that these	18	originating a tax strategy for a company, I think it's
19	things would be very problematic. And, as Mike, I	19	a problem. And whether it's a tax strategy or some
20	don't see any difference between the tax side or the	20	other advice to get around an accounting thing, I think
21	financial reporting side. You would have problems with	21	that's a problem.
22	those overarching principles.	22	MS. RIVSHIN: Pat Walters.
23	MS. RIVSHIN: Jim Brasher.	23	MS. WALTERS: As I said before lunch, I think
24	MR. BRASHER: Thank you. We believe that in	24 25	it's almost impossible for a tax strategy or product to
25	the spirit of good governance, the auditing firms	23	not have a significant financial reporting result, and
	Page 103		Page 105
1		1	-
12	should not sell tax strategies to an audit client that	1 2	it's inconceivable to me that companies would not take
2	should not sell tax strategies to an audit client that lack business purpose and economic substance. We do	2	it's inconceivable to me that companies would not take that into account as a joint decision-making situation.
2 3	should not sell tax strategies to an audit client that lack business purpose and economic substance. We do believe that we should be continuing to provide	2 3	it's inconceivable to me that companies would not take that into account as a joint decision-making situation. And therefore, I would have significant difficult with
2 3 4	should not sell tax strategies to an audit client that lack business purpose and economic substance. We do believe that we should be continuing to provide traditional tax advice and compliance services, and of	2 3 4	it's inconceivable to me that companies would not take that into account as a joint decision-making situation. And therefore, I would have significant difficult with auditors who engage in either of these particular types
2 3	should not sell tax strategies to an audit client that lack business purpose and economic substance. We do believe that we should be continuing to provide traditional tax advice and compliance services, and of course, all such services have to be approved by the	2 3 4 5	it's inconceivable to me that companies would not take that into account as a joint decision-making situation. And therefore, I would have significant difficult with auditors who engage in either of these particular types of advising to companies.
2 3 4 5	should not sell tax strategies to an audit client that lack business purpose and economic substance. We do believe that we should be continuing to provide traditional tax advice and compliance services, and of course, all such services have to be approved by the audit committee in any event, and that we think the	2 3 4	it's inconceivable to me that companies would not take that into account as a joint decision-making situation. And therefore, I would have significant difficult with auditors who engage in either of these particular types of advising to companies. MS. RIVSHIN: Barbara Roper.
2 3 4 5 6 7	should not sell tax strategies to an audit client that lack business purpose and economic substance. We do believe that we should be continuing to provide traditional tax advice and compliance services, and of course, all such services have to be approved by the audit committee in any event, and that we think the provision of such services is consistent with sound	2 3 4 5 6	it's inconceivable to me that companies would not take that into account as a joint decision-making situation. And therefore, I would have significant difficult with auditors who engage in either of these particular types of advising to companies.
2 3 4 5 6	should not sell tax strategies to an audit client that lack business purpose and economic substance. We do believe that we should be continuing to provide traditional tax advice and compliance services, and of course, all such services have to be approved by the audit committee in any event, and that we think the provision of such services is consistent with sound public policy.	2 3 4 5 6 7	it's inconceivable to me that companies would not take that into account as a joint decision-making situation. And therefore, I would have significant difficult with auditors who engage in either of these particular types of advising to companies. MS. RIVSHIN: Barbara Roper. MS. ROPER: I agree, and I think earlier I said I think there are certain areas where it is
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	should not sell tax strategies to an audit client that lack business purpose and economic substance. We do believe that we should be continuing to provide traditional tax advice and compliance services, and of course, all such services have to be approved by the audit committee in any event, and that we think the provision of such services is consistent with sound	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	it's inconceivable to me that companies would not take that into account as a joint decision-making situation. And therefore, I would have significant difficult with auditors who engage in either of these particular types of advising to companies. MS. RIVSHIN: Barbara Roper. MS. ROPER: I agree, and I think earlier I said I think there are certain areas where it is incumbent upon the PCAOB to ban certain services in
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	should not sell tax strategies to an audit client that lack business purpose and economic substance. We do believe that we should be continuing to provide traditional tax advice and compliance services, and of course, all such services have to be approved by the audit committee in any event, and that we think the provision of such services is consistent with sound public policy. However, in addition, at KPMG we've instituted the following risk procedures when we bring	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	it's inconceivable to me that companies would not take that into account as a joint decision-making situation. And therefore, I would have significant difficult with auditors who engage in either of these particular types of advising to companies. MS. RIVSHIN: Barbara Roper. MS. ROPER: I agree, and I think earlier I said I think there are certain areas where it is incumbent upon the PCAOB to ban certain services in certain areas where audit committees need to be given
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	should not sell tax strategies to an audit client that lack business purpose and economic substance. We do believe that we should be continuing to provide traditional tax advice and compliance services, and of course, all such services have to be approved by the audit committee in any event, and that we think the provision of such services is consistent with sound public policy. However, in addition, at KPMG we've	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	it's inconceivable to me that companies would not take that into account as a joint decision-making situation. And therefore, I would have significant difficult with auditors who engage in either of these particular types of advising to companies. MS. RIVSHIN: Barbara Roper. MS. ROPER: I agree, and I think earlier I said I think there are certain areas where it is incumbent upon the PCAOB to ban certain services in
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	should not sell tax strategies to an audit client that lack business purpose and economic substance. We do believe that we should be continuing to provide traditional tax advice and compliance services, and of course, all such services have to be approved by the audit committee in any event, and that we think the provision of such services is consistent with sound public policy. However, in addition, at KPMG we've instituted the following risk procedures when we bring an idea, a planning idea, to a client, which is	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	it's inconceivable to me that companies would not take that into account as a joint decision-making situation. And therefore, I would have significant difficult with auditors who engage in either of these particular types of advising to companies. MS. RIVSHIN: Barbara Roper. MS. ROPER: I agree, and I think earlier I said I think there are certain areas where it is incumbent upon the PCAOB to ban certain services in certain areas where audit committees need to be given guidance on how to evaluate them. I think this is an
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	should not sell tax strategies to an audit client that lack business purpose and economic substance. We do believe that we should be continuing to provide traditional tax advice and compliance services, and of course, all such services have to be approved by the audit committee in any event, and that we think the provision of such services is consistent with sound public policy. However, in addition, at KPMG we've instituted the following risk procedures when we bring an idea, a planning idea, to a client, which is material to the financial statements. First of all,	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	it's inconceivable to me that companies would not take that into account as a joint decision-making situation. And therefore, I would have significant difficult with auditors who engage in either of these particular types of advising to companies. MS. RIVSHIN: Barbara Roper. MS. ROPER: I agree, and I think earlier I said I think there are certain areas where it is incumbent upon the PCAOB to ban certain services in certain areas where audit committees need to be given guidance on how to evaluate them. I think this is an area where we need a ban on and then the challenge is where you draw the line between those types of tax
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	should not sell tax strategies to an audit client that lack business purpose and economic substance. We do believe that we should be continuing to provide traditional tax advice and compliance services, and of course, all such services have to be approved by the audit committee in any event, and that we think the provision of such services is consistent with sound public policy. However, in addition, at KPMG we've instituted the following risk procedures when we bring an idea, a planning idea, to a client, which is material to the financial statements. First of all, the tax planning, of course, must be technically sound	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	it's inconceivable to me that companies would not take that into account as a joint decision-making situation. And therefore, I would have significant difficult with auditors who engage in either of these particular types of advising to companies. MS. RIVSHIN: Barbara Roper. MS. ROPER: I agree, and I think earlier I said I think there are certain areas where it is incumbent upon the PCAOB to ban certain services in certain areas where audit committees need to be given guidance on how to evaluate them. I think this is an area where we need a ban on and then the challenge
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	should not sell tax strategies to an audit client that lack business purpose and economic substance. We do believe that we should be continuing to provide traditional tax advice and compliance services, and of course, all such services have to be approved by the audit committee in any event, and that we think the provision of such services is consistent with sound public policy. However, in addition, at KPMG we've instituted the following risk procedures when we bring an idea, a planning idea, to a client, which is material to the financial statements. First of all, the tax planning, of course, must be technically sound and customized to the client's facts. We're not	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	it's inconceivable to me that companies would not take that into account as a joint decision-making situation. And therefore, I would have significant difficult with auditors who engage in either of these particular types of advising to companies. MS. RIVSHIN: Barbara Roper. MS. ROPER: I agree, and I think earlier I said I think there are certain areas where it is incumbent upon the PCAOB to ban certain services in certain areas where audit committees need to be given guidance on how to evaluate them. I think this is an area where we need a ban on and then the challenge is where you draw the line between those types of tax strategies or products that are banned and what is
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	should not sell tax strategies to an audit client that lack business purpose and economic substance. We do believe that we should be continuing to provide traditional tax advice and compliance services, and of course, all such services have to be approved by the audit committee in any event, and that we think the provision of such services is consistent with sound public policy. However, in addition, at KPMG we've instituted the following risk procedures when we bring an idea, a planning idea, to a client, which is material to the financial statements. First of all, the tax planning, of course, must be technically sound and customized to the client's facts. We're not marketing any pre-shrink wrapped or ideas of that	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	it's inconceivable to me that companies would not take that into account as a joint decision-making situation. And therefore, I would have significant difficult with auditors who engage in either of these particular types of advising to companies. MS. RIVSHIN: Barbara Roper. MS. ROPER: I agree, and I think earlier I said I think there are certain areas where it is incumbent upon the PCAOB to ban certain services in certain areas where audit committees need to be given guidance on how to evaluate them. I think this is an area where we need a ban on and then the challenge is where you draw the line between those types of tax strategies or products that are banned and what is permissible, and I think that is an appropriate area to
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	should not sell tax strategies to an audit client that lack business purpose and economic substance. We do believe that we should be continuing to provide traditional tax advice and compliance services, and of course, all such services have to be approved by the audit committee in any event, and that we think the provision of such services is consistent with sound public policy. However, in addition, at KPMG we've instituted the following risk procedures when we bring an idea, a planning idea, to a client, which is material to the financial statements. First of all, the tax planning, of course, must be technically sound and customized to the client's facts. We're not marketing any pre-shrink wrapped or ideas of that nature. The idea must be approved by our partner in	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	it's inconceivable to me that companies would not take that into account as a joint decision-making situation. And therefore, I would have significant difficult with auditors who engage in either of these particular types of advising to companies. MS. RIVSHIN: Barbara Roper. MS. ROPER: I agree, and I think earlier I said I think there are certain areas where it is incumbent upon the PCAOB to ban certain services in certain areas where audit committees need to be given guidance on how to evaluate them. I think this is an area where we need a ban on and then the challenge is where you draw the line between those types of tax strategies or products that are banned and what is permissible, and I think that is an appropriate area to supplement the ban with guidance to audit committees on how they make a distinction between what's appropriate and what's inappropriate.
$\begin{array}{c} 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13 \\ 14 \\ 15 \\ 16 \\ 17 \end{array}$	should not sell tax strategies to an audit client that lack business purpose and economic substance. We do believe that we should be continuing to provide traditional tax advice and compliance services, and of course, all such services have to be approved by the audit committee in any event, and that we think the provision of such services is consistent with sound public policy. However, in addition, at KPMG we've instituted the following risk procedures when we bring an idea, a planning idea, to a client, which is material to the financial statements. First of all, the tax planning, of course, must be technically sound and customized to the client's facts. We're not marketing any pre-shrink wrapped or ideas of that nature. The idea must be approved by our partner in charge of tax risk and regulatory affairs who is	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	it's inconceivable to me that companies would not take that into account as a joint decision-making situation. And therefore, I would have significant difficult with auditors who engage in either of these particular types of advising to companies. MS. RIVSHIN: Barbara Roper. MS. ROPER: I agree, and I think earlier I said I think there are certain areas where it is incumbent upon the PCAOB to ban certain services in certain areas where audit committees need to be given guidance on how to evaluate them. I think this is an area where we need a ban on and then the challenge is where you draw the line between those types of tax strategies or products that are banned and what is permissible, and I think that is an appropriate area to supplement the ban with guidance to audit committees on how they make a distinction between what's appropriate
$\begin{array}{c} 2\\ 3\\ 4\\ 5\\ 6\\ 7\\ 8\\ 9\\ 10\\ 11\\ 12\\ 13\\ 14\\ 15\\ 16\\ 17\\ 18 \end{array}$	should not sell tax strategies to an audit client that lack business purpose and economic substance. We do believe that we should be continuing to provide traditional tax advice and compliance services, and of course, all such services have to be approved by the audit committee in any event, and that we think the provision of such services is consistent with sound public policy. However, in addition, at KPMG we've instituted the following risk procedures when we bring an idea, a planning idea, to a client, which is material to the financial statements. First of all, the tax planning, of course, must be technically sound and customized to the client's facts. We're not marketing any pre-shrink wrapped or ideas of that nature. The idea must be approved by our partner in charge of tax risk and regulatory affairs who is totally independent of the tax function. That's an	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	it's inconceivable to me that companies would not take that into account as a joint decision-making situation. And therefore, I would have significant difficult with auditors who engage in either of these particular types of advising to companies. MS. RIVSHIN: Barbara Roper. MS. ROPER: I agree, and I think earlier I said I think there are certain areas where it is incumbent upon the PCAOB to ban certain services in certain areas where audit committees need to be given guidance on how to evaluate them. I think this is an area where we need a ban on and then the challenge is where you draw the line between those types of tax strategies or products that are banned and what is permissible, and I think that is an appropriate area to supplement the ban with guidance to audit committees on how they make a distinction between what's appropriate and what's inappropriate.
$\begin{array}{c} 2\\ 3\\ 4\\ 5\\ 6\\ 7\\ 8\\ 9\\ 10\\ 11\\ 12\\ 13\\ 14\\ 15\\ 16\\ 17\\ 18\\ 19\\ 20\\ 21\\ \end{array}$	should not sell tax strategies to an audit client that lack business purpose and economic substance. We do believe that we should be continuing to provide traditional tax advice and compliance services, and of course, all such services have to be approved by the audit committee in any event, and that we think the provision of such services is consistent with sound public policy. However, in addition, at KPMG we've instituted the following risk procedures when we bring an idea, a planning idea, to a client, which is material to the financial statements. First of all, the tax planning, of course, must be technically sound and customized to the client's facts. We're not marketing any pre-shrink wrapped or ideas of that nature. The idea must be approved by our partner in charge of tax risk and regulatory affairs who is totally independent of the tax function. That's an oversight provision in our firm.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	it's inconceivable to me that companies would not take that into account as a joint decision-making situation. And therefore, I would have significant difficult with auditors who engage in either of these particular types of advising to companies. MS. RIVSHIN: Barbara Roper. MS. ROPER: I agree, and I think earlier I said I think there are certain areas where it is incumbent upon the PCAOB to ban certain services in certain areas where audit committees need to be given guidance on how to evaluate them. I think this is an area where we need a ban on and then the challenge is where you draw the line between those types of tax strategies or products that are banned and what is permissible, and I think that is an appropriate area to supplement the ban with guidance to audit committees on how they make a distinction between what's appropriate and what's inappropriate. MS. RIVSHIN: Damon Silvers. MR. SILVERS: I want to echo what Barbara said and I want to remind people about something that
$\begin{array}{c} 2\\ 3\\ 4\\ 5\\ 6\\ 7\\ 8\\ 9\\ 10\\ 11\\ 12\\ 13\\ 14\\ 15\\ 16\\ 17\\ 18\\ 19\\ 20\\ 21\\ 22\\ \end{array}$	should not sell tax strategies to an audit client that lack business purpose and economic substance. We do believe that we should be continuing to provide traditional tax advice and compliance services, and of course, all such services have to be approved by the audit committee in any event, and that we think the provision of such services is consistent with sound public policy. However, in addition, at KPMG we've instituted the following risk procedures when we bring an idea, a planning idea, to a client, which is material to the financial statements. First of all, the tax planning, of course, must be technically sound and customized to the client's facts. We're not marketing any pre-shrink wrapped or ideas of that nature. The idea must be approved by our partner in charge of tax risk and regulatory affairs who is totally independent of the tax function. That's an oversight provision in our firm. The planning idea must have economic substance and business purpose, and we tell the audit committee of the audit client that they must obtain a	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	it's inconceivable to me that companies would not take that into account as a joint decision-making situation. And therefore, I would have significant difficult with auditors who engage in either of these particular types of advising to companies. MS. RIVSHIN: Barbara Roper. MS. ROPER: I agree, and I think earlier I said I think there are certain areas where it is incumbent upon the PCAOB to ban certain services in certain areas where audit committees need to be given guidance on how to evaluate them. I think this is an area where we need a ban on and then the challenge is where you draw the line between those types of tax strategies or products that are banned and what is permissible, and I think that is an appropriate area to supplement the ban with guidance to audit committees on how they make a distinction between what's appropriate and what's inappropriate. MS. RIVSHIN: Damon Silvers. MR. SILVERS: I want to echo what Barbara said
$\begin{array}{c} 2\\ 3\\ 4\\ 5\\ 6\\ 7\\ 8\\ 9\\ 10\\ 11\\ 12\\ 13\\ 14\\ 15\\ 16\\ 17\\ 18\\ 19\\ 20\\ 21\\ \end{array}$	should not sell tax strategies to an audit client that lack business purpose and economic substance. We do believe that we should be continuing to provide traditional tax advice and compliance services, and of course, all such services have to be approved by the audit committee in any event, and that we think the provision of such services is consistent with sound public policy. However, in addition, at KPMG we've instituted the following risk procedures when we bring an idea, a planning idea, to a client, which is material to the financial statements. First of all, the tax planning, of course, must be technically sound and customized to the client's facts. We're not marketing any pre-shrink wrapped or ideas of that nature. The idea must be approved by our partner in charge of tax risk and regulatory affairs who is totally independent of the tax function. That's an oversight provision in our firm. The planning idea must have economic substance and business purpose, and we tell the audit committee of the audit client that they must obtain a third-party opinion from an independent firm of their	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	it's inconceivable to me that companies would not take that into account as a joint decision-making situation. And therefore, I would have significant difficult with auditors who engage in either of these particular types of advising to companies. MS. RIVSHIN: Barbara Roper. MS. ROPER: I agree, and I think earlier I said I think there are certain areas where it is incumbent upon the PCAOB to ban certain services in certain areas where audit committees need to be given guidance on how to evaluate them. I think this is an area where we need a ban on and then the challenge is where you draw the line between those types of tax strategies or products that are banned and what is permissible, and I think that is an appropriate area to supplement the ban with guidance to audit committees on how they make a distinction between what's appropriate and what's inappropriate. MS. RIVSHIN: Damon Silvers. MR. SILVERS: I want to echo what Barbara said and I want to remind people about something that predates the latest round of the scandal around sort of prepackaged, mass-marketed type strategies, and go
$\begin{array}{c} 2\\ 3\\ 4\\ 5\\ 6\\ 7\\ 8\\ 9\\ 10\\ 11\\ 12\\ 13\\ 14\\ 15\\ 16\\ 17\\ 18\\ 19\\ 20\\ 21\\ 22\\ \end{array}$	should not sell tax strategies to an audit client that lack business purpose and economic substance. We do believe that we should be continuing to provide traditional tax advice and compliance services, and of course, all such services have to be approved by the audit committee in any event, and that we think the provision of such services is consistent with sound public policy. However, in addition, at KPMG we've instituted the following risk procedures when we bring an idea, a planning idea, to a client, which is material to the financial statements. First of all, the tax planning, of course, must be technically sound and customized to the client's facts. We're not marketing any pre-shrink wrapped or ideas of that nature. The idea must be approved by our partner in charge of tax risk and regulatory affairs who is totally independent of the tax function. That's an oversight provision in our firm. The planning idea must have economic substance and business purpose, and we tell the audit committee of the audit client that they must obtain a	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	it's inconceivable to me that companies would not take that into account as a joint decision-making situation. And therefore, I would have significant difficult with auditors who engage in either of these particular types of advising to companies. MS. RIVSHIN: Barbara Roper. MS. ROPER: I agree, and I think earlier I said I think there are certain areas where it is incumbent upon the PCAOB to ban certain services in certain areas where audit committees need to be given guidance on how to evaluate them. I think this is an area where we need a ban on and then the challenge is where you draw the line between those types of tax strategies or products that are banned and what is permissible, and I think that is an appropriate area to supplement the ban with guidance to audit committees on how they make a distinction between what's appropriate and what's inappropriate. MS. RIVSHIN: Damon Silvers. MR. SILVERS: I want to echo what Barbara said and I want to remind people about something that predates the latest round of the scandal around sort

	Page 106		Page 108	
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	Arthur Andersen in those hearings that Arthur Andersen was not involved in structuring the special purpose entities that were at the heart of what was wrong with Enron. These were entities that both could be characterized as tax planning structures and also obviously structures for affecting the shape of the GAAP financials of Enron. Andersen sought to deny that they were involved in structuring them in the initial hearings. Of course, it turned out that they were lying. Much of the AFL-CIO's concern about this issue of auditor independence and particularly around tax issues arose out of that experience, and our sense that our members as investors directly and through our pension plans were seriously endangered by the practice of audit firms structuring these off-balance sheet vehicles, and then auditing their own work. We believed that the combination of the statutory language in Sarbanes-Oxley plus the guidance that the principles that we were discussing earlier this morning would be a very strong signal to audit firms that they were not to do this. I just no longer have that belief and I believe that the PCAOB needs to provide exactly what Barbara said, clear that this	$ \begin{array}{c} 1\\2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\\23\\24\\\end{array} $	tax advice and tax service. A lot of discussion this morning surrounded auditor independence and the extent to which that may actually be advanced by distancing the accountant from this particular area. I would suggest to you, given the complexity of this particular area, and I draw upon the one I deal with day in and day out, operating in 140 countries around the world, filing over 1,000 tax returns, that if the outside accounting firm in terms of its advice and planning posture gets too far afield of this, then you'll find that you're actually compromising their independence. There is a heavy utility to knowledge and understanding in this area. So I think there are a host of things that may have been sponsored in the past which are inappropriate, and this is an excellent example. But I encourage the committee to take a look at what is acceptable practice in this particular area, because I believe it is instrumental in terms of having effective independence of the accounting firms that they be knowledgeable about the transaction. MS. RIVSHIN: Lynn Turner. MR. TURNER: I think it's actually encouraging and a very positive sign to hear some of the firms talk	
25	sort of stuff needs to be banned and that there needs	25	about the fact they don't think some of the tax	
	Page 107		Page 109	
$ \begin{array}{c} 1\\2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\\23\\24\\25\end{array} $	to be clear guidance given both to audit firms and to audit committees as to where the lines are. It is not acceptable, and again I think that Nick Cyprus' comments are completely correct. It is not acceptable to have an audit firm creating the structures they audit. MS. RIVSHIN: Mark Weinberger. MR. WEINBERGER: Thank you. I would say that certainly I would agree that the rule that's currently out there, which says that there should be careful scrutiny of these transactions where sole motivation is tax aid without business purpose, could go further and it should be banned frankly from audit firms providing it to their audit clients or others. I think that the audit committees are there, but clarity there would certainly not hurt. And I agree with Barbara's comment that once you go beyond that, it's a lot more difficult to define, and that's really I think where the other harder issues arise. MS. RIVSHIN: David Shedlarz. MR. SHEDLARZ: Yes, I would agree as well that this is inappropriate activity for the outside accounting firm. But at the same time, and just drawing back to this morning's conversation, I think it has to be done with a mind towards what is acceptable	$\begin{array}{c}1\\2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\\23\\24\\25\end{array}$	strategy stuff goes hand in hand with auditor independence, and especially on the comments I've heard today about tax opinion letters that people have been issuing in the past. Just as we've banned them on the financial reporting side, I think they ought to be banned on this side, on the tax side as well. I do think that causes a problem. But going back to what Barb said, I think this becomes more of a question of where you slice things and how you define things, because while people may say, we don't do tax strategy services, what they all do is they'll go in and help you with your international operations, they'll help you identify the right countries to be in, then with their foreign affiliates they'll help you identify how to structure that international operation in the right international company with the right type of royalty or other type of revenue arrangements to get those revenues outside the U.S. along with the income and get taxed offshore. To me, everyone's doing that and that's a pretty clear tax strategy. And so when people say, we aren't doing tax strategy, that's a misnomer, because there's every one of the firms are turning around and doing that. So I think it depends upon how you define it, whereas it sounds like everyone attempts to say we	

-	Washington, DC			
	Page 110		Page 112	
$ \begin{array}{c} 1\\2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\\end{array} $	shouldn't do tax opinion letters, maybe that's a starting point, but then it becomes how far down that path do you go? And that's where I come back to, if there isn't clear-cut support for what you're doing in the code, if the likelihood of prevailing starts to drop, then you put the auditor in the role of being an advocate, and I think that's where you need to turn around and start cutting it off, and as I heard someone say, provide some guidance to the audit committees. I can tell you the O'Malley Panel, who thoroughly researched this, did put out nine criteria, very good criteria, that the SEC has repeated for audit committees to look at, and I think if you applied those nine criteria to a number of these things, you'll find that they don't stand up against the test. MS. RIVSHIN: Mark Anson. MR. ANSON: Mark Anson from CALPERS. First, with regard to the first half of question 6, does the accounting firm's sale of tax products affect their	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	least, was those situations where there is no business purpose, it's solely tax-motivated, and where it's mass marketed and it's not tailored to an individual client. I think those are very, very different situations. MS. RIVSHIN: Paul Koren. MR. KOREN: Well, I certainly think it's clear that the answer to number 6 is we shouldn't. But I'm a little I think I'd like to readdress something. If we say that the auditor should do nothing but audit, and that's certainly be eloquently expressed here today, then in giving our views to the Board, there really isn't much further discussion as to what are the gradations of what you could do. If the Board doesn't turn the light off and keeps the light on, then I think it's important that perhaps we should share some of the ideas which might be appropriate, again always recognizing that the investor community has its choice of doing what it wants. Our firm does provide tax planning. We don't	
20	independence? The answer is absolutely. Accounting	20	do any of the tax strategy services. And I had one of	
22	firms' audit firms are supposed to audit the arm's-	22	our tax partners, who uses, I guess, complex phrases,	
23	length transactions of the corporation, and in the	23	kind of describe for me what we do and what we believe	
24 25	first part of that question they go from auditing the arm's-length transactions to taking part in the arm's-	24 25	is, well, professional, and doesn't impact us. And his phrasing is, in discussing a service, which in his view	
1	Page 111 length transaction with the public company. How can	1	Page 113 and our view doesn't conflict for auditors, it's	
2	length transaction with the public company. How can that be independent?	1 2 3	and our view doesn't conflict for auditors, it's planning using methods of structuring business	
2 3 4	length transaction with the public company. How can that be independent? Second, with regard to the second part of that question, I think it's particularly, the issue of	3 4	and our view doesn't conflict for auditors, it's planning using methods of structuring business transactions, which are within the common knowledge of sophisticated tax practitioners, supported by the code	
2 3 4 5	length transaction with the public company. How can that be independent? Second, with regard to the second part of that question, I think it's particularly, the issue of independence is particularly acute when the tax	3 4 5	and our view doesn't conflict for auditors, it's planning using methods of structuring business transactions, which are within the common knowledge of sophisticated tax practitioners, supported by the code regulations and case law with an absence of conflict	
2 3 4	length transaction with the public company. How can that be independent? Second, with regard to the second part of that question, I think it's particularly, the issue of independence is particularly acute when the tax strategy is sold to achieve a financial statement	3 4	and our view doesn't conflict for auditors, it's planning using methods of structuring business transactions, which are within the common knowledge of sophisticated tax practitioners, supported by the code regulations and case law with an absence of conflict that we would be sharing the benefit between us and the	
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	length transaction with the public company. How can that be independent? Second, with regard to the second part of that question, I think it's particularly, the issue of independence is particularly acute when the tax strategy is sold to achieve a financial statement result. The whole point of the auditor is to audit the financial statements, but now they're affecting the	3 4 5 6 7 8	and our view doesn't conflict for auditors, it's planning using methods of structuring business transactions, which are within the common knowledge of sophisticated tax practitioners, supported by the code regulations and case law with an absence of conflict that we would be sharing the benefit between us and the client, creating a partnership. That's the way we've approached it, and	
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	length transaction with the public company. How can that be independent? Second, with regard to the second part of that question, I think it's particularly, the issue of independence is particularly acute when the tax strategy is sold to achieve a financial statement result. The whole point of the auditor is to audit the financial statements, but now they're affecting the financial statement of results and they're then going	3 4 5 6 7 8 9	and our view doesn't conflict for auditors, it's planning using methods of structuring business transactions, which are within the common knowledge of sophisticated tax practitioners, supported by the code regulations and case law with an absence of conflict that we would be sharing the benefit between us and the client, creating a partnership. That's the way we've approached it, and obviously we wait for whatever comes out of these	
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	length transaction with the public company. How can that be independent? Second, with regard to the second part of that question, I think it's particularly, the issue of independence is particularly acute when the tax strategy is sold to achieve a financial statement result. The whole point of the auditor is to audit the financial statements, but now they're affecting the	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	and our view doesn't conflict for auditors, it's planning using methods of structuring business transactions, which are within the common knowledge of sophisticated tax practitioners, supported by the code regulations and case law with an absence of conflict that we would be sharing the benefit between us and the client, creating a partnership. That's the way we've approached it, and	
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	length transaction with the public company. How can that be independent? Second, with regard to the second part of that question, I think it's particularly, the issue of independence is particularly acute when the tax strategy is sold to achieve a financial statement result. The whole point of the auditor is to audit the financial statements, but now they're affecting the financial statement of results and they're then going to audit that? How can that possibly be independent? MS. RIVSHIN: Mark Weinberger. MR. WEINBERGER: I just wanted to follow up	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	and our view doesn't conflict for auditors, it's planning using methods of structuring business transactions, which are within the common knowledge of sophisticated tax practitioners, supported by the code regulations and case law with an absence of conflict that we would be sharing the benefit between us and the client, creating a partnership. That's the way we've approached it, and obviously we wait for whatever comes out of these particular hearings to see whether that still is appropriate. MS. RIVSHIN: Okay. Let's move on to the next	
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	length transaction with the public company. How can that be independent? Second, with regard to the second part of that question, I think it's particularly, the issue of independence is particularly acute when the tax strategy is sold to achieve a financial statement result. The whole point of the auditor is to audit the financial statements, but now they're affecting the financial statement of results and they're then going to audit that? How can that possibly be independent? MS. RIVSHIN: Mark Weinberger. MR. WEINBERGER: I just wanted to follow up on, I guess, Lynn's point, because it is obviously	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	and our view doesn't conflict for auditors, it's planning using methods of structuring business transactions, which are within the common knowledge of sophisticated tax practitioners, supported by the code regulations and case law with an absence of conflict that we would be sharing the benefit between us and the client, creating a partnership. That's the way we've approached it, and obviously we wait for whatever comes out of these particular hearings to see whether that still is appropriate. MS. RIVSHIN: Okay. Let's move on to the next question. If the IRS or other tax regulator challenges	
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	length transaction with the public company. How can that be independent? Second, with regard to the second part of that question, I think it's particularly, the issue of independence is particularly acute when the tax strategy is sold to achieve a financial statement result. The whole point of the auditor is to audit the financial statements, but now they're affecting the financial statement of results and they're then going to audit that? How can that possibly be independent? MS. RIVSHIN: Mark Weinberger. MR. WEINBERGER: I just wanted to follow up	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	and our view doesn't conflict for auditors, it's planning using methods of structuring business transactions, which are within the common knowledge of sophisticated tax practitioners, supported by the code regulations and case law with an absence of conflict that we would be sharing the benefit between us and the client, creating a partnership. That's the way we've approached it, and obviously we wait for whatever comes out of these particular hearings to see whether that still is appropriate. MS. RIVSHIN: Okay. Let's move on to the next	
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	length transaction with the public company. How can that be independent? Second, with regard to the second part of that question, I think it's particularly, the issue of independence is particularly acute when the tax strategy is sold to achieve a financial statement result. The whole point of the auditor is to audit the financial statements, but now they're affecting the financial statement of results and they're then going to audit that? How can that possibly be independent? MS. RIVSHIN: Mark Weinberger. MR. WEINBERGER: I just wanted to follow up on, I guess, Lynn's point, because it is obviously we're all giving our opinions and it's all being interpreted and the words up there on the page mean many different things to many different people. When	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	and our view doesn't conflict for auditors, it's planning using methods of structuring business transactions, which are within the common knowledge of sophisticated tax practitioners, supported by the code regulations and case law with an absence of conflict that we would be sharing the benefit between us and the client, creating a partnership. That's the way we've approached it, and obviously we wait for whatever comes out of these particular hearings to see whether that still is appropriate. MS. RIVSHIN: Okay. Let's move on to the next question. If the IRS or other tax regulator challenges a tax strategy designed or marketed by the issuer's auditor, what, if any, should the auditor's role be in resolving the challenge?	
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	length transaction with the public company. How can that be independent? Second, with regard to the second part of that question, I think it's particularly, the issue of independence is particularly acute when the tax strategy is sold to achieve a financial statement result. The whole point of the auditor is to audit the financial statements, but now they're affecting the financial statement of results and they're then going to audit that? How can that possibly be independent? MS. RIVSHIN: Mark Weinberger. MR. WEINBERGER: I just wanted to follow up on, I guess, Lynn's point, because it is obviously we're all giving our opinions and it's all being interpreted and the words up there on the page mean many different things to many different people. When you described, Lynn, the situation you're talking about	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	and our view doesn't conflict for auditors, it's planning using methods of structuring business transactions, which are within the common knowledge of sophisticated tax practitioners, supported by the code regulations and case law with an absence of conflict that we would be sharing the benefit between us and the client, creating a partnership. That's the way we've approached it, and obviously we wait for whatever comes out of these particular hearings to see whether that still is appropriate. MS. RIVSHIN: Okay. Let's move on to the next question. If the IRS or other tax regulator challenges a tax strategy designed or marketed by the issuer's auditor, what, if any, should the auditor's role be in resolving the challenge? Sure, Lynn. Go ahead.	
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	length transaction with the public company. How can that be independent? Second, with regard to the second part of that question, I think it's particularly, the issue of independence is particularly acute when the tax strategy is sold to achieve a financial statement result. The whole point of the auditor is to audit the financial statements, but now they're affecting the financial statement of results and they're then going to audit that? How can that possibly be independent? MS. RIVSHIN: Mark Weinberger. MR. WEINBERGER: I just wanted to follow up on, I guess, Lynn's point, because it is obviously we're all giving our opinions and it's all being interpreted and the words up there on the page mean many different things to many different people. When you described, Lynn, the situation you're talking about where an auditor advises a business on business issues	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	and our view doesn't conflict for auditors, it's planning using methods of structuring business transactions, which are within the common knowledge of sophisticated tax practitioners, supported by the code regulations and case law with an absence of conflict that we would be sharing the benefit between us and the client, creating a partnership. That's the way we've approached it, and obviously we wait for whatever comes out of these particular hearings to see whether that still is appropriate. MS. RIVSHIN: Okay. Let's move on to the next question. If the IRS or other tax regulator challenges a tax strategy designed or marketed by the issuer's auditor, what, if any, should the auditor's role be in resolving the challenge? Sure, Lynn. Go ahead. MR. TURNER: Nothing. This gets into the	
$\begin{array}{c} 2\\ 3\\ 4\\ 5\\ 6\\ 7\\ 8\\ 9\\ 10\\ 11\\ 12\\ 13\\ 14\\ 15\\ 16\\ 17\\ 18\\ 19\\ 20\\ \end{array}$	length transaction with the public company. How can that be independent? Second, with regard to the second part of that question, I think it's particularly, the issue of independence is particularly acute when the tax strategy is sold to achieve a financial statement result. The whole point of the auditor is to audit the financial statements, but now they're affecting the financial statement of results and they're then going to audit that? How can that possibly be independent? MS. RIVSHIN: Mark Weinberger. MR. WEINBERGER: I just wanted to follow up on, I guess, Lynn's point, because it is obviously we're all giving our opinions and it's all being interpreted and the words up there on the page mean many different things to many different people. When you described, Lynn, the situation you're talking about where an auditor advises a business on business issues that are unique to that company and they have a knowledge of that business and they're going to go in	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	and our view doesn't conflict for auditors, it's planning using methods of structuring business transactions, which are within the common knowledge of sophisticated tax practitioners, supported by the code regulations and case law with an absence of conflict that we would be sharing the benefit between us and the client, creating a partnership. That's the way we've approached it, and obviously we wait for whatever comes out of these particular hearings to see whether that still is appropriate. MS. RIVSHIN: Okay. Let's move on to the next question. If the IRS or other tax regulator challenges a tax strategy designed or marketed by the issuer's auditor, what, if any, should the auditor's role be in resolving the challenge? Sure, Lynn. Go ahead. MR. TURNER: Nothing. This gets into the defense and advocacy. If you bring in the auditor into trying to get involved with the defense or something, I	
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	length transaction with the public company. How can that be independent? Second, with regard to the second part of that question, I think it's particularly, the issue of independence is particularly acute when the tax strategy is sold to achieve a financial statement result. The whole point of the auditor is to audit the financial statements, but now they're affecting the financial statement of results and they're then going to audit that? How can that possibly be independent? MS. RIVSHIN: Mark Weinberger. MR. WEINBERGER: I just wanted to follow up on, I guess, Lynn's point, because it is obviously we're all giving our opinions and it's all being interpreted and the words up there on the page mean many different things to many different people. When you described, Lynn, the situation you're talking about where an auditor advises a business on business issues that are unique to that company and they have a knowledge of that business and they're going to go in and advise tax advice on how to pay the appropriate	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	and our view doesn't conflict for auditors, it's planning using methods of structuring business transactions, which are within the common knowledge of sophisticated tax practitioners, supported by the code regulations and case law with an absence of conflict that we would be sharing the benefit between us and the client, creating a partnership. That's the way we've approached it, and obviously we wait for whatever comes out of these particular hearings to see whether that still is appropriate. MS. RIVSHIN: Okay. Let's move on to the next question. If the IRS or other tax regulator challenges a tax strategy designed or marketed by the issuer's auditor, what, if any, should the auditor's role be in resolving the challenge? Sure, Lynn. Go ahead. MR. TURNER: Nothing. This gets into the defense and advocacy. If you bring in the auditor into trying to get involved with the defense or something, I just don't see how this could ever be viewed as being	
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	length transaction with the public company. How can that be independent? Second, with regard to the second part of that question, I think it's particularly, the issue of independence is particularly acute when the tax strategy is sold to achieve a financial statement result. The whole point of the auditor is to audit the financial statements, but now they're affecting the financial statement of results and they're then going to audit that? How can that possibly be independent? MS. RIVSHIN: Mark Weinberger. MR. WEINBERGER: I just wanted to follow up on, I guess, Lynn's point, because it is obviously we're all giving our opinions and it's all being interpreted and the words up there on the page mean many different things to many different people. When you described, Lynn, the situation you're talking about where an auditor advises a business on business issues that are unique to that company and they have a knowledge of that business and they're going to go in and advise tax advice on how to pay the appropriate amount of tax, I did not mean to suggest that we would	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	and our view doesn't conflict for auditors, it's planning using methods of structuring business transactions, which are within the common knowledge of sophisticated tax practitioners, supported by the code regulations and case law with an absence of conflict that we would be sharing the benefit between us and the client, creating a partnership. That's the way we've approached it, and obviously we wait for whatever comes out of these particular hearings to see whether that still is appropriate. MS. RIVSHIN: Okay. Let's move on to the next question. If the IRS or other tax regulator challenges a tax strategy designed or marketed by the issuer's auditor, what, if any, should the auditor's role be in resolving the challenge? Sure, Lynn. Go ahead. MR. TURNER: Nothing. This gets into the defense and advocacy. If you bring in the auditor into trying to get involved with the defense or something, I just don't see how this could ever be viewed as being consistent with the auditor being unbiased. They've	
$\begin{array}{c} 2\\ 3\\ 4\\ 5\\ 6\\ 7\\ 8\\ 9\\ 10\\ 11\\ 12\\ 13\\ 14\\ 15\\ 16\\ 17\\ 18\\ 19\\ 20\\ 21\\ \end{array}$	length transaction with the public company. How can that be independent? Second, with regard to the second part of that question, I think it's particularly, the issue of independence is particularly acute when the tax strategy is sold to achieve a financial statement result. The whole point of the auditor is to audit the financial statements, but now they're affecting the financial statement of results and they're then going to audit that? How can that possibly be independent? MS. RIVSHIN: Mark Weinberger. MR. WEINBERGER: I just wanted to follow up on, I guess, Lynn's point, because it is obviously we're all giving our opinions and it's all being interpreted and the words up there on the page mean many different things to many different people. When you described, Lynn, the situation you're talking about where an auditor advises a business on business issues that are unique to that company and they have a knowledge of that business and they're going to go in and advise tax advice on how to pay the appropriate	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	and our view doesn't conflict for auditors, it's planning using methods of structuring business transactions, which are within the common knowledge of sophisticated tax practitioners, supported by the code regulations and case law with an absence of conflict that we would be sharing the benefit between us and the client, creating a partnership. That's the way we've approached it, and obviously we wait for whatever comes out of these particular hearings to see whether that still is appropriate. MS. RIVSHIN: Okay. Let's move on to the next question. If the IRS or other tax regulator challenges a tax strategy designed or marketed by the issuer's auditor, what, if any, should the auditor's role be in resolving the challenge? Sure, Lynn. Go ahead. MR. TURNER: Nothing. This gets into the defense and advocacy. If you bring in the auditor into trying to get involved with the defense or something, I just don't see how this could ever be viewed as being	

	w astinigton, DC			
	Page 114		Page 116	
1	position, and this is exactly one of the reasons we put	1	the client, going really building in what Barbara said,	
2	the advocacy principle in the four principles.	2	I think they have a responsibility at least to explain	
3	MS. RIVSHIN: Bruce Webb.	3 4	to the IRS what they marketed. Otherwise, the client's kind of hung out to dry there.	
4 5	MR. WEBB: If we're talking about strategies in terms of the mass marketed and everything else we	4 5	So maybe they don't go and fight it in their	
6	just said shouldn't be permitted in the first place,	6	day of court, but at least they have some	
7	then I have to absolutely agree with Lynn. On the	7	responsibility to explain it, because it's their	
8	other hand, if you're talking about an auditor	8	strategy really. It's not so much the client if it's	
9	assisting a client with an IRS examination or something	9	one they've developed for the client. I'm assuming	
10	regarding a position that was taken on the return, I	10	this was a packaged or marketed strategy, and it's	
11	don't see how that's any different than an auditor	11	possible the auditor has sold that strategy many times.	
12	dealing with the Office of the Chief Accountant when a	12	So I would think that they would be expected to defend	
13	client's accounting position is being challenged.	13	that under some code of ethics or something.	
14	You've had to do the research, you've had to reach a	14	MS. RIVSHIN: Mark Weinberger.	
15	conclusion, and you have an obligation to state the	15	MR. WEINBERGER: Thank you. I would agree. I	
16	basis for your conclusions.	16	think we have the same issue. If you believe the	
17	MS. RIVSHIN: David Shedlarz.	17	underlying service that the auditor is providing is one	
18	MR. SHEDLARZ: I hate to do this and I may	18	that's legitimate for the auditor to provide, and it	
19 20	regret it, but I'd have to agree with Lynn on this.	19 20	would seem to be very difficult to then say, they've	
20	(Laughter.) MR. SHEDLARZ: I don't think much of anything	20	already taken a position on it, they said it works from a tax standpoint, they're going to sign off on the	
$\frac{21}{22}$	under these circumstances.	22	financial statement that they believe it works from a	
23	MS. RIVSHIN: Anyone else?	$\frac{22}{23}$	financial statement standpoint the way it's treated, to	
24	Barbara Roper.	24	suggest that there's something odd that they would be	
25	MS. ROPER: I just think this question takes	25	of the opinion to be able to help out the taxpayer to	
	Page 115		Page 117	
1		1	-	
1 2	us back to the point Lynn made earlier that part of how	1 2	get it right, I'm not sure I would agree that that's a	
1 2 3	us back to the point Lynn made earlier that part of how you draw the line between what's permissible and what's	1 2 3	get it right, I'm not sure I would agree that that's a problem.	
2	us back to the point Lynn made earlier that part of how	2	get it right, I'm not sure I would agree that that's a	
2 3 4 5	us back to the point Lynn made earlier that part of how you draw the line between what's permissible and what's impermissible is how likely you're going to end up in this situation. If you're talking about a position you've taken that is supported by case law and	2 3	get it right, I'm not sure I would agree that that's a problem. Particularly, if you're talking about the aggressive mass-marketed, as we've just discussed, if you don't believe those should provide, it's easier to	
2 3 4	us back to the point Lynn made earlier that part of how you draw the line between what's permissible and what's impermissible is how likely you're going to end up in this situation. If you're talking about a position you've taken that is supported by case law and supported by the regulations and not considered	2 3 4	get it right, I'm not sure I would agree that that's a problem. Particularly, if you're talking about the aggressive mass-marketed, as we've just discussed, if you don't believe those should provide, it's easier to get there. But if you think about a tax return, for	
2 3 4 5 6 7	us back to the point Lynn made earlier that part of how you draw the line between what's permissible and what's impermissible is how likely you're going to end up in this situation. If you're talking about a position you've taken that is supported by case law and supported by the regulations and not considered controversial, you're in a very different position for	2 3 4 5 6 7	get it right, I'm not sure I would agree that that's a problem. Particularly, if you're talking about the aggressive mass-marketed, as we've just discussed, if you don't believe those should provide, it's easier to get there. But if you think about a tax return, for example, major companies, big companies are audited in	
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	us back to the point Lynn made earlier that part of how you draw the line between what's permissible and what's impermissible is how likely you're going to end up in this situation. If you're talking about a position you've taken that is supported by case law and supported by the regulations and not considered controversial, you're in a very different position for one that's likely to put you in the position of finding	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	get it right, I'm not sure I would agree that that's a problem. Particularly, if you're talking about the aggressive mass-marketed, as we've just discussed, if you don't believe those should provide, it's easier to get there. But if you think about a tax return, for example, major companies, big companies are audited in the large-case audit every year. You often are	
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	us back to the point Lynn made earlier that part of how you draw the line between what's permissible and what's impermissible is how likely you're going to end up in this situation. If you're talking about a position you've taken that is supported by case law and supported by the regulations and not considered controversial, you're in a very different position for one that's likely to put you in the position of finding yourself before the IRS.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	get it right, I'm not sure I would agree that that's a problem. Particularly, if you're talking about the aggressive mass-marketed, as we've just discussed, if you don't believe those should provide, it's easier to get there. But if you think about a tax return, for example, major companies, big companies are audited in the large-case audit every year. You often are involved in the audit helping that client work through	
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	us back to the point Lynn made earlier that part of how you draw the line between what's permissible and what's impermissible is how likely you're going to end up in this situation. If you're talking about a position you've taken that is supported by case law and supported by the regulations and not considered controversial, you're in a very different position for one that's likely to put you in the position of finding yourself before the IRS. And if I'm not mistaken, I think in his	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	get it right, I'm not sure I would agree that that's a problem. Particularly, if you're talking about the aggressive mass-marketed, as we've just discussed, if you don't believe those should provide, it's easier to get there. But if you think about a tax return, for example, major companies, big companies are audited in the large-case audit every year. You often are involved in the audit helping that client work through the issues, and in that case you are explaining and	
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	us back to the point Lynn made earlier that part of how you draw the line between what's permissible and what's impermissible is how likely you're going to end up in this situation. If you're talking about a position you've taken that is supported by case law and supported by the regulations and not considered controversial, you're in a very different position for one that's likely to put you in the position of finding yourself before the IRS. And if I'm not mistaken, I think in his comment on the SEC rule proposal, Lynn drew a	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	get it right, I'm not sure I would agree that that's a problem. Particularly, if you're talking about the aggressive mass-marketed, as we've just discussed, if you don't believe those should provide, it's easier to get there. But if you think about a tax return, for example, major companies, big companies are audited in the large-case audit every year. You often are involved in the audit helping that client work through the issues, and in that case you are explaining and advocating the positions on the return for the client.	
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	us back to the point Lynn made earlier that part of how you draw the line between what's permissible and what's impermissible is how likely you're going to end up in this situation. If you're talking about a position you've taken that is supported by case law and supported by the regulations and not considered controversial, you're in a very different position for one that's likely to put you in the position of finding yourself before the IRS. And if I'm not mistaken, I think in his comment on the SEC rule proposal, Lynn drew a distinction between the role of being a fact witness	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	get it right, I'm not sure I would agree that that's a problem. Particularly, if you're talking about the aggressive mass-marketed, as we've just discussed, if you don't believe those should provide, it's easier to get there. But if you think about a tax return, for example, major companies, big companies are audited in the large-case audit every year. You often are involved in the audit helping that client work through the issues, and in that case you are explaining and advocating the positions on the return for the client. To say that the auditor couldn't do that, and	
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	us back to the point Lynn made earlier that part of how you draw the line between what's permissible and what's impermissible is how likely you're going to end up in this situation. If you're talking about a position you've taken that is supported by case law and supported by the regulations and not considered controversial, you're in a very different position for one that's likely to put you in the position of finding yourself before the IRS. And if I'm not mistaken, I think in his comment on the SEC rule proposal, Lynn drew a distinction between the role of being a fact witness and serving as an advocate. I don't know if that's	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	get it right, I'm not sure I would agree that that's a problem. Particularly, if you're talking about the aggressive mass-marketed, as we've just discussed, if you don't believe those should provide, it's easier to get there. But if you think about a tax return, for example, major companies, big companies are audited in the large-case audit every year. You often are involved in the audit helping that client work through the issues, and in that case you are explaining and advocating the positions on the return for the client. To say that the auditor couldn't do that, and somebody else would have to come in and understand and	
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	us back to the point Lynn made earlier that part of how you draw the line between what's permissible and what's impermissible is how likely you're going to end up in this situation. If you're talking about a position you've taken that is supported by case law and supported by the regulations and not considered controversial, you're in a very different position for one that's likely to put you in the position of finding yourself before the IRS. And if I'm not mistaken, I think in his comment on the SEC rule proposal, Lynn drew a distinction between the role of being a fact witness and serving as an advocate. I don't know if that's relevant here, but I think there's a difference from	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	get it right, I'm not sure I would agree that that's a problem. Particularly, if you're talking about the aggressive mass-marketed, as we've just discussed, if you don't believe those should provide, it's easier to get there. But if you think about a tax return, for example, major companies, big companies are audited in the large-case audit every year. You often are involved in the audit helping that client work through the issues, and in that case you are explaining and advocating the positions on the return for the client. To say that the auditor couldn't do that, and somebody else would have to come in and understand and grasp all those issues and everything that went into	
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	us back to the point Lynn made earlier that part of how you draw the line between what's permissible and what's impermissible is how likely you're going to end up in this situation. If you're talking about a position you've taken that is supported by case law and supported by the regulations and not considered controversial, you're in a very different position for one that's likely to put you in the position of finding yourself before the IRS. And if I'm not mistaken, I think in his comment on the SEC rule proposal, Lynn drew a distinction between the role of being a fact witness and serving as an advocate. I don't know if that's relevant here, but I think there's a difference from being in a position of explaining the reasoning that	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	get it right, I'm not sure I would agree that that's a problem. Particularly, if you're talking about the aggressive mass-marketed, as we've just discussed, if you don't believe those should provide, it's easier to get there. But if you think about a tax return, for example, major companies, big companies are audited in the large-case audit every year. You often are involved in the audit helping that client work through the issues, and in that case you are explaining and advocating the positions on the return for the client. To say that the auditor couldn't do that, and somebody else would have to come in and understand and grasp all those issues and everything that went into them, if the auditor did the work, did the reporting, I	
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	us back to the point Lynn made earlier that part of how you draw the line between what's permissible and what's impermissible is how likely you're going to end up in this situation. If you're talking about a position you've taken that is supported by case law and supported by the regulations and not considered controversial, you're in a very different position for one that's likely to put you in the position of finding yourself before the IRS. And if I'm not mistaken, I think in his comment on the SEC rule proposal, Lynn drew a distinction between the role of being a fact witness and serving as an advocate. I don't know if that's relevant here, but I think there's a difference from	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	get it right, I'm not sure I would agree that that's a problem. Particularly, if you're talking about the aggressive mass-marketed, as we've just discussed, if you don't believe those should provide, it's easier to get there. But if you think about a tax return, for example, major companies, big companies are audited in the large-case audit every year. You often are involved in the audit helping that client work through the issues, and in that case you are explaining and advocating the positions on the return for the client. To say that the auditor couldn't do that, and somebody else would have to come in and understand and grasp all those issues and everything that went into	
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	us back to the point Lynn made earlier that part of how you draw the line between what's permissible and what's impermissible is how likely you're going to end up in this situation. If you're talking about a position you've taken that is supported by case law and supported by the regulations and not considered controversial, you're in a very different position for one that's likely to put you in the position of finding yourself before the IRS. And if I'm not mistaken, I think in his comment on the SEC rule proposal, Lynn drew a distinction between the role of being a fact witness and serving as an advocate. I don't know if that's relevant here, but I think there's a difference from being in a position of explaining the reasoning that went into a situation and actually trying to defend a	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	get it right, I'm not sure I would agree that that's a problem. Particularly, if you're talking about the aggressive mass-marketed, as we've just discussed, if you don't believe those should provide, it's easier to get there. But if you think about a tax return, for example, major companies, big companies are audited in the large-case audit every year. You often are involved in the audit helping that client work through the issues, and in that case you are explaining and advocating the positions on the return for the client. To say that the auditor couldn't do that, and somebody else would have to come in and understand and grasp all those issues and everything that went into them, if the auditor did the work, did the reporting, I think it would be extremely burdensome on the issuer.	
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	us back to the point Lynn made earlier that part of how you draw the line between what's permissible and what's impermissible is how likely you're going to end up in this situation. If you're talking about a position you've taken that is supported by case law and supported by the regulations and not considered controversial, you're in a very different position for one that's likely to put you in the position of finding yourself before the IRS. And if I'm not mistaken, I think in his comment on the SEC rule proposal, Lynn drew a distinction between the role of being a fact witness and serving as an advocate. I don't know if that's relevant here, but I think there's a difference from being in a position of explaining the reasoning that went into a situation and actually trying to defend a client's position. MS. RIVSHIN: Jeff Steinhoff. MR. STEINHOFF: I think it's an extremely	$\begin{array}{c} 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13 \\ 14 \\ 15 \\ 16 \\ 17 \\ 18 \\ 19 \end{array}$	get it right, I'm not sure I would agree that that's a problem. Particularly, if you're talking about the aggressive mass-marketed, as we've just discussed, if you don't believe those should provide, it's easier to get there. But if you think about a tax return, for example, major companies, big companies are audited in the large-case audit every year. You often are involved in the audit helping that client work through the issues, and in that case you are explaining and advocating the positions on the return for the client. To say that the auditor couldn't do that, and somebody else would have to come in and understand and grasp all those issues and everything that went into them, if the auditor did the work, did the reporting, I think it would be extremely burdensome on the issuer. MS. RIVSHIN: Damon Silvers. MR. SILVERS: I think it's it may not be that well known, but this is one very unusual exception	
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	us back to the point Lynn made earlier that part of how you draw the line between what's permissible and what's impermissible is how likely you're going to end up in this situation. If you're talking about a position you've taken that is supported by case law and supported by the regulations and not considered controversial, you're in a very different position for one that's likely to put you in the position of finding yourself before the IRS. And if I'm not mistaken, I think in his comment on the SEC rule proposal, Lynn drew a distinction between the role of being a fact witness and serving as an advocate. I don't know if that's relevant here, but I think there's a difference from being in a position of explaining the reasoning that went into a situation and actually trying to defend a client's position. MS. RIVSHIN: Jeff Steinhoff. MR. STEINHOFF: I think it's an extremely difficult issue. I think the auditor's already got	$\begin{array}{c} 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13 \\ 14 \\ 15 \\ 16 \\ 17 \\ 18 \\ 19 \\ 20 \end{array}$	get it right, I'm not sure I would agree that that's a problem. Particularly, if you're talking about the aggressive mass-marketed, as we've just discussed, if you don't believe those should provide, it's easier to get there. But if you think about a tax return, for example, major companies, big companies are audited in the large-case audit every year. You often are involved in the audit helping that client work through the issues, and in that case you are explaining and advocating the positions on the return for the client. To say that the auditor couldn't do that, and somebody else would have to come in and understand and grasp all those issues and everything that went into them, if the auditor did the work, did the reporting, I think it would be extremely burdensome on the issuer. MS. RIVSHIN: Damon Silvers. MR. SILVERS: I think it's it may not be that well known, but this is one very unusual exception to the general iron grip that the legal profession has	
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	us back to the point Lynn made earlier that part of how you draw the line between what's permissible and what's impermissible is how likely you're going to end up in this situation. If you're talking about a position you've taken that is supported by case law and supported by the regulations and not considered controversial, you're in a very different position for one that's likely to put you in the position of finding yourself before the IRS. And if I'm not mistaken, I think in his comment on the SEC rule proposal, Lynn drew a distinction between the role of being a fact witness and serving as an advocate. I don't know if that's relevant here, but I think there's a difference from being in a position of explaining the reasoning that went into a situation and actually trying to defend a client's position. MS. RIVSHIN: Jeff Steinhoff. MR. STEINHOFF: I think it's an extremely difficult issue. I think the auditor's already got some issues already, even before they get to this	$\begin{array}{c} 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13 \\ 14 \\ 15 \\ 16 \\ 17 \\ 18 \\ 19 \\ 20 \\ 21 \end{array}$	get it right, I'm not sure I would agree that that's a problem. Particularly, if you're talking about the aggressive mass-marketed, as we've just discussed, if you don't believe those should provide, it's easier to get there. But if you think about a tax return, for example, major companies, big companies are audited in the large-case audit every year. You often are involved in the audit helping that client work through the issues, and in that case you are explaining and advocating the positions on the return for the client. To say that the auditor couldn't do that, and somebody else would have to come in and understand and grasp all those issues and everything that went into them, if the auditor did the work, did the reporting, I think it would be extremely burdensome on the issuer. MS. RIVSHIN: Damon Silvers. MR. SILVERS: I think it's it may not be that well known, but this is one very unusual exception to the general iron grip that the legal profession has on the business of representing people in litigation	
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	us back to the point Lynn made earlier that part of how you draw the line between what's permissible and what's impermissible is how likely you're going to end up in this situation. If you're talking about a position you've taken that is supported by case law and supported by the regulations and not considered controversial, you're in a very different position for one that's likely to put you in the position of finding yourself before the IRS. And if I'm not mistaken, I think in his comment on the SEC rule proposal, Lynn drew a distinction between the role of being a fact witness and serving as an advocate. I don't know if that's relevant here, but I think there's a difference from being in a position of explaining the reasoning that went into a situation and actually trying to defend a client's position. MS. RIVSHIN: Jeff Steinhoff. MR. STEINHOFF: I think it's an extremely difficult issue. I think the auditor's already got some issues already, even before they get to this stage. So if the issue is, will they impair their	$\begin{array}{c} 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13 \\ 14 \\ 15 \\ 16 \\ 17 \\ 18 \\ 19 \\ 20 \\ 21 \\ 22 \end{array}$	get it right, I'm not sure I would agree that that's a problem. Particularly, if you're talking about the aggressive mass-marketed, as we've just discussed, if you don't believe those should provide, it's easier to get there. But if you think about a tax return, for example, major companies, big companies are audited in the large-case audit every year. You often are involved in the audit helping that client work through the issues, and in that case you are explaining and advocating the positions on the return for the client. To say that the auditor couldn't do that, and somebody else would have to come in and understand and grasp all those issues and everything that went into them, if the auditor did the work, did the reporting, I think it would be extremely burdensome on the issuer. MS. RIVSHIN: Damon Silvers. MR. SILVERS: I think it's it may not be that well known, but this is one very unusual exception to the general iron grip that the legal profession has on the business of representing people in litigation environments. And so there really it's common for	
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	us back to the point Lynn made earlier that part of how you draw the line between what's permissible and what's impermissible is how likely you're going to end up in this situation. If you're talking about a position you've taken that is supported by case law and supported by the regulations and not considered controversial, you're in a very different position for one that's likely to put you in the position of finding yourself before the IRS. And if I'm not mistaken, I think in his comment on the SEC rule proposal, Lynn drew a distinction between the role of being a fact witness and serving as an advocate. I don't know if that's relevant here, but I think there's a difference from being in a position of explaining the reasoning that went into a situation and actually trying to defend a client's position. MS. RIVSHIN: Jeff Steinhoff. MR. STEINHOFF: I think it's an extremely difficult issue. I think the auditor's already got some issues already, even before they get to this stage. So if the issue is, will they impair their independence, perhaps no more than it already has been	$\begin{array}{c} 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13 \\ 14 \\ 15 \\ 16 \\ 17 \\ 18 \\ 19 \\ 20 \\ 21 \\ 22 \\ 23 \end{array}$	get it right, I'm not sure I would agree that that's a problem. Particularly, if you're talking about the aggressive mass-marketed, as we've just discussed, if you don't believe those should provide, it's easier to get there. But if you think about a tax return, for example, major companies, big companies are audited in the large-case audit every year. You often are involved in the audit helping that client work through the issues, and in that case you are explaining and advocating the positions on the return for the client. To say that the auditor couldn't do that, and somebody else would have to come in and understand and grasp all those issues and everything that went into them, if the auditor did the work, did the reporting, I think it would be extremely burdensome on the issuer. MS. RIVSHIN: Damon Silvers. MR. SILVERS: I think it's it may not be that well known, but this is one very unusual exception to the general iron grip that the legal profession has on the business of representing people in litigation environments. And so there really it's common for audit firms, for integrated accounting firms to play	
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	us back to the point Lynn made earlier that part of how you draw the line between what's permissible and what's impermissible is how likely you're going to end up in this situation. If you're talking about a position you've taken that is supported by case law and supported by the regulations and not considered controversial, you're in a very different position for one that's likely to put you in the position of finding yourself before the IRS. And if I'm not mistaken, I think in his comment on the SEC rule proposal, Lynn drew a distinction between the role of being a fact witness and serving as an advocate. I don't know if that's relevant here, but I think there's a difference from being in a position of explaining the reasoning that went into a situation and actually trying to defend a client's position. MS. RIVSHIN: Jeff Steinhoff. MR. STEINHOFF: I think it's an extremely difficult issue. I think the auditor's already got some issues already, even before they get to this stage. So if the issue is, will they impair their	$\begin{array}{c} 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13 \\ 14 \\ 15 \\ 16 \\ 17 \\ 18 \\ 19 \\ 20 \\ 21 \\ 22 \end{array}$	get it right, I'm not sure I would agree that that's a problem. Particularly, if you're talking about the aggressive mass-marketed, as we've just discussed, if you don't believe those should provide, it's easier to get there. But if you think about a tax return, for example, major companies, big companies are audited in the large-case audit every year. You often are involved in the audit helping that client work through the issues, and in that case you are explaining and advocating the positions on the return for the client. To say that the auditor couldn't do that, and somebody else would have to come in and understand and grasp all those issues and everything that went into them, if the auditor did the work, did the reporting, I think it would be extremely burdensome on the issuer. MS. RIVSHIN: Damon Silvers. MR. SILVERS: I think it's it may not be that well known, but this is one very unusual exception to the general iron grip that the legal profession has on the business of representing people in litigation environments. And so there really it's common for	

		1	
	Page 118		Page 120
$ \begin{array}{c} 1\\2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\\23\end{array} $	in a way that not everyone may appreciate, because the question is not the question as posed is not actually the question of, should the audit firm be allowed to come and explain its thinking? It's, should the audit firm be the advocate for the issuer in front of the Commission? And it's very hard for me to see how that squares with the principles, and I think it's a particularly serious conflict with those principles. Secondly, I think that the discussion that we've just had around the kind of contradictions one gets into around this question shows that the real problem here is the notion of the audit of an audit firm simultaneously selling a management strategy to the audit client. That just doesn't work, and that you get into all kinds of problems, this one of advocacy being one of them, once you cross over that line. MS. RIVSHIN: Scott Bayless. MR. BAYLESS: I think it's important to remember in this context that taking the prepackaged offerings or strategies off the table, you're left with tax advice and whether that tax advice is provided by a third party, not the auditor, or the auditor, the	$ \begin{array}{c} 1\\2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\\23\end{array} $	you, you get there, and you basically would not it's not appropriate to use your auditor for designing and marketing with respect to tax strategies if they designed and marketed. MS. RIVSHIN: Pat Walters. MS. WALTERS: I actually think Colleen summed it up well, because I think Mark's arguments in favor of having the auditor appear before the IRS really taken in the opposite direction argues against them doing any of these activities, because if they have designed and marketed this tax strategy, if as the auditor they have opined that it's okay, then you're right, they should be standing there saying, we think this is a good idea. I think because I don't think that that's appropriate for them, working backwards, they shouldn't be auditing their own firm's work and they shouldn't be marketing the strategies to the companies that they audit. It just seems to me that if the final conclusion is they shouldn't be acting as an advocate for the company, which they would invariably be doing, they shouldn't have gotten themselves in the position
23 24	auditor is going to have to reach a conclusion as to the appropriate tax treatment in that context. And the	23 24	where they had no alternative but to do that. MS. RIVSHIN: Okay. Mike Gagnon.
24 25	very difficulty at that juncture is whether, when	24 25	MR. GAGNON: I think the discussion is a good
	Page 119		Page 121
$ \begin{array}{c} 1\\2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\end{array} $	challenged, the auditor is in the position of a fact witness or an expert witness or acting in an advocacy capacity when describing its own analysis, the audit firm's own analysis, as to the appropriateness of the tax treatment, even though it might not have been the firm that provided that strategy for that tax planning issue. It makes it very difficult in that context, and you have to keep that in mind. If an audit firm is permitted to go through its own analysis and provide its own conclusion, it ought to be able to do that whether or not it provided the tax planning advice. MS. RIVSHIN: Colleen Sayther. MS. SAYTHER: Colleen Sayther, Financial Executives International. And as a company, I would want an advocate sitting by my side discussing I'm sorry, sorry to interrupt that. MS. RIVSHIN: Can you repeat what you were saying? MS. SAYTHER: Yes, I was as a company I	$ \begin{array}{c} 1\\2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\end{array} $	one and it highlights the challenges that we're facing in terms of marketed strategies and advice to a client on tax matters driven by specific facts and circumstances, and then tax compliance services in preparing tax filings. And I do think it requires an in-depth discussion, and there are differences. I think we've all talked this afternoon about the notion of abusive tax shelters and mass-marketed programs are not appropriate, and certainly if that were to have been done, the answer to this question I think is clear to most in the room that it's not appropriate. Where I think there is some difficulty and maybe even some ambiguity is the notion of advice, tax advice, being provided by an auditor on some particular matter at the client, and a position then taken by the client with respect to that advice and a filing position made. And it does highlight in my mind the challenges that we face here in terms of the four overarching independence principles. Fundamentally, I
20 21 22 23 24 25	want to make sure I have an advocate by my side if I'm going to the IRS to defend a tax strategy. And I think that the operative words here are designed and marketed by the issuer's auditor, and I think if you look at the principle disallowing the auditor to be an advocate for	20 21 22 23 24 25	believe our tax system is, if you will, an advocacy system. Lynn said it this morning that we would all prepare our tax returns in a manner that's consistent with the tax laws, but in a manner that would be designed consistent with those laws to minimize our

	D 100		D 104
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	Page 122 taxes. That's the way the system works and I think, at least in the basic premise, we would all agree with that. In terms of filing positions and actions and thoughts and independent objective opinions taken by auditors, I do think under those circumstances it is appropriate to explain positions taken, bases for those positions, and authority for those positions to the IRS or other taxing authority. And here is where I think there are issues and the debate, or at least the discussion, ought to be explored, because given the inherent, at least as I would articulate it, advocacy inherent in the tax system, advocacy services are an independence issue, and it is certainly one of the four basic principles. And I think that topic is one that is difficult to reconcile, it ought to be explored, because it's a very difficult one, but under certain circumstances I think are appropriate. Just one last comment on there. I do think today in the context of audit committee oversight, review, and approval, there are in fact and assuming, as Lynn alluded to earlier, assuming and I think it's absolutely imperative that audit committees	$ \begin{array}{c} 1\\2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\\23\end{array} $	Page 124 take it, you believe you're going to prevail, reserving for it at the same time drives me crazy, and yet I know it's prevailing practice, so you see it out there quite a bit. But I had to comment on that, because that's an issue that I think somehow, and probably not at the PCAOB level, needs addressed. MS. RIVSHIN: Okay. Let's move on to our last question in this area. Is it appropriate for the auditor to audit the financial statement of facts of a tax strategy the auditor's firm sold to the company? If another firm sold the company the tax strategy, are there independence implications if the auditor's firm markets the same strategy to other companies? Barbara Roper. MS. ROPER: If you preclude them from selling these kinds of services to their audit clients so that they are not a potential competitor for the provision of those services, then you should, if not remove, at least ameliorate any possible conflicts that would result. MS. RIVSHIN: Pat Walters. MS. WALTERS: I just have a really dumb
23 24	think it's absolutely imperative that audit committees be given full disclosure of services being provided,	23 24	MS. WALTERS: I just have a really dumb question here for the firms. If your tax department is
25	which I think is a very good thing, certainly in the	25	designing strategies for your audit clients or others
	Page 123		Page 125
1 2	audit context a very good thing I do think that ought to bear on how we think about these things.	1 2	to implement, doesn't the audit part of the firm have any input to whether or not those would be legitimate
3	MS. RIVSHIN: Nick Cyprus.	3	strategies from an audit perspective? I mean, there's
4	MR. CYPRUS: Mike, I'm in agreement with a lot	4	just some sort of disconnect here that is escaping me.
5 6	of what you said, but there is a thing Lynn brought up that probably is, at least for me, an age-old question	5 6	So either the strategy is legitimate or it isn't, and if it's not legitimate, nobody should be selling it,
7	that I deal with. Lynn, you said this morning that	7	and auditors should be out there saying, this, we're
8	clients can put something they only had a 40 percent	8	just not going to give clean opinions if you implement
9	chance or less than 50 for sure on their tax return.	9	this strategy. So what am I missing?
10 11	And I get into the point is, when is it is that the right thing when is it the wrong thing to do? When	10 11	MS. RIVSHIN: Mark Weinberger. MR. WEINBERGER: Pat, I think you're
12	you think you will not prevail with the service and	12	brilliant. I don't think that was a stupid question.
13	it's less than a 50 percent chance, okay, that goes on	13	I think you hit the nail on the head frankly, which is,
14	your return, it just bugs me.	14	if a tax strategy works, then the only question is,
15	And then, of course, what you'll see is	15	what is the appropriate financial accounting treatment
16 17	they'll turn around on the other side and take 100 percent provision for it, right? So we'll set up a	16 17	for it that the auditors determine, not the tax people? The tax people determine whether or not the transaction
18	reserve and in fact we'll accrue interest and penalties	18	works under the tax law. The auditors then come in and
19	on that reserve.	19	determine what is the treatment from financial
20	Somehow that issue just really and you see	20	statement purposes with regard to that transaction.
21 22	it a lot. To me, and this is simple, so if I believe that I have a valid deduction to take on the return	21 22	So looking at this question, if the transaction works and you it's a type of a service
22	then I'm not so sure I want to provide for it, because	22	that you all conclude is one that auditors should
24	how could you which branch of the government are you	24	provide, then I don't see any problem with the audit
25	lying to? I know it's simplistic thought, but if you	25	firm doing it, and then the audit firm obviously

	Washington, DC			
	Page 126		Page 128	
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	Page 126 reviewing it, the audit site reviewing the financial statement consequences from it. The second question raises an issue I'm not sure I fully understand, but I guess if it goes to if you provide a strategy to a non-audit client, is the I guess there's a suggestion somehow that could come back and impair your independence from a client that you don't even provide that strategy to. I think that would be very hard to effectuate. I don't really understand what that question goes to. MS. RIVSHIN: That part of the question goes to if two separate audit firms are providing the same types of tax strategy, and audit firm number A provides it to company X and audit firm number B provides it to company Y, and A is the auditor of Y, then is there, since it's the same strategy, is there any difference? MR. WEINBERGER: I think the answer is F. (Laughter.) MS. RIVSHIN: Okay.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	Page 128 company's GAAP financials is accurate? It seems to me this once again goes to the point that these are indeed separate functions, but they look at the same thing, and to say that for the audit side to defer to the tax side on the audit implications of the company's tax behavior seems problematic. Secondly, in relationship to the question asked, is there a conflict, I think the answer is yes, but how much the conflict, how big the conflict is depends completely, I think, on what Mark was talking about, which is how customized is this, or how mass- marketed is it? The more mass-marketed, the greater the conflict. What is very clear though is that when is that the greatest degree of conflict is, of course, when it's the same firm that is marketing to the that is both marketing to and passing on for audit purposes the strategy. Then it doesn't matter whether	
19 20 21 22 23 24 25	MS. KIVSHIN. OKay. MR. WEINBERGER: I think obviously the issue there is, the one I would raise is, there's no I mean, we're talking about strategies. Again, this is hard because sometimes you know too much about the details of some of the tax laws, but there's really not one strategy per se that you come out with if you're	19 20 21 22 23 24 25	it's mass-marketed or customized because then, right, you're actually looking at the real thing, not some comparable or similar thing or maybe similar thing. I think this is an example of the of something that's true in corporate governance in general, which is that there are conflicts and there	
	Page 127		Page 129	
$ \begin{array}{c} 1\\2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\\23\\24\\25\end{array} $	not mass marketing, which we said we shouldn't be doing, and doing a transaction for a client, kind of as Lynn described before, you may have a similar fact pattern for a client who has operations in different parts of the world that you have a structure that helps them minimize their taxes. That is totally, absolutely legal, and we all agree that you shouldn't pay more tax than you owe under the law. If you have another taxpayer who happens to have similar facts and they have a similar, use similar parts of the tax code to reach that result, I think it would be hard to say that you would be not independent, so to speak, in either of those circumstances. MS. RIVSHIN: Damon Silvers. MR. SILVERS: I have two points about this. The first is that while it's true that the tax if you have an integrated firm that provides both tax and auditor services, the tax people do are responsible for determining whether, in their capacity as tax consultant, whether their tax treatment is correct. Is it not the case though that as the auditor, for GAAP purposes, you have to, you have a responsibility for reviewing the tax the tax line, so to speak, on the GAAP statement, and thus providing the audit side opinion that the way in which taxes figure into the	$ \begin{array}{c} 1\\2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\\23\\24\\25\end{array} $	are conflicts and there are conflicts, and that it's important to get to the big conflicts first and some conflicts you'll never get to, because they're sort of endemic to the nature of the way the corporate form works or the audit function works, and that as long as we have audit firms that also provide tax services to somebody, anybody, and it's worth noting where those conflicts are and reining them in as much as possible. But I think it would be a very grave mistake to say, oh well, you know, there are conflicts left over, so then let's do nothing. That would be the wrong approach. MS. RIVSHIN: Jeff Steinhoff. MR. STEINHOFF: First, I want to put context to the way I read this question. I saw this as a follow-on to the previous question, so when you talk about tax strategy, you're not talking about routine tax advice, you're talking about something structured to really reduce tax liability or change the accounting treatment in some manner. And I think there was pretty much unanimity that people did not think that that was a proper role. I think in looking at the second part of your question, if someone else actually sold that strategy,	

33 (Pages 126 to 129)

	Wushington, DC			
	Page 130		Page 132	
$ \begin{array}{c} 1\\2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\\23\end{array} $	but you were fully able to sell it yourself, because you were also marketing it, I think you have to look at substance over form. If one's going to be concerned about whether you're independent in auditing the transaction, the fact that you're marketing the same strategy, I think, would be the same thing. So I don't really see any difference in substance between those two. It really gets down to how one defines. I think it will be important for the PCAOB to properly define what these terms mean and take the 10, 15, 20 different types of tax services provided and be very clear as to what would be allowed and what wouldn't. But if tax strategy structuring, that kind of thing would not be allowed, and your firm in fact was selling that same thing or it sold that same thing, I would think you would have some independence problems. MS. RIVSHIN: Barbara Roper. MS. ROPER: When I looked at this question initially, I was looking at it from one point of view, which is that if you're offering a competing product and you're an auditor, as we know has occurred in some instances, who is being strongly encouraged by your	$ \begin{array}{c} 1\\2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\\23\end{array} $	Every strategy designed to reduce your tax liability has other financial statement and disclosure effects. I was very I don't know whether the word is delighted or horrified to hear Nick explain about the provisions that I doubt are adequately disclosed anywhere in the footnotes about tax strategies that may be implemented but there's a less than 50 percent chance that they're going to be accepted by the IRS. I'll have to go back and look at a few financial statements when I get home. So I think that we really have to keep in mind that all of these things have much wider effects on the financial statements than simply tax, and that the wider those effects, the more concern investors have over the integrity of the statements when the auditor is involved in the decision-making for those strategies, advice, however you want to characterize it. And therefore, I want to go back and ask David from Pfizer a question based on his statement earlier in this session, and I hope I'm going to be able to restate it as he would have intended to be, and	
23	firm to market your firm's products, then you have an	23	that the failure of the auditor to be involved in tax	
24 25	incentive to say, well, you know, this thing over here you're using is really inappropriate and we've got	24 25	planning or strategies may actually compromise their independence. I still don't understand how that could	
1 2	Page 131 something comparable but superior that we think solves some of these problems.	1 2	Page 133 be. I could understand how their failure to be knowledgeable about tax planning and strategies could	
3	So you have an independence problem, I think,	3	compromise their ability to do an effective audit, but	
4 5	there as a potential competitor. There's, of course, the conflict on the other side, which is if your firm	4 5	I don't understand how it would compromise their independence, and I would like to better understand	
6	is marketing something that's virtually identical, you	6	that.	
7 8	are potentially put in a very difficult situation to say that this is somehow inappropriate. And so I think	7 8	MS. RIVSHIN: David, would you like to respond?	
9	on either whichever way you look at the conflicts,	9	MR. SHEDLARZ: I didn't even have to put my	
10 11	they exist and they are a potential problem, which I think brings us back to the same thing, why we don't	10 11	nameplate up. See what I get for agreeing with Lynn? (Laughter.)	
12	want audit firms marketing strategies to their audit	12	MR. SHEDLARZ: This in many respects may be a	
13	clients.	13	semantical issue. I think it is important to have some	
14	MS. RIVSHIN: Pat Walters.	14	clear guidelines in terms of what's acceptable practice	
14 15	MS. RIVSHIN: Pat Walters. MS. WALTERS: I actually have like two things	15	when it comes to tax planning, tax advice, and tax	
14	MS. RIVSHIN: Pat Walters.			
14 15 16 17 18	MS. RIVSHIN: Pat Walters. MS. WALTERS: I actually have like two things I want to say and then a question. I would like to echo what Mr. Steinhoff said about the difficulty in understanding the differences between tax advice, tax	15 16 17 18	when it comes to tax planning, tax advice, and tax involvement on the part of the accounting firms. There are many things I would not be in favor of, and some of them have just been discussed, because I do think they	
14 15 16 17 18 19	MS. RIVSHIN: Pat Walters. MS. WALTERS: I actually have like two things I want to say and then a question. I would like to echo what Mr. Steinhoff said about the difficulty in understanding the differences between tax advice, tax planning, tax strategy, and then tax products, and how	15 16 17 18 19	when it comes to tax planning, tax advice, and tax involvement on the part of the accounting firms. There are many things I would not be in favor of, and some of them have just been discussed, because I do think they do compromise the independence of the outside	
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	MS. RIVSHIN: Pat Walters. MS. WALTERS: I actually have like two things I want to say and then a question. I would like to echo what Mr. Steinhoff said about the difficulty in understanding the differences between tax advice, tax planning, tax strategy, and then tax products, and how where on this continuum of all of these things we might say there is some legitimacy to the audit firm	15 16 17 18 19 20 21	when it comes to tax planning, tax advice, and tax involvement on the part of the accounting firms. There are many things I would not be in favor of, and some of them have just been discussed, because I do think they do compromise the independence of the outside accounting firm. We personally do not use our outside	
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	MS. RIVSHIN: Pat Walters. MS. WALTERS: I actually have like two things I want to say and then a question. I would like to echo what Mr. Steinhoff said about the difficulty in understanding the differences between tax advice, tax planning, tax strategy, and then tax products, and how where on this continuum of all of these things we might say there is some legitimacy to the audit firm being involved. I use that vague term specifically.	15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	when it comes to tax planning, tax advice, and tax involvement on the part of the accounting firms. There are many things I would not be in favor of, and some of them have just been discussed, because I do think they do compromise the independence of the outside accounting firm. We personally do not use our outside accounting firm for tax strategy. They're not involved	
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	MS. RIVSHIN: Pat Walters. MS. WALTERS: I actually have like two things I want to say and then a question. I would like to echo what Mr. Steinhoff said about the difficulty in understanding the differences between tax advice, tax planning, tax strategy, and then tax products, and how where on this continuum of all of these things we might say there is some legitimacy to the audit firm	15 16 17 18 19 20 21	when it comes to tax planning, tax advice, and tax involvement on the part of the accounting firms. There are many things I would not be in favor of, and some of them have just been discussed, because I do think they do compromise the independence of the outside accounting firm. We personally do not use our outside	

	washington, DC			
	Page 134		Page 136	
$ \begin{array}{c} 1\\2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\\23\\24\\25\end{array} $	that the outside accounting firm have a viable vantage point from which to exercise their independence. If they are not involved on an ongoing basis in terms of the planning and advice that goes on in a global concern, and even a smaller concern, then that vantage point is not maximized. I believe very strongly, having practiced in this field for 28 years, that independence has a lot of dimensions. One of the critical ones is being knowledgeable enough to exercise that independence, and not being involved in the planning and advisory services in the tax arena clearly compromises that in terms of the continuity of understanding in this very, very complex and involved area. So I think it's critically important in terms of what we're all trying to achieve, which is the independence of the outside accounting firms, the integrity of the financial statements that the accounting firms have that vantage point. In fact, it's one I demand of the outside accounting firms so they can exercise the independence and judgement which is so critical in this complex area. MS. RIVSHIN: Mark Weinberger? MR. WEINBERGER: Thanks. I hate to go back to	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	was when relying on the use of an in-firm tax specialist. And I think the response to that is that an auditor who uses an in-firm tax specialist has the same responsibility to supervise and review that work as he does for any other assistant that the auditor uses. So therefore, the partner with the final responsibility for signing that audit report has an obligation to supervise and review the tax specialist. MS. RIVSHIN: Lynn Turner. MR. TURNER: We had a similar question on the auditing side that the profession has dealt with, and that was, were we going to let the accounting firms continue to issue these opinions on accounting matters, including if you just issued an opinion to an investment banking firm that they could then go sell to others, and you might do it and you wouldn't be necessarily issuing it to one of your audit clients, but it could be out there and certainly run you in a position where your audit client then picked it up and what do you do with it then? And in those situations, and I think the profession did it right, I think the profession came back and said, consistent with what our current code is, we have an obligation to the public. And the	
25	this question, but it's interesting, it's fascinating,	25	public, especially after Enron, doesn't see the	
	Page 135		Page 137	
$ \begin{array}{c} 1\\2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\\23\\24\\25\end{array} $	every time you read it, when you hear the conversations that go on here, I get a different interpretation. I actually think this question is much broader than the work you can provide to your audit firm. And again, I'm still trying to understand the AF and ZY, but I would if you answer no to one and yes to two, so there are certain tax strategies that you cannot provide to your audit client, whatever they are, and then you assume if you provide those strategies, however, to another firm, a non-audit client, that could risk your independence with your audit client that you never sold a strategy to, it would basically make it impossible for you to sell tax strategies to any other non-audit client because the mere fact that somebody may bring that idea to your client and cause an independence problem due to no fault of anything you've done for them. I think there are pretty broad ramifications of that. Am I reading that wrong? MS. RIVSHIN: You are reading that actually correct. MR. WEINBERGER: Okay. MS. RIVSHIN: Bruce Webb. MR. WEBB: Bruce Webb, McGladrey & Pullen. This is maybe a tangential issue, but the issue was sort of raised as to what the auditor's responsibility	$ \begin{array}{c} 1\\2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\\23\\24\\25\end{array} $	profession living up to its obligation to the public if we're issuing those type opinions, regardless of whether it's to one of our audit clients or to another firm, so we banned them on the accounting side. And I think the answer here, just from common sense and building upon what Nick said, gets you to the same answer. If you're, as a professional certified public accountant, going to go out and issue these type of tax opinions or take these type of positions on tax strategies, where it's less than likely that you're going to prevail, certainly if you're going to start reserving for it and saying one thing to the IRS and another thing to your investors, if you're going to take that position as a public accountant, then there's a definite price that goes with it, and the price is, if that shows up at the audit client, you're not going to be able to do that audit. The public investors just don't buy that that is an unbiased and rational position for a certified public accountant to take and they don't accept it. And when you look at it from that perspective, I think it very well comes out that if you get yourself in those positions, you just shouldn't be doing it and it's going to cause you a problem. And so just like we banned it on the financial reporting side, I think the	
	Page 138		Page 140	
--	--	--	--	
1	profession needs to come in and do the same thing on	1	SEC audit clients. I think it's important to	
2	the tax side and say, we're just not going to find	2	understand that concept and the extent to which firms	
3	ourselves in that position anymore because it doesn't	3	go in order to ensure that that is not the case, that	
4	work out, it just does nothing but terrible damage to	4	you're not providing something indirectly that you	
5	the profession.	5	can't provide directly to your SEC audit clients.	
6	MS. RIVSHIN: Nick Cyprus.	6	In that scenario, if there's a tax opinion	
7	MR. CYPRUS: Actually, Pat, I wanted to just	7	that sits out there, certainly that would be an issue	
8	follow on to what David was talking about. I really	8	that would say you can't do that, it's an indirect	
9	believe if the auditor is not in the origination	9	provision of something you can't provide directly. In	
10	stages, but rather you use the auditor as a consultant,	10	addition, that has to go back to this whole process of	
11	whether it's in tax planning, tax strategies, et	11	determining that we're not going to put ourselves in	
12	cetera, just like I would use the auditor when I do	12	the positions of taking something to the audit	
13	accounting policy, I mean, I wouldn't think about	13	committee that from a risk perspective we don't think	
14	calling up the SEC without making sure my auditors	14	is appropriate to independence, doesn't match up to the	
15	understood where I stood on accounting policy and made	15	principles, and it puts the audit committee in the	
16	sure the national office was with me.	16	fully formed position to protect the investors as we	
17	It would be the same thing if I'm thinking	17	are trying to do and ensure that those services don't	
18	about a merger or acquisition and the tax implications	18	show up indirectly.	
19	of that, you'd want to consult your auditor and	19	MS. RIVSHIN: Bruce Webb.	
20	understand both the tax and accounting impacts of that.	20	MR. WEBB: Bruce Webb, McGladrey. I just wanted to	
21	And as long as the auditor is independent, in other	21	follow up on Lynn's comment on the amendment to SAS 50.	
22	words, they didn't create the strategy, they didn't	22	I served on the Auditing Standards Board at the time	
23	create the tax planning itself, but they're consulting	23	that amendment was passed and we certainly supported	
24	on it, they're giving you advice on it the same way	24	it. And I think that SAS 50 might be a good place to	
25	you'd get accounting advice, I don't really see a	25	look for some guidance in this area because an	
	Page 139		Page 141	
1	· · · · ·	1		
1 2	problem with it. In fact, I think it's really	$\frac{1}{2}$	accountant or an auditor is permitted to issue and	
2	problem with it. In fact, I think it's really necessary.	2	accountant or an auditor is permitted to issue and sometimes in fact is required to issue a preferability	
2 3	problem with it. In fact, I think it's really necessary. And I know we've said this a lot, but when	2 3	accountant or an auditor is permitted to issue and sometimes in fact is required to issue a preferability opinion on the application of accounting principles to	
2 3 4	problem with it. In fact, I think it's really necessary. And I know we've said this a lot, but when you're a major international player with many, many,	2 3 4	accountant or an auditor is permitted to issue and sometimes in fact is required to issue a preferability opinion on the application of accounting principles to specify transactions, either completed or proposed,	
2 3 4 5	problem with it. In fact, I think it's really necessary. And I know we've said this a lot, but when you're a major international player with many, many, many locations, it takes a long time for someone to	2 3 4 5	accountant or an auditor is permitted to issue and sometimes in fact is required to issue a preferability opinion on the application of accounting principles to specify transactions, either completed or proposed, involving facts and circumstances of a specific entity.	
2 3 4 5 6	problem with it. In fact, I think it's really necessary. And I know we've said this a lot, but when you're a major international player with many, many, many locations, it takes a long time for someone to really understand the quirks of your company. And if	2 3 4 5 6	accountant or an auditor is permitted to issue and sometimes in fact is required to issue a preferability opinion on the application of accounting principles to specify transactions, either completed or proposed, involving facts and circumstances of a specific entity. On the other hand, an auditor or accountant	
2 3 4 5 6 7	problem with it. In fact, I think it's really necessary. And I know we've said this a lot, but when you're a major international player with many, many, many locations, it takes a long time for someone to really understand the quirks of your company. And if you're just bringing a third party to do it sort of on	2 3 4 5 6 7	accountant or an auditor is permitted to issue and sometimes in fact is required to issue a preferability opinion on the application of accounting principles to specify transactions, either completed or proposed, involving facts and circumstances of a specific entity. On the other hand, an auditor or accountant is precluded from issuing an opinion on the application	
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	problem with it. In fact, I think it's really necessary. And I know we've said this a lot, but when you're a major international player with many, many, many locations, it takes a long time for someone to really understand the quirks of your company. And if you're just bringing a third party to do it sort of on a part-time basis, even on a full-time basis, I think	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	accountant or an auditor is permitted to issue and sometimes in fact is required to issue a preferability opinion on the application of accounting principles to specify transactions, either completed or proposed, involving facts and circumstances of a specific entity. On the other hand, an auditor or accountant is precluded from issuing an opinion on the application of accounting principles to a hypothetical transaction,	
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	problem with it. In fact, I think it's really necessary. And I know we've said this a lot, but when you're a major international player with many, many, many locations, it takes a long time for someone to really understand the quirks of your company. And if you're just bringing a third party to do it sort of on a part-time basis, even on a full-time basis, I think the audit firm, because there's so much more resource	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	accountant or an auditor is permitted to issue and sometimes in fact is required to issue a preferability opinion on the application of accounting principles to specify transactions, either completed or proposed, involving facts and circumstances of a specific entity. On the other hand, an auditor or accountant is precluded from issuing an opinion on the application of accounting principles to a hypothetical transaction, that is, one that does not involve a specific	
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	problem with it. In fact, I think it's really necessary. And I know we've said this a lot, but when you're a major international player with many, many, many locations, it takes a long time for someone to really understand the quirks of your company. And if you're just bringing a third party to do it sort of on a part-time basis, even on a full-time basis, I think the audit firm, because there's so much more resource there, you have the audit resource and the tax	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	accountant or an auditor is permitted to issue and sometimes in fact is required to issue a preferability opinion on the application of accounting principles to specify transactions, either completed or proposed, involving facts and circumstances of a specific entity. On the other hand, an auditor or accountant is precluded from issuing an opinion on the application of accounting principles to a hypothetical transaction, that is, one that does not involve a specific transaction and specific facts and circumstances.	
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	problem with it. In fact, I think it's really necessary. And I know we've said this a lot, but when you're a major international player with many, many, many locations, it takes a long time for someone to really understand the quirks of your company. And if you're just bringing a third party to do it sort of on a part-time basis, even on a full-time basis, I think the audit firm, because there's so much more resource there, you have the audit resource and the tax resource, and lots of members that talk about things,	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	accountant or an auditor is permitted to issue and sometimes in fact is required to issue a preferability opinion on the application of accounting principles to specify transactions, either completed or proposed, involving facts and circumstances of a specific entity. On the other hand, an auditor or accountant is precluded from issuing an opinion on the application of accounting principles to a hypothetical transaction, that is, one that does not involve a specific transaction and specific facts and circumstances. MS. RIVSHIN: We're going to take our two last	
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	problem with it. In fact, I think it's really necessary. And I know we've said this a lot, but when you're a major international player with many, many, many locations, it takes a long time for someone to really understand the quirks of your company. And if you're just bringing a third party to do it sort of on a part-time basis, even on a full-time basis, I think the audit firm, because there's so much more resource there, you have the audit resource and the tax resource, and lots of members that talk about things, there are nuances that come to the attention of your	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	accountant or an auditor is permitted to issue and sometimes in fact is required to issue a preferability opinion on the application of accounting principles to specify transactions, either completed or proposed, involving facts and circumstances of a specific entity. On the other hand, an auditor or accountant is precluded from issuing an opinion on the application of accounting principles to a hypothetical transaction, that is, one that does not involve a specific transaction and specific facts and circumstances. MS. RIVSHIN: We're going to take our two last comments. We'll start with Mike Gagnon.	
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	problem with it. In fact, I think it's really necessary. And I know we've said this a lot, but when you're a major international player with many, many, many locations, it takes a long time for someone to really understand the quirks of your company. And if you're just bringing a third party to do it sort of on a part-time basis, even on a full-time basis, I think the audit firm, because there's so much more resource there, you have the audit resource and the tax resource, and lots of members that talk about things, there are nuances that come to the attention of your auditors that I think sometimes an outsider may not get	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	accountant or an auditor is permitted to issue and sometimes in fact is required to issue a preferability opinion on the application of accounting principles to specify transactions, either completed or proposed, involving facts and circumstances of a specific entity. On the other hand, an auditor or accountant is precluded from issuing an opinion on the application of accounting principles to a hypothetical transaction, that is, one that does not involve a specific transaction and specific facts and circumstances. MS. RIVSHIN: We're going to take our two last comments. We'll start with Mike Gagnon. MR. GAGNON: Just echoing the last comment and	
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	problem with it. In fact, I think it's really necessary. And I know we've said this a lot, but when you're a major international player with many, many, many locations, it takes a long time for someone to really understand the quirks of your company. And if you're just bringing a third party to do it sort of on a part-time basis, even on a full-time basis, I think the audit firm, because there's so much more resource there, you have the audit resource and the tax resource, and lots of members that talk about things, there are nuances that come to the attention of your auditors that I think sometimes an outsider may not get until it's too late, you've already made a mistake of	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	accountant or an auditor is permitted to issue and sometimes in fact is required to issue a preferability opinion on the application of accounting principles to specify transactions, either completed or proposed, involving facts and circumstances of a specific entity. On the other hand, an auditor or accountant is precluded from issuing an opinion on the application of accounting principles to a hypothetical transaction, that is, one that does not involve a specific transaction and specific facts and circumstances. MS. RIVSHIN: We're going to take our two last comments. We'll start with Mike Gagnon. MR. GAGNON: Just echoing the last comment and picking up on what Lynn said, I agree and I think it's	
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	problem with it. In fact, I think it's really necessary. And I know we've said this a lot, but when you're a major international player with many, many, many locations, it takes a long time for someone to really understand the quirks of your company. And if you're just bringing a third party to do it sort of on a part-time basis, even on a full-time basis, I think the audit firm, because there's so much more resource there, you have the audit resource and the tax resource, and lots of members that talk about things, there are nuances that come to the attention of your auditors that I think sometimes an outsider may not get until it's too late, you've already made a mistake of some kind. And so that's what I was really trying to	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	accountant or an auditor is permitted to issue and sometimes in fact is required to issue a preferability opinion on the application of accounting principles to specify transactions, either completed or proposed, involving facts and circumstances of a specific entity. On the other hand, an auditor or accountant is precluded from issuing an opinion on the application of accounting principles to a hypothetical transaction, that is, one that does not involve a specific transaction and specific facts and circumstances. MS. RIVSHIN: We're going to take our two last comments. We'll start with Mike Gagnon. MR. GAGNON: Just echoing the last comment and picking up on what Lynn said, I agree and I think it's a pretty good framework, SAS 50, in the context of tax	
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	problem with it. In fact, I think it's really necessary. And I know we've said this a lot, but when you're a major international player with many, many, many locations, it takes a long time for someone to really understand the quirks of your company. And if you're just bringing a third party to do it sort of on a part-time basis, even on a full-time basis, I think the audit firm, because there's so much more resource there, you have the audit resource and the tax resource, and lots of members that talk about things, there are nuances that come to the attention of your auditors that I think sometimes an outsider may not get until it's too late, you've already made a mistake of some kind. And so that's what I was really trying to get to.	$ \begin{array}{c} 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13 \\ 14 \\ 15 \\ 16 \\ \end{array} $	accountant or an auditor is permitted to issue and sometimes in fact is required to issue a preferability opinion on the application of accounting principles to specify transactions, either completed or proposed, involving facts and circumstances of a specific entity. On the other hand, an auditor or accountant is precluded from issuing an opinion on the application of accounting principles to a hypothetical transaction, that is, one that does not involve a specific transaction and specific facts and circumstances. MS. RIVSHIN: We're going to take our two last comments. We'll start with Mike Gagnon. MR. GAGNON: Just echoing the last comment and picking up on what Lynn said, I agree and I think it's a pretty good framework, SAS 50, in the context of tax opinions on hypothetical transactions. Tax advice, tax	
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	problem with it. In fact, I think it's really necessary. And I know we've said this a lot, but when you're a major international player with many, many, many locations, it takes a long time for someone to really understand the quirks of your company. And if you're just bringing a third party to do it sort of on a part-time basis, even on a full-time basis, I think the audit firm, because there's so much more resource there, you have the audit resource and the tax resource, and lots of members that talk about things, there are nuances that come to the attention of your auditors that I think sometimes an outsider may not get until it's too late, you've already made a mistake of some kind. And so that's what I was really trying to get to. I think it would kind of hurt us if we took	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	accountant or an auditor is permitted to issue and sometimes in fact is required to issue a preferability opinion on the application of accounting principles to specify transactions, either completed or proposed, involving facts and circumstances of a specific entity. On the other hand, an auditor or accountant is precluded from issuing an opinion on the application of accounting principles to a hypothetical transaction, that is, one that does not involve a specific transaction and specific facts and circumstances. MS. RIVSHIN: We're going to take our two last comments. We'll start with Mike Gagnon. MR. GAGNON: Just echoing the last comment and picking up on what Lynn said, I agree and I think it's a pretty good framework, SAS 50, in the context of tax opinions on hypothetical transactions. Tax advice, tax consulting should be driven by individual facts and	
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	problem with it. In fact, I think it's really necessary. And I know we've said this a lot, but when you're a major international player with many, many, many locations, it takes a long time for someone to really understand the quirks of your company. And if you're just bringing a third party to do it sort of on a part-time basis, even on a full-time basis, I think the audit firm, because there's so much more resource there, you have the audit resource and the tax resource, and lots of members that talk about things, there are nuances that come to the attention of your auditors that I think sometimes an outsider may not get until it's too late, you've already made a mistake of some kind. And so that's what I was really trying to get to. I think it would kind of hurt us if we took that resource away from the consulting side of the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	accountant or an auditor is permitted to issue and sometimes in fact is required to issue a preferability opinion on the application of accounting principles to specify transactions, either completed or proposed, involving facts and circumstances of a specific entity. On the other hand, an auditor or accountant is precluded from issuing an opinion on the application of accounting principles to a hypothetical transaction, that is, one that does not involve a specific transaction and specific facts and circumstances. MS. RIVSHIN: We're going to take our two last comments. We'll start with Mike Gagnon. MR. GAGNON: Just echoing the last comment and picking up on what Lynn said, I agree and I think it's a pretty good framework, SAS 50, in the context of tax opinions on hypothetical transactions. Tax advice, tax consulting should be driven by individual facts and circumstances, and it's the former, that is, the	
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	problem with it. In fact, I think it's really necessary. And I know we've said this a lot, but when you're a major international player with many, many, many locations, it takes a long time for someone to really understand the quirks of your company. And if you're just bringing a third party to do it sort of on a part-time basis, even on a full-time basis, I think the audit firm, because there's so much more resource there, you have the audit resource and the tax resource, and lots of members that talk about things, there are nuances that come to the attention of your auditors that I think sometimes an outsider may not get until it's too late, you've already made a mistake of some kind. And so that's what I was really trying to get to. I think it would kind of hurt us if we took that resource away from the consulting side of the equation.	$\begin{array}{c} 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13 \\ 14 \\ 15 \\ 16 \\ 17 \\ 18 \\ 19 \end{array}$	accountant or an auditor is permitted to issue and sometimes in fact is required to issue a preferability opinion on the application of accounting principles to specify transactions, either completed or proposed, involving facts and circumstances of a specific entity. On the other hand, an auditor or accountant is precluded from issuing an opinion on the application of accounting principles to a hypothetical transaction, that is, one that does not involve a specific transaction and specific facts and circumstances. MS. RIVSHIN: We're going to take our two last comments. We'll start with Mike Gagnon. MR. GAGNON: Just echoing the last comment and picking up on what Lynn said, I agree and I think it's a pretty good framework, SAS 50, in the context of tax opinions on hypothetical transactions. Tax advice, tax consulting should be driven by individual facts and circumstances, and it's the former, that is, the hypothetical tax opinions, that is an area that I don't	
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	problem with it. In fact, I think it's really necessary. And I know we've said this a lot, but when you're a major international player with many, many, many locations, it takes a long time for someone to really understand the quirks of your company. And if you're just bringing a third party to do it sort of on a part-time basis, even on a full-time basis, I think the audit firm, because there's so much more resource there, you have the audit resource and the tax resource, and lots of members that talk about things, there are nuances that come to the attention of your auditors that I think sometimes an outsider may not get until it's too late, you've already made a mistake of some kind. And so that's what I was really trying to get to. I think it would kind of hurt us if we took that resource away from the consulting side of the equation. MS. RIVSHIN: Scott Bayless.	$\begin{array}{c} 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13 \\ 14 \\ 15 \\ 16 \\ 17 \\ 18 \\ 19 \\ 20 \end{array}$	accountant or an auditor is permitted to issue and sometimes in fact is required to issue a preferability opinion on the application of accounting principles to specify transactions, either completed or proposed, involving facts and circumstances of a specific entity. On the other hand, an auditor or accountant is precluded from issuing an opinion on the application of accounting principles to a hypothetical transaction, that is, one that does not involve a specific transaction and specific facts and circumstances. MS. RIVSHIN: We're going to take our two last comments. We'll start with Mike Gagnon. MR. GAGNON: Just echoing the last comment and picking up on what Lynn said, I agree and I think it's a pretty good framework, SAS 50, in the context of tax opinions on hypothetical transactions. Tax advice, tax consulting should be driven by individual facts and circumstances, and it's the former, that is, the hypothetical tax opinions, that is an area that I don't think is appropriate, and I think there's a framework	
$\begin{array}{c} 2\\ 3\\ 4\\ 5\\ 6\\ 7\\ 8\\ 9\\ 10\\ 11\\ 12\\ 13\\ 14\\ 15\\ 16\\ 17\\ 18\\ 19\\ 20\\ 21\\ \end{array}$	problem with it. In fact, I think it's really necessary. And I know we've said this a lot, but when you're a major international player with many, many, many locations, it takes a long time for someone to really understand the quirks of your company. And if you're just bringing a third party to do it sort of on a part-time basis, even on a full-time basis, I think the audit firm, because there's so much more resource there, you have the audit resource and the tax resource, and lots of members that talk about things, there are nuances that come to the attention of your auditors that I think sometimes an outsider may not get until it's too late, you've already made a mistake of some kind. And so that's what I was really trying to get to. I think it would kind of hurt us if we took that resource away from the consulting side of the equation. MS. RIVSHIN: Scott Bayless. MR. BAYLESS: Scott Bayless, Deloitte. Just	$\begin{array}{c} 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13 \\ 14 \\ 15 \\ 16 \\ 17 \\ 18 \\ 19 \\ 20 \\ 21 \end{array}$	accountant or an auditor is permitted to issue and sometimes in fact is required to issue a preferability opinion on the application of accounting principles to specify transactions, either completed or proposed, involving facts and circumstances of a specific entity. On the other hand, an auditor or accountant is precluded from issuing an opinion on the application of accounting principles to a hypothetical transaction, that is, one that does not involve a specific transaction and specific facts and circumstances. MS. RIVSHIN: We're going to take our two last comments. We'll start with Mike Gagnon. MR. GAGNON: Just echoing the last comment and picking up on what Lynn said, I agree and I think it's a pretty good framework, SAS 50, in the context of tax opinions on hypothetical transactions. Tax advice, tax consulting should be driven by individual facts and circumstances, and it's the former, that is, the hypothetical tax opinions, that is an area that I don't think is appropriate, and I think there's a framework for consideration here.	
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	 problem with it. In fact, I think it's really necessary. And I know we've said this a lot, but when you're a major international player with many, many, many locations, it takes a long time for someone to really understand the quirks of your company. And if you're just bringing a third party to do it sort of on a part-time basis, even on a full-time basis, I think the audit firm, because there's so much more resource there, you have the audit resource and the tax resource, and lots of members that talk about things, there are nuances that come to the attention of your auditors that I think sometimes an outsider may not get until it's too late, you've already made a mistake of some kind. And so that's what I was really trying to get to. I think it would kind of hurt us if we took that resource away from the consulting side of the equation. MS. RIVSHIN: Scott Bayless. MR. BAYLESS: Scott Bayless, Deloitte. Just in terms of addressing the issue that I think Lynn 	$\begin{array}{c} 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13 \\ 14 \\ 15 \\ 16 \\ 17 \\ 18 \\ 19 \\ 20 \\ 21 \\ 22 \end{array}$	accountant or an auditor is permitted to issue and sometimes in fact is required to issue a preferability opinion on the application of accounting principles to specify transactions, either completed or proposed, involving facts and circumstances of a specific entity. On the other hand, an auditor or accountant is precluded from issuing an opinion on the application of accounting principles to a hypothetical transaction, that is, one that does not involve a specific transaction and specific facts and circumstances. MS. RIVSHIN: We're going to take our two last comments. We'll start with Mike Gagnon. MR. GAGNON: Just echoing the last comment and picking up on what Lynn said, I agree and I think it's a pretty good framework, SAS 50, in the context of tax opinions on hypothetical transactions. Tax advice, tax consulting should be driven by individual facts and circumstances, and it's the former, that is, the hypothetical tax opinions, that is an area that I don't think is appropriate, and I think there's a framework for consideration here. To Pat's issue earlier of independence, it's	
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 problem with it. In fact, I think it's really necessary. And I know we've said this a lot, but when you're a major international player with many, many, many locations, it takes a long time for someone to really understand the quirks of your company. And if you're just bringing a third party to do it sort of on a part-time basis, even on a full-time basis, I think the audit firm, because there's so much more resource there, you have the audit resource and the tax resource, and lots of members that talk about things, there are nuances that come to the attention of your auditors that I think sometimes an outsider may not get until it's too late, you've already made a mistake of some kind. And so that's what I was really trying to get to. I think it would kind of hurt us if we took that resource away from the consulting side of the equation. MS. RIVSHIN: Scott Bayless. MR. BAYLESS: Scott Bayless, Deloitte. Just in terms of addressing the issue that I think Lynn raised, and that is that in looking at independence 	$\begin{array}{c} 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13 \\ 14 \\ 15 \\ 16 \\ 17 \\ 18 \\ 19 \\ 20 \\ 21 \\ 22 \\ 23 \end{array}$	accountant or an auditor is permitted to issue and sometimes in fact is required to issue a preferability opinion on the application of accounting principles to specify transactions, either completed or proposed, involving facts and circumstances of a specific entity. On the other hand, an auditor or accountant is precluded from issuing an opinion on the application of accounting principles to a hypothetical transaction, that is, one that does not involve a specific transaction and specific facts and circumstances. MS. RIVSHIN: We're going to take our two last comments. We'll start with Mike Gagnon. MR. GAGNON: Just echoing the last comment and picking up on what Lynn said, I agree and I think it's a pretty good framework, SAS 50, in the context of tax opinions on hypothetical transactions. Tax advice, tax consulting should be driven by individual facts and circumstances, and it's the former, that is, the hypothetical tax opinions, that is an area that I don't think is appropriate, and I think there's a framework for consideration here. To Pat's issue earlier of independence, it's important for auditors and tax advisers it's	
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	 problem with it. In fact, I think it's really necessary. And I know we've said this a lot, but when you're a major international player with many, many, many locations, it takes a long time for someone to really understand the quirks of your company. And if you're just bringing a third party to do it sort of on a part-time basis, even on a full-time basis, I think the audit firm, because there's so much more resource there, you have the audit resource and the tax resource, and lots of members that talk about things, there are nuances that come to the attention of your auditors that I think sometimes an outsider may not get until it's too late, you've already made a mistake of some kind. And so that's what I was really trying to get to. I think it would kind of hurt us if we took that resource away from the consulting side of the equation. MS. RIVSHIN: Scott Bayless. MR. BAYLESS: Scott Bayless, Deloitte. Just in terms of addressing the issue that I think Lynn 	$\begin{array}{c} 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13 \\ 14 \\ 15 \\ 16 \\ 17 \\ 18 \\ 19 \\ 20 \\ 21 \\ 22 \end{array}$	accountant or an auditor is permitted to issue and sometimes in fact is required to issue a preferability opinion on the application of accounting principles to specify transactions, either completed or proposed, involving facts and circumstances of a specific entity. On the other hand, an auditor or accountant is precluded from issuing an opinion on the application of accounting principles to a hypothetical transaction, that is, one that does not involve a specific transaction and specific facts and circumstances. MS. RIVSHIN: We're going to take our two last comments. We'll start with Mike Gagnon. MR. GAGNON: Just echoing the last comment and picking up on what Lynn said, I agree and I think it's a pretty good framework, SAS 50, in the context of tax opinions on hypothetical transactions. Tax advice, tax consulting should be driven by individual facts and circumstances, and it's the former, that is, the hypothetical tax opinions, that is an area that I don't think is appropriate, and I think there's a framework for consideration here. To Pat's issue earlier of independence, it's	

	vv asimi	Ston,	
	Page 142		Page 144
$ \begin{array}{c} 1\\2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\\23\\24\\25\end{array} $	viewpoint. In order to develop that independent viewpoint which is relevant to the particular facts and circumstances, you've got to understand the environment, you've got to know what's going on, and maybe that was the basis for your comment. I believe that enhances independence. You are advising a client on a variety of matters, some of which bear on accounting, some of which may bear on a particular tax issue. That advice does need to be developed or spring from an independent, objective perspective, but that has to be well informed, and the information that is gathered in that process is critical as a backdrop to providing it. I think, going back to the discussion of the application of our tax code, there are benefits there as well, because clearly an auditor in an audit process in an organization that operates in 140 countries, an auditor who has the breadth and depth and capability of undertaking that assignment from an audit perspective has the expertise and develops a base of knowledge in that organization around the world, and will see things, will observe things, not just tax-driven, but other avenues as well, and clearly is in a position to provide that independent, objective advice to the client on these matters, some of which will properly	$ \begin{array}{c} 1\\2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\\23\\24\\25\end{array} $	off the first-in, first-out, FIFO inventory method, going to LIFO, not too controversial. Another might be whether I file a consolidated tax return or a separate tax return. Forming a sub-S corporation to avoid double taxation. Hey, look at your interest income and you're paying a lot or you're having a lot of high- yield bonds but you're paying tax on it. Have you thought about buying municipal bonds that are tax free? So there's a lot of issues here where you look at things and you say, now is this a tax strategy? Maybe to form a sub-S corporation, you know, here's the structure you need to do. There are certain things you have to do to go from the FIFO to LIFO methods to meet IRS rules. I've got something that I can help you with. The issue here is I think there's a lot of these plain vanilla things that nobody really has an objection to, and we also read about a lot of things in the newspapers where a lot of people may have objections to. I can't really comment on that. I don't know their validity, I don't know their facts. But someplace between these two is a line where you can say, this is allowed, I think these things I mentioned are okay, but you can't go any further. And I welcome the challenge that you folks face in figuring out where
	Page 143		Page 145
$ \begin{array}{c} 1\\2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\\23\\24\\25\end{array} $	bear on taxes, some of which will bear on other areas of the organization. But the critical point, not only from the perspective of the auditor's responsibilities, but from an independence perspective, is the ability to be impartial and objective in rendering that advice. MS. RIVSHIN: Jim Brown. MR. BROWN: Jim Brown of Crowe Chizek. The last question, I was sort of trying to wrap things up or maybe return to an issue here for a moment, and that is I don't really relish the Board's mission ahead of them, which is to sort of try to figure out where to draw the line here, and that's sort of how I see this. We've been talking about tax planning and tax strategies, and it all sort of blends together. Some of it's even, is it tax advice or is it accounting advice? And I just wanted to give you a couple of examples I had down here on some things that people don't really, I think don't see too much of a concern when you do talk to a company about this or give them a suggestion. I just say, you know, when you go to a party, somebody says, oh, you're an accountant? Well, I have a tax question for you. People expect that accountants can give tax advice. And there are some matters, such as getting	$\begin{array}{c}1\\2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\\23\\24\\25\end{array}$	that line is. I think we have to allow some matters. The public does expect accountants to be able to give advice on audit and tax issues. We have to as part of our audit responsibility, but at some point we get too involved. I'll remind you of those four overarching principles, and I think those are good points to consider. MS. RIVSHIN: Okay, due to time constraints we're going to move on to our next area, which is executive and international assignment tax services. Accounting firms may provide services to executives of its audit clients, such as the preparation of personal income tax returns and tax planning. Accounting firms may also provide specialized tax services to employees of the company who participate in an international assignment program. These services include home and host country tax compliance assistance and estate planning for expatriates. Starting with our first question, does providing tax services to audit client executives and other members of management affect the auditor's independence from the company? Does the answer depend on whether the executives are involved in the financial reporting process or otherwise making representations

		-	
	Page 146		Page 148
1	to the auditor?	1	the tax services that are being compromised vis-a-vis
2	Mark Anson.	2	the company. And obviously from our perspective as
3	MR. ANSON: Mark Anson from CALPERS. Big	3	investors, that's what we care about.
4	problem with this question. Boards of directors and	4	Secondly, there's this issue of the audit now
5	audit committees rely on the input from executive	5	the audit and others and the ability of the firm to
6	management, just like CALPERS. CALPERS' board of	6	gain other services from the issuer is potentially in
7	administration relies on the input and recommendations	7	play as the issuer as the audit firm interacts on
8	and presentations I make to them in their decision-	8	tax matters with the CEO or CFO of the company. And
9	making process. When you have the audit firm providing	9	that adds a second layer of conflict on top of the
10	tax advice, preparing tax returns for the senior	10	existing tension between the company's tax interest and
11	management, you've now created a mutual interest	11	the company's and the executive's tax interest.
12	between the executive management and that audit firm	12	This is this, in our view, is just a hornet's nest
13	which could potentially taint the recommendation to	13	of problems, and not all of them are ones not all of
14	that audit committee or the board of directors.	14	them are problems that are of the sort the PCAOB
15	I mean, my God, if the audit firm is going to	15	typically focuses on, but there of extreme concern to
16	prepare the tax returns for the chief executive, as a	16	investors.
17 18	shareowner, I want him to come prepare mine also. MS. RIVSHIN: Elliot Schwartz.	17 18	MS. RIVSHIN: Jim Brasher. MR. BRASHER: I guess the question on the
10	MS. KIVSHIN, Enfot Schwarz. MR. SCHWARTZ: Yes, of course the answer is	10	floor here is whether or not the investment community
20	that providing tax services to audit clients	20	feels comfortable with letting the audit committee
20	compromises their independence or at least it	20	makes these types of decisions, because I can assure
21	compromises the perception of their independence, which	21	you that's what's happening in the real world, not only
23	is a lot of what's going on here. Just continuing a	23	with respect to executives, but also with respect to
24	little bit from the last discussion, as we continue to	24	the international executive program that all of the big
25	try to draw lines, it becomes increasingly obvious that	25	firms we all have that capability. Those decisions
	Page 147		Page 149
1	it's very, very difficult to do so, and again, as I've	1	are seemingly being made almost on a weekly basis where
1 2	it's very, very difficult to do so, and again, as I've said before, that is why audit firms should not be	2	are seemingly being made almost on a weekly basis where they decide whether or not they want the auditor to
2 3	said before, that is why audit firms should not be providing non-audit services to their audit clients.	2 3	
2 3 4	said before, that is why audit firms should not be providing non-audit services to their audit clients. We have no problem with audit firms, accounting firms,	2 3 4	they decide whether or not they want the auditor to provide those services. So I guess the question is, what else are we
2 3 4 5	said before, that is why audit firms should not be providing non-audit services to their audit clients. We have no problem with audit firms, accounting firms, providing tax advice or providing advice to executives,	2 3 4 5	they decide whether or not they want the auditor to provide those services. So I guess the question is, what else are we trying to safeguard if the audit committee cannot be
2 3 4 5 6	said before, that is why audit firms should not be providing non-audit services to their audit clients. We have no problem with audit firms, accounting firms, providing tax advice or providing advice to executives, but not to the same ones that are in the firm or not to	2 3 4 5 6	they decide whether or not they want the auditor to provide those services. So I guess the question is, what else are we trying to safeguard if the audit committee cannot be entrusted to make that decision?
2 3 4 5 6 7	said before, that is why audit firms should not be providing non-audit services to their audit clients. We have no problem with audit firms, accounting firms, providing tax advice or providing advice to executives, but not to the same ones that are in the firm or not to the same firm where they're doing their audits.	2 3 4 5 6 7	they decide whether or not they want the auditor to provide those services. So I guess the question is, what else are we trying to safeguard if the audit committee cannot be entrusted to make that decision? MS. RIVSHIN: Barbara Roper.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	said before, that is why audit firms should not be providing non-audit services to their audit clients. We have no problem with audit firms, accounting firms, providing tax advice or providing advice to executives, but not to the same ones that are in the firm or not to the same firm where they're doing their audits. MS. RIVSHIN: Damon Silvers.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	they decide whether or not they want the auditor to provide those services. So I guess the question is, what else are we trying to safeguard if the audit committee cannot be entrusted to make that decision? MS. RIVSHIN: Barbara Roper. MS. ROPER: I had a question about that. Does
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	said before, that is why audit firms should not be providing non-audit services to their audit clients. We have no problem with audit firms, accounting firms, providing tax advice or providing advice to executives, but not to the same ones that are in the firm or not to the same firm where they're doing their audits. MS. RIVSHIN: Damon Silvers. MR. SILVERS: Not surprisingly, I agree with	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	they decide whether or not they want the auditor to provide those services. So I guess the question is, what else are we trying to safeguard if the audit committee cannot be entrusted to make that decision? MS. RIVSHIN: Barbara Roper. MS. ROPER: I had a question about that. Does the audit committee the audit committee is obliged
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	said before, that is why audit firms should not be providing non-audit services to their audit clients. We have no problem with audit firms, accounting firms, providing tax advice or providing advice to executives, but not to the same ones that are in the firm or not to the same firm where they're doing their audits. MS. RIVSHIN: Damon Silvers. MR. SILVERS: Not surprisingly, I agree with the last two comments. I'd like to detail a little bit	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	they decide whether or not they want the auditor to provide those services. So I guess the question is, what else are we trying to safeguard if the audit committee cannot be entrusted to make that decision? MS. RIVSHIN: Barbara Roper. MS. ROPER: I had a question about that. Does the audit committee the audit committee is obliged to preapprove non-audit services provided to the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	said before, that is why audit firms should not be providing non-audit services to their audit clients. We have no problem with audit firms, accounting firms, providing tax advice or providing advice to executives, but not to the same ones that are in the firm or not to the same firm where they're doing their audits. MS. RIVSHIN: Damon Silvers. MR. SILVERS: Not surprisingly, I agree with the last two comments. I'd like to detail a little bit more of what the problem is here with providing tax	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	they decide whether or not they want the auditor to provide those services. So I guess the question is, what else are we trying to safeguard if the audit committee cannot be entrusted to make that decision? MS. RIVSHIN: Barbara Roper. MS. ROPER: I had a question about that. Does the audit committee the audit committee is obliged to preapprove non-audit services provided to the company. Is there anything that says they're required
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	said before, that is why audit firms should not be providing non-audit services to their audit clients. We have no problem with audit firms, accounting firms, providing tax advice or providing advice to executives, but not to the same ones that are in the firm or not to the same firm where they're doing their audits. MS. RIVSHIN: Damon Silvers. MR. SILVERS: Not surprisingly, I agree with the last two comments. I'd like to detail a little bit more of what the problem is here with providing tax services to senior executives. I think it gets more	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	they decide whether or not they want the auditor to provide those services. So I guess the question is, what else are we trying to safeguard if the audit committee cannot be entrusted to make that decision? MS. RIVSHIN: Barbara Roper. MS. ROPER: I had a question about that. Does the audit committee the audit committee is obliged to preapprove non-audit services provided to the company. Is there anything that says they're required to preapprove or even know about non-audit services
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	said before, that is why audit firms should not be providing non-audit services to their audit clients. We have no problem with audit firms, accounting firms, providing tax advice or providing advice to executives, but not to the same ones that are in the firm or not to the same firm where they're doing their audits. MS. RIVSHIN: Damon Silvers. MR. SILVERS: Not surprisingly, I agree with the last two comments. I'd like to detail a little bit more of what the problem is here with providing tax services to senior executives. I think it gets more I think maybe later on in the second part 2, it's more	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	they decide whether or not they want the auditor to provide those services. So I guess the question is, what else are we trying to safeguard if the audit committee cannot be entrusted to make that decision? MS. RIVSHIN: Barbara Roper. MS. ROPER: I had a question about that. Does the audit committee the audit committee is obliged to preapprove non-audit services provided to the company. Is there anything that says they're required to preapprove or even know about non-audit services provided to executives of the company? Because I'm not
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	said before, that is why audit firms should not be providing non-audit services to their audit clients. We have no problem with audit firms, accounting firms, providing tax advice or providing advice to executives, but not to the same ones that are in the firm or not to the same firm where they're doing their audits. MS. RIVSHIN: Damon Silvers. MR. SILVERS: Not surprisingly, I agree with the last two comments. I'd like to detail a little bit more of what the problem is here with providing tax services to senior executives. I think it gets more I think maybe later on in the second part 2, it's more complicated when you're talking about more middle	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	they decide whether or not they want the auditor to provide those services. So I guess the question is, what else are we trying to safeguard if the audit committee cannot be entrusted to make that decision? MS. RIVSHIN: Barbara Roper. MS. ROPER: I had a question about that. Does the audit committee the audit committee is obliged to preapprove non-audit services provided to the company. Is there anything that says they're required to preapprove or even know about non-audit services provided to executives of the company? Because I'm not assuming that the audit committee will be consulted or
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	said before, that is why audit firms should not be providing non-audit services to their audit clients. We have no problem with audit firms, accounting firms, providing tax advice or providing advice to executives, but not to the same ones that are in the firm or not to the same firm where they're doing their audits. MS. RIVSHIN: Damon Silvers. MR. SILVERS: Not surprisingly, I agree with the last two comments. I'd like to detail a little bit more of what the problem is here with providing tax services to senior executives. I think it gets more I think maybe later on in the second part 2, it's more complicated when you're talking about more middle managers in the international context.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	they decide whether or not they want the auditor to provide those services. So I guess the question is, what else are we trying to safeguard if the audit committee cannot be entrusted to make that decision? MS. RIVSHIN: Barbara Roper. MS. ROPER: I had a question about that. Does the audit committee the audit committee is obliged to preapprove non-audit services provided to the company. Is there anything that says they're required to preapprove or even know about non-audit services provided to executives of the company? Because I'm not assuming that the audit committee will be consulted or involved in that review process.
$\begin{array}{c} 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13 \\ 14 \\ 15 \\ 16 \end{array}$	said before, that is why audit firms should not be providing non-audit services to their audit clients. We have no problem with audit firms, accounting firms, providing tax advice or providing advice to executives, but not to the same ones that are in the firm or not to the same firm where they're doing their audits. MS. RIVSHIN: Damon Silvers. MR. SILVERS: Not surprisingly, I agree with the last two comments. I'd like to detail a little bit more of what the problem is here with providing tax services to senior executives. I think it gets more I think maybe later on in the second part 2, it's more complicated when you're talking about more middle managers in the international context. But when you're dealing with senior	$\begin{array}{c} 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13 \\ 14 \\ 15 \\ 16 \end{array}$	they decide whether or not they want the auditor to provide those services. So I guess the question is, what else are we trying to safeguard if the audit committee cannot be entrusted to make that decision? MS. RIVSHIN: Barbara Roper. MS. ROPER: I had a question about that. Does the audit committee the audit committee is obliged to preapprove non-audit services provided to the company. Is there anything that says they're required to preapprove or even know about non-audit services provided to executives of the company? Because I'm not assuming that the audit committee will be consulted or involved in that review process. MS. RIVSHIN: Lynn Turner.
$\begin{array}{c} 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13 \\ 14 \\ 15 \\ 16 \\ 17 \end{array}$	said before, that is why audit firms should not be providing non-audit services to their audit clients. We have no problem with audit firms, accounting firms, providing tax advice or providing advice to executives, but not to the same ones that are in the firm or not to the same firm where they're doing their audits. MS. RIVSHIN: Damon Silvers. MR. SILVERS: Not surprisingly, I agree with the last two comments. I'd like to detail a little bit more of what the problem is here with providing tax services to senior executives. I think it gets more I think maybe later on in the second part 2, it's more complicated when you're talking about more middle managers in the international context. But when you're dealing with senior executives, I think there are two things going on here	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	they decide whether or not they want the auditor to provide those services. So I guess the question is, what else are we trying to safeguard if the audit committee cannot be entrusted to make that decision? MS. RIVSHIN: Barbara Roper. MS. ROPER: I had a question about that. Does the audit committee the audit committee is obliged to preapprove non-audit services provided to the company. Is there anything that says they're required to preapprove or even know about non-audit services provided to executives of the company? Because I'm not assuming that the audit committee will be consulted or involved in that review process. MS. RIVSHIN: Lynn Turner. MR. TURNER: There is not a requirement under
$\begin{array}{c} 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13 \\ 14 \\ 15 \\ 16 \\ 17 \\ 18 \end{array}$	said before, that is why audit firms should not be providing non-audit services to their audit clients. We have no problem with audit firms, accounting firms, providing tax advice or providing advice to executives, but not to the same ones that are in the firm or not to the same firm where they're doing their audits. MS. RIVSHIN: Damon Silvers. MR. SILVERS: Not surprisingly, I agree with the last two comments. I'd like to detail a little bit more of what the problem is here with providing tax services to senior executives. I think it gets more I think maybe later on in the second part 2, it's more complicated when you're talking about more middle managers in the international context. But when you're dealing with senior executives, I think there are two things going on here that are a little different than a lot of what we	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	they decide whether or not they want the auditor to provide those services. So I guess the question is, what else are we trying to safeguard if the audit committee cannot be entrusted to make that decision? MS. RIVSHIN: Barbara Roper. MS. ROPER: I had a question about that. Does the audit committee the audit committee is obliged to preapprove non-audit services provided to the company. Is there anything that says they're required to preapprove or even know about non-audit services provided to executives of the company? Because I'm not assuming that the audit committee will be consulted or involved in that review process. MS. RIVSHIN: Lynn Turner. MR. TURNER: There is not a requirement under Sarbanes-Oxley that the audit committee preapprove the
$\begin{array}{c} 2\\ 3\\ 4\\ 5\\ 6\\ 7\\ 8\\ 9\\ 10\\ 11\\ 12\\ 13\\ 14\\ 15\\ 16\\ 17\\ 18\\ 19\\ \end{array}$	said before, that is why audit firms should not be providing non-audit services to their audit clients. We have no problem with audit firms, accounting firms, providing tax advice or providing advice to executives, but not to the same ones that are in the firm or not to the same firm where they're doing their audits. MS. RIVSHIN: Damon Silvers. MR. SILVERS: Not surprisingly, I agree with the last two comments. I'd like to detail a little bit more of what the problem is here with providing tax services to senior executives. I think it gets more I think maybe later on in the second part 2, it's more complicated when you're talking about more middle managers in the international context. But when you're dealing with senior executives, I think there are two things going on here that are a little different than a lot of what we talked about earlier today. One is that, assuming that	$\begin{array}{c} 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13 \\ 14 \\ 15 \\ 16 \\ 17 \\ 18 \\ 19 \end{array}$	they decide whether or not they want the auditor to provide those services. So I guess the question is, what else are we trying to safeguard if the audit committee cannot be entrusted to make that decision? MS. RIVSHIN: Barbara Roper. MS. ROPER: I had a question about that. Does the audit committee the audit committee is obliged to preapprove non-audit services provided to the company. Is there anything that says they're required to preapprove or even know about non-audit services provided to executives of the company? Because I'm not assuming that the audit committee will be consulted or involved in that review process. MS. RIVSHIN: Lynn Turner. MR. TURNER: There is not a requirement under Sarbanes-Oxley that the audit committee preapprove the work done for the executives. I know, however, and I
$\begin{array}{c} 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13 \\ 14 \\ 15 \\ 16 \\ 17 \\ 18 \\ 19 \\ 20 \end{array}$	said before, that is why audit firms should not be providing non-audit services to their audit clients. We have no problem with audit firms, accounting firms, providing tax advice or providing advice to executives, but not to the same ones that are in the firm or not to the same firm where they're doing their audits. MS. RIVSHIN: Damon Silvers. MR. SILVERS: Not surprisingly, I agree with the last two comments. I'd like to detail a little bit more of what the problem is here with providing tax services to senior executives. I think it gets more I think maybe later on in the second part 2, it's more complicated when you're talking about more middle managers in the international context. But when you're dealing with senior executives, I think there are two things going on here that are a little different than a lot of what we talked about earlier today. One is that, assuming that the firm is also providing tax services to the company,	$\begin{array}{c} 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13 \\ 14 \\ 15 \\ 16 \\ 17 \\ 18 \\ 19 \\ 20 \end{array}$	they decide whether or not they want the auditor to provide those services. So I guess the question is, what else are we trying to safeguard if the audit committee cannot be entrusted to make that decision? MS. RIVSHIN: Barbara Roper. MS. ROPER: I had a question about that. Does the audit committee the audit committee is obliged to preapprove non-audit services provided to the company. Is there anything that says they're required to preapprove or even know about non-audit services provided to executives of the company? Because I'm not assuming that the audit committee will be consulted or involved in that review process. MS. RIVSHIN: Lynn Turner. MR. TURNER: There is not a requirement under Sarbanes-Oxley that the audit committee preapprove the work done for the executives. I know, however, and I give them great kudos for this, in the case where I sit
$\begin{array}{c} 2\\ 3\\ 4\\ 5\\ 6\\ 7\\ 8\\ 9\\ 10\\ 11\\ 12\\ 13\\ 14\\ 15\\ 16\\ 17\\ 18\\ 19\\ 20\\ 21\\ \end{array}$	said before, that is why audit firms should not be providing non-audit services to their audit clients. We have no problem with audit firms, accounting firms, providing tax advice or providing advice to executives, but not to the same ones that are in the firm or not to the same firm where they're doing their audits. MS. RIVSHIN: Damon Silvers. MR. SILVERS: Not surprisingly, I agree with the last two comments. I'd like to detail a little bit more of what the problem is here with providing tax services to senior executives. I think it gets more I think maybe later on in the second part 2, it's more complicated when you're talking about more middle managers in the international context. But when you're dealing with senior executives, I think there are two things going on here that are a little different than a lot of what we talked about earlier today. One is that, assuming that the firm is also providing tax services to the company, the interests of the company, the tax-related interests	$\begin{array}{c} 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13 \\ 14 \\ 15 \\ 16 \\ 17 \\ 18 \\ 19 \\ 20 \\ 21 \end{array}$	they decide whether or not they want the auditor to provide those services. So I guess the question is, what else are we trying to safeguard if the audit committee cannot be entrusted to make that decision? MS. RIVSHIN: Barbara Roper. MS. ROPER: I had a question about that. Does the audit committee the audit committee is obliged to preapprove non-audit services provided to the company. Is there anything that says they're required to preapprove or even know about non-audit services provided to executives of the company? Because I'm not assuming that the audit committee will be consulted or involved in that review process. MS. RIVSHIN: Lynn Turner. MR. TURNER: There is not a requirement under Sarbanes-Oxley that the audit committee preapprove the work done for the executives. I know, however, and I give them great kudos for this, in the case where I sit on the audit committee, the firm has adopted a policy,
$\begin{array}{c} 2\\ 3\\ 4\\ 5\\ 6\\ 7\\ 8\\ 9\\ 10\\ 11\\ 12\\ 13\\ 14\\ 15\\ 16\\ 17\\ 18\\ 19\\ 20\\ 21\\ 22\\ \end{array}$	said before, that is why audit firms should not be providing non-audit services to their audit clients. We have no problem with audit firms, accounting firms, providing tax advice or providing advice to executives, but not to the same ones that are in the firm or not to the same firm where they're doing their audits. MS. RIVSHIN: Damon Silvers. MR. SILVERS: Not surprisingly, I agree with the last two comments. I'd like to detail a little bit more of what the problem is here with providing tax services to senior executives. I think it gets more I think maybe later on in the second part 2, it's more complicated when you're talking about more middle managers in the international context. But when you're dealing with senior executives, I think there are two things going on here that are a little different than a lot of what we talked about earlier today. One is that, assuming that the firm is also providing tax services to the company, the interests of the company, the tax-related interests of the company and the tax-related interests of the	$\begin{array}{c} 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13 \\ 14 \\ 15 \\ 16 \\ 17 \\ 18 \\ 19 \\ 20 \\ 21 \\ 22 \end{array}$	they decide whether or not they want the auditor to provide those services. So I guess the question is, what else are we trying to safeguard if the audit committee cannot be entrusted to make that decision? MS. RIVSHIN: Barbara Roper. MS. ROPER: I had a question about that. Does the audit committee the audit committee is obliged to preapprove non-audit services provided to the company. Is there anything that says they're required to preapprove or even know about non-audit services provided to executives of the company? Because I'm not assuming that the audit committee will be consulted or involved in that review process. MS. RIVSHIN: Lynn Turner. MR. TURNER: There is not a requirement under Sarbanes-Oxley that the audit committee preapprove the work done for the executives. I know, however, and I give them great kudos for this, in the case where I sit on the audit committee, the firm has adopted a policy, at least they told us they've adopted a policy and I
$\begin{array}{c} 2\\ 3\\ 4\\ 5\\ 6\\ 7\\ 8\\ 9\\ 10\\ 11\\ 12\\ 13\\ 14\\ 15\\ 16\\ 17\\ 18\\ 19\\ 20\\ 21\\ \end{array}$	said before, that is why audit firms should not be providing non-audit services to their audit clients. We have no problem with audit firms, accounting firms, providing tax advice or providing advice to executives, but not to the same ones that are in the firm or not to the same firm where they're doing their audits. MS. RIVSHIN: Damon Silvers. MR. SILVERS: Not surprisingly, I agree with the last two comments. I'd like to detail a little bit more of what the problem is here with providing tax services to senior executives. I think it gets more I think maybe later on in the second part 2, it's more complicated when you're talking about more middle managers in the international context. But when you're dealing with senior executives, I think there are two things going on here that are a little different than a lot of what we talked about earlier today. One is that, assuming that the firm is also providing tax services to the company, the interests of the company, the tax-related interests of the company and the tax-related interests of the senior executives are likely not to be in line with	$\begin{array}{c} 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13 \\ 14 \\ 15 \\ 16 \\ 17 \\ 18 \\ 19 \\ 20 \\ 21 \end{array}$	they decide whether or not they want the auditor to provide those services. So I guess the question is, what else are we trying to safeguard if the audit committee cannot be entrusted to make that decision? MS. RIVSHIN: Barbara Roper. MS. ROPER: I had a question about that. Does the audit committee the audit committee is obliged to preapprove non-audit services provided to the company. Is there anything that says they're required to preapprove or even know about non-audit services provided to executives of the company? Because I'm not assuming that the audit committee will be consulted or involved in that review process. MS. RIVSHIN: Lynn Turner. MR. TURNER: There is not a requirement under Sarbanes-Oxley that the audit committee preapprove the work done for the executives. I know, however, and I give them great kudos for this, in the case where I sit on the audit committee, the firm has adopted a policy,
$\begin{array}{c} 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13 \\ 14 \\ 15 \\ 16 \\ 17 \\ 18 \\ 19 \\ 20 \\ 21 \\ 22 \\ 23 \end{array}$	said before, that is why audit firms should not be providing non-audit services to their audit clients. We have no problem with audit firms, accounting firms, providing tax advice or providing advice to executives, but not to the same ones that are in the firm or not to the same firm where they're doing their audits. MS. RIVSHIN: Damon Silvers. MR. SILVERS: Not surprisingly, I agree with the last two comments. I'd like to detail a little bit more of what the problem is here with providing tax services to senior executives. I think it gets more I think maybe later on in the second part 2, it's more complicated when you're talking about more middle managers in the international context. But when you're dealing with senior executives, I think there are two things going on here that are a little different than a lot of what we talked about earlier today. One is that, assuming that the firm is also providing tax services to the company, the interests of the company, the tax-related interests of the company and the tax-related interests of the	$\begin{array}{c} 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13 \\ 14 \\ 15 \\ 16 \\ 17 \\ 18 \\ 19 \\ 20 \\ 21 \\ 22 \\ 23 \end{array}$	they decide whether or not they want the auditor to provide those services. So I guess the question is, what else are we trying to safeguard if the audit committee cannot be entrusted to make that decision? MS. RIVSHIN: Barbara Roper. MS. ROPER: I had a question about that. Does the audit committee the audit committee is obliged to preapprove non-audit services provided to the company. Is there anything that says they're required to preapprove or even know about non-audit services provided to executives of the company? Because I'm not assuming that the audit committee will be consulted or involved in that review process. MS. RIVSHIN: Lynn Turner. MR. TURNER: There is not a requirement under Sarbanes-Oxley that the audit committee preapprove the work done for the executives. I know, however, and I give them great kudos for this, in the case where I sit on the audit committee, the firm has adopted a policy, at least they told us they've adopted a policy and I assume they have, that before they do any work for

38 (Pages 146 to 149)

		ſ	
	Page 150		Page 152
1	Young, and I give them tremendous kudos for that. And	1	It's simply inappropriate.
2	so they have brought it to us, and we, of course,	2	MS. RIVSHIN: Scott Bayless.
3	declined to preapprove, so it solved our problem. But	3	MR. BAYLESS: With respect to the executive
4	technically under Sarbanes-Oxley, no, that does not go	4	compensation issue, I think that those are independence-
5	to a vote of the audit committee.	5	impairing services that we do not render. However,
6	MS. RIVSHIN: Mark Anson.	6	just to follow up with Lynn's comments, Deloitte does
7	MR. ANSON: Jim, just to follow up on your	7	undertake to, one, ensure that services provided to
8	question, from an investor perspective the key issue	8	executives of the company are preapproved, and where
9	here is how much does the audit committee rely upon the	9	there other services that are not required because the
10	input, recommendations, and information from senior	10	company does not pay for those services, that there is
11	management? If it's a decision made totally in a	11	a notification procedure to ensure that the audit
12	vacuum without any input from senior management, then	12	committee has the ability to take control of that
13	you have a good claim to objectivity. But I know most	13	relationship if they so desire.
14	boards of directors listen to their senior management,	14	MS. RIVSHIN: David Shedlarz.
15	whether it's formally at the actual committee meeting	15	MR. SHEDLARZ: I guess I'm a believer that you
16	or outside the committee meeting, and that's where the	16	can parse what's acceptable and not acceptable. But in
17	independence breaks down.	17	this particular area, I don't think is appropriate.
18	MR. BRASHER: Mark, I guess I'm not in a	18	This is not appropriate activity for the audit firm to
19	position to comment on what goes through their minds	19	be carrying on on behalf of the board, the senior
20	and how they make their decisions, but to Lynn's	20 21	management, or any employee of the company.
21 22	statement I would like to add that if the company were	21	MS. RIVSHIN: Nick Cyprus. MR. CYPRUS: This was just also getting back
22	paying for that service, certainly the audit committee would be required to sign off on that service.	22	to Barbara. At AT&T, any expenses that were to your
23	Secondly, I think we also have risk	23	public accounting firm had to run by the audit
25	procedures that are designed in our firm that whether	25	committee, and when this issue came to the audit
	I C		······································
	Page 151		Page 153
1	•	1	-
1 2	Page 151 or not the company paid for it we would have a disclosure requirement to go to the audit committee and	1 2	Page 153 committee, it was basically taboo, you can't provide those services. So the audit committee will exercise -
	or not the company paid for it we would have a		committee, it was basically taboo, you can't provide
2 3 4	or not the company paid for it we would have a disclosure requirement to go to the audit committee and advise them that we were rendering these types of services and also advise them of what policies and	2 3 4	committee, it was basically taboo, you can't provide those services. So the audit committee will exercise - - I think the audit committees are exercising their fiduciary duty. I think I just heard Lynn say the same
2 3	or not the company paid for it we would have a disclosure requirement to go to the audit committee and advise them that we were rendering these types of services and also advise them of what policies and procedures that we would follow with respect to the	2 3	committee, it was basically taboo, you can't provide those services. So the audit committee will exercise - - I think the audit committees are exercising their fiduciary duty. I think I just heard Lynn say the same thing when it came to him.
2 3 4 5 6	or not the company paid for it we would have a disclosure requirement to go to the audit committee and advise them that we were rendering these types of services and also advise them of what policies and procedures that we would follow with respect to the provision of services to the executives. That would	2 3 4 5 6	committee, it was basically taboo, you can't provide those services. So the audit committee will exercise - - I think the audit committees are exercising their fiduciary duty. I think I just heard Lynn say the same thing when it came to him. MS. RIVSHIN: Lynn Turner.
2 3 4 5 6 7	or not the company paid for it we would have a disclosure requirement to go to the audit committee and advise them that we were rendering these types of services and also advise them of what policies and procedures that we would follow with respect to the provision of services to the executives. That would include other covered persons, for example, people on	2 3 4 5 6 7	committee, it was basically taboo, you can't provide those services. So the audit committee will exercise - - I think the audit committees are exercising their fiduciary duty. I think I just heard Lynn say the same thing when it came to him. MS. RIVSHIN: Lynn Turner. MR. TURNER: I will just say you don't see a
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	or not the company paid for it we would have a disclosure requirement to go to the audit committee and advise them that we were rendering these types of services and also advise them of what policies and procedures that we would follow with respect to the provision of services to the executives. That would include other covered persons, for example, people on the audit committee that we may provide those tax	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	committee, it was basically taboo, you can't provide those services. So the audit committee will exercise - - I think the audit committees are exercising their fiduciary duty. I think I just heard Lynn say the same thing when it came to him. MS. RIVSHIN: Lynn Turner. MR. TURNER: I will just say you don't see a whole lot of disclosure on this. I've never seen an
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	or not the company paid for it we would have a disclosure requirement to go to the audit committee and advise them that we were rendering these types of services and also advise them of what policies and procedures that we would follow with respect to the provision of services to the executives. That would include other covered persons, for example, people on the audit committee that we may provide those tax services, not in connection with that audit, but	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	committee, it was basically taboo, you can't provide those services. So the audit committee will exercise - - I think the audit committees are exercising their fiduciary duty. I think I just heard Lynn say the same thing when it came to him. MS. RIVSHIN: Lynn Turner. MR. TURNER: I will just say you don't see a whole lot of disclosure on this. I've never seen an investor institution I've talked to, I don't think I've
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	or not the company paid for it we would have a disclosure requirement to go to the audit committee and advise them that we were rendering these types of services and also advise them of what policies and procedures that we would follow with respect to the provision of services to the executives. That would include other covered persons, for example, people on the audit committee that we may provide those tax services, not in connection with that audit, but certainly because they're an individual client of the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	committee, it was basically taboo, you can't provide those services. So the audit committee will exercise - - I think the audit committees are exercising their fiduciary duty. I think I just heard Lynn say the same thing when it came to him. MS. RIVSHIN: Lynn Turner. MR. TURNER: I will just say you don't see a whole lot of disclosure on this. I've never seen an investor institution I've talked to, I don't think I've ever talked to one that thought this was appropriate.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	or not the company paid for it we would have a disclosure requirement to go to the audit committee and advise them that we were rendering these types of services and also advise them of what policies and procedures that we would follow with respect to the provision of services to the executives. That would include other covered persons, for example, people on the audit committee that we may provide those tax services, not in connection with that audit, but certainly because they're an individual client of the firm, although they could be on the audit committee and	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	committee, it was basically taboo, you can't provide those services. So the audit committee will exercise - - I think the audit committees are exercising their fiduciary duty. I think I just heard Lynn say the same thing when it came to him. MS. RIVSHIN: Lynn Turner. MR. TURNER: I will just say you don't see a whole lot of disclosure on this. I've never seen an investor institution I've talked to, I don't think I've ever talked to one that thought this was appropriate. I think it's 100 percent on the investor side that they
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	or not the company paid for it we would have a disclosure requirement to go to the audit committee and advise them that we were rendering these types of services and also advise them of what policies and procedures that we would follow with respect to the provision of services to the executives. That would include other covered persons, for example, people on the audit committee that we may provide those tax services, not in connection with that audit, but certainly because they're an individual client of the firm, although they could be on the audit committee and we'd have to disclose that to the audit committee that	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	committee, it was basically taboo, you can't provide those services. So the audit committee will exercise - - I think the audit committees are exercising their fiduciary duty. I think I just heard Lynn say the same thing when it came to him. MS. RIVSHIN: Lynn Turner. MR. TURNER: I will just say you don't see a whole lot of disclosure on this. I've never seen an investor institution I've talked to, I don't think I've ever talked to one that thought this was appropriate. I think it's 100 percent on the investor side that they just don't believe this one is appropriate, and what's
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	or not the company paid for it we would have a disclosure requirement to go to the audit committee and advise them that we were rendering these types of services and also advise them of what policies and procedures that we would follow with respect to the provision of services to the executives. That would include other covered persons, for example, people on the audit committee that we may provide those tax services, not in connection with that audit, but certainly because they're an individual client of the firm, although they could be on the audit committee that we'd have to disclose that to the audit committee that we were doing this even though this person is not an	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	committee, it was basically taboo, you can't provide those services. So the audit committee will exercise - - I think the audit committees are exercising their fiduciary duty. I think I just heard Lynn say the same thing when it came to him. MS. RIVSHIN: Lynn Turner. MR. TURNER: I will just say you don't see a whole lot of disclosure on this. I've never seen an investor institution I've talked to, I don't think I've ever talked to one that thought this was appropriate. I think it's 100 percent on the investor side that they just don't believe this one is appropriate, and what's interesting is you do have, Jim points out, makes a
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	or not the company paid for it we would have a disclosure requirement to go to the audit committee and advise them that we were rendering these types of services and also advise them of what policies and procedures that we would follow with respect to the provision of services to the executives. That would include other covered persons, for example, people on the audit committee that we may provide those tax services, not in connection with that audit, but certainly because they're an individual client of the firm, although they could be on the audit committee and we'd have to disclose that to the audit committee that we were doing this even though this person is not an executive of the registrant.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	committee, it was basically taboo, you can't provide those services. So the audit committee will exercise - - I think the audit committees are exercising their fiduciary duty. I think I just heard Lynn say the same thing when it came to him. MS. RIVSHIN: Lynn Turner. MR. TURNER: I will just say you don't see a whole lot of disclosure on this. I've never seen an investor institution I've talked to, I don't think I've ever talked to one that thought this was appropriate. I think it's 100 percent on the investor side that they just don't believe this one is appropriate, and what's interesting is you do have, Jim points out, makes a good point, you have those situations where in a lot of
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	or not the company paid for it we would have a disclosure requirement to go to the audit committee and advise them that we were rendering these types of services and also advise them of what policies and procedures that we would follow with respect to the provision of services to the executives. That would include other covered persons, for example, people on the audit committee that we may provide those tax services, not in connection with that audit, but certainly because they're an individual client of the firm, although they could be on the audit committee and we'd have to disclose that to the audit committee that we were doing this even though this person is not an executive of the registrant. MS. RIVSHIN: Damon Silvers.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	committee, it was basically taboo, you can't provide those services. So the audit committee will exercise - - I think the audit committees are exercising their fiduciary duty. I think I just heard Lynn say the same thing when it came to him. MS. RIVSHIN: Lynn Turner. MR. TURNER: I will just say you don't see a whole lot of disclosure on this. I've never seen an investor institution I've talked to, I don't think I've ever talked to one that thought this was appropriate. I think it's 100 percent on the investor side that they just don't believe this one is appropriate, and what's interesting is you do have, Jim points out, makes a good point, you have those situations where in a lot of cases the executives actually pay for it themselves,
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	or not the company paid for it we would have a disclosure requirement to go to the audit committee and advise them that we were rendering these types of services and also advise them of what policies and procedures that we would follow with respect to the provision of services to the executives. That would include other covered persons, for example, people on the audit committee that we may provide those tax services, not in connection with that audit, but certainly because they're an individual client of the firm, although they could be on the audit committee and we'd have to disclose that to the audit committee that we were doing this even though this person is not an executive of the registrant. MS. RIVSHIN: Damon Silvers. MR. SILVERS: I figure I better answer your	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	committee, it was basically taboo, you can't provide those services. So the audit committee will exercise - - I think the audit committees are exercising their fiduciary duty. I think I just heard Lynn say the same thing when it came to him. MS. RIVSHIN: Lynn Turner. MR. TURNER: I will just say you don't see a whole lot of disclosure on this. I've never seen an investor institution I've talked to, I don't think I've ever talked to one that thought this was appropriate. I think it's 100 percent on the investor side that they just don't believe this one is appropriate, and what's interesting is you do have, Jim points out, makes a good point, you have those situations where in a lot of cases the executives actually pay for it themselves, and then you've got the situation where the companies
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	or not the company paid for it we would have a disclosure requirement to go to the audit committee and advise them that we were rendering these types of services and also advise them of what policies and procedures that we would follow with respect to the provision of services to the executives. That would include other covered persons, for example, people on the audit committee that we may provide those tax services, not in connection with that audit, but certainly because they're an individual client of the firm, although they could be on the audit committee and we'd have to disclose that to the audit committee that we were doing this even though this person is not an executive of the registrant. MS. RIVSHIN: Damon Silvers. MR. SILVERS: I figure I better answer your question quickly. In my view, there is no circumstance	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	committee, it was basically taboo, you can't provide those services. So the audit committee will exercise - - I think the audit committees are exercising their fiduciary duty. I think I just heard Lynn say the same thing when it came to him. MS. RIVSHIN: Lynn Turner. MR. TURNER: I will just say you don't see a whole lot of disclosure on this. I've never seen an investor institution I've talked to, I don't think I've ever talked to one that thought this was appropriate. I think it's 100 percent on the investor side that they just don't believe this one is appropriate, and what's interesting is you do have, Jim points out, makes a good point, you have those situations where in a lot of cases the executives actually pay for it themselves, and then you've got the situation where the companies are actually paying for it as well.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	or not the company paid for it we would have a disclosure requirement to go to the audit committee and advise them that we were rendering these types of services and also advise them of what policies and procedures that we would follow with respect to the provision of services to the executives. That would include other covered persons, for example, people on the audit committee that we may provide those tax services, not in connection with that audit, but certainly because they're an individual client of the firm, although they could be on the audit committee and we'd have to disclose that to the audit committee that we were doing this even though this person is not an executive of the registrant. MS. RIVSHIN: Damon Silvers. MR. SILVERS: I figure I better answer your question quickly. In my view, there is no circumstance under which a professional services firm that owes a	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	committee, it was basically taboo, you can't provide those services. So the audit committee will exercise - - I think the audit committees are exercising their fiduciary duty. I think I just heard Lynn say the same thing when it came to him. MS. RIVSHIN: Lynn Turner. MR. TURNER: I will just say you don't see a whole lot of disclosure on this. I've never seen an investor institution I've talked to, I don't think I've ever talked to one that thought this was appropriate. I think it's 100 percent on the investor side that they just don't believe this one is appropriate, and what's interesting is you do have, Jim points out, makes a good point, you have those situations where in a lot of cases the executives actually pay for it themselves, and then you've got the situation where the companies are actually paying for it as well. Unfortunately, when the companies are
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	or not the company paid for it we would have a disclosure requirement to go to the audit committee and advise them that we were rendering these types of services and also advise them of what policies and procedures that we would follow with respect to the provision of services to the executives. That would include other covered persons, for example, people on the audit committee that we may provide those tax services, not in connection with that audit, but certainly because they're an individual client of the firm, although they could be on the audit committee and we'd have to disclose that to the audit committee that we were doing this even though this person is not an executive of the registrant. MS. RIVSHIN: Damon Silvers. MR. SILVERS: I figure I better answer your question quickly. In my view, there is no circumstance	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	committee, it was basically taboo, you can't provide those services. So the audit committee will exercise - - I think the audit committees are exercising their fiduciary duty. I think I just heard Lynn say the same thing when it came to him. MS. RIVSHIN: Lynn Turner. MR. TURNER: I will just say you don't see a whole lot of disclosure on this. I've never seen an investor institution I've talked to, I don't think I've ever talked to one that thought this was appropriate. I think it's 100 percent on the investor side that they just don't believe this one is appropriate, and what's interesting is you do have, Jim points out, makes a good point, you have those situations where in a lot of cases the executives actually pay for it themselves, and then you've got the situation where the companies are actually paying for it as well. Unfortunately, when the companies are providing those perks, we don't see those type of perks
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	or not the company paid for it we would have a disclosure requirement to go to the audit committee and advise them that we were rendering these types of services and also advise them of what policies and procedures that we would follow with respect to the provision of services to the executives. That would include other covered persons, for example, people on the audit committee that we may provide those tax services, not in connection with that audit, but certainly because they're an individual client of the firm, although they could be on the audit committee and we'd have to disclose that to the audit committee that we were doing this even though this person is not an executive of the registrant. MS. RIVSHIN: Damon Silvers. MR. SILVERS: I figure I better answer your question quickly. In my view, there is no circumstance under which a professional services firm that owes a fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary duty to its client should	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	committee, it was basically taboo, you can't provide those services. So the audit committee will exercise - - I think the audit committees are exercising their fiduciary duty. I think I just heard Lynn say the same thing when it came to him. MS. RIVSHIN: Lynn Turner. MR. TURNER: I will just say you don't see a whole lot of disclosure on this. I've never seen an investor institution I've talked to, I don't think I've ever talked to one that thought this was appropriate. I think it's 100 percent on the investor side that they just don't believe this one is appropriate, and what's interesting is you do have, Jim points out, makes a good point, you have those situations where in a lot of cases the executives actually pay for it themselves, and then you've got the situation where the companies are actually paying for it as well. Unfortunately, when the companies are
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	or not the company paid for it we would have a disclosure requirement to go to the audit committee and advise them that we were rendering these types of services and also advise them of what policies and procedures that we would follow with respect to the provision of services to the executives. That would include other covered persons, for example, people on the audit committee that we may provide those tax services, not in connection with that audit, but certainly because they're an individual client of the firm, although they could be on the audit committee and we'd have to disclose that to the audit committee that we were doing this even though this person is not an executive of the registrant. MS. RIVSHIN: Damon Silvers. MR. SILVERS: I figure I better answer your question quickly. In my view, there is no circumstance under which a professional services firm that owes a fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary duty to its client should be on both sides of the executive compensation	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	committee, it was basically taboo, you can't provide those services. So the audit committee will exercise - - I think the audit committees are exercising their fiduciary duty. I think I just heard Lynn say the same thing when it came to him. MS. RIVSHIN: Lynn Turner. MR. TURNER: I will just say you don't see a whole lot of disclosure on this. I've never seen an investor institution I've talked to, I don't think I've ever talked to one that thought this was appropriate. I think it's 100 percent on the investor side that they just don't believe this one is appropriate, and what's interesting is you do have, Jim points out, makes a good point, you have those situations where in a lot of cases the executives actually pay for it themselves, and then you've got the situation where the companies are actually paying for it as well. Unfortunately, when the companies are providing those perks, we don't see those type of perks showing up in the disclosure and the compensation
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	or not the company paid for it we would have a disclosure requirement to go to the audit committee and advise them that we were rendering these types of services and also advise them of what policies and procedures that we would follow with respect to the provision of services to the executives. That would include other covered persons, for example, people on the audit committee that we may provide those tax services, not in connection with that audit, but certainly because they're an individual client of the firm, although they could be on the audit committee and we'd have to disclose that to the audit committee that we were doing this even though this person is not an executive of the registrant. MS. RIVSHIN: Damon Silvers. MR. SILVERS: I figure I better answer your question quickly. In my view, there is no circumstance under which a professional services firm that owes a fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary duty to its client should be on both sides of the executive compensation relationship, and therefore, the AFL-CIO does not believe there is any circumstance under which an audit committee should approve an audit firm or a law firm or	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	committee, it was basically taboo, you can't provide those services. So the audit committee will exercise - I think the audit committees are exercising their fiduciary duty. I think I just heard Lynn say the same thing when it came to him. MS. RIVSHIN: Lynn Turner. MR. TURNER: I will just say you don't see a whole lot of disclosure on this. I've never seen an investor institution I've talked to, I don't think I've ever talked to one that thought this was appropriate. I think it's 100 percent on the investor side that they just don't believe this one is appropriate, and what's interesting is you do have, Jim points out, makes a good point, you have those situations where in a lot of cases the executives actually pay for it themselves, and then you've got the situation where the companies are actually paying for it as well. Unfortunately, when the companies are providing those perks, we don't see those type of perks showing up in the disclosure and the compensation tables in the proxy disclosures, so it's not forthright, and quite honestly, investors don't see that. But where investors have seen it, I think Sprint
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	or not the company paid for it we would have a disclosure requirement to go to the audit committee and advise them that we were rendering these types of services and also advise them of what policies and procedures that we would follow with respect to the provision of services to the executives. That would include other covered persons, for example, people on the audit committee that we may provide those tax services, not in connection with that audit, but certainly because they're an individual client of the firm, although they could be on the audit committee and we'd have to disclose that to the audit committee that we were doing this even though this person is not an executive of the registrant. MS. RIVSHIN: Damon Silvers. MR. SILVERS: I figure I better answer your question quickly. In my view, there is no circumstance under which a professional services firm that owes a fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary duty to its client should be on both sides of the executive compensation relationship, and therefore, the AFL-CIO does not believe there is any circumstance under which an audit committee should approve an audit firm or a law firm or a consulting firm representing both the executive and	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	committee, it was basically taboo, you can't provide those services. So the audit committee will exercise - I think the audit committees are exercising their fiduciary duty. I think I just heard Lynn say the same thing when it came to him. MS. RIVSHIN: Lynn Turner. MR. TURNER: I will just say you don't see a whole lot of disclosure on this. I've never seen an investor institution I've talked to, I don't think I've ever talked to one that thought this was appropriate. I think it's 100 percent on the investor side that they just don't believe this one is appropriate, and what's interesting is you do have, Jim points out, makes a good point, you have those situations where in a lot of cases the executives actually pay for it themselves, and then you've got the situation where the companies are actually paying for it as well. Unfortunately, when the companies are providing those perks, we don't see those type of perks showing up in the disclosure and the compensation tables in the proxy disclosures, so it's not forthright, and quite honestly, investors don't see that. But where investors have seen it, I think Sprint was the classic case, they just come out of the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	or not the company paid for it we would have a disclosure requirement to go to the audit committee and advise them that we were rendering these types of services and also advise them of what policies and procedures that we would follow with respect to the provision of services to the executives. That would include other covered persons, for example, people on the audit committee that we may provide those tax services, not in connection with that audit, but certainly because they're an individual client of the firm, although they could be on the audit committee and we'd have to disclose that to the audit committee that we were doing this even though this person is not an executive of the registrant. MS. RIVSHIN: Damon Silvers. MR. SILVERS: I figure I better answer your question quickly. In my view, there is no circumstance under which a professional services firm that owes a fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary duty to its client should be on both sides of the executive compensation relationship, and therefore, the AFL-CIO does not believe there is any circumstance under which an audit committee should approve an audit firm or a law firm or	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	committee, it was basically taboo, you can't provide those services. So the audit committee will exercise - I think the audit committees are exercising their fiduciary duty. I think I just heard Lynn say the same thing when it came to him. MS. RIVSHIN: Lynn Turner. MR. TURNER: I will just say you don't see a whole lot of disclosure on this. I've never seen an investor institution I've talked to, I don't think I've ever talked to one that thought this was appropriate. I think it's 100 percent on the investor side that they just don't believe this one is appropriate, and what's interesting is you do have, Jim points out, makes a good point, you have those situations where in a lot of cases the executives actually pay for it themselves, and then you've got the situation where the companies are actually paying for it as well. Unfortunately, when the companies are providing those perks, we don't see those type of perks showing up in the disclosure and the compensation tables in the proxy disclosures, so it's not forthright, and quite honestly, investors don't see that. But where investors have seen it, I think Sprint

	Page 154	[Page 156
1	can't comprehend, I think very consistent with Mark,	1	MS. RIVSHIN: Mark Weinberger.
$1 \\ 2$	they can't comprehend how you could do this and be on	1 2	MR. WEINBERGER: Lynn, I'm not sure all the
3	both sides with the fiduciary responsibility to the	3	services obviously encompassed in your comments, but a
4	executives that's very clear, including a legal	4	lot of the time these services are basically company-
5	obligation there, as well as fiduciary responsibility	5	provided services to individuals to help them comply
6	to the company.	6	with the tax laws, they're expatriates who are in
7	Early on, I was involved with the Sprint	7	foreign jurisdictions, and to make sure they comply
8	situation, and I personally think that turned into a	8	with all the jurisdictional laws, and since they're
9	terrible conflict and it really wasn't clearly laid out	9	usually not there for a whole lot of time, the company
10	where those conflicts were on both sides, so after that	10	usually takes responsibility for providing for them in
11	situation I think it made a clear-cut case that you	11	their compliance.
12	just shouldn't be there.	12	With regard to that, I guess I don't believe
13	MS. RIVSHIN: We'll let Barbara Roper have the	13	there's an independence issue, and frankly I think that
14	last say in this and move on to the next question then.	14	because we are serving the client in all those
15	MS. ROPER: I was just going to say that based	15	jurisdictions, and because these people are there, it
16 17	on this discussion it sounds like even those who	16 17	enhances their opportunity to get the compliance right, and they choose us when we match up right
17	advocate leaving this decision to the audit committees view that almost always or always the appropriate	17	geographically with them and know the law in those
19	decision by the audit committee is to say no, in which	19	jurisdictions and can help their employees comply.
20	case I think the appropriate position by the PCAOB is	20	Now, that's the compliance aspect. The other
21	to say no for them and eliminate the lack of clarity.	21	services you're referencing I'm not tying them to,
22	MS. RIVSHIN: Okay. With that, let's move on	22	because I'm not sure what they are.
23	to the last question in this area, and that is, does	23	MS. RIVSHIN: Damon Silvers.
24	providing tax services to employees who participate in	24	MR. SILVERS: This is an area where it
25	long-term international assignments affect the	25	certainly does feel like sensible for companies to be
	Page 155		Page 157
1		1	
1 2	auditors' independence?	1 2	able to get the type of assistance that they get from -
2	auditors' independence? Okay, Lynn. MR. TURNER: I've had to deal with this one. This is an interesting one, because you start looking	2 3 4	able to get the type of assistance that they get from - - for companies and their employees to get the type of
2 3 4 5	auditors' independence? Okay, Lynn. MR. TURNER: I've had to deal with this one. This is an interesting one, because you start looking are you really being an advocate or whatever, and a lot	2 3 4 5	able to get the type of assistance that they get from - - for companies and their employees to get the type of assistance that integrated audit firms provide. The problem, I think, that at least in my mind is raised is again the question of who is the firm representing in
2 3 4 5 6	auditors' independence? Okay, Lynn. MR. TURNER: I've had to deal with this one. This is an interesting one, because you start looking are you really being an advocate or whatever, and a lot of times you don't hit into those. One of the problems	2 3 4 5 6	able to get the type of assistance that they get from - - for companies and their employees to get the type of assistance that integrated audit firms provide. The problem, I think, that at least in my mind is raised is again the question of who is the firm representing in that effort? And it seems pretty clear to me that
2 3 4 5 6 7	auditors' independence? Okay, Lynn. MR. TURNER: I've had to deal with this one. This is an interesting one, because you start looking are you really being an advocate or whatever, and a lot of times you don't hit into those. One of the problems that you get into these though is as you get into the	2 3 4 5 6 7	able to get the type of assistance that they get from - - for companies and their employees to get the type of assistance that integrated audit firms provide. The problem, I think, that at least in my mind is raised is again the question of who is the firm representing in that effort? And it seems pretty clear to me that they're not representing the employee, that in reality
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	auditors' independence? Okay, Lynn. MR. TURNER: I've had to deal with this one. This is an interesting one, because you start looking are you really being an advocate or whatever, and a lot of times you don't hit into those. One of the problems that you get into these though is as you get into the international affiliates, they're not only providing	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	able to get the type of assistance that they get from - - for companies and their employees to get the type of assistance that integrated audit firms provide. The problem, I think, that at least in my mind is raised is again the question of who is the firm representing in that effort? And it seems pretty clear to me that they're not representing the employee, that in reality they're representing the company, the issuer, the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	auditors' independence? Okay, Lynn. MR. TURNER: I've had to deal with this one. This is an interesting one, because you start looking are you really being an advocate or whatever, and a lot of times you don't hit into those. One of the problems that you get into these though is as you get into the international affiliates, they're not only providing the tax service in the tax return, they're providing	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	able to get the type of assistance that they get from - - for companies and their employees to get the type of assistance that integrated audit firms provide. The problem, I think, that at least in my mind is raised is again the question of who is the firm representing in that effort? And it seems pretty clear to me that they're not representing the employee, that in reality they're representing the company, the issuer, the employer in this arrangement, and that this, in many
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	auditors' independence? Okay, Lynn. MR. TURNER: I've had to deal with this one. This is an interesting one, because you start looking are you really being an advocate or whatever, and a lot of times you don't hit into those. One of the problems that you get into these though is as you get into the international affiliates, they're not only providing the tax service in the tax return, they're providing relocation and a number of other services that go with	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	able to get the type of assistance that they get from - - for companies and their employees to get the type of assistance that integrated audit firms provide. The problem, I think, that at least in my mind is raised is again the question of who is the firm representing in that effort? And it seems pretty clear to me that they're not representing the employee, that in reality they're representing the company, the issuer, the employer in this arrangement, and that this, in many instances, an employer and employee have a common
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	auditors' independence? Okay, Lynn. MR. TURNER: I've had to deal with this one. This is an interesting one, because you start looking are you really being an advocate or whatever, and a lot of times you don't hit into those. One of the problems that you get into these though is as you get into the international affiliates, they're not only providing the tax service in the tax return, they're providing relocation and a number of other services that go with it. So the question is probably more simpler than what	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	able to get the type of assistance that they get from - - for companies and their employees to get the type of assistance that integrated audit firms provide. The problem, I think, that at least in my mind is raised is again the question of who is the firm representing in that effort? And it seems pretty clear to me that they're not representing the employee, that in reality they're representing the company, the issuer, the employer in this arrangement, and that this, in many instances, an employer and employee have a common interest in compliance obviously. But in tax, where
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	auditors' independence? Okay, Lynn. MR. TURNER: I've had to deal with this one. This is an interesting one, because you start looking are you really being an advocate or whatever, and a lot of times you don't hit into those. One of the problems that you get into these though is as you get into the international affiliates, they're not only providing the tax service in the tax return, they're providing relocation and a number of other services that go with it. So the question is probably more simpler than what it is. It should be, does providing the tax services	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	able to get the type of assistance that they get from - - for companies and their employees to get the type of assistance that integrated audit firms provide. The problem, I think, that at least in my mind is raised is again the question of who is the firm representing in that effort? And it seems pretty clear to me that they're not representing the employee, that in reality they're representing the company, the issuer, the employer in this arrangement, and that this, in many instances, an employer and employee have a common interest in compliance obviously. But in tax, where there's a fair amount of latitude as to what you do,
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	auditors' independence? Okay, Lynn. MR. TURNER: I've had to deal with this one. This is an interesting one, because you start looking are you really being an advocate or whatever, and a lot of times you don't hit into those. One of the problems that you get into these though is as you get into the international affiliates, they're not only providing the tax service in the tax return, they're providing relocation and a number of other services that go with it. So the question is probably more simpler than what it is. It should be, does providing the tax services and all the other services that you provide to the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	able to get the type of assistance that they get from - - for companies and their employees to get the type of assistance that integrated audit firms provide. The problem, I think, that at least in my mind is raised is again the question of who is the firm representing in that effort? And it seems pretty clear to me that they're not representing the employee, that in reality they're representing the company, the issuer, the employer in this arrangement, and that this, in many instances, an employer and employee have a common interest in compliance obviously. But in tax, where there's a fair amount of latitude as to what you do, there may indeed be areas where there are tensions
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	auditors' independence? Okay, Lynn. MR. TURNER: I've had to deal with this one. This is an interesting one, because you start looking are you really being an advocate or whatever, and a lot of times you don't hit into those. One of the problems that you get into these though is as you get into the international affiliates, they're not only providing the tax service in the tax return, they're providing relocation and a number of other services that go with it. So the question is probably more simpler than what it is. It should be, does providing the tax services	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	able to get the type of assistance that they get from - - for companies and their employees to get the type of assistance that integrated audit firms provide. The problem, I think, that at least in my mind is raised is again the question of who is the firm representing in that effort? And it seems pretty clear to me that they're not representing the employee, that in reality they're representing the company, the issuer, the employer in this arrangement, and that this, in many instances, an employer and employee have a common interest in compliance obviously. But in tax, where there's a fair amount of latitude as to what you do,
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	auditors' independence? Okay, Lynn. MR. TURNER: I've had to deal with this one. This is an interesting one, because you start looking are you really being an advocate or whatever, and a lot of times you don't hit into those. One of the problems that you get into these though is as you get into the international affiliates, they're not only providing the tax service in the tax return, they're providing relocation and a number of other services that go with it. So the question is probably more simpler than what it is. It should be, does providing the tax services and all the other services that you provide to the expats compatible with being independent?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	able to get the type of assistance that they get from - - for companies and their employees to get the type of assistance that integrated audit firms provide. The problem, I think, that at least in my mind is raised is again the question of who is the firm representing in that effort? And it seems pretty clear to me that they're not representing the employee, that in reality they're representing the company, the issuer, the employer in this arrangement, and that this, in many instances, an employer and employee have a common interest in compliance obviously. But in tax, where there's a fair amount of latitude as to what you do, there may indeed be areas where there are tensions between employer and employee interests here.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	auditors' independence? Okay, Lynn. MR. TURNER: I've had to deal with this one. This is an interesting one, because you start looking are you really being an advocate or whatever, and a lot of times you don't hit into those. One of the problems that you get into these though is as you get into the international affiliates, they're not only providing the tax service in the tax return, they're providing relocation and a number of other services that go with it. So the question is probably more simpler than what it is. It should be, does providing the tax services and all the other services that you provide to the expats compatible with being independent? And when you go back to those nine O'Malley criteria and you apply them in this situation, the nine O'Malley criteria turn around and say, no, the auditors	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	able to get the type of assistance that they get from - for companies and their employees to get the type of assistance that integrated audit firms provide. The problem, I think, that at least in my mind is raised is again the question of who is the firm representing in that effort? And it seems pretty clear to me that they're not representing the employee, that in reality they're representing the company, the issuer, the employer in this arrangement, and that this, in many instances, an employer and employee have a common interest in compliance obviously. But in tax, where there's a fair amount of latitude as to what you do, there may indeed be areas where there are tensions between employer and employee interests here. And it seems that in that circumstance it ought to be crystal clear that the firm is representing the employer, is acting in the employer's interest, and
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	auditors' independence? Okay, Lynn. MR. TURNER: I've had to deal with this one. This is an interesting one, because you start looking are you really being an advocate or whatever, and a lot of times you don't hit into those. One of the problems that you get into these though is as you get into the international affiliates, they're not only providing the tax service in the tax return, they're providing relocation and a number of other services that go with it. So the question is probably more simpler than what it is. It should be, does providing the tax services and all the other services that you provide to the expats compatible with being independent? And when you go back to those nine O'Malley criteria and you apply them in this situation, the nine O'Malley criteria turn around and say, no, the auditors shouldn't be doing this type service, so that would	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	able to get the type of assistance that they get from - for companies and their employees to get the type of assistance that integrated audit firms provide. The problem, I think, that at least in my mind is raised is again the question of who is the firm representing in that effort? And it seems pretty clear to me that they're not representing the employee, that in reality they're representing the company, the issuer, the employer in this arrangement, and that this, in many instances, an employer and employee have a common interest in compliance obviously. But in tax, where there's a fair amount of latitude as to what you do, there may indeed be areas where there are tensions between employer and employee interests here. And it seems that in that circumstance it ought to be crystal clear that the firm is representing the employer, is acting in the employer's interest, and that, A, there's no ambiguity on the firm's part on
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	auditors' independence? Okay, Lynn. MR. TURNER: I've had to deal with this one. This is an interesting one, because you start looking are you really being an advocate or whatever, and a lot of times you don't hit into those. One of the problems that you get into these though is as you get into the international affiliates, they're not only providing the tax service in the tax return, they're providing relocation and a number of other services that go with it. So the question is probably more simpler than what it is. It should be, does providing the tax services and all the other services that you provide to the expats compatible with being independent? And when you go back to those nine O'Malley criteria and you apply them in this situation, the nine O'Malley criteria turn around and say, no, the auditors shouldn't be doing this type service, so that would turn around and give you a no answer to this one. I	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	able to get the type of assistance that they get from - for companies and their employees to get the type of assistance that integrated audit firms provide. The problem, I think, that at least in my mind is raised is again the question of who is the firm representing in that effort? And it seems pretty clear to me that they're not representing the employee, that in reality they're representing the company, the issuer, the employer in this arrangement, and that this, in many instances, an employer and employee have a common interest in compliance obviously. But in tax, where there's a fair amount of latitude as to what you do, there may indeed be areas where there are tensions between employer and employee interests here. And it seems that in that circumstance it ought to be crystal clear that the firm is representing the employer, is acting in the employer's interest, and that, A, there's no ambiguity on the firm's part on that matter, and thus protecting investors' interests,
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	auditors' independence? Okay, Lynn. MR. TURNER: I've had to deal with this one. This is an interesting one, because you start looking are you really being an advocate or whatever, and a lot of times you don't hit into those. One of the problems that you get into these though is as you get into the international affiliates, they're not only providing the tax service in the tax return, they're providing relocation and a number of other services that go with it. So the question is probably more simpler than what it is. It should be, does providing the tax services and all the other services that you provide to the expats compatible with being independent? And when you go back to those nine O'Malley criteria and you apply them in this situation, the nine O'Malley criteria turn around and say, no, the auditors shouldn't be doing this type service, so that would turn around and give you a no answer to this one. I will tell you I have seen credit rating agencies, one	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	able to get the type of assistance that they get from - for companies and their employees to get the type of assistance that integrated audit firms provide. The problem, I think, that at least in my mind is raised is again the question of who is the firm representing in that effort? And it seems pretty clear to me that they're not representing the employee, that in reality they're representing the company, the issuer, the employer in this arrangement, and that this, in many instances, an employer and employee have a common interest in compliance obviously. But in tax, where there's a fair amount of latitude as to what you do, there may indeed be areas where there are tensions between employer and employee interests here. And it seems that in that circumstance it ought to be crystal clear that the firm is representing the employer, is acting in the employer's interest, and that, A, there's no ambiguity on the firm's part on that matter, and thus protecting investors' interests, and, B, the employee needs to know that that's what's
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	auditors' independence? Okay, Lynn. MR. TURNER: I've had to deal with this one. This is an interesting one, because you start looking are you really being an advocate or whatever, and a lot of times you don't hit into those. One of the problems that you get into these though is as you get into the international affiliates, they're not only providing the tax service in the tax return, they're providing relocation and a number of other services that go with it. So the question is probably more simpler than what it is. It should be, does providing the tax services and all the other services that you provide to the expats compatible with being independent? And when you go back to those nine O'Malley criteria and you apply them in this situation, the nine O'Malley criteria turn around and say, no, the auditors shouldn't be doing this type service, so that would turn around and give you a no answer to this one. I will tell you I have seen credit rating agencies, one of the three large credit rating agencies, actually	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	able to get the type of assistance that they get from - for companies and their employees to get the type of assistance that integrated audit firms provide. The problem, I think, that at least in my mind is raised is again the question of who is the firm representing in that effort? And it seems pretty clear to me that they're not representing the employee, that in reality they're representing the company, the issuer, the employer in this arrangement, and that this, in many instances, an employer and employee have a common interest in compliance obviously. But in tax, where there's a fair amount of latitude as to what you do, there may indeed be areas where there are tensions between employer and employee interests here. And it seems that in that circumstance it ought to be crystal clear that the firm is representing the employer, is acting in the employer's interest, and that, A, there's no ambiguity on the firm's part on that matter, and thus protecting investors' interests, and, B, the employee needs to know that that's what's going on here. Again, maybe not the PCAOB's concern,
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	auditors' independence? Okay, Lynn. MR. TURNER: I've had to deal with this one. This is an interesting one, because you start looking are you really being an advocate or whatever, and a lot of times you don't hit into those. One of the problems that you get into these though is as you get into the international affiliates, they're not only providing the tax service in the tax return, they're providing relocation and a number of other services that go with it. So the question is probably more simpler than what it is. It should be, does providing the tax services and all the other services that you provide to the expats compatible with being independent? And when you go back to those nine O'Malley criteria and you apply them in this situation, the nine O'Malley criteria turn around and say, no, the auditors shouldn't be doing this type service, so that would turn around and give you a no answer to this one. I will tell you I have seen credit rating agencies, one of the three large credit rating agencies, actually challenge companies who are doing this on their	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	able to get the type of assistance that they get from - for companies and their employees to get the type of assistance that integrated audit firms provide. The problem, I think, that at least in my mind is raised is again the question of who is the firm representing in that effort? And it seems pretty clear to me that they're not representing the employee, that in reality they're representing the company, the issuer, the employer in this arrangement, and that this, in many instances, an employer and employee have a common interest in compliance obviously. But in tax, where there's a fair amount of latitude as to what you do, there may indeed be areas where there are tensions between employer and employee interests here. And it seems that in that circumstance it ought to be crystal clear that the firm is representing the employer, is acting in the employer's interest, and that, A, there's no ambiguity on the firm's part on that matter, and thus protecting investors' interests, and, B, the employee needs to know that that's what's going on here. Again, maybe not the PCAOB's concern, but that is, I think, a genuine sort of independence
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	auditors' independence? Okay, Lynn. MR. TURNER: I've had to deal with this one. This is an interesting one, because you start looking are you really being an advocate or whatever, and a lot of times you don't hit into those. One of the problems that you get into these though is as you get into the international affiliates, they're not only providing the tax service in the tax return, they're providing relocation and a number of other services that go with it. So the question is probably more simpler than what it is. It should be, does providing the tax services and all the other services that you provide to the expats compatible with being independent? And when you go back to those nine O'Malley criteria and you apply them in this situation, the nine O'Malley criteria turn around and say, no, the auditors shouldn't be doing this type service, so that would turn around and give you a no answer to this one. I will tell you I have seen credit rating agencies, one of the three large credit rating agencies, actually challenge companies who are doing this on their independence, so that's at least one source where	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	able to get the type of assistance that they get from - for companies and their employees to get the type of assistance that integrated audit firms provide. The problem, I think, that at least in my mind is raised is again the question of who is the firm representing in that effort? And it seems pretty clear to me that they're not representing the employee, that in reality they're representing the company, the issuer, the employer in this arrangement, and that this, in many instances, an employer and employee have a common interest in compliance obviously. But in tax, where there's a fair amount of latitude as to what you do, there may indeed be areas where there are tensions between employer and employee interests here. And it seems that in that circumstance it ought to be crystal clear that the firm is representing the employer, is acting in the employer's interest, and that, A, there's no ambiguity on the firm's part on that matter, and thus protecting investors' interests, and, B, the employee needs to know that that's what's going on here. Again, maybe not the PCAOB's concern, but that is, I think, a genuine sort of independence issue, but it's not, it doesn't have the punch of
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	auditors' independence? Okay, Lynn. MR. TURNER: I've had to deal with this one. This is an interesting one, because you start looking are you really being an advocate or whatever, and a lot of times you don't hit into those. One of the problems that you get into these though is as you get into the international affiliates, they're not only providing the tax service in the tax return, they're providing relocation and a number of other services that go with it. So the question is probably more simpler than what it is. It should be, does providing the tax services and all the other services that you provide to the expats compatible with being independent? And when you go back to those nine O'Malley criteria and you apply them in this situation, the nine O'Malley criteria turn around and say, no, the auditors shouldn't be doing this type service, so that would turn around and give you a no answer to this one. I will tell you I have seen credit rating agencies, one of the three large credit rating agencies, actually challenge companies who are doing this on their	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	able to get the type of assistance that they get from - for companies and their employees to get the type of assistance that integrated audit firms provide. The problem, I think, that at least in my mind is raised is again the question of who is the firm representing in that effort? And it seems pretty clear to me that they're not representing the employee, that in reality they're representing the company, the issuer, the employer in this arrangement, and that this, in many instances, an employer and employee have a common interest in compliance obviously. But in tax, where there's a fair amount of latitude as to what you do, there may indeed be areas where there are tensions between employer and employee interests here. And it seems that in that circumstance it ought to be crystal clear that the firm is representing the employer, is acting in the employer's interest, and that, A, there's no ambiguity on the firm's part on that matter, and thus protecting investors' interests, and, B, the employee needs to know that that's what's going on here. Again, maybe not the PCAOB's concern, but that is, I think, a genuine sort of independence

				
	Page 158		Page 160	
$ \begin{array}{c} 1\\2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\\23\\24\end{array} $	not really dual representation. This is representing the employer's interest, the issuer's interest, and seeing to it that these matters are handled appropriately and that both the issuer and its employee complies, and it's not really a dual representation and should not be represented as such. MS. RIVSHIN: Mike Gagnon. MR. GAGNON: I don't know. I put my sign up and Lynn put his down. I guess I'm getting a little nervous here. A couple of points on the background of the service. I think the service itself evolved from organizations obviously sending their people around the world and the complex tax environment that people operate in who are from one jurisdiction and operate in other jurisdictions, and it does become very complicated, and our firms have the breadth and scope and capability to deal with these complex areas. I would agree that I do see a distinction between this type of service, which is by and large, I believe, a compliance service at its core, and I'm going to get to a point Lynn raised a second ago in terms of other services, which I think provides needed assistance not only to the individual employees who are	$ \begin{array}{c} 1\\2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\\23\\24\end{array} $	individuals and the organization as a whole, that would suggest that this is a prohibitive service. I do think it comes back to a fundamental point that I made earlier, which is that this does still need to be approached from the perspective of being knowledgeable, impartial, and objective as to how the service is performed. But I do think there are benefits associated with organizations like ours in providing the service. MS. RIVSHIN: Mark Anson. MR. ANSON: First, I'll agree with Mike's comments. It's clear this is a valuable service, not only for our compliance issues but also for attracting and retaining qualified employees for the company. However, there is a secondary issue associated with question 10. Keep in mind that this tax service is just another service contract that is sold to the public company, which at some point in time must be audited by the auditing firm that has sold the contract to the company. So once again you will still call into question at some point in time the independence issue, because the audit firm will be auditing a service contract that they had sold to the public company.	
24 25	in another jurisdiction with presumably little knowledge of the local tax requirements, but certainly	24 25	MS. RIVSHIN: Pat Walters. MS. WALTERS: And to just follow on to that,	
	Page 159		Page 161	
$ \begin{array}{c} 1\\2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\end{array} $	a requirement that they must adhere to them. And therefore, it's very important that a competent service provider assist these individuals, and in organizations there are frequently quite a large number of them, to make sure that they do in fact, as an individual and as an organization, because there are obviously reputational and other implications to the organization as a whole with the absence of compliance, that they adhere to the local requirements and the requirements of obviously the host country. I do see a distinction in those types of compliance services from an independence perspective to other sorts of planning services, other sorts of relocation services, and so on and so forth, and we've got some policies that differentiate between the two, whether the service offering is to an audit client versus a non-audit client, and I think that's very important. I do think in terms of Lynn's point on the other attributes outlined in the O'Malley Panel, I do think that's very helpful. I'm not sure if you look at	$ \begin{array}{c} 1\\2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\end{array} $	there doesn't seem to be none of the arguments that have been put forward earlier today about why the audit firm should be tax services for the issuer apply here. It doesn't seem to me as if one needs to be terribly familiar with the business operations of the firm in order to provide these services. All of the major firms can accomplish this globally, and therefore, there doesn't seem to me to be any legitimate reason for the audit firm to do this for its audit client. The audit client can very easily contract for these services from someone else without any of the efficiencies or synergies or familiarities that we have used as arguments for providing tax services to the firm itself. And I actually would like to disagree a little bit with Damon about some of this in that one would expect that there is some negotiation when one accepts an international assignment. You're probably a management person, you may not be an executive, and therefore, you may wish to negotiate certain aspects of your compensation based on the advice that you get from	
22 23 24 25	all of those criteria whether they stack up in terms of this type of service. I believe in my own judgement at least that they would not suggest that the compliance service aspects, because of its implications to	22 23 24 25	your tax professional with your firm. And so I think some of the same arguments that he made about executives and executive compensation apply here.	

41 (Pages 158 to 161)

	Dec. 1/2		Dec. 174
	Page 162		Page 164
1	MS. RIVSHIN: We have four people with their	1	ultimately will pay as a practical matter. And
2	tents up. We'll take their comments and then move on	$\frac{2}{2}$	secondly is, I think, the point that Mark made earlier
3 4	to the next area.	3 4	is it's very important for the company to make certain
5	Walter McNairy. MR. MCNAIRY: Walter McNairy, Dixon Hughes.	4 5	that these are properly prepared because otherwise they could be even potentially precluded from doing business
6	If the Board goes down the path of putting some	6	in those various countries. So it's much more of a
7	restrictions on tax services to executives, I would	7	compliance issue, I think, than it is an independence
8	just encourage that they consider other perhaps more	8	issue.
9	far-reaching ramifications from an independence	9	MS. RIVSHIN: Mark Weinberger.
10	standpoint with respect to related-party transactions.	10	MR. WEINBERGER: Thanks. I just wanted to
11	Would the restrictions be just for executives? Would	11	address a practical issue, I guess. There was a
12	it extend to middle-level management? Would it extend	12	statement made that any of the firms could do it, so
13	to the board? What about situations where the audit	13	why not just move it around? I don't think it's that
14	firm audits the acquiree and the acquirer, situations	14	easy. Actually, many of the issuers could be
15	where the audit firm audits significant customers, the	15	conflicted from, based on their affiliation through
16	audit firm audits the parent company and audits the	16	either financial service firms or mutual fund complexes
17	ESOP or benefit plans?	17	or with subsidiaries in other countries from being able
18	I just think there is a whole lot of related-	18	to do work for two or three firms if we start limiting
19	party type relationships that could come into play as	19	who can whether an auditor can do work.
20	you evaluate all the clients that an auditor of a	20	But importantly, there's only, for better or
21	public company may have, and those clients may have	21	worse, four big global firms left, and if you're
22	conflicting interests with the interest of that public	22	precluded from working with one or two, the other two
23 24	company. Just something to consider.	23 24	have to match up geographically almost exactly where
24 25	MS. RIVSHIN: David Shedlarz. MR. SHEDLARZ: This may be in fact a	24 25	you are in order to be able to provide those services on a global basis, and it doesn't work out that way for
23	MR. SHEDLARZ. This may be in fact a	23	on a global basis, and it doesn't work out that way for
	Page 163		Page 165
1	Page 163 historical moment in that I get the opportunity this	1	
1 2		1 2	Page 165 all the companies. And so it's not as easy to say that if one can't provide it, one of the other two or three
	historical moment in that I get the opportunity this afternoon not only to agree with Lynn, but also Pat. (Laughter.)	2 3	all the companies. And so it's not as easy to say that if one can't provide it, one of the other two or three that are available can. It's in practice a little more
2 3 4	historical moment in that I get the opportunity this afternoon not only to agree with Lynn, but also Pat. (Laughter.) MR. SHEDLARZ: I agree. It lacks a lot of the	2 3 4	all the companies. And so it's not as easy to say that if one can't provide it, one of the other two or three that are available can. It's in practice a little more difficult.
2 3 4 5	historical moment in that I get the opportunity this afternoon not only to agree with Lynn, but also Pat. (Laughter.) MR. SHEDLARZ: I agree. It lacks a lot of the arguments and good ones in terms of the vantage point	2 3 4 5	all the companies. And so it's not as easy to say that if one can't provide it, one of the other two or three that are available can. It's in practice a little more difficult. MS. RIVSHIN: Okay. Two other people put up
2 3 4 5 6	historical moment in that I get the opportunity this afternoon not only to agree with Lynn, but also Pat. (Laughter.) MR. SHEDLARZ: I agree. It lacks a lot of the arguments and good ones in terms of the vantage point and knowledge attendant to tax planning and tax	2 3 4 5 6	all the companies. And so it's not as easy to say that if one can't provide it, one of the other two or three that are available can. It's in practice a little more difficult. MS. RIVSHIN: Okay. Two other people put up their tents, so we'll let them say their remarks.
2 3 4 5 6 7	historical moment in that I get the opportunity this afternoon not only to agree with Lynn, but also Pat. (Laughter.) MR. SHEDLARZ: I agree. It lacks a lot of the arguments and good ones in terms of the vantage point and knowledge attendant to tax planning and tax advisory activity, and for that reason, if nothing for	2 3 4 5 6 7	all the companies. And so it's not as easy to say that if one can't provide it, one of the other two or three that are available can. It's in practice a little more difficult. MS. RIVSHIN: Okay. Two other people put up their tents, so we'll let them say their remarks. Damon Silvers.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	historical moment in that I get the opportunity this afternoon not only to agree with Lynn, but also Pat. (Laughter.) MR. SHEDLARZ: I agree. It lacks a lot of the arguments and good ones in terms of the vantage point and knowledge attendant to tax planning and tax advisory activity, and for that reason, if nothing for form but clearly for substance, it's not something that	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	all the companies. And so it's not as easy to say that if one can't provide it, one of the other two or three that are available can. It's in practice a little more difficult. MS. RIVSHIN: Okay. Two other people put up their tents, so we'll let them say their remarks. Damon Silvers. MR. SILVERS: Well, A, I don't disagree with
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	historical moment in that I get the opportunity this afternoon not only to agree with Lynn, but also Pat. (Laughter.) MR. SHEDLARZ: I agree. It lacks a lot of the arguments and good ones in terms of the vantage point and knowledge attendant to tax planning and tax advisory activity, and for that reason, if nothing for form but clearly for substance, it's not something that we support.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	all the companies. And so it's not as easy to say that if one can't provide it, one of the other two or three that are available can. It's in practice a little more difficult. MS. RIVSHIN: Okay. Two other people put up their tents, so we'll let them say their remarks. Damon Silvers. MR. SILVERS: Well, A, I don't disagree with the comments that Mark and Pat made. I think that
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	historical moment in that I get the opportunity this afternoon not only to agree with Lynn, but also Pat. (Laughter.) MR. SHEDLARZ: I agree. It lacks a lot of the arguments and good ones in terms of the vantage point and knowledge attendant to tax planning and tax advisory activity, and for that reason, if nothing for form but clearly for substance, it's not something that we support. MS. RIVSHIN: Tom Ochsenschlager.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	all the companies. And so it's not as easy to say that if one can't provide it, one of the other two or three that are available can. It's in practice a little more difficult. MS. RIVSHIN: Okay. Two other people put up their tents, so we'll let them say their remarks. Damon Silvers. MR. SILVERS: Well, A, I don't disagree with the comments that Mark and Pat made. I think that those issues are present in any non-audit service, and
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	 historical moment in that I get the opportunity this afternoon not only to agree with Lynn, but also Pat. (Laughter.) MR. SHEDLARZ: I agree. It lacks a lot of the arguments and good ones in terms of the vantage point and knowledge attendant to tax planning and tax advisory activity, and for that reason, if nothing for form but clearly for substance, it's not something that we support. MS. RIVSHIN: Tom Ochsenschlager. MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: Tom Ochsenschlager with 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	all the companies. And so it's not as easy to say that if one can't provide it, one of the other two or three that are available can. It's in practice a little more difficult. MS. RIVSHIN: Okay. Two other people put up their tents, so we'll let them say their remarks. Damon Silvers. MR. SILVERS: Well, A, I don't disagree with the comments that Mark and Pat made. I think that those issues are present in any non-audit service, and I was trying to be soft-hearted.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	 historical moment in that I get the opportunity this afternoon not only to agree with Lynn, but also Pat. (Laughter.) MR. SHEDLARZ: I agree. It lacks a lot of the arguments and good ones in terms of the vantage point and knowledge attendant to tax planning and tax advisory activity, and for that reason, if nothing for form but clearly for substance, it's not something that we support. MS. RIVSHIN: Tom Ochsenschlager. MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: Tom Ochsenschlager with the AICPA. I think the argument here regarding 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	all the companies. And so it's not as easy to say that if one can't provide it, one of the other two or three that are available can. It's in practice a little more difficult. MS. RIVSHIN: Okay. Two other people put up their tents, so we'll let them say their remarks. Damon Silvers. MR. SILVERS: Well, A, I don't disagree with the comments that Mark and Pat made. I think that those issues are present in any non-audit service, and I was trying to be soft-hearted. (Laughter.)
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	 historical moment in that I get the opportunity this afternoon not only to agree with Lynn, but also Pat. (Laughter.) MR. SHEDLARZ: I agree. It lacks a lot of the arguments and good ones in terms of the vantage point and knowledge attendant to tax planning and tax advisory activity, and for that reason, if nothing for form but clearly for substance, it's not something that we support. MS. RIVSHIN: Tom Ochsenschlager. MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: Tom Ochsenschlager with 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	all the companies. And so it's not as easy to say that if one can't provide it, one of the other two or three that are available can. It's in practice a little more difficult. MS. RIVSHIN: Okay. Two other people put up their tents, so we'll let them say their remarks. Damon Silvers. MR. SILVERS: Well, A, I don't disagree with the comments that Mark and Pat made. I think that those issues are present in any non-audit service, and I was trying to be soft-hearted.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	historical moment in that I get the opportunity this afternoon not only to agree with Lynn, but also Pat. (Laughter.) MR. SHEDLARZ: I agree. It lacks a lot of the arguments and good ones in terms of the vantage point and knowledge attendant to tax planning and tax advisory activity, and for that reason, if nothing for form but clearly for substance, it's not something that we support. MS. RIVSHIN: Tom Ochsenschlager. MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: Tom Ochsenschlager with the AICPA. I think the argument here regarding expatriate returns is very similar to the argument, the issue involving whether or not auditors should be permitted to prepare tax returns in general for the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	all the companies. And so it's not as easy to say that if one can't provide it, one of the other two or three that are available can. It's in practice a little more difficult. MS. RIVSHIN: Okay. Two other people put up their tents, so we'll let them say their remarks. Damon Silvers. MR. SILVERS: Well, A, I don't disagree with the comments that Mark and Pat made. I think that those issues are present in any non-audit service, and I was trying to be soft-hearted. (Laughter.) MR. SILVERS: The issue of whether or not you
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	historical moment in that I get the opportunity this afternoon not only to agree with Lynn, but also Pat. (Laughter.) MR. SHEDLARZ: I agree. It lacks a lot of the arguments and good ones in terms of the vantage point and knowledge attendant to tax planning and tax advisory activity, and for that reason, if nothing for form but clearly for substance, it's not something that we support. MS. RIVSHIN: Tom Ochsenschlager. MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: Tom Ochsenschlager with the AICPA. I think the argument here regarding expatriate returns is very similar to the argument, the issue involving whether or not auditors should be permitted to prepare tax returns in general for the company. The way the expatriate returns frequently	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	all the companies. And so it's not as easy to say that if one can't provide it, one of the other two or three that are available can. It's in practice a little more difficult. MS. RIVSHIN: Okay. Two other people put up their tents, so we'll let them say their remarks. Damon Silvers. MR. SILVERS: Well, A, I don't disagree with the comments that Mark and Pat made. I think that those issues are present in any non-audit service, and I was trying to be soft-hearted. (Laughter.) MR. SILVERS: The issue of whether or not you whether in looking at conflicts between an employer and employee in the context of tax consulting, whether that necessarily brings in the question of whether you
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	historical moment in that I get the opportunity this afternoon not only to agree with Lynn, but also Pat. (Laughter.) MR. SHEDLARZ: I agree. It lacks a lot of the arguments and good ones in terms of the vantage point and knowledge attendant to tax planning and tax advisory activity, and for that reason, if nothing for form but clearly for substance, it's not something that we support. MS. RIVSHIN: Tom Ochsenschlager. MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: Tom Ochsenschlager with the AICPA. I think the argument here regarding expatriate returns is very similar to the argument, the issue involving whether or not auditors should be permitted to prepare tax returns in general for the company. The way the expatriate returns frequently work is it's actually a tax liability of the company.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	all the companies. And so it's not as easy to say that if one can't provide it, one of the other two or three that are available can. It's in practice a little more difficult. MS. RIVSHIN: Okay. Two other people put up their tents, so we'll let them say their remarks. Damon Silvers. MR. SILVERS: Well, A, I don't disagree with the comments that Mark and Pat made. I think that those issues are present in any non-audit service, and I was trying to be soft-hearted. (Laughter.) MR. SILVERS: The issue of whether or not you whether in looking at conflicts between an employer and employee in the context of tax consulting, whether that necessarily brings in the question of whether you could ever whether an audit firm could ever be in
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	historical moment in that I get the opportunity this afternoon not only to agree with Lynn, but also Pat. (Laughter.) MR. SHEDLARZ: I agree. It lacks a lot of the arguments and good ones in terms of the vantage point and knowledge attendant to tax planning and tax advisory activity, and for that reason, if nothing for form but clearly for substance, it's not something that we support. MS. RIVSHIN: Tom Ochsenschlager. MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: Tom Ochsenschlager with the AICPA. I think the argument here regarding expatriate returns is very similar to the argument, the issue involving whether or not auditors should be permitted to prepare tax returns in general for the company. The way the expatriate returns frequently work is it's actually a tax liability of the company. The company reimburses the employee for the difference	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	all the companies. And so it's not as easy to say that if one can't provide it, one of the other two or three that are available can. It's in practice a little more difficult. MS. RIVSHIN: Okay. Two other people put up their tents, so we'll let them say their remarks. Damon Silvers. MR. SILVERS: Well, A, I don't disagree with the comments that Mark and Pat made. I think that those issues are present in any non-audit service, and I was trying to be soft-hearted. (Laughter.) MR. SILVERS: The issue of whether or not you whether in looking at conflicts between an employer and employee in the context of tax consulting, whether that necessarily brings in the question of whether you could ever whether an audit firm could ever be in its role as auditor on both sides of a transaction,
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	historical moment in that I get the opportunity this afternoon not only to agree with Lynn, but also Pat. (Laughter.) MR. SHEDLARZ: I agree. It lacks a lot of the arguments and good ones in terms of the vantage point and knowledge attendant to tax planning and tax advisory activity, and for that reason, if nothing for form but clearly for substance, it's not something that we support. MS. RIVSHIN: Tom Ochsenschlager. MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: Tom Ochsenschlager with the AICPA. I think the argument here regarding expatriate returns is very similar to the argument, the issue involving whether or not auditors should be permitted to prepare tax returns in general for the company. The way the expatriate returns frequently work is it's actually a tax liability of the company. The company reimburses the employee for the difference between whatever the U.S. taxes and what the foreign	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	all the companies. And so it's not as easy to say that if one can't provide it, one of the other two or three that are available can. It's in practice a little more difficult. MS. RIVSHIN: Okay. Two other people put up their tents, so we'll let them say their remarks. Damon Silvers. MR. SILVERS: Well, A, I don't disagree with the comments that Mark and Pat made. I think that those issues are present in any non-audit service, and I was trying to be soft-hearted. (Laughter.) MR. SILVERS: The issue of whether or not you whether in looking at conflicts between an employer and employee in the context of tax consulting, whether that necessarily brings in the question of whether you could ever whether an audit firm could ever be in its role as auditor on both sides of a transaction, those are different things actually. And the reason is
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	historical moment in that I get the opportunity this afternoon not only to agree with Lynn, but also Pat. (Laughter.) MR. SHEDLARZ: I agree. It lacks a lot of the arguments and good ones in terms of the vantage point and knowledge attendant to tax planning and tax advisory activity, and for that reason, if nothing for form but clearly for substance, it's not something that we support. MS. RIVSHIN: Tom Ochsenschlager. MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: Tom Ochsenschlager with the AICPA. I think the argument here regarding expatriate returns is very similar to the argument, the issue involving whether or not auditors should be permitted to prepare tax returns in general for the company. The way the expatriate returns frequently work is it's actually a tax liability of the company. The company reimburses the employee for the difference between whatever the U.S. taxes and what the foreign taxes were plus some housing expenses and things of	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	all the companies. And so it's not as easy to say that if one can't provide it, one of the other two or three that are available can. It's in practice a little more difficult. MS. RIVSHIN: Okay. Two other people put up their tents, so we'll let them say their remarks. Damon Silvers. MR. SILVERS: Well, A, I don't disagree with the comments that Mark and Pat made. I think that those issues are present in any non-audit service, and I was trying to be soft-hearted. (Laughter.) MR. SILVERS: The issue of whether or not you whether in looking at conflicts between an employer and employee in the context of tax consulting, whether that necessarily brings in the question of whether you could ever whether an audit firm could ever be in its role as auditor on both sides of a transaction, those are different things actually. And the reason is because of what we discussed earlier, which is the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	historical moment in that I get the opportunity this afternoon not only to agree with Lynn, but also Pat. (Laughter.) MR. SHEDLARZ: I agree. It lacks a lot of the arguments and good ones in terms of the vantage point and knowledge attendant to tax planning and tax advisory activity, and for that reason, if nothing for form but clearly for substance, it's not something that we support. MS. RIVSHIN: Tom Ochsenschlager. MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: Tom Ochsenschlager with the AICPA. I think the argument here regarding expatriate returns is very similar to the argument, the issue involving whether or not auditors should be permitted to prepare tax returns in general for the company. The way the expatriate returns frequently work is it's actually a tax liability of the company. The company reimburses the employee for the difference between whatever the U.S. taxes and what the foreign taxes were plus some housing expenses and things of that nature.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	all the companies. And so it's not as easy to say that if one can't provide it, one of the other two or three that are available can. It's in practice a little more difficult. MS. RIVSHIN: Okay. Two other people put up their tents, so we'll let them say their remarks. Damon Silvers. MR. SILVERS: Well, A, I don't disagree with the comments that Mark and Pat made. I think that those issues are present in any non-audit service, and I was trying to be soft-hearted. (Laughter.) MR. SILVERS: The issue of whether or not you whether in looking at conflicts between an employer and employee in the context of tax consulting, whether that necessarily brings in the question of whether you could ever whether an audit firm could ever be in its role as auditor on both sides of a transaction, those are different things actually. And the reason is because of what we discussed earlier, which is the elements of advocacy involved in tax consulting and tax
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	historical moment in that I get the opportunity this afternoon not only to agree with Lynn, but also Pat. (Laughter.) MR. SHEDLARZ: I agree. It lacks a lot of the arguments and good ones in terms of the vantage point and knowledge attendant to tax planning and tax advisory activity, and for that reason, if nothing for form but clearly for substance, it's not something that we support. MS. RIVSHIN: Tom Ochsenschlager. MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: Tom Ochsenschlager with the AICPA. I think the argument here regarding expatriate returns is very similar to the argument, the issue involving whether or not auditors should be permitted to prepare tax returns in general for the company. The way the expatriate returns frequently work is it's actually a tax liability of the company. The company reimburses the employee for the difference between whatever the U.S. taxes and what the foreign taxes were plus some housing expenses and things of that nature. So, in effect, what we're doing is for two	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	all the companies. And so it's not as easy to say that if one can't provide it, one of the other two or three that are available can. It's in practice a little more difficult. MS. RIVSHIN: Okay. Two other people put up their tents, so we'll let them say their remarks. Damon Silvers. MR. SILVERS: Well, A, I don't disagree with the comments that Mark and Pat made. I think that those issues are present in any non-audit service, and I was trying to be soft-hearted. (Laughter.) MR. SILVERS: The issue of whether or not you whether in looking at conflicts between an employer and employee in the context of tax consulting, whether that necessarily brings in the question of whether you could ever whether an audit firm could ever be in its role as auditor on both sides of a transaction, those are different things actually. And the reason is because of what we discussed earlier, which is the elements of advocacy involved in tax consulting and tax advisory services that is quite different than at
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	historical moment in that I get the opportunity this afternoon not only to agree with Lynn, but also Pat. (Laughter.) MR. SHEDLARZ: I agree. It lacks a lot of the arguments and good ones in terms of the vantage point and knowledge attendant to tax planning and tax advisory activity, and for that reason, if nothing for form but clearly for substance, it's not something that we support. MS. RIVSHIN: Tom Ochsenschlager. MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: Tom Ochsenschlager with the AICPA. I think the argument here regarding expatriate returns is very similar to the argument, the issue involving whether or not auditors should be permitted to prepare tax returns in general for the company. The way the expatriate returns frequently work is it's actually a tax liability of the company. The company reimburses the employee for the difference between whatever the U.S. taxes and what the foreign taxes were plus some housing expenses and things of that nature. So, in effect, what we're doing is for two reasons I guess, one, because of this reimbursement, in	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	all the companies. And so it's not as easy to say that if one can't provide it, one of the other two or three that are available can. It's in practice a little more difficult. MS. RIVSHIN: Okay. Two other people put up their tents, so we'll let them say their remarks. Damon Silvers. MR. SILVERS: Well, A, I don't disagree with the comments that Mark and Pat made. I think that those issues are present in any non-audit service, and I was trying to be soft-hearted. (Laughter.) MR. SILVERS: The issue of whether or not you whether in looking at conflicts between an employer and employee in the context of tax consulting, whether that necessarily brings in the question of whether you could ever whether an audit firm could ever be in its role as auditor on both sides of a transaction, those are different things actually. And the reason is because of what we discussed earlier, which is the elements of advocacy involved in tax consulting and tax advisory services that is quite different than at least I hope it's quite different than the role that
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	historical moment in that I get the opportunity this afternoon not only to agree with Lynn, but also Pat. (Laughter.) MR. SHEDLARZ: I agree. It lacks a lot of the arguments and good ones in terms of the vantage point and knowledge attendant to tax planning and tax advisory activity, and for that reason, if nothing for form but clearly for substance, it's not something that we support. MS. RIVSHIN: Tom Ochsenschlager. MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: Tom Ochsenschlager with the AICPA. I think the argument here regarding expatriate returns is very similar to the argument, the issue involving whether or not auditors should be permitted to prepare tax returns in general for the company. The way the expatriate returns frequently work is it's actually a tax liability of the company. The company reimburses the employee for the difference between whatever the U.S. taxes and what the foreign taxes were plus some housing expenses and things of that nature. So, in effect, what we're doing is for two	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	all the companies. And so it's not as easy to say that if one can't provide it, one of the other two or three that are available can. It's in practice a little more difficult. MS. RIVSHIN: Okay. Two other people put up their tents, so we'll let them say their remarks. Damon Silvers. MR. SILVERS: Well, A, I don't disagree with the comments that Mark and Pat made. I think that those issues are present in any non-audit service, and I was trying to be soft-hearted. (Laughter.) MR. SILVERS: The issue of whether or not you whether in looking at conflicts between an employer and employee in the context of tax consulting, whether that necessarily brings in the question of whether you could ever whether an audit firm could ever be in its role as auditor on both sides of a transaction, those are different things actually. And the reason is because of what we discussed earlier, which is the elements of advocacy involved in tax consulting and tax advisory services that is quite different than at

42 (Pages 162 to 165)

Meeting

1	Page 166		Page 168
1	lines that can be drawn here.	1	currently exist today, I wouldn't want there to be
2	MS. RIVSHIN: Lynn Turner.	2	confusion that sort of all of them would be grouped
3	MR. TURNER: Back to this service, first of	3	together, either because perhaps a tax professional
4	all, there's nothing in this service that really does	4	might be providing them, or because they're sort of
5	enhance the auditor or even ties into the audit, so	5	lumped in tax services per se. It may be a minor
6	that's where the O'Malley panel things start to kick it	6	point, but an important distinction.
7	out. It's done by people, it's not associated with the	7	MS. RIVSHIN: David Shedlarz. Anyone else?
8	audit, it's more of a compliance-type thing. So you	8	Okay, why don't we then take a 15-minute break. That
9	can get other service providers, and it's not just the	9	means we will be back at 3:00. Thank you.
10	other three firms. In fact, having recently been	10	MR. CARMICHAEL: Okay. We are going to resume
11	associated with this process, we had to shut the door	11	our discussion on the relationship between audit and
12	we had so many people wanting to come in and offer you	12	tax practices. I'd like to remind you at this point
13	the service. You could get the service and this is	13	that we're inviting audience members to pose a question
14	one where perhaps you can even get it at a lower rate	14	to the whole roundtable group potentially. If you'd
15	when you go through this type of process, but there's	15	like to ask a question, we'd ask that you please fill
16	many people out that provide this service other than	16	out a notecard that we've provided and return a
17	just the big three, so there's not an issue with	17	completed card just to any member of the staff.
18	getting a service provider on this one as well.	18	Bella, if you would continue with our next
19	MS. RIVSHIN: Okay, let's move on to our next	19	topic.
20	area for a few minutes and then we're going to take a	20	MS. RIVSHIN: Great. In some small firms,
21	short break. And this is really kind of the catch-all	21	such as sole practitioner firms, audit personnel have
22	of other tax services. This is your opportunity to	22	expertise in both auditing and tax. In many other
23	discuss any other types of tax services that have not	23	firms, especially large firms, there are separate tax
24	been mentioned in these categories and how they could	24	and audit practices. The question is, is it
25	affect auditor independence.	25	appropriate to have tax specialists on engagement teams
	Page 167		Page 169
-	(No response.)		
		1	to axamina tax accruals structured transactions and
$\frac{1}{2}$		$\frac{1}{2}$	to examine tax accruals, structured transactions, and other tax related accounting matters? If the firm uses
2	MS. RIVSHIN: Did we do a really good job and	2	other tax-related accounting matters? If the firm uses
2 3	MS. RIVSHIN: Did we do a really good job and categorize everything? Or do people want to break?	2 3	other tax-related accounting matters? If the firm uses a specialist from its tax practice to audit tax
2 3 4	MS. RIVSHIN: Did we do a really good job and categorize everything? Or do people want to break? (Laughter.)	2 3 4	other tax-related accounting matters? If the firm uses a specialist from its tax practice to audit tax accounts, how should that engagement team supervise and
2 3 4 5	MS. RIVSHIN: Did we do a really good job and categorize everything? Or do people want to break? (Laughter.) MS. RIVSHIN: Pat Walters.	2 3 4 5	other tax-related accounting matters? If the firm uses a specialist from its tax practice to audit tax accounts, how should that engagement team supervise and otherwise relate to the specialist? And finally,
2 3 4 5 6	MS. RIVSHIN: Did we do a really good job and categorize everything? Or do people want to break? (Laughter.) MS. RIVSHIN: Pat Walters. MS. WALTERS: Well, I think we're still not	2 3 4 5 6	other tax-related accounting matters? If the firm uses a specialist from its tax practice to audit tax accounts, how should that engagement team supervise and otherwise relate to the specialist? And finally, should such a specialist's advancement, compensation,
2 3 4 5 6 7	MS. RIVSHIN: Did we do a really good job and categorize everything? Or do people want to break? (Laughter.) MS. RIVSHIN: Pat Walters. MS. WALTERS: Well, I think we're still not really sure what tax advice planning and strategies	2 3 4 5 6 7	other tax-related accounting matters? If the firm uses a specialist from its tax practice to audit tax accounts, how should that engagement team supervise and otherwise relate to the specialist? And finally, should such a specialist's advancement, compensation, and other rewards be tied to the quality of his or her
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	MS. RIVSHIN: Did we do a really good job and categorize everything? Or do people want to break? (Laughter.) MS. RIVSHIN: Pat Walters. MS. WALTERS: Well, I think we're still not really sure what tax advice planning and strategies are, so anything else must be in one of those three	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	other tax-related accounting matters? If the firm uses a specialist from its tax practice to audit tax accounts, how should that engagement team supervise and otherwise relate to the specialist? And finally, should such a specialist's advancement, compensation, and other rewards be tied to the quality of his or her audit work?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	MS. RIVSHIN: Did we do a really good job and categorize everything? Or do people want to break? (Laughter.) MS. RIVSHIN: Pat Walters. MS. WALTERS: Well, I think we're still not really sure what tax advice planning and strategies are, so anything else must be in one of those three categories.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	other tax-related accounting matters? If the firm uses a specialist from its tax practice to audit tax accounts, how should that engagement team supervise and otherwise relate to the specialist? And finally, should such a specialist's advancement, compensation, and other rewards be tied to the quality of his or her audit work? And it looks like Lynn would like to comment
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	MS. RIVSHIN: Did we do a really good job and categorize everything? Or do people want to break? (Laughter.) MS. RIVSHIN: Pat Walters. MS. WALTERS: Well, I think we're still not really sure what tax advice planning and strategies are, so anything else must be in one of those three categories. MS. RIVSHIN: Mike Gagnon.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	other tax-related accounting matters? If the firm uses a specialist from its tax practice to audit tax accounts, how should that engagement team supervise and otherwise relate to the specialist? And finally, should such a specialist's advancement, compensation, and other rewards be tied to the quality of his or her audit work? And it looks like Lynn would like to comment on that one.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	MS. RIVSHIN: Did we do a really good job and categorize everything? Or do people want to break? (Laughter.) MS. RIVSHIN: Pat Walters. MS. WALTERS: Well, I think we're still not really sure what tax advice planning and strategies are, so anything else must be in one of those three categories. MS. RIVSHIN: Mike Gagnon. MR. GAGNON: I do think it's important,	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	other tax-related accounting matters? If the firm uses a specialist from its tax practice to audit tax accounts, how should that engagement team supervise and otherwise relate to the specialist? And finally, should such a specialist's advancement, compensation, and other rewards be tied to the quality of his or her audit work? And it looks like Lynn would like to comment on that one. MR. TURNER: Actually, this is where I come
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	MS. RIVSHIN: Did we do a really good job and categorize everything? Or do people want to break? (Laughter.) MS. RIVSHIN: Pat Walters. MS. WALTERS: Well, I think we're still not really sure what tax advice planning and strategies are, so anything else must be in one of those three categories. MS. RIVSHIN: Mike Gagnon. MR. GAGNON: I do think it's important, because I think embedded in some of the questions we've	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	other tax-related accounting matters? If the firm uses a specialist from its tax practice to audit tax accounts, how should that engagement team supervise and otherwise relate to the specialist? And finally, should such a specialist's advancement, compensation, and other rewards be tied to the quality of his or her audit work? And it looks like Lynn would like to comment on that one. MR. TURNER: Actually, this is where I come back and totally agree with David and Nick on the issue
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	MS. RIVSHIN: Did we do a really good job and categorize everything? Or do people want to break? (Laughter.) MS. RIVSHIN: Pat Walters. MS. WALTERS: Well, I think we're still not really sure what tax advice planning and strategies are, so anything else must be in one of those three categories. MS. RIVSHIN: Mike Gagnon. MR. GAGNON: I do think it's important, because I think embedded in some of the questions we've talked about this morning and this afternoon have I	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	other tax-related accounting matters? If the firm uses a specialist from its tax practice to audit tax accounts, how should that engagement team supervise and otherwise relate to the specialist? And finally, should such a specialist's advancement, compensation, and other rewards be tied to the quality of his or her audit work? And it looks like Lynn would like to comment on that one. MR. TURNER: Actually, this is where I come back and totally agree with David and Nick on the issue of the tax people involved with the audit. Having been
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	MS. RIVSHIN: Did we do a really good job and categorize everything? Or do people want to break? (Laughter.) MS. RIVSHIN: Pat Walters. MS. WALTERS: Well, I think we're still not really sure what tax advice planning and strategies are, so anything else must be in one of those three categories. MS. RIVSHIN: Mike Gagnon. MR. GAGNON: I do think it's important, because I think embedded in some of the questions we've talked about this morning and this afternoon have I think other related services that at least I would not	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	other tax-related accounting matters? If the firm uses a specialist from its tax practice to audit tax accounts, how should that engagement team supervise and otherwise relate to the specialist? And finally, should such a specialist's advancement, compensation, and other rewards be tied to the quality of his or her audit work? And it looks like Lynn would like to comment on that one. MR. TURNER: Actually, this is where I come back and totally agree with David and Nick on the issue of the tax people involved with the audit. Having been a CFO out there, I think it's critically important as
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	MS. RIVSHIN: Did we do a really good job and categorize everything? Or do people want to break? (Laughter.) MS. RIVSHIN: Pat Walters. MS. WALTERS: Well, I think we're still not really sure what tax advice planning and strategies are, so anything else must be in one of those three categories. MS. RIVSHIN: Mike Gagnon. MR. GAGNON: I do think it's important, because I think embedded in some of the questions we've talked about this morning and this afternoon have I think other related services that at least I would not consider to be tax services per se. And I think it's	$ \begin{array}{c} 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13 \\ 14 \\ 15 \\ \end{array} $	other tax-related accounting matters? If the firm uses a specialist from its tax practice to audit tax accounts, how should that engagement team supervise and otherwise relate to the specialist? And finally, should such a specialist's advancement, compensation, and other rewards be tied to the quality of his or her audit work? And it looks like Lynn would like to comment on that one. MR. TURNER: Actually, this is where I come back and totally agree with David and Nick on the issue of the tax people involved with the audit. Having been a CFO out there, I think it's critically important as you go through some of these transactions that their
$\begin{array}{c} 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13 \\ 14 \\ 15 \\ 16 \end{array}$	MS. RIVSHIN: Did we do a really good job and categorize everything? Or do people want to break? (Laughter.) MS. RIVSHIN: Pat Walters. MS. WALTERS: Well, I think we're still not really sure what tax advice planning and strategies are, so anything else must be in one of those three categories. MS. RIVSHIN: Mike Gagnon. MR. GAGNON: I do think it's important, because I think embedded in some of the questions we've talked about this morning and this afternoon have I think other related services that at least I would not consider to be tax services per se. And I think it's clear in the independence rules today that calling a	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	other tax-related accounting matters? If the firm uses a specialist from its tax practice to audit tax accounts, how should that engagement team supervise and otherwise relate to the specialist? And finally, should such a specialist's advancement, compensation, and other rewards be tied to the quality of his or her audit work? And it looks like Lynn would like to comment on that one. MR. TURNER: Actually, this is where I come back and totally agree with David and Nick on the issue of the tax people involved with the audit. Having been a CFO out there, I think it's critically important as you go through some of these transactions that their involvement is there right on at the front end advising
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	MS. RIVSHIN: Did we do a really good job and categorize everything? Or do people want to break? (Laughter.) MS. RIVSHIN: Pat Walters. MS. WALTERS: Well, I think we're still not really sure what tax advice planning and strategies are, so anything else must be in one of those three categories. MS. RIVSHIN: Mike Gagnon. MR. GAGNON: I do think it's important, because I think embedded in some of the questions we've talked about this morning and this afternoon have I think other related services that at least I would not consider to be tax services per se. And I think it's clear in the independence rules today that calling a service a tax service, or the fact that the service	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	other tax-related accounting matters? If the firm uses a specialist from its tax practice to audit tax accounts, how should that engagement team supervise and otherwise relate to the specialist? And finally, should such a specialist's advancement, compensation, and other rewards be tied to the quality of his or her audit work? And it looks like Lynn would like to comment on that one. MR. TURNER: Actually, this is where I come back and totally agree with David and Nick on the issue of the tax people involved with the audit. Having been a CFO out there, I think it's critically important as you go through some of these transactions that their involvement is there right on at the front end advising you, because you got the attorneys sitting around the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	MS. RIVSHIN: Did we do a really good job and categorize everything? Or do people want to break? (Laughter.) MS. RIVSHIN: Pat Walters. MS. WALTERS: Well, I think we're still not really sure what tax advice planning and strategies are, so anything else must be in one of those three categories. MS. RIVSHIN: Mike Gagnon. MR. GAGNON: I do think it's important, because I think embedded in some of the questions we've talked about this morning and this afternoon have I think other related services that at least I would not consider to be tax services per se. And I think it's clear in the independence rules today that calling a service a tax service, or the fact that the service itself may be performed by a tax professional doesn't	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	other tax-related accounting matters? If the firm uses a specialist from its tax practice to audit tax accounts, how should that engagement team supervise and otherwise relate to the specialist? And finally, should such a specialist's advancement, compensation, and other rewards be tied to the quality of his or her audit work? And it looks like Lynn would like to comment on that one. MR. TURNER: Actually, this is where I come back and totally agree with David and Nick on the issue of the tax people involved with the audit. Having been a CFO out there, I think it's critically important as you go through some of these transactions that their involvement is there right on at the front end advising you, because you got the attorneys sitting around the table, you're trying to put together either capital
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	MS. RIVSHIN: Did we do a really good job and categorize everything? Or do people want to break? (Laughter.) MS. RIVSHIN: Pat Walters. MS. WALTERS: Well, I think we're still not really sure what tax advice planning and strategies are, so anything else must be in one of those three categories. MS. RIVSHIN: Mike Gagnon. MR. GAGNON: I do think it's important, because I think embedded in some of the questions we've talked about this morning and this afternoon have I think other related services that at least I would not consider to be tax services per se. And I think it's clear in the independence rules today that calling a service a tax service, or the fact that the service itself may be performed by a tax professional doesn't mean it's a tax service.	$\begin{array}{c} 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13 \\ 14 \\ 15 \\ 16 \\ 17 \\ 18 \\ 19 \end{array}$	other tax-related accounting matters? If the firm uses a specialist from its tax practice to audit tax accounts, how should that engagement team supervise and otherwise relate to the specialist? And finally, should such a specialist's advancement, compensation, and other rewards be tied to the quality of his or her audit work? And it looks like Lynn would like to comment on that one. MR. TURNER: Actually, this is where I come back and totally agree with David and Nick on the issue of the tax people involved with the audit. Having been a CFO out there, I think it's critically important as you go through some of these transactions that their involvement is there right on at the front end advising you, because you got the attorneys sitting around the table, you're trying to put together either capital transactions or merger-type transactions, where we're
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	MS. RIVSHIN: Did we do a really good job and categorize everything? Or do people want to break? (Laughter.) MS. RIVSHIN: Pat Walters. MS. WALTERS: Well, I think we're still not really sure what tax advice planning and strategies are, so anything else must be in one of those three categories. MS. RIVSHIN: Mike Gagnon. MR. GAGNON: I do think it's important, because I think embedded in some of the questions we've talked about this morning and this afternoon have I think other related services that at least I would not consider to be tax services per se. And I think it's clear in the independence rules today that calling a service a tax service, or the fact that the service itself may be performed by a tax professional doesn't mean it's a tax service. And I guess a couple of examples that I saw	$\begin{array}{c} 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13 \\ 14 \\ 15 \\ 16 \\ 17 \\ 18 \\ 19 \\ 20 \end{array}$	other tax-related accounting matters? If the firm uses a specialist from its tax practice to audit tax accounts, how should that engagement team supervise and otherwise relate to the specialist? And finally, should such a specialist's advancement, compensation, and other rewards be tied to the quality of his or her audit work? And it looks like Lynn would like to comment on that one. MR. TURNER: Actually, this is where I come back and totally agree with David and Nick on the issue of the tax people involved with the audit. Having been a CFO out there, I think it's critically important as you go through some of these transactions that their involvement is there right on at the front end advising you, because you got the attorneys sitting around the table, you're trying to put together either capital transactions or merger-type transactions, where we're doing financial statements now on a quarterly basis and
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	MS. RIVSHIN: Did we do a really good job and categorize everything? Or do people want to break? (Laughter.) MS. RIVSHIN: Pat Walters. MS. WALTERS: Well, I think we're still not really sure what tax advice planning and strategies are, so anything else must be in one of those three categories. MS. RIVSHIN: Mike Gagnon. MR. GAGNON: I do think it's important, because I think embedded in some of the questions we've talked about this morning and this afternoon have I think other related services that at least I would not consider to be tax services per se. And I think it's clear in the independence rules today that calling a service a tax service, or the fact that the service itself may be performed by a tax professional doesn't mean it's a tax service. And I guess a couple of examples that I saw in some of the text of the questions would be some	$\begin{array}{c} 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13 \\ 14 \\ 15 \\ 16 \\ 17 \\ 18 \\ 19 \\ 20 \\ 21 \end{array}$	other tax-related accounting matters? If the firm uses a specialist from its tax practice to audit tax accounts, how should that engagement team supervise and otherwise relate to the specialist? And finally, should such a specialist's advancement, compensation, and other rewards be tied to the quality of his or her audit work? And it looks like Lynn would like to comment on that one. MR. TURNER: Actually, this is where I come back and totally agree with David and Nick on the issue of the tax people involved with the audit. Having been a CFO out there, I think it's critically important as you go through some of these transactions that their involvement is there right on at the front end advising you, because you got the attorneys sitting around the table, you're trying to put together either capital transactions or merger-type transactions, where we're doing financial statements now on a quarterly basis and each one is equally important. The Qs aren't any
$\begin{array}{c} 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13 \\ 14 \\ 15 \\ 16 \\ 17 \\ 18 \\ 19 \\ 20 \\ 21 \\ 22 \end{array}$	MS. RIVSHIN: Did we do a really good job and categorize everything? Or do people want to break? (Laughter.) MS. RIVSHIN: Pat Walters. MS. WALTERS: Well, I think we're still not really sure what tax advice planning and strategies are, so anything else must be in one of those three categories. MS. RIVSHIN: Mike Gagnon. MR. GAGNON: I do think it's important, because I think embedded in some of the questions we've talked about this morning and this afternoon have I think other related services that at least I would not consider to be tax services per se. And I think it's clear in the independence rules today that calling a service a tax service, or the fact that the service itself may be performed by a tax professional doesn't mean it's a tax service. And I guess a couple of examples that I saw in some of the text of the questions would be some executive compensation consulting I wouldn't consider a	$\begin{array}{c} 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13 \\ 14 \\ 15 \\ 16 \\ 17 \\ 18 \\ 19 \\ 20 \\ 21 \\ 22 \end{array}$	other tax-related accounting matters? If the firm uses a specialist from its tax practice to audit tax accounts, how should that engagement team supervise and otherwise relate to the specialist? And finally, should such a specialist's advancement, compensation, and other rewards be tied to the quality of his or her audit work? And it looks like Lynn would like to comment on that one. MR. TURNER: Actually, this is where I come back and totally agree with David and Nick on the issue of the tax people involved with the audit. Having been a CFO out there, I think it's critically important as you go through some of these transactions that their involvement is there right on at the front end advising you, because you got the attorneys sitting around the table, you're trying to put together either capital transactions or merger-type transactions, where we're doing financial statements now on a quarterly basis and each one is equally important. The Qs aren't any different than the Ks now. You don't have a chance to
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	MS. RIVSHIN: Did we do a really good job and categorize everything? Or do people want to break? (Laughter.) MS. RIVSHIN: Pat Walters. MS. WALTERS: Well, I think we're still not really sure what tax advice planning and strategies are, so anything else must be in one of those three categories. MS. RIVSHIN: Mike Gagnon. MR. GAGNON: I do think it's important, because I think embedded in some of the questions we've talked about this morning and this afternoon have I think other related services that at least I would not consider to be tax services per se. And I think it's clear in the independence rules today that calling a service a tax service, or the fact that the service itself may be performed by a tax professional doesn't mean it's a tax service. And I guess a couple of examples that I saw in some of the text of the questions would be some executive compensation consulting I wouldn't consider a direct tax service. There may be some unclaimed	$\begin{array}{c} 2\\ 3\\ 4\\ 5\\ 6\\ 7\\ 8\\ 9\\ 10\\ 11\\ 12\\ 13\\ 14\\ 15\\ 16\\ 17\\ 18\\ 19\\ 20\\ 21\\ 22\\ 23\\ \end{array}$	other tax-related accounting matters? If the firm uses a specialist from its tax practice to audit tax accounts, how should that engagement team supervise and otherwise relate to the specialist? And finally, should such a specialist's advancement, compensation, and other rewards be tied to the quality of his or her audit work? And it looks like Lynn would like to comment on that one. MR. TURNER: Actually, this is where I come back and totally agree with David and Nick on the issue of the tax people involved with the audit. Having been a CFO out there, I think it's critically important as you go through some of these transactions that their involvement is there right on at the front end advising you, because you got the attorneys sitting around the table, you're trying to put together either capital transactions or merger-type transactions, where we're doing financial statements now on a quarterly basis and each one is equally important. The Qs aren't any different than the Ks now. You don't have a chance to wait until the end of the year to get it done right.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	MS. RIVSHIN: Did we do a really good job and categorize everything? Or do people want to break? (Laughter.) MS. RIVSHIN: Pat Walters. MS. WALTERS: Well, I think we're still not really sure what tax advice planning and strategies are, so anything else must be in one of those three categories. MS. RIVSHIN: Mike Gagnon. MR. GAGNON: I do think it's important, because I think embedded in some of the questions we've talked about this morning and this afternoon have I think other related services that at least I would not consider to be tax services per se. And I think it's clear in the independence rules today that calling a service a tax service, or the fact that the service itself may be performed by a tax professional doesn't mean it's a tax service. And I guess a couple of examples that I saw in some of the text of the questions would be some executive compensation consulting I wouldn't consider a	$\begin{array}{c} 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13 \\ 14 \\ 15 \\ 16 \\ 17 \\ 18 \\ 19 \\ 20 \\ 21 \\ 22 \end{array}$	other tax-related accounting matters? If the firm uses a specialist from its tax practice to audit tax accounts, how should that engagement team supervise and otherwise relate to the specialist? And finally, should such a specialist's advancement, compensation, and other rewards be tied to the quality of his or her audit work? And it looks like Lynn would like to comment on that one. MR. TURNER: Actually, this is where I come back and totally agree with David and Nick on the issue of the tax people involved with the audit. Having been a CFO out there, I think it's critically important as you go through some of these transactions that their involvement is there right on at the front end advising you, because you got the attorneys sitting around the table, you're trying to put together either capital transactions or merger-type transactions, where we're doing financial statements now on a quarterly basis and each one is equally important. The Qs aren't any different than the Ks now. You don't have a chance to

		-	
	Page 170		Page 172
 ability to have ability to have there next to ye something that the business ar absolutely has And for the Q or end of and then tell ye reasons we've we've had that So there has to expertise and t in doing these deals that can I And as David done early on I MS. RIV MR. STI audit, you're ge complex entity specialist is an specialist, if ye specialist, so y 	at night as a CFO, have to have the that type of tax expertise sitting ou telling you that if there going to be 's going to have a financial impact on d on those financial statements, it to be done right. an auditor to show up at the end of T the K and only then start to look at it ou that something is wrong is one of the gotten some of the restatements that have done investors damage and not good. be some interplay between the tax he auditors when it comes to those items deals, and there are many items in these have financial statement applications. absolutely was correct on, it has to be ather than later. 'SHIN: Jeff Steinhoff. EINHOFF: In the course of conducting an oing to use many specialists if it's a . I don't really see that the tax y different than the actuarial ou might have a computer security ou would manage that person in the same y if this is what this specialist does	$\begin{array}{c}1\\2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\\23\\24\\25\end{array}$	oversee that work and review that work. That would not mean they would need to have the same technical knowledge as the specialist. Clearly, to the extent that a specialist is involved, a tax specialist is involved in performing audit procedures, the quality and effectiveness of that work should be evaluated. If that's all they do, that should essentially be all they're evaluated on. On the other hand, I would expect that most tax specialists are not solely confined to audit, otherwise they probably couldn't keep their tax skills up where you would need them to be, so rather than being the sole basis for their evaluation, I think it would normally be one element of their evaluation. MS. RIVSHIN: Colleen Sayther. MS. SAYTHER: Colleen Sayther, Financial Executives International. I'm not sure how you can audit some complex organizations that enter into tax strategies that may be fairly complicated without having a tax specialist. I also think that this is the area, you know, the key area where using your auditor for certain tax services is clearly beneficial with respect to the knowledge spill-over that you can get, particularly when you're talking about due diligence of potential acquisition candidates and the like.
	Page 171		Page 173
 2 evaluated on th 3 what they're do 4 duties, you wo 5 rata basis. 6 But I do: 7 which I agree w 8 would want on 9 any other spect 10 an audit. 11 MS. RIV 12 MR. WE 13 think Jeff summers 14 you should cert 15 of the audit enguination of the audi	ir professional life, they should be the quality of their audit work. That's bing. If they have a wide range of uld evaluate them on some kind of pro n't really see a tax specialist, with Lynn would be the type of person you the audit team, being any different than alist that the audit team would use on "SHIN: Bruce Webb. EBB: Bruce Webb, McGladrey & Pullen. I ned up things pretty well. I agree that tainly use a tax specialist as a member gagement team whenever such specialist red. I think AU 311 would require you 1 I also agree that a tax specialist or lls that might need to be brought to t engagement. tor's responsibility for supervising s, as I've previously mentioned, ny other assistant. That would mean would need to have a sufficient of what the specialist is doing to	$ \begin{array}{c} 1\\2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\\23\\24\\25\end{array} $	MS. RIVSHIN: Paul Koren. MR. KOREN: Paul Koren, Goldstein Golub Kessler. Well, we're neither a sole practitioner firm or a large firm, so we fall in between. However, we do have our audit people are not tax specialists and our tax people are not audit specialists. However, they are tax people are conversant with the standards regarding tax accrual process, and they become part of our audit team. They're actually reported to the PCAOB as associated persons of those who practice in that area, and they have powers in regard to the accrual, the accrual in the financial statements, and they have to approve of that so that we can go forward. I think certainly in our firm our tax specialists who do that work are evaluated on that basis. MS. RIVSHIN: Barbara Roper. MS. ROPER: I think there's a fundamental difference reflected in this discussion between having a tax specialist who's working for the auditor and under the auditor's direction, and having a tax specialist who is working for the audit client, and that as far as auditor independence issues are concerned, that is a fundamental, basic difference in

Meeting

	Page 174		Page 176
$ \begin{array}{c} 1\\2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\\23\\24\end{array} $	Page 174 terms of the concerns raised. I think there's obvious I don't think anyone would contest that there's obvious benefits to having that kind of expertise where appropriate represented on the audit team under the supervision of the audit partner. If it is true, as has been indicated, that those tax specialists are rarely going to be confined to working on audit teams, then I think it becomes very important to look at what other services they perform and how they're compensated and evaluated for those other services to ensure that they do not conflict with the audit or compromise the audit's independence. MS. RIVSHIN: Michael Gagnon. MR. GAGNON: I certainly Lynn actually passed me a note and said, should anybody be nervous if I were to sign a set of accounts or report on a set of financial statements without some tax advice? And the answer was, yes, they really should be nervous. Certainly having tax expertise assisting an auditor in carrying out an exam is vital to that examination, and it goes back to, I believe, some of our dialogue this morning.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	Page 176 bifurcated, there are two possible ramifications to that. I think one ramification could be that the tax experts they're still experts, that doesn't change their expertise the knowledge though has the potential for changing. And effective audits, more effective audits, are influenced by not only having auditor and accounting expertise, but by having knowledge, and to some degree there is an impact there. I think a second possible ramification is having the requisite cadre of experts and people who are dealing in this area on an ongoing basis within the audit firm. I think it's vital because it's not simply income taxes that we're talking about today. We're talking about a complex array of various areas of taxation, whether it be federal income taxes or state and local in the U.S. or foreign taxes, and particularly the interplay of foreign taxes to U.S. taxation in various jurisdictions around the world, it is indeed a complex area. And the knowledge of organizations like ours is critical in order to properly carry out the audit function. So while I think there is broad agreement that it's very important, indeed vital, to have proper specialists in this area advise the audit team in
24 25	There was, I think, a fair dialogue on audit quality, audit effectiveness, audit efficiency, and I	24 25	specialists in this area advise the audit team in conducting the audit, I think there are at least
		23	-
1	Page 175 would bring us back at least for a minute or two to	1	Page 177 potential areas that the Board needs to consider in
2 3	that topic as it relates to tax advice to the audit process. I think it's important to have, and while I	2 3	terms of audit quality, in terms of knowledge, in terms of breadth of expertise as they consider this complex
4	echo the comments of the critical need for	4 5	area.
5 6	independence, what I think the Board ought to be considering in this complex area is the implications to	6	MS. RIVSHIN: Scott Bayless. MR. BAYLESS: Scott Bayless with Deloitte.
7 8	audit quality of various levels of restrictions to tax services.	7 8	Just to echo some of Mike's comments, I think it is extremely important in the conduct of the audit, and
9	And while I think there was some unanimity	9	we've talked about the quality of the audit and the
10	this afternoon amongst this group on certain abusive tax shelter arrangements, I think there is still	10	importance of the tax function to the quality of the audit going forward, that the persons that are brought
11 12	confusion as to definitional issues of other types of	11 12	to bear in the conduct of the audit are also those
13	services, and some comments I made earlier about not	13	persons that have been the advisors along the way
14	only tax expertise, but knowledgeable tax expertise,	14	throughout the year that have provided insight when the
15	knowledgeable about the client's facts and	15 16	client seeks an understanding, a better understanding
16 17	circumstances, the situation, particularly in complex environments of operating in 140 countries around the	10	of how the tax laws applied, that that person that's been involved in those consultations during the year or
18	world. It's important not only to have the tax experts	18	that group of persons is brought to bear in that final
19	certainly at the corporate headquarters knowledgeable	19	audit function, because they are, having been consulted
20	about how it's all coming together, but also to have	20	during the year, more aware of the issues that could
21 22	the knowledge spread around the world to advise the	21 22	arise or affect that determination, either at the end
22	auditors as the auditors carry out their responsibilities, but also to advise the client as	22 23	of the quarter or at the end of the year, whichever period they're brought in to review.
23	well.	24	Importantly, the compensation should be
25	And to the extent services become more	25	geared to their contribution to the quality of the

	Page 178		Page 180
1	audit and should be considered in the total	1	MS. RIVSHIN: Okay, there aren't any other
2	compensation during their annual reviews.	2	commenters. We will move on to the next section, and
3	MS. RIVSHIN: Damon Silvers.	3	I'm going to turn it over to my colleague, Greg Scates,
4	MR. SILVERS: I can't see how anyone could	4	to tee it off.
5	disagree with the notion that there ought to be some	5	MR. SCATES: The last series of questions has
6	tax experts involved in auditing tax matters. I think	6	to do with independence and auditor ethics. Regardless
7	what that tells you though is that because of the very	7	of how well the auditor performs the audit, investors
8	nature of the expertise involved, it's then vital that	8	will not have confidence in the quality of the audit if
9	that tax expert, to the extent that they're doing	9	they do not believe the auditor is independent.
10	anything other than auditing, is not doing anything	10	Investors may also question whether it is ethical for
11	other than auditing that would compromise the audit.	11	the auditor to provide a particular service, even if a
12	And it comes back around this question is	12 13	service does not impair the auditor's independence.
13 14	really a very deftly hidden loop back to much of this morning's discussion for that reason, that because you	13 14	That brings us to our next question. Do any of the services discussed today raise specific concerns
14	have to have tax expertise involved in the audit, and	14	about the auditor's appearance of independence? And do
16	then the real question is, what else are these tax	16	any of the services discussed today raise specific
17	experts doing for the rest of their time?	17	concerns about auditors' business ethics?
18	I'm not satisfied, I don't think, with the	18	Pat Walters.
19	notion that the tax expert is subordinate to the audit	19	MS. WALTERS: I mean, how could we answer
20	partner, because I think much of what the audit	20	anything other than yes? I think that certainly the
21	community has said today suggests that the audit	21	investor representatives around the table have been
22	partner, if they themselves are not a tax expert, may	22	pretty consistent across most of the questions that
23	be unable to figure out when the tax expert if the	23	have been raised today that everything really raises
24	tax expert is compromised, they may not really have the	24	concerns for us in terms of appearance as well as fact,
25	ability to oversee and correct that compromise because	25	and it's sort of difficult to know what to say after
	Page 179		Page 181
1		1	-
$\frac{1}{2}$	of the nature of the expertise involved.	$\frac{1}{2}$	that.
2	of the nature of the expertise involved. MS. RIVSHIN: Bruce Webb.	2	that. I guess the question about auditors' business
2 3	of the nature of the expertise involved. MS. RIVSHIN: Bruce Webb. MR. WEBB: Bruce Webb, McGladrey. I think		that. I guess the question about auditors' business ethics is perhaps more problematic, because it's
2	of the nature of the expertise involved. MS. RIVSHIN: Bruce Webb. MR. WEBB: Bruce Webb, McGladrey. I think it's just important that we recognize that issuers	2 3	that. I guess the question about auditors' business ethics is perhaps more problematic, because it's difficult for me as an investor to listen to the
2 3 4	of the nature of the expertise involved. MS. RIVSHIN: Bruce Webb. MR. WEBB: Bruce Webb, McGladrey. I think	2 3 4	that. I guess the question about auditors' business ethics is perhaps more problematic, because it's
2 3 4 5	of the nature of the expertise involved. MS. RIVSHIN: Bruce Webb. MR. WEBB: Bruce Webb, McGladrey. I think it's just important that we recognize that issuers often come to their auditors, at least if their	2 3 4 5	that. I guess the question about auditors' business ethics is perhaps more problematic, because it's difficult for me as an investor to listen to the arguments that I've listened to today that attempt to
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	of the nature of the expertise involved. MS. RIVSHIN: Bruce Webb. MR. WEBB: Bruce Webb, McGladrey. I think it's just important that we recognize that issuers often come to their auditors, at least if their auditors are their tax preparers, or if they're not, they probably come to both their auditor and their tax preparer in the course of contemplating a transaction	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	that. I guess the question about auditors' business ethics is perhaps more problematic, because it's difficult for me as an investor to listen to the arguments that I've listened to today that attempt to brush away the concerns that investors have. And I guess to go as far as to say I have concerns about their ethics is probably too far, but I'm puzzled that
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	of the nature of the expertise involved. MS. RIVSHIN: Bruce Webb. MR. WEBB: Bruce Webb, McGladrey. I think it's just important that we recognize that issuers often come to their auditors, at least if their auditors are their tax preparers, or if they're not, they probably come to both their auditor and their tax preparer in the course of contemplating a transaction or in the course of completing a transaction, to ask	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	that. I guess the question about auditors' business ethics is perhaps more problematic, because it's difficult for me as an investor to listen to the arguments that I've listened to today that attempt to brush away the concerns that investors have. And I guess to go as far as to say I have concerns about their ethics is probably too far, but I'm puzzled that the concerns that we have expressed on this wide
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	of the nature of the expertise involved. MS. RIVSHIN: Bruce Webb. MR. WEBB: Bruce Webb, McGladrey. I think it's just important that we recognize that issuers often come to their auditors, at least if their auditors are their tax preparers, or if they're not, they probably come to both their auditor and their tax preparer in the course of contemplating a transaction or in the course of completing a transaction, to ask their advice regarding how that transaction will be	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	that. I guess the question about auditors' business ethics is perhaps more problematic, because it's difficult for me as an investor to listen to the arguments that I've listened to today that attempt to brush away the concerns that investors have. And I guess to go as far as to say I have concerns about their ethics is probably too far, but I'm puzzled that the concerns that we have expressed on this wide variety of issues related to providing these particular
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	of the nature of the expertise involved. MS. RIVSHIN: Bruce Webb. MR. WEBB: Bruce Webb, McGladrey. I think it's just important that we recognize that issuers often come to their auditors, at least if their auditors are their tax preparers, or if they're not, they probably come to both their auditor and their tax preparer in the course of contemplating a transaction or in the course of completing a transaction, to ask their advice regarding how that transaction will be accounted for from both a tax and a GAAP perspective.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	that. I guess the question about auditors' business ethics is perhaps more problematic, because it's difficult for me as an investor to listen to the arguments that I've listened to today that attempt to brush away the concerns that investors have. And I guess to go as far as to say I have concerns about their ethics is probably too far, but I'm puzzled that the concerns that we have expressed on this wide variety of issues related to providing these particular kinds of services to issuers haven't really been heard.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	of the nature of the expertise involved. MS. RIVSHIN: Bruce Webb. MR. WEBB: Bruce Webb, McGladrey. I think it's just important that we recognize that issuers often come to their auditors, at least if their auditors are their tax preparers, or if they're not, they probably come to both their auditor and their tax preparer in the course of contemplating a transaction or in the course of completing a transaction, to ask their advice regarding how that transaction will be accounted for from both a tax and a GAAP perspective. And I think it would be a mistake to preclude an	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	that. I guess the question about auditors' business ethics is perhaps more problematic, because it's difficult for me as an investor to listen to the arguments that I've listened to today that attempt to brush away the concerns that investors have. And I guess to go as far as to say I have concerns about their ethics is probably too far, but I'm puzzled that the concerns that we have expressed on this wide variety of issues related to providing these particular kinds of services to issuers haven't really been heard. With that, I'll let the other guys have their chance.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	of the nature of the expertise involved. MS. RIVSHIN: Bruce Webb. MR. WEBB: Bruce Webb, McGladrey. I think it's just important that we recognize that issuers often come to their auditors, at least if their auditors are their tax preparers, or if they're not, they probably come to both their auditor and their tax preparer in the course of contemplating a transaction or in the course of completing a transaction, to ask their advice regarding how that transaction will be accounted for from both a tax and a GAAP perspective. And I think it would be a mistake to preclude an auditor from writing that advice. As I said this	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	that. I guess the question about auditors' business ethics is perhaps more problematic, because it's difficult for me as an investor to listen to the arguments that I've listened to today that attempt to brush away the concerns that investors have. And I guess to go as far as to say I have concerns about their ethics is probably too far, but I'm puzzled that the concerns that we have expressed on this wide variety of issues related to providing these particular kinds of services to issuers haven't really been heard. With that, I'll let the other guys have their chance. MR. SCATES: Barbara Roper.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	of the nature of the expertise involved. MS. RIVSHIN: Bruce Webb. MR. WEBB: Bruce Webb, McGladrey. I think it's just important that we recognize that issuers often come to their auditors, at least if their auditors are their tax preparers, or if they're not, they probably come to both their auditor and their tax preparer in the course of contemplating a transaction or in the course of completing a transaction, to ask their advice regarding how that transaction will be accounted for from both a tax and a GAAP perspective. And I think it would be a mistake to preclude an auditor from writing that advice. As I said this morning, I don't think auditing is something you come	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	that. I guess the question about auditors' business ethics is perhaps more problematic, because it's difficult for me as an investor to listen to the arguments that I've listened to today that attempt to brush away the concerns that investors have. And I guess to go as far as to say I have concerns about their ethics is probably too far, but I'm puzzled that the concerns that we have expressed on this wide variety of issues related to providing these particular kinds of services to issuers haven't really been heard. With that, I'll let the other guys have their chance. MR. SCATES: Barbara Roper. MS. ROPER: Rather than reiterate what I've
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	of the nature of the expertise involved. MS. RIVSHIN: Bruce Webb. MR. WEBB: Bruce Webb, McGladrey. I think it's just important that we recognize that issuers often come to their auditors, at least if their auditors are their tax preparers, or if they're not, they probably come to both their auditor and their tax preparer in the course of contemplating a transaction or in the course of completing a transaction, to ask their advice regarding how that transaction will be accounted for from both a tax and a GAAP perspective. And I think it would be a mistake to preclude an auditor from writing that advice. As I said this morning, I don't think auditing is something you come in and do at the end of the year after the client's	$ \begin{array}{c} 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13 \\ 14 \\ 15 \\ \end{array} $	that. I guess the question about auditors' business ethics is perhaps more problematic, because it's difficult for me as an investor to listen to the arguments that I've listened to today that attempt to brush away the concerns that investors have. And I guess to go as far as to say I have concerns about their ethics is probably too far, but I'm puzzled that the concerns that we have expressed on this wide variety of issues related to providing these particular kinds of services to issuers haven't really been heard. With that, I'll let the other guys have their chance. MR. SCATES: Barbara Roper. MS. ROPER: Rather than reiterate what I've said earlier, because I haven't exactly sat here
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	of the nature of the expertise involved. MS. RIVSHIN: Bruce Webb. MR. WEBB: Bruce Webb, McGladrey. I think it's just important that we recognize that issuers often come to their auditors, at least if their auditors are their tax preparers, or if they're not, they probably come to both their auditor and their tax preparer in the course of contemplating a transaction or in the course of completing a transaction, to ask their advice regarding how that transaction will be accounted for from both a tax and a GAAP perspective. And I think it would be a mistake to preclude an auditor from writing that advice. As I said this morning, I don't think auditing is something you come in and do at the end of the year after the client's fully completed their financial statements. I believe	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	that. I guess the question about auditors' business ethics is perhaps more problematic, because it's difficult for me as an investor to listen to the arguments that I've listened to today that attempt to brush away the concerns that investors have. And I guess to go as far as to say I have concerns about their ethics is probably too far, but I'm puzzled that the concerns that we have expressed on this wide variety of issues related to providing these particular kinds of services to issuers haven't really been heard. With that, I'll let the other guys have their chance. MR. SCATES: Barbara Roper. MS. ROPER: Rather than reiterate what I've said earlier, because I haven't exactly sat here quietly, I'd just like to add one area that we haven't
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	of the nature of the expertise involved. MS. RIVSHIN: Bruce Webb. MR. WEBB: Bruce Webb, McGladrey. I think it's just important that we recognize that issuers often come to their auditors, at least if their auditors are their tax preparers, or if they're not, they probably come to both their auditor and their tax preparer in the course of contemplating a transaction or in the course of completing a transaction, to ask their advice regarding how that transaction will be accounted for from both a tax and a GAAP perspective. And I think it would be a mistake to preclude an auditor from writing that advice. As I said this morning, I don't think auditing is something you come in and do at the end of the year after the client's	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	that. I guess the question about auditors' business ethics is perhaps more problematic, because it's difficult for me as an investor to listen to the arguments that I've listened to today that attempt to brush away the concerns that investors have. And I guess to go as far as to say I have concerns about their ethics is probably too far, but I'm puzzled that the concerns that we have expressed on this wide variety of issues related to providing these particular kinds of services to issuers haven't really been heard. With that, I'll let the other guys have their chance. MR. SCATES: Barbara Roper. MS. ROPER: Rather than reiterate what I've said earlier, because I haven't exactly sat here
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	of the nature of the expertise involved. MS. RIVSHIN: Bruce Webb. MR. WEBB: Bruce Webb, McGladrey. I think it's just important that we recognize that issuers often come to their auditors, at least if their auditors are their tax preparers, or if they're not, they probably come to both their auditor and their tax preparer in the course of contemplating a transaction or in the course of completing a transaction, to ask their advice regarding how that transaction will be accounted for from both a tax and a GAAP perspective. And I think it would be a mistake to preclude an auditor from writing that advice. As I said this morning, I don't think auditing is something you come in and do at the end of the year after the client's fully completed their financial statements. I believe it's more of a continuous process.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	that. I guess the question about auditors' business ethics is perhaps more problematic, because it's difficult for me as an investor to listen to the arguments that I've listened to today that attempt to brush away the concerns that investors have. And I guess to go as far as to say I have concerns about their ethics is probably too far, but I'm puzzled that the concerns that we have expressed on this wide variety of issues related to providing these particular kinds of services to issuers haven't really been heard. With that, I'll let the other guys have their chance. MR. SCATES: Barbara Roper. MS. ROPER: Rather than reiterate what I've said earlier, because I haven't exactly sat here quietly, I'd just like to add one area that we haven't discussed or haven't discussed much, which is how you
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	of the nature of the expertise involved. MS. RIVSHIN: Bruce Webb. MR. WEBB: Bruce Webb, McGladrey. I think it's just important that we recognize that issuers often come to their auditors, at least if their auditors are their tax preparers, or if they're not, they probably come to both their auditor and their tax preparer in the course of contemplating a transaction or in the course of completing a transaction, to ask their advice regarding how that transaction will be accounted for from both a tax and a GAAP perspective. And I think it would be a mistake to preclude an auditor from writing that advice. As I said this morning, I don't think auditing is something you come in and do at the end of the year after the client's fully completed their financial statements. I believe it's more of a continuous process. I think it is the line between providing	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	that. I guess the question about auditors' business ethics is perhaps more problematic, because it's difficult for me as an investor to listen to the arguments that I've listened to today that attempt to brush away the concerns that investors have. And I guess to go as far as to say I have concerns about their ethics is probably too far, but I'm puzzled that the concerns that we have expressed on this wide variety of issues related to providing these particular kinds of services to issuers haven't really been heard. With that, I'll let the other guys have their chance. MR. SCATES: Barbara Roper. MS. ROPER: Rather than reiterate what I've said earlier, because I haven't exactly sat here quietly, I'd just like to add one area that we haven't discussed or haven't discussed much, which is how you look at the question of audit and non-audit fees. And
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	of the nature of the expertise involved. MS. RIVSHIN: Bruce Webb. MR. WEBB: Bruce Webb, McGladrey. I think it's just important that we recognize that issuers often come to their auditors, at least if their auditors are their tax preparers, or if they're not, they probably come to both their auditor and their tax preparer in the course of contemplating a transaction or in the course of completing a transaction, to ask their advice regarding how that transaction will be accounted for from both a tax and a GAAP perspective. And I think it would be a mistake to preclude an auditor from writing that advice. As I said this morning, I don't think auditing is something you come in and do at the end of the year after the client's fully completed their financial statements. I believe it's more of a continuous process. I think it is the line between providing advice and performing audit procedures can get blurred at times, but I think auditors can be independent and objective in discharging their responsibilities. As a	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	that. I guess the question about auditors' business ethics is perhaps more problematic, because it's difficult for me as an investor to listen to the arguments that I've listened to today that attempt to brush away the concerns that investors have. And I guess to go as far as to say I have concerns about their ethics is probably too far, but I'm puzzled that the concerns that we have expressed on this wide variety of issues related to providing these particular kinds of services to issuers haven't really been heard. With that, I'll let the other guys have their chance. MR. SCATES: Barbara Roper. MS. ROPER: Rather than reiterate what I've said earlier, because I haven't exactly sat here quietly, I'd just like to add one area that we haven't discussed or haven't discussed much, which is how you look at the question of audit and non-audit fees. And in at least one instance we've seen an audit firm advising its audit clients to lump the audit services, the fees for audit services, audit-related service, and
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	of the nature of the expertise involved. MS. RIVSHIN: Bruce Webb. MR. WEBB: Bruce Webb, McGladrey. I think it's just important that we recognize that issuers often come to their auditors, at least if their auditors are their tax preparers, or if they're not, they probably come to both their auditor and their tax preparer in the course of contemplating a transaction or in the course of completing a transaction, to ask their advice regarding how that transaction will be accounted for from both a tax and a GAAP perspective. And I think it would be a mistake to preclude an auditor from writing that advice. As I said this morning, I don't think auditing is something you come in and do at the end of the year after the client's fully completed their financial statements. I believe it's more of a continuous process. I think it is the line between providing advice and performing audit procedures can get blurred at times, but I think auditors can be independent and objective in discharging their responsibilities. As a matter of fact, under our code of conduct auditors are	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	that. I guess the question about auditors' business ethics is perhaps more problematic, because it's difficult for me as an investor to listen to the arguments that I've listened to today that attempt to brush away the concerns that investors have. And I guess to go as far as to say I have concerns about their ethics is probably too far, but I'm puzzled that the concerns that we have expressed on this wide variety of issues related to providing these particular kinds of services to issuers haven't really been heard. With that, I'll let the other guys have their chance. MR. SCATES: Barbara Roper. MS. ROPER: Rather than reiterate what I've said earlier, because I haven't exactly sat here quietly, I'd just like to add one area that we haven't discussed or haven't discussed much, which is how you look at the question of audit and non-audit fees. And in at least one instance we've seen an audit firm advising its audit clients to lump the audit services, the fees for audit services, audit-related service, and tax services on one side of the equation, except for
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	of the nature of the expertise involved. MS. RIVSHIN: Bruce Webb. MR. WEBB: Bruce Webb, McGladrey. I think it's just important that we recognize that issuers often come to their auditors, at least if their auditors are their tax preparers, or if they're not, they probably come to both their auditor and their tax preparer in the course of contemplating a transaction or in the course of completing a transaction, to ask their advice regarding how that transaction will be accounted for from both a tax and a GAAP perspective. And I think it would be a mistake to preclude an auditor from writing that advice. As I said this morning, I don't think auditing is something you come in and do at the end of the year after the client's fully completed their financial statements. I believe it's more of a continuous process. I think it is the line between providing advice and performing audit procedures can get blurred at times, but I think auditors can be independent and objective in discharging their responsibilities. As a matter of fact, under our code of conduct auditors are required or tax preparers for that matter any CPA	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	that. I guess the question about auditors' business ethics is perhaps more problematic, because it's difficult for me as an investor to listen to the arguments that I've listened to today that attempt to brush away the concerns that investors have. And I guess to go as far as to say I have concerns about their ethics is probably too far, but I'm puzzled that the concerns that we have expressed on this wide variety of issues related to providing these particular kinds of services to issuers haven't really been heard. With that, I'll let the other guys have their chance. MR. SCATES: Barbara Roper. MS. ROPER: Rather than reiterate what I've said earlier, because I haven't exactly sat here quietly, I'd just like to add one area that we haven't discussed or haven't discussed much, which is how you look at the question of audit and non-audit fees. And in at least one instance we've seen an audit firm advising its audit clients to lump the audit services, the fees for audit services, audit-related service, and tax services on one side of the equation, except for tax shelter services, and then leave just the little
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	of the nature of the expertise involved. MS. RIVSHIN: Bruce Webb. MR. WEBB: Bruce Webb, McGladrey. I think it's just important that we recognize that issuers often come to their auditors, at least if their auditors are their tax preparers, or if they're not, they probably come to both their auditor and their tax preparer in the course of contemplating a transaction or in the course of completing a transaction, to ask their advice regarding how that transaction will be accounted for from both a tax and a GAAP perspective. And I think it would be a mistake to preclude an auditor from writing that advice. As I said this morning, I don't think auditing is something you come in and do at the end of the year after the client's fully completed their financial statements. I believe it's more of a continuous process. I think it is the line between providing advice and performing audit procedures can get blurred at times, but I think auditors can be independent and objective in discharging their responsibilities. As a matter of fact, under our code of conduct auditors are	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	that. I guess the question about auditors' business ethics is perhaps more problematic, because it's difficult for me as an investor to listen to the arguments that I've listened to today that attempt to brush away the concerns that investors have. And I guess to go as far as to say I have concerns about their ethics is probably too far, but I'm puzzled that the concerns that we have expressed on this wide variety of issues related to providing these particular kinds of services to issuers haven't really been heard. With that, I'll let the other guys have their chance. MR. SCATES: Barbara Roper. MS. ROPER: Rather than reiterate what I've said earlier, because I haven't exactly sat here quietly, I'd just like to add one area that we haven't discussed or haven't discussed much, which is how you look at the question of audit and non-audit fees. And in at least one instance we've seen an audit firm advising its audit clients to lump the audit services, the fees for audit services, audit-related service, and tax services on one side of the equation, except for

46 (Pages 178 to 181)

		1	
	Page 182		Page 184
1	create a potential independence problem.	1	and I think some guidance around, definitional guidance
2	And so in addition to questions about method	2	around that, would also be helpful to companies.
3	of compensation, which we touched on briefly, I think	3	And I think lastly we can't forget that the
4	this issue of how you balance the auditor's financial	4	audit committee, that that sort of stopgap of having
5	dependence on that client needs to be measured very	5	all of this go to the audit committee is a relevant and
6 7	differently, and it needs to be measured with only those services that are directly related to the audit	6 7	important piece of the puzzle here. MR. SCATES: Pat Walters.
8	on one side of the equation, and everything else on the	8	MS. WALTERS: There is something I would like
9	other side of the equation, when you decide whether the	9	to add and it does have to do with a conversation I had
10	audit firm has too much at stake in other services to	10	with David during the break. I think that, well, at
11	risk losing this audit client.	11	least I have been persuaded that there are activities
12	MR. SCATES: Elliot Schwartz.	12	that occur in decision-making about tax and other
13	MR. SCHWARTZ: Well, of course I agree with	13	strategies that happen during the year that the auditor
14	Pat that the answer here is, of course, all of these	14	needs to be and I'm going to use this term again,
15	services raise questions. And one thing I wish I had	15	even though it's fuzzy involved in, so that they
16	raised at the very beginning when we were talking about	16	have the requisite knowledge in order to perform an
17	the four principles was the first one, which is the	17	effective audit, and an effective audit would be an
18	principle of whether a relationship creates a mutual or	18	independent audit.
19 20	conflicting interest, and I would have added the appearance of a conflicting interest, because I think	19 20	Part of that obviously would be to have a tax specialist as part of the audit team. To me, all of
20	the appearance is one that is also important, it's one	20	those activities are audit services, they are not tax
$\frac{21}{22}$	that we've talked about. And I don't want to impugn	$\frac{21}{22}$	services. And it's important to get to the fee
23	anybody's ethics, but it's very difficult for investors	23	question that Barbara raised that those kinds of
24	to know with certainty that an audit is independent,	24	services be included in the audit fee and not in a tax
25	that it is done consistent with integrity of the	25	services or some other fee, so that it is clear that
-			
	Decc 192		Daga 195
	Page 183		Page 185
1	auditor, and I think actually toughening up the initial	1	when the tax professionals are engaged in these
2	auditor, and I think actually toughening up the initial standards would help some.	2	when the tax professionals are engaged in these activities, that they are engaged to the benefit of the
2 3	auditor, and I think actually toughening up the initial standards would help some. MR. SCATES: Colleen Sayther.	2 3	when the tax professionals are engaged in these activities, that they are engaged to the benefit of the auditor and the audit, and not to the benefit of the
2 3 4	auditor, and I think actually toughening up the initial standards would help some. MR. SCATES: Colleen Sayther. MS. SAYTHER: Colleen Sayther, Financial	2 3 4	when the tax professionals are engaged in these activities, that they are engaged to the benefit of the auditor and the audit, and not to the benefit of the company necessarily and its decision-making as
2 3 4 5	auditor, and I think actually toughening up the initial standards would help some. MR. SCATES: Colleen Sayther. MS. SAYTHER: Colleen Sayther, Financial Executives International. I think we have to keep in	2 3 4 5	when the tax professionals are engaged in these activities, that they are engaged to the benefit of the auditor and the audit, and not to the benefit of the company necessarily and its decision-making as managers, and that those particular aspects of the
2 3 4 5 6	auditor, and I think actually toughening up the initial standards would help some. MR. SCATES: Colleen Sayther. MS. SAYTHER: Colleen Sayther, Financial Executives International. I think we have to keep in mind we all have the same goal, and that's to enhance	2 3 4 5 6	when the tax professionals are engaged in these activities, that they are engaged to the benefit of the auditor and the audit, and not to the benefit of the company necessarily and its decision-making as managers, and that those particular aspects of the discussion today I think is the important aspect for
2 3 4 5	auditor, and I think actually toughening up the initial standards would help some. MR. SCATES: Colleen Sayther. MS. SAYTHER: Colleen Sayther, Financial Executives International. I think we have to keep in mind we all have the same goal, and that's to enhance the quality and integrity of the financial statements	2 3 4 5	when the tax professionals are engaged in these activities, that they are engaged to the benefit of the auditor and the audit, and not to the benefit of the company necessarily and its decision-making as managers, and that those particular aspects of the discussion today I think is the important aspect for the Board to define and describe so that there's a
2 3 4 5 6 7	auditor, and I think actually toughening up the initial standards would help some. MR. SCATES: Colleen Sayther. MS. SAYTHER: Colleen Sayther, Financial Executives International. I think we have to keep in mind we all have the same goal, and that's to enhance	2 3 4 5 6 7	when the tax professionals are engaged in these activities, that they are engaged to the benefit of the auditor and the audit, and not to the benefit of the company necessarily and its decision-making as managers, and that those particular aspects of the discussion today I think is the important aspect for
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	auditor, and I think actually toughening up the initial standards would help some. MR. SCATES: Colleen Sayther. MS. SAYTHER: Colleen Sayther, Financial Executives International. I think we have to keep in mind we all have the same goal, and that's to enhance the quality and integrity of the financial statements and the audit. And I think that having the audit firm perform certain tax services enhances the quality of the audit, as we've stated several times today. It	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	when the tax professionals are engaged in these activities, that they are engaged to the benefit of the auditor and the audit, and not to the benefit of the company necessarily and its decision-making as managers, and that those particular aspects of the discussion today I think is the important aspect for the Board to define and describe so that there's a clear understanding, not only by issuers and auditors, but by investors, as to what particular tax activities is appropriate for an auditor to engage in in order to
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	auditor, and I think actually toughening up the initial standards would help some. MR. SCATES: Colleen Sayther. MS. SAYTHER: Colleen Sayther, Financial Executives International. I think we have to keep in mind we all have the same goal, and that's to enhance the quality and integrity of the financial statements and the audit. And I think that having the audit firm perform certain tax services enhances the quality of the audit, as we've stated several times today. It enables the knowledge spill-over and enhanced	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	when the tax professionals are engaged in these activities, that they are engaged to the benefit of the auditor and the audit, and not to the benefit of the company necessarily and its decision-making as managers, and that those particular aspects of the discussion today I think is the important aspect for the Board to define and describe so that there's a clear understanding, not only by issuers and auditors, but by investors, as to what particular tax activities is appropriate for an auditor to engage in in order to enhance their independence and objectivity and to
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	auditor, and I think actually toughening up the initial standards would help some. MR. SCATES: Colleen Sayther. MS. SAYTHER: Colleen Sayther, Financial Executives International. I think we have to keep in mind we all have the same goal, and that's to enhance the quality and integrity of the financial statements and the audit. And I think that having the audit firm perform certain tax services enhances the quality of the audit, as we've stated several times today. It enables the knowledge spill-over and enhanced communication between the tax side and the audit side,	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	when the tax professionals are engaged in these activities, that they are engaged to the benefit of the auditor and the audit, and not to the benefit of the company necessarily and its decision-making as managers, and that those particular aspects of the discussion today I think is the important aspect for the Board to define and describe so that there's a clear understanding, not only by issuers and auditors, but by investors, as to what particular tax activities is appropriate for an auditor to engage in in order to enhance their independence and objectivity and to enhance the effectiveness in the audit, and what kinds
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	auditor, and I think actually toughening up the initial standards would help some. MR. SCATES: Colleen Sayther. MS. SAYTHER: Colleen Sayther, Financial Executives International. I think we have to keep in mind we all have the same goal, and that's to enhance the quality and integrity of the financial statements and the audit. And I think that having the audit firm perform certain tax services enhances the quality of the audit, as we've stated several times today. It enables the knowledge spill-over and enhanced communication between the tax side and the audit side, and in most cases I won't use the term always	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	when the tax professionals are engaged in these activities, that they are engaged to the benefit of the auditor and the audit, and not to the benefit of the company necessarily and its decision-making as managers, and that those particular aspects of the discussion today I think is the important aspect for the Board to define and describe so that there's a clear understanding, not only by issuers and auditors, but by investors, as to what particular tax activities is appropriate for an auditor to engage in in order to enhance their independence and objectivity and to enhance the effectiveness in the audit, and what kinds of activities are inappropriate because they compromise
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	auditor, and I think actually toughening up the initial standards would help some. MR. SCATES: Colleen Sayther. MS. SAYTHER: Colleen Sayther, Financial Executives International. I think we have to keep in mind we all have the same goal, and that's to enhance the quality and integrity of the financial statements and the audit. And I think that having the audit firm perform certain tax services enhances the quality of the audit, as we've stated several times today. It enables the knowledge spill-over and enhanced communication between the tax side and the audit side, and in most cases I won't use the term always it's more efficient.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	when the tax professionals are engaged in these activities, that they are engaged to the benefit of the auditor and the audit, and not to the benefit of the company necessarily and its decision-making as managers, and that those particular aspects of the discussion today I think is the important aspect for the Board to define and describe so that there's a clear understanding, not only by issuers and auditors, but by investors, as to what particular tax activities is appropriate for an auditor to engage in in order to enhance their independence and objectivity and to enhance the effectiveness in the audit, and what kinds of activities are inappropriate because they compromise the independence and objectivity of the audit.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	auditor, and I think actually toughening up the initial standards would help some. MR. SCATES: Colleen Sayther. MS. SAYTHER: Colleen Sayther, Financial Executives International. I think we have to keep in mind we all have the same goal, and that's to enhance the quality and integrity of the financial statements and the audit. And I think that having the audit firm perform certain tax services enhances the quality of the audit, as we've stated several times today. It enables the knowledge spill-over and enhanced communication between the tax side and the audit side, and in most cases I won't use the term always it's more efficient. I'm also familiar with the study that Jim	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	when the tax professionals are engaged in these activities, that they are engaged to the benefit of the auditor and the audit, and not to the benefit of the company necessarily and its decision-making as managers, and that those particular aspects of the discussion today I think is the important aspect for the Board to define and describe so that there's a clear understanding, not only by issuers and auditors, but by investors, as to what particular tax activities is appropriate for an auditor to engage in in order to enhance their independence and objectivity and to enhance the effectiveness in the audit, and what kinds of activities are inappropriate because they compromise the independence and objectivity of the audit. MR. SCATES: Mike Gagnon.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	auditor, and I think actually toughening up the initial standards would help some. MR. SCATES: Colleen Sayther. MS. SAYTHER: Colleen Sayther, Financial Executives International. I think we have to keep in mind we all have the same goal, and that's to enhance the quality and integrity of the financial statements and the audit. And I think that having the audit firm perform certain tax services enhances the quality of the audit, as we've stated several times today. It enables the knowledge spill-over and enhanced communication between the tax side and the audit side, and in most cases I won't use the term always it's more efficient. I'm also familiar with the study that Jim Brown mentioned earlier by three well-respected	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	when the tax professionals are engaged in these activities, that they are engaged to the benefit of the auditor and the audit, and not to the benefit of the company necessarily and its decision-making as managers, and that those particular aspects of the discussion today I think is the important aspect for the Board to define and describe so that there's a clear understanding, not only by issuers and auditors, but by investors, as to what particular tax activities is appropriate for an auditor to engage in in order to enhance their independence and objectivity and to enhance the effectiveness in the audit, and what kinds of activities are inappropriate because they compromise the independence and objectivity of the audit. MR. SCATES: Mike Gagnon. MR. GAGNON: I think that the discussion now
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	auditor, and I think actually toughening up the initial standards would help some. MR. SCATES: Colleen Sayther. MS. SAYTHER: Colleen Sayther, Financial Executives International. I think we have to keep in mind we all have the same goal, and that's to enhance the quality and integrity of the financial statements and the audit. And I think that having the audit firm perform certain tax services enhances the quality of the audit, as we've stated several times today. It enables the knowledge spill-over and enhanced communication between the tax side and the audit side, and in most cases I won't use the term always it's more efficient. I'm also familiar with the study that Jim Brown mentioned earlier by three well-respected academics, which correlated the provision of tax	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	when the tax professionals are engaged in these activities, that they are engaged to the benefit of the auditor and the audit, and not to the benefit of the company necessarily and its decision-making as managers, and that those particular aspects of the discussion today I think is the important aspect for the Board to define and describe so that there's a clear understanding, not only by issuers and auditors, but by investors, as to what particular tax activities is appropriate for an auditor to engage in in order to enhance their independence and objectivity and to enhance the effectiveness in the audit, and what kinds of activities are inappropriate because they compromise the independence and objectivity of the audit. MR. SCATES: Mike Gagnon. MR. GAGNON: I think that the discussion now about appearance or appearances related to auditor
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	auditor, and I think actually toughening up the initial standards would help some. MR. SCATES: Colleen Sayther. MS. SAYTHER: Colleen Sayther, Financial Executives International. I think we have to keep in mind we all have the same goal, and that's to enhance the quality and integrity of the financial statements and the audit. And I think that having the audit firm perform certain tax services enhances the quality of the audit, as we've stated several times today. It enables the knowledge spill-over and enhanced communication between the tax side and the audit side, and in most cases I won't use the term always it's more efficient. I'm also familiar with the study that Jim Brown mentioned earlier by three well-respected	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	when the tax professionals are engaged in these activities, that they are engaged to the benefit of the auditor and the audit, and not to the benefit of the company necessarily and its decision-making as managers, and that those particular aspects of the discussion today I think is the important aspect for the Board to define and describe so that there's a clear understanding, not only by issuers and auditors, but by investors, as to what particular tax activities is appropriate for an auditor to engage in in order to enhance their independence and objectivity and to enhance the effectiveness in the audit, and what kinds of activities are inappropriate because they compromise the independence and objectivity of the audit. MR. SCATES: Mike Gagnon. MR. GAGNON: I think that the discussion now
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	auditor, and I think actually toughening up the initial standards would help some. MR. SCATES: Colleen Sayther. MS. SAYTHER: Colleen Sayther, Financial Executives International. I think we have to keep in mind we all have the same goal, and that's to enhance the quality and integrity of the financial statements and the audit. And I think that having the audit firm perform certain tax services enhances the quality of the audit, as we've stated several times today. It enables the knowledge spill-over and enhanced communication between the tax side and the audit side, and in most cases I won't use the term always it's more efficient. I'm also familiar with the study that Jim Brown mentioned earlier by three well-respected academics, which correlated the provision of tax services with less audit restatements, and I encourage	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	when the tax professionals are engaged in these activities, that they are engaged to the benefit of the auditor and the audit, and not to the benefit of the company necessarily and its decision-making as managers, and that those particular aspects of the discussion today I think is the important aspect for the Board to define and describe so that there's a clear understanding, not only by issuers and auditors, but by investors, as to what particular tax activities is appropriate for an auditor to engage in in order to enhance their independence and objectivity and to enhance the effectiveness in the audit, and what kinds of activities are inappropriate because they compromise the independence and objectivity of the audit. MR. SCATES: Mike Gagnon. MR. GAGNON: I think that the discussion now about appearance or appearances related to auditor independence is an important one, and would go back
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	auditor, and I think actually toughening up the initial standards would help some. MR. SCATES: Colleen Sayther. MS. SAYTHER: Colleen Sayther, Financial Executives International. I think we have to keep in mind we all have the same goal, and that's to enhance the quality and integrity of the financial statements and the audit. And I think that having the audit firm perform certain tax services enhances the quality of the audit, as we've stated several times today. It enables the knowledge spill-over and enhanced communication between the tax side and the audit side, and in most cases I won't use the term always it's more efficient. I'm also familiar with the study that Jim Brown mentioned earlier by three well-respected academics, which correlated the provision of tax services with less audit restatements, and I encourage the Board to take a look at that study as they determine what route to take going forward on this, keeping the goal of enhanced quality and integrity of	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	when the tax professionals are engaged in these activities, that they are engaged to the benefit of the auditor and the audit, and not to the benefit of the company necessarily and its decision-making as managers, and that those particular aspects of the discussion today I think is the important aspect for the Board to define and describe so that there's a clear understanding, not only by issuers and auditors, but by investors, as to what particular tax activities is appropriate for an auditor to engage in in order to enhance their independence and objectivity and to enhance the effectiveness in the audit, and what kinds of activities are inappropriate because they compromise the independence and objectivity of the audit. MR. SCATES: Mike Gagnon. MR. GAGNON: I think that the discussion now about appearance or appearances related to auditor independence is an important one, and would go back actually, Pat, to some of the comments you made before the break at lunch in the context of as well as this afternoon in that some of the appearance concerns
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	auditor, and I think actually toughening up the initial standards would help some. MR. SCATES: Colleen Sayther. MS. SAYTHER: Colleen Sayther, Financial Executives International. I think we have to keep in mind we all have the same goal, and that's to enhance the quality and integrity of the financial statements and the audit. And I think that having the audit firm perform certain tax services enhances the quality of the audit, as we've stated several times today. It enables the knowledge spill-over and enhanced communication between the tax side and the audit side, and in most cases I won't use the term always it's more efficient. I'm also familiar with the study that Jim Brown mentioned earlier by three well-respected academics, which correlated the provision of tax services with less audit restatements, and I encourage the Board to take a look at that study as they determine what route to take going forward on this, keeping the goal of enhanced quality and integrity of the audit in mind.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	when the tax professionals are engaged in these activities, that they are engaged to the benefit of the auditor and the audit, and not to the benefit of the company necessarily and its decision-making as managers, and that those particular aspects of the discussion today I think is the important aspect for the Board to define and describe so that there's a clear understanding, not only by issuers and auditors, but by investors, as to what particular tax activities is appropriate for an auditor to engage in in order to enhance their independence and objectivity and to enhance the effectiveness in the audit, and what kinds of activities are inappropriate because they compromise the independence and objectivity of the audit. MR. SCATES: Mike Gagnon. MR. GAGNON: I think that the discussion now about appearance or appearances related to auditor independence is an important one, and would go back actually, Pat, to some of the comments you made before the break at lunch in the context of as well as this afternoon in that some of the appearance concerns appear to be downplayed or brushed aside. And I would
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	auditor, and I think actually toughening up the initial standards would help some. MR. SCATES: Colleen Sayther. MS. SAYTHER: Colleen Sayther, Financial Executives International. I think we have to keep in mind we all have the same goal, and that's to enhance the quality and integrity of the financial statements and the audit. And I think that having the audit firm perform certain tax services enhances the quality of the audit, as we've stated several times today. It enables the knowledge spill-over and enhanced communication between the tax side and the audit side, and in most cases I won't use the term always it's more efficient. I'm also familiar with the study that Jim Brown mentioned earlier by three well-respected academics, which correlated the provision of tax services with less audit restatements, and I encourage the Board to take a look at that study as they determine what route to take going forward on this, keeping the goal of enhanced quality and integrity of the audit in mind. I think some of the issues that came up today	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	when the tax professionals are engaged in these activities, that they are engaged to the benefit of the auditor and the audit, and not to the benefit of the company necessarily and its decision-making as managers, and that those particular aspects of the discussion today I think is the important aspect for the Board to define and describe so that there's a clear understanding, not only by issuers and auditors, but by investors, as to what particular tax activities is appropriate for an auditor to engage in in order to enhance their independence and objectivity and to enhance the effectiveness in the audit, and what kinds of activities are inappropriate because they compromise the independence and objectivity of the audit. MR. SCATES: Mike Gagnon. MR. GAGNON: I think that the discussion now about appearance or appearances related to auditor independence is an important one, and would go back actually, Pat, to some of the comments you made before the break at lunch in the context of as well as this afternoon in that some of the appearance concerns appear to be downplayed or brushed aside. And I would tell you, at least from my own perspective, that
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	auditor, and I think actually toughening up the initial standards would help some. MR. SCATES: Colleen Sayther. MS. SAYTHER: Colleen Sayther, Financial Executives International. I think we have to keep in mind we all have the same goal, and that's to enhance the quality and integrity of the financial statements and the audit. And I think that having the audit firm perform certain tax services enhances the quality of the audit, as we've stated several times today. It enables the knowledge spill-over and enhanced communication between the tax side and the audit side, and in most cases I won't use the term always it's more efficient. I'm also familiar with the study that Jim Brown mentioned earlier by three well-respected academics, which correlated the provision of tax services with less audit restatements, and I encourage the Board to take a look at that study as they determine what route to take going forward on this, keeping the goal of enhanced quality and integrity of the audit in mind.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	when the tax professionals are engaged in these activities, that they are engaged to the benefit of the auditor and the audit, and not to the benefit of the company necessarily and its decision-making as managers, and that those particular aspects of the discussion today I think is the important aspect for the Board to define and describe so that there's a clear understanding, not only by issuers and auditors, but by investors, as to what particular tax activities is appropriate for an auditor to engage in in order to enhance their independence and objectivity and to enhance the effectiveness in the audit, and what kinds of activities are inappropriate because they compromise the independence and objectivity of the audit. MR. SCATES: Mike Gagnon. MR. GAGNON: I think that the discussion now about appearance or appearances related to auditor independence is an important one, and would go back actually, Pat, to some of the comments you made before the break at lunch in the context of as well as this afternoon in that some of the appearance concerns appear to be downplayed or brushed aside. And I would

	tt usining	,	
	Page 186		Page 188
$\begin{array}{c}1\\1\\2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\\23\\24\\25\end{array}$	acknowledged by virtue of the fact of the people in the room this afternoon that we all consider them very serious issues, but nonetheless, very complex issues, and complex in the sense of the intertwine between some of the independence issues that we've talked about today, which are very difficult to sort of get your arms around in the context of tax services broadly, but more specifically, the interplay between those services and what is also critical to investor confidence and protection and integrity, that is, the basic audit itself and the integrity of the audit and the quality of the audit. And the interplay between those two they're not separate concepts, they're intertwined are very important. If I have it correctly, I think that part of the perhaps it's an impression that sort of audit firms are here this afternoon wanting to do this work, I think was some of the commentary and there's no question that firms like ours do possess and have deeply credentialed expertise to provide the service. Providing that service though in all instances to all audit clients, at least for my firm, is not the driving force here. The marketplace is certainly shifting these services, and it is important, as Colleen just mentioned, that audit committee oversight here and	$\begin{array}{c}1\\2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\\23\\24\\25\end{array}$	on fee disclosures that I think today there is very clear guidance provided, requirements provided, in terms of the categories of fee disclosures. I personally believe that those disclosures are very informative in the manner that they are now presented today. I certainly believe they ought to be full disclosures, and to the extent that there's an ambiguity or an interplay there, that ought to be corrected. But I do think the disclosures today in terms of the categories are fairly clear and fairly uniformly applies. MR. SCATES: Scott Bayless. MR. BAYLESS: Scott Bayless, Deloitte. In terms of just responding to some of the comments that have been made, certainly the firms are here today, particularly Deloitte, because of the importance of independence, because of the importance of audit quality, and the importance of tax services in connection with audit quality. We believe that they're integrally tied together and that we want to protect the integrity of our audits, protect the importance of investors of these audits. Certainly the firms have undertaken and continue to expend millions of dollars in funds and resources to ensure independence and to maintain
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	Page 187 consideration of the very important independence matters we've talked about this afternoon is changing the way businesses operate. In my judgement at least, some of those considerations are need to also encompass the basic principles of independence we've talked about as well as the O'Malley principles that we've also alluded to earlier. I am concerned about what I would guess I would call unintended consequences in the sense of we want to make sure that to serve the public interest in this market, that we continue to preserve the required and knowledgeable expertise in our firms to make sure that we can get the job done and get the job done properly and correctly. And that's a balancing factor in my mind that complicates this question, complicates it significantly. But I wouldn't want the impression provided that this is sort of all about business. It's not. Audit quality if of paramount importance here. Independence goes hand in hand with audit quality. But it is a very complex and a very difficult discussion that at least in my mind wouldn't lend itself necessarily to sort of bright line tests. One last point. In terms of fee disclosures,	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	Page 189 independence with respect to SEC audit clients, and we would encourage the Board to consider, as it reviews these issues, certainly that there are scenarios in which services, we believe, are strictly out of bounds. I think we've talked about various provisions today, transactions that would include no business purpose, or that were purely tax motivated with no basis in the code, as criteria that would clearly place services out of bounds, but that the Board be measured in terms of looking at those services that are tax compliance, tax advice oriented, because those are integral, we feel, to the conduct of audits. MR. SCATES: Lynn Turner. MR. TURNER: There's been a number of business ethics raised on the front page of the newspapers in recent years because of some of the auditors' involvement with compensation or tax shelter-type issues, and I don't think any of those have played out well for the profession in the public eyes. And I think there are some very significant business ethic issues here that go beyond even where you decide, if you decide to make a cut, that are very important. I've heard people, Chairman McDonough, give a speech more than once about getting it done right, and I think

	Page 190		Page 192
1	But you're also asking an awful lot of people	1	We didn't talk about the fee structures for those, but
2	here, because you've got a very regulated entity on the	2	some of them weren't based on an hourly rate, it was
3	audit side now underneath the same corporation and	3	based on you're getting so much back, so I share in
4	within the same under the same roof as you do a non-	4	that largess. And there's something frankly
5	regulated entity, and that's the tax people. And	5	fundamentally wrong with that.
6	you're now asking talking about asking the tax	6	On the other side of the spectrum today, we
7	people to switch that hat from time to time between	7	were speaking about preparing a tax return for an
8	when they are advocating the interest of a particular	8	expatriate, which I guess I view somewhat as a
9	tax client vis-a-vis advocating the interest for an	9	ministerial duty. We've asked this employee to go
10	investor. That is not an easy switch to make as they	10	abroad, you know, there's a lot of complex issues, they
11	go about their business day to day. That's a difficult	11	already have enough on their plate, so we'll provide
12	thing to ask of very good people.	12	this service to the employee. It's not quite like day
13	And so I think part of what you need to think	13	care, but it's like providing a fringe benefit or a
14	about as you decide what to do here is not only where	14	benefit to the employee.
15	you might make some cuts on tax services that are not	15	I think the Board is going to have to kind of
16	okay, but how do you also provide the support for some	16	focus in on what are the more important areas, what are
17	of the tax people to make sure that they are able to	17	those things that really drive behavior. One thing the
18	switch that hat back and forth in an appropriate	18	Board has that was never really in play before is a
19	fashion. Give them the right environment in which to	19	process where one can be disciplined, and through the
20	do it and I think they will do it right. But if you	20	inspections and the work you all are doing, you can
21	don't create the right environment for them, I think	21	look at the range of issues that affect audit quality,
22	that will also have some negative ramifications. So I	22	including this one, and you can act when you see that
23	think quality controls and ethics go with this, and	23	type of behavior that in its totality is not
24 25	that's an important part of it. MR. SCATES: Jeff Steinhoff.	24 25	acceptable. But I certainly think ethics are a big part
23	MR. SCATES. Jen Stennion.	23	But I certainly tillik ethics are a big part
	Page 191		Page 193
1	•	1	-
1 2	MR. STEINHOFF: I think the issue you're	1 2	of this and I think changing the cultural focus on,
2	MR. STEINHOFF: I think the issue you're really addressing today, independence, is really part	2	of this and I think changing the cultural focus on, let's say, a firm or an entity's bottom line to more of
2 3	MR. STEINHOFF: I think the issue you're really addressing today, independence, is really part of a broader issue, and that ties back to greed,	2 3	of this and I think changing the cultural focus on, let's say, a firm or an entity's bottom line to more of the public interest focus is probably what's needed.
2 3 4	MR. STEINHOFF: I think the issue you're really addressing today, independence, is really part of a broader issue, and that ties back to greed, morality, I think gave rise to this body was much	2 3 4	of this and I think changing the cultural focus on, let's say, a firm or an entity's bottom line to more of the public interest focus is probably what's needed. MR. SCATES: Bruce Webb.
2 3 4 5	MR. STEINHOFF: I think the issue you're really addressing today, independence, is really part of a broader issue, and that ties back to greed, morality, I think gave rise to this body was much broader than whether people were independent to do	2 3 4 5	of this and I think changing the cultural focus on, let's say, a firm or an entity's bottom line to more of the public interest focus is probably what's needed. MR. SCATES: Bruce Webb. MR. WEBB: Bruce Webb, McGladrey & Pullen.
2 3 4 5 6	MR. STEINHOFF: I think the issue you're really addressing today, independence, is really part of a broader issue, and that ties back to greed, morality, I think gave rise to this body was much broader than whether people were independent to do their work or not. I think there were large grey areas	2 3 4	of this and I think changing the cultural focus on, let's say, a firm or an entity's bottom line to more of the public interest focus is probably what's needed. MR. SCATES: Bruce Webb. MR. WEBB: Bruce Webb, McGladrey & Pullen. There's been a lot of statements today that imply that
2 3 4 5 6 7	MR. STEINHOFF: I think the issue you're really addressing today, independence, is really part of a broader issue, and that ties back to greed, morality, I think gave rise to this body was much broader than whether people were independent to do their work or not. I think there were large grey areas in terms of what was allowed and what wasn't. People	2 3 4 5 6	of this and I think changing the cultural focus on, let's say, a firm or an entity's bottom line to more of the public interest focus is probably what's needed. MR. SCATES: Bruce Webb. MR. WEBB: Bruce Webb, McGladrey & Pullen. There's been a lot of statements today that imply that when an auditor prepares a tax return, he's being a
2 3 4 5 6	MR. STEINHOFF: I think the issue you're really addressing today, independence, is really part of a broader issue, and that ties back to greed, morality, I think gave rise to this body was much broader than whether people were independent to do their work or not. I think there were large grey areas in terms of what was allowed and what wasn't. People continued to push the grey areas out and if there	2 3 4 5 6 7	of this and I think changing the cultural focus on, let's say, a firm or an entity's bottom line to more of the public interest focus is probably what's needed. MR. SCATES: Bruce Webb. MR. WEBB: Bruce Webb, McGladrey & Pullen. There's been a lot of statements today that imply that when an auditor prepares a tax return, he's being a client advocate, when he signs an audit return he's
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	MR. STEINHOFF: I think the issue you're really addressing today, independence, is really part of a broader issue, and that ties back to greed, morality, I think gave rise to this body was much broader than whether people were independent to do their work or not. I think there were large grey areas in terms of what was allowed and what wasn't. People	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	of this and I think changing the cultural focus on, let's say, a firm or an entity's bottom line to more of the public interest focus is probably what's needed. MR. SCATES: Bruce Webb. MR. WEBB: Bruce Webb, McGladrey & Pullen. There's been a lot of statements today that imply that when an auditor prepares a tax return, he's being a
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	MR. STEINHOFF: I think the issue you're really addressing today, independence, is really part of a broader issue, and that ties back to greed, morality, I think gave rise to this body was much broader than whether people were independent to do their work or not. I think there were large grey areas in terms of what was allowed and what wasn't. People continued to push the grey areas out and if there wasn't some rule that said I can't do it, then I'm	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	of this and I think changing the cultural focus on, let's say, a firm or an entity's bottom line to more of the public interest focus is probably what's needed. MR. SCATES: Bruce Webb. MR. WEBB: Bruce Webb, McGladrey & Pullen. There's been a lot of statements today that imply that when an auditor prepares a tax return, he's being a client advocate, when he signs an audit return he's being an investor advocate. I'm just not sure I buy
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	MR. STEINHOFF: I think the issue you're really addressing today, independence, is really part of a broader issue, and that ties back to greed, morality, I think gave rise to this body was much broader than whether people were independent to do their work or not. I think there were large grey areas in terms of what was allowed and what wasn't. People continued to push the grey areas out and if there wasn't some rule that said I can't do it, then I'm permitted to do it. And I think the profession has	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	of this and I think changing the cultural focus on, let's say, a firm or an entity's bottom line to more of the public interest focus is probably what's needed. MR. SCATES: Bruce Webb. MR. WEBB: Bruce Webb, McGladrey & Pullen. There's been a lot of statements today that imply that when an auditor prepares a tax return, he's being a client advocate, when he signs an audit return he's being an investor advocate. I'm just not sure I buy that. My firm hasn't let me sign tax returns other
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	MR. STEINHOFF: I think the issue you're really addressing today, independence, is really part of a broader issue, and that ties back to greed, morality, I think gave rise to this body was much broader than whether people were independent to do their work or not. I think there were large grey areas in terms of what was allowed and what wasn't. People continued to push the grey areas out and if there wasn't some rule that said I can't do it, then I'm permitted to do it. And I think the profession has paid a big price for that and saw the rule as being the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	of this and I think changing the cultural focus on, let's say, a firm or an entity's bottom line to more of the public interest focus is probably what's needed. MR. SCATES: Bruce Webb. MR. WEBB: Bruce Webb, McGladrey & Pullen. There's been a lot of statements today that imply that when an auditor prepares a tax return, he's being a client advocate, when he signs an audit return he's being an investor advocate. I'm just not sure I buy that. My firm hasn't let me sign tax returns other than my own in 15 years, but I can assure you that when
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	MR. STEINHOFF: I think the issue you're really addressing today, independence, is really part of a broader issue, and that ties back to greed, morality, I think gave rise to this body was much broader than whether people were independent to do their work or not. I think there were large grey areas in terms of what was allowed and what wasn't. People continued to push the grey areas out and if there wasn't some rule that said I can't do it, then I'm permitted to do it. And I think the profession has paid a big price for that and saw the rule as being the floor and the ceiling at the same time. I think you're talking about cultural change, and I think some of the people participating today	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	of this and I think changing the cultural focus on, let's say, a firm or an entity's bottom line to more of the public interest focus is probably what's needed. MR. SCATES: Bruce Webb. MR. WEBB: Bruce Webb, McGladrey & Pullen. There's been a lot of statements today that imply that when an auditor prepares a tax return, he's being a client advocate, when he signs an audit return he's being an investor advocate. I'm just not sure I buy that. My firm hasn't let me sign tax returns other than my own in 15 years, but I can assure you that when I sign tax returns on behalf of a client, I read that statement that I was signing and I took my responsibility very seriously.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	MR. STEINHOFF: I think the issue you're really addressing today, independence, is really part of a broader issue, and that ties back to greed, morality, I think gave rise to this body was much broader than whether people were independent to do their work or not. I think there were large grey areas in terms of what was allowed and what wasn't. People continued to push the grey areas out and if there wasn't some rule that said I can't do it, then I'm permitted to do it. And I think the profession has paid a big price for that and saw the rule as being the floor and the ceiling at the same time. I think you're talking about cultural change, and I think some of the people participating today spoke about some of the things their firms are engaged	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	of this and I think changing the cultural focus on, let's say, a firm or an entity's bottom line to more of the public interest focus is probably what's needed. MR. SCATES: Bruce Webb. MR. WEBB: Bruce Webb, McGladrey & Pullen. There's been a lot of statements today that imply that when an auditor prepares a tax return, he's being a client advocate, when he signs an audit return he's being an investor advocate. I'm just not sure I buy that. My firm hasn't let me sign tax returns other than my own in 15 years, but I can assure you that when I sign tax returns on behalf of a client, I read that statement that I was signing and I took my responsibility very seriously. I think that what I said, to the best of my
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	MR. STEINHOFF: I think the issue you're really addressing today, independence, is really part of a broader issue, and that ties back to greed, morality, I think gave rise to this body was much broader than whether people were independent to do their work or not. I think there were large grey areas in terms of what was allowed and what wasn't. People continued to push the grey areas out and if there wasn't some rule that said I can't do it, then I'm permitted to do it. And I think the profession has paid a big price for that and saw the rule as being the floor and the ceiling at the same time. I think you're talking about cultural change, and I think some of the people participating today spoke about some of the things their firms are engaged in doing now. But it will be very, very important to	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	of this and I think changing the cultural focus on, let's say, a firm or an entity's bottom line to more of the public interest focus is probably what's needed. MR. SCATES: Bruce Webb. MR. WEBB: Bruce Webb, McGladrey & Pullen. There's been a lot of statements today that imply that when an auditor prepares a tax return, he's being a client advocate, when he signs an audit return he's being an investor advocate. I'm just not sure I buy that. My firm hasn't let me sign tax returns other than my own in 15 years, but I can assure you that when I sign tax returns on behalf of a client, I read that statement that I was signing and I took my responsibility very seriously. I think that what I said, to the best of my knowledge and belief, the representations contained in
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	MR. STEINHOFF: I think the issue you're really addressing today, independence, is really part of a broader issue, and that ties back to greed, morality, I think gave rise to this body was much broader than whether people were independent to do their work or not. I think there were large grey areas in terms of what was allowed and what wasn't. People continued to push the grey areas out and if there wasn't some rule that said I can't do it, then I'm permitted to do it. And I think the profession has paid a big price for that and saw the rule as being the floor and the ceiling at the same time. I think you're talking about cultural change, and I think some of the people participating today spoke about some of the things their firms are engaged in doing now. But it will be very, very important to push forward in a permanent basis that kind of cultural	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	of this and I think changing the cultural focus on, let's say, a firm or an entity's bottom line to more of the public interest focus is probably what's needed. MR. SCATES: Bruce Webb. MR. WEBB: Bruce Webb, McGladrey & Pullen. There's been a lot of statements today that imply that when an auditor prepares a tax return, he's being a client advocate, when he signs an audit return he's being an investor advocate. I'm just not sure I buy that. My firm hasn't let me sign tax returns other than my own in 15 years, but I can assure you that when I sign tax returns on behalf of a client, I read that statement that I was signing and I took my responsibility very seriously. I think that what I said, to the best of my knowledge and belief, the representations contained in that tax return were true and correct. And I will tell
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	MR. STEINHOFF: I think the issue you're really addressing today, independence, is really part of a broader issue, and that ties back to greed, morality, I think gave rise to this body was much broader than whether people were independent to do their work or not. I think there were large grey areas in terms of what was allowed and what wasn't. People continued to push the grey areas out and if there wasn't some rule that said I can't do it, then I'm permitted to do it. And I think the profession has paid a big price for that and saw the rule as being the floor and the ceiling at the same time. I think you're talking about cultural change, and I think some of the people participating today spoke about some of the things their firms are engaged in doing now. But it will be very, very important to push forward in a permanent basis that kind of cultural change.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	of this and I think changing the cultural focus on, let's say, a firm or an entity's bottom line to more of the public interest focus is probably what's needed. MR. SCATES: Bruce Webb. MR. WEBB: Bruce Webb, McGladrey & Pullen. There's been a lot of statements today that imply that when an auditor prepares a tax return, he's being a client advocate, when he signs an audit return he's being an investor advocate. I'm just not sure I buy that. My firm hasn't let me sign tax returns other than my own in 15 years, but I can assure you that when I sign tax returns on behalf of a client, I read that statement that I was signing and I took my responsibility very seriously. I think that what I said, to the best of my knowledge and belief, the representations contained in that tax return were true and correct. And I will tell you that if I was the auditor of that client, I had a
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	MR. STEINHOFF: I think the issue you're really addressing today, independence, is really part of a broader issue, and that ties back to greed, morality, I think gave rise to this body was much broader than whether people were independent to do their work or not. I think there were large grey areas in terms of what was allowed and what wasn't. People continued to push the grey areas out and if there wasn't some rule that said I can't do it, then I'm permitted to do it. And I think the profession has paid a big price for that and saw the rule as being the floor and the ceiling at the same time. I think you're talking about cultural change, and I think some of the people participating today spoke about some of the things their firms are engaged in doing now. But it will be very, very important to push forward in a permanent basis that kind of cultural change. At the same time, all this has got to be	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	of this and I think changing the cultural focus on, let's say, a firm or an entity's bottom line to more of the public interest focus is probably what's needed. MR. SCATES: Bruce Webb. MR. WEBB: Bruce Webb, McGladrey & Pullen. There's been a lot of statements today that imply that when an auditor prepares a tax return, he's being a client advocate, when he signs an audit return he's being an investor advocate. I'm just not sure I buy that. My firm hasn't let me sign tax returns other than my own in 15 years, but I can assure you that when I sign tax returns on behalf of a client, I read that statement that I was signing and I took my responsibility very seriously. I think that what I said, to the best of my knowledge and belief, the representations contained in that tax return were true and correct. And I will tell you that if I was the auditor of that client, I had a much better knowledge and belief on which to base that
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	MR. STEINHOFF: I think the issue you're really addressing today, independence, is really part of a broader issue, and that ties back to greed, morality, I think gave rise to this body was much broader than whether people were independent to do their work or not. I think there were large grey areas in terms of what was allowed and what wasn't. People continued to push the grey areas out and if there wasn't some rule that said I can't do it, then I'm permitted to do it. And I think the profession has paid a big price for that and saw the rule as being the floor and the ceiling at the same time. I think you're talking about cultural change, and I think some of the people participating today spoke about some of the things their firms are engaged in doing now. But it will be very, very important to push forward in a permanent basis that kind of cultural change. At the same time, all this has got to be balanced out, and it struck me that we were speaking	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	of this and I think changing the cultural focus on, let's say, a firm or an entity's bottom line to more of the public interest focus is probably what's needed. MR. SCATES: Bruce Webb. MR. WEBB: Bruce Webb, McGladrey & Pullen. There's been a lot of statements today that imply that when an auditor prepares a tax return, he's being a client advocate, when he signs an audit return he's being an investor advocate. I'm just not sure I buy that. My firm hasn't let me sign tax returns other than my own in 15 years, but I can assure you that when I sign tax returns on behalf of a client, I read that statement that I was signing and I took my responsibility very seriously. I think that what I said, to the best of my knowledge and belief, the representations contained in that tax return were true and correct. And I will tell you that if I was the auditor of that client, I had a much better knowledge and belief on which to base that representation.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	MR. STEINHOFF: I think the issue you're really addressing today, independence, is really part of a broader issue, and that ties back to greed, morality, I think gave rise to this body was much broader than whether people were independent to do their work or not. I think there were large grey areas in terms of what was allowed and what wasn't. People continued to push the grey areas out and if there wasn't some rule that said I can't do it, then I'm permitted to do it. And I think the profession has paid a big price for that and saw the rule as being the floor and the ceiling at the same time. I think you're talking about cultural change, and I think some of the people participating today spoke about some of the things their firms are engaged in doing now. But it will be very, very important to push forward in a permanent basis that kind of cultural change. At the same time, all this has got to be balanced out, and it struck me that we were speaking today about types of services that were very, very	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	of this and I think changing the cultural focus on, let's say, a firm or an entity's bottom line to more of the public interest focus is probably what's needed. MR. SCATES: Bruce Webb. MR. WEBB: Bruce Webb, McGladrey & Pullen. There's been a lot of statements today that imply that when an auditor prepares a tax return, he's being a client advocate, when he signs an audit return he's being an investor advocate. I'm just not sure I buy that. My firm hasn't let me sign tax returns other than my own in 15 years, but I can assure you that when I sign tax returns on behalf of a client, I read that statement that I was signing and I took my responsibility very seriously. I think that what I said, to the best of my knowledge and belief, the representations contained in that tax return were true and correct. And I will tell you that if I was the auditor of that client, I had a much better knowledge and belief on which to base that representation. MR. SCATES: Tom Ochsenschlager.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	MR. STEINHOFF: I think the issue you're really addressing today, independence, is really part of a broader issue, and that ties back to greed, morality, I think gave rise to this body was much broader than whether people were independent to do their work or not. I think there were large grey areas in terms of what was allowed and what wasn't. People continued to push the grey areas out and if there wasn't some rule that said I can't do it, then I'm permitted to do it. And I think the profession has paid a big price for that and saw the rule as being the floor and the ceiling at the same time. I think you're talking about cultural change, and I think some of the people participating today spoke about some of the things their firms are engaged in doing now. But it will be very, very important to push forward in a permanent basis that kind of cultural change. At the same time, all this has got to be balanced out, and it struck me that we were speaking today about types of services that were very, very broad. We were talking about structured transactions,	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	of this and I think changing the cultural focus on, let's say, a firm or an entity's bottom line to more of the public interest focus is probably what's needed. MR. SCATES: Bruce Webb. MR. WEBB: Bruce Webb, McGladrey & Pullen. There's been a lot of statements today that imply that when an auditor prepares a tax return, he's being a client advocate, when he signs an audit return he's being an investor advocate. I'm just not sure I buy that. My firm hasn't let me sign tax returns other than my own in 15 years, but I can assure you that when I sign tax returns on behalf of a client, I read that statement that I was signing and I took my responsibility very seriously. I think that what I said, to the best of my knowledge and belief, the representations contained in that tax return were true and correct. And I will tell you that if I was the auditor of that client, I had a much better knowledge and belief on which to base that representation. MR. SCATES: Tom Ochsenschlager. MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: Tom Ochsenschlager with
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	MR. STEINHOFF: I think the issue you're really addressing today, independence, is really part of a broader issue, and that ties back to greed, morality, I think gave rise to this body was much broader than whether people were independent to do their work or not. I think there were large grey areas in terms of what was allowed and what wasn't. People continued to push the grey areas out and if there wasn't some rule that said I can't do it, then I'm permitted to do it. And I think the profession has paid a big price for that and saw the rule as being the floor and the ceiling at the same time. I think you're talking about cultural change, and I think some of the people participating today spoke about some of the things their firms are engaged in doing now. But it will be very, very important to push forward in a permanent basis that kind of cultural change. At the same time, all this has got to be balanced out, and it struck me that we were speaking today about types of services that were very, very broad. We were talking about structured transactions, we were talking about cases where auditing firms pulled	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	of this and I think changing the cultural focus on, let's say, a firm or an entity's bottom line to more of the public interest focus is probably what's needed. MR. SCATES: Bruce Webb. MR. WEBB: Bruce Webb, McGladrey & Pullen. There's been a lot of statements today that imply that when an auditor prepares a tax return, he's being a client advocate, when he signs an audit return he's being an investor advocate. I'm just not sure I buy that. My firm hasn't let me sign tax returns other than my own in 15 years, but I can assure you that when I sign tax returns on behalf of a client, I read that statement that I was signing and I took my responsibility very seriously. I think that what I said, to the best of my knowledge and belief, the representations contained in that tax return were true and correct. And I will tell you that if I was the auditor of that client, I had a much better knowledge and belief on which to base that representation. MR. SCATES: Tom Ochsenschlager. MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: Tom Ochsenschlager with AICPA. I think much of the impetus that we are here
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	MR. STEINHOFF: I think the issue you're really addressing today, independence, is really part of a broader issue, and that ties back to greed, morality, I think gave rise to this body was much broader than whether people were independent to do their work or not. I think there were large grey areas in terms of what was allowed and what wasn't. People continued to push the grey areas out and if there wasn't some rule that said I can't do it, then I'm permitted to do it. And I think the profession has paid a big price for that and saw the rule as being the floor and the ceiling at the same time. I think you're talking about cultural change, and I think some of the people participating today spoke about some of the things their firms are engaged in doing now. But it will be very, very important to push forward in a permanent basis that kind of cultural change. At the same time, all this has got to be balanced out, and it struck me that we were speaking today about types of services that were very, very broad. We were talking about structured transactions, we were talking about cases where auditing firms pulled together themselves very aggressive, questionable, if	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	of this and I think changing the cultural focus on, let's say, a firm or an entity's bottom line to more of the public interest focus is probably what's needed. MR. SCATES: Bruce Webb. MR. WEBB: Bruce Webb, McGladrey & Pullen. There's been a lot of statements today that imply that when an auditor prepares a tax return, he's being a client advocate, when he signs an audit return he's being an investor advocate. I'm just not sure I buy that. My firm hasn't let me sign tax returns other than my own in 15 years, but I can assure you that when I sign tax returns on behalf of a client, I read that statement that I was signing and I took my responsibility very seriously. I think that what I said, to the best of my knowledge and belief, the representations contained in that tax return were true and correct. And I will tell you that if I was the auditor of that client, I had a much better knowledge and belief on which to base that representation. MR. SCATES: Tom Ochsenschlager. MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: Tom Ochsenschlager with AICPA. I think much of the impetus that we are here today actually probably relates to some of the abusive
$\begin{array}{c} 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13 \\ 14 \\ 15 \\ 16 \\ 17 \\ 18 \\ 19 \\ 20 \\ 21 \\ 22 \\ 23 \end{array}$	MR. STEINHOFF: I think the issue you're really addressing today, independence, is really part of a broader issue, and that ties back to greed, morality, I think gave rise to this body was much broader than whether people were independent to do their work or not. I think there were large grey areas in terms of what was allowed and what wasn't. People continued to push the grey areas out and if there wasn't some rule that said I can't do it, then I'm permitted to do it. And I think the profession has paid a big price for that and saw the rule as being the floor and the ceiling at the same time. I think you're talking about cultural change, and I think some of the people participating today spoke about some of the things their firms are engaged in doing now. But it will be very, very important to push forward in a permanent basis that kind of cultural change. At the same time, all this has got to be balanced out, and it struck me that we were speaking today about types of services that were very, very broad. We were talking about structured transactions, we were talking about cases where auditing firms pulled	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	of this and I think changing the cultural focus on, let's say, a firm or an entity's bottom line to more of the public interest focus is probably what's needed. MR. SCATES: Bruce Webb. MR. WEBB: Bruce Webb, McGladrey & Pullen. There's been a lot of statements today that imply that when an auditor prepares a tax return, he's being a client advocate, when he signs an audit return he's being an investor advocate. I'm just not sure I buy that. My firm hasn't let me sign tax returns other than my own in 15 years, but I can assure you that when I sign tax returns on behalf of a client, I read that statement that I was signing and I took my responsibility very seriously. I think that what I said, to the best of my knowledge and belief, the representations contained in that tax return were true and correct. And I will tell you that if I was the auditor of that client, I had a much better knowledge and belief on which to base that representation. MR. SCATES: Tom Ochsenschlager. MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: Tom Ochsenschlager with AICPA. I think much of the impetus that we are here

	Page 194		Page 196
1	•	1	Ŭ
$\frac{1}{2}$	mass marketing of products and abusive tax shelters and things of that nature. I think had it not been for	1 2	would think that that should temper any major change now in a policy as to whether or not auditing firms
3	that unfortunate occurrence over a period of a few	3	should be permitted to do tax work for their various
4	years we probably wouldn't be having this meeting	4	types of tax work for their clients.
5	today.	5	MR. SCATES: Mark Weinberger.
6	And so I think we need to look at it from the	6	MR. WEINBERGER: Thanks. I guess I'd just
7	perspective of is that still an issue or is it an	7	maybe Tom stole some of what I was going to talk
8	ongoing issue and what is being done about it that	8	about, but I do believe it's all of our
9	might correct those problems so that we wouldn't	9	responsibilities, us as audit firms, certainly
10	necessarily need a draconian measure to eliminate all	10	investors, to keep us focused on what the investors
11	tax services that could be provided by a CPA firm?	11	care about, regulators to write the right rules, to
12	In that regard, the world has really changed.	12	stay focused on these issues. These issues aren't
13	I mean, we now have audit committees that I can't	13	brand new. They were around before Sarbanes-Oxley,
14	imagine would approve any of these transactions going	14	they were around during the debate, they were around
15	forward. The audit committees have only been in	15	during the rulemaking, and they're still here today.
16 17	existence for about a year and a half now, and they're	16 17	I think there has been a lot that has changed
17	still on a learning curve as to some of the more technical tax issues, but based on anecdotal evidence,	17	though, and as you decide where to go next, I think you do have to view it with that filter, at least I would
19	I think it's starting to take hold and we're starting	19	hope we all would. The world operates differently, and
20	to see the turnaround and them to be more effective.	20	as we decide in our firms what to do to try and make
21	Secondly, there was an allusion earlier that	21	ourselves from an ethics standpoint more aligned with
22	there were different standards for CPAs in the audit	22	where we should be, we put in numerable changes in our
23	function and relatively few standards for CPAs in the	23	processes, and I'm sure the other firms have as well.
24	tax function, and that probably was true up until very	24	In addition, you can't ignore I mean, one
25	recent relatively recently. But our friends at the	25	of the issues that was put on the table was the abusive
	Page 195		Page 197
			I age 197
1	Internal Revenue Service are strengthening up	1	C C
1 2	Internal Revenue Service are strengthening up dramatically strengthening the circular 230	1 2	tax transactions, which we all wish never happened and which we hope will not happen again, and that's not to
			tax transactions, which we all wish never happened and
2 3 4	dramatically strengthening the circular 230	2 3 4	tax transactions, which we all wish never happened and which we hope will not happen again, and that's not to say that there won't be differences of opinion on tax transactions as companies enter into them and they're
2 3 4 5	dramatically strengthening the circular 230 regulations, which will make it much more difficult for tax preparers or tax specialists to perform any of the sorts of activities that we think of in the more	2 3 4 5	tax transactions, which we all wish never happened and which we hope will not happen again, and that's not to say that there won't be differences of opinion on tax transactions as companies enter into them and they're reviewed by the IRS. But the mass marketing of these
2 3 4 5 6	dramatically strengthening the circular 230 regulations, which will make it much more difficult for tax preparers or tax specialists to perform any of the sorts of activities that we think of in the more negative sense.	2 3 4 5 6	tax transactions, which we all wish never happened and which we hope will not happen again, and that's not to say that there won't be differences of opinion on tax transactions as companies enter into them and they're reviewed by the IRS. But the mass marketing of these transactions that are tax motivated without business
2 3 4 5 6 7	dramatically strengthening the circular 230 regulations, which will make it much more difficult for tax preparers or tax specialists to perform any of the sorts of activities that we think of in the more negative sense. Additionally, the AICPA, you may not be	2 3 4 5 6 7	tax transactions, which we all wish never happened and which we hope will not happen again, and that's not to say that there won't be differences of opinion on tax transactions as companies enter into them and they're reviewed by the IRS. But the mass marketing of these transactions that are tax motivated without business purpose, what is out there now to prevent them from
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	dramatically strengthening the circular 230 regulations, which will make it much more difficult for tax preparers or tax specialists to perform any of the sorts of activities that we think of in the more negative sense. Additionally, the AICPA, you may not be aware, has recently made its standards of tax practice	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	tax transactions, which we all wish never happened and which we hope will not happen again, and that's not to say that there won't be differences of opinion on tax transactions as companies enter into them and they're reviewed by the IRS. But the mass marketing of these transactions that are tax motivated without business purpose, what is out there now to prevent them from happening again? It's something we all care about.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	dramatically strengthening the circular 230 regulations, which will make it much more difficult for tax preparers or tax specialists to perform any of the sorts of activities that we think of in the more negative sense. Additionally, the AICPA, you may not be aware, has recently made its standards of tax practice to be mandatory, they're enforceable now, so that	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	tax transactions, which we all wish never happened and which we hope will not happen again, and that's not to say that there won't be differences of opinion on tax transactions as companies enter into them and they're reviewed by the IRS. But the mass marketing of these transactions that are tax motivated without business purpose, what is out there now to prevent them from happening again? It's something we all care about. Well, Cono and the IRS have taken a lot of
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	dramatically strengthening the circular 230 regulations, which will make it much more difficult for tax preparers or tax specialists to perform any of the sorts of activities that we think of in the more negative sense. Additionally, the AICPA, you may not be aware, has recently made its standards of tax practice to be mandatory, they're enforceable now, so that anyone violating, found to violate those standards,	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	tax transactions, which we all wish never happened and which we hope will not happen again, and that's not to say that there won't be differences of opinion on tax transactions as companies enter into them and they're reviewed by the IRS. But the mass marketing of these transactions that are tax motivated without business purpose, what is out there now to prevent them from happening again? It's something we all care about. Well, Cono and the IRS have taken a lot of steps that we need to be cognizant of if you all think
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	dramatically strengthening the circular 230 regulations, which will make it much more difficult for tax preparers or tax specialists to perform any of the sorts of activities that we think of in the more negative sense. Additionally, the AICPA, you may not be aware, has recently made its standards of tax practice to be mandatory, they're enforceable now, so that anyone violating, found to violate those standards, would be expelled from the AICPA. To take even a step	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	tax transactions, which we all wish never happened and which we hope will not happen again, and that's not to say that there won't be differences of opinion on tax transactions as companies enter into them and they're reviewed by the IRS. But the mass marketing of these transactions that are tax motivated without business purpose, what is out there now to prevent them from happening again? It's something we all care about. Well, Cono and the IRS have taken a lot of steps that we need to be cognizant of if you all think through the rulemaking. Not only are there brand new
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	dramatically strengthening the circular 230 regulations, which will make it much more difficult for tax preparers or tax specialists to perform any of the sorts of activities that we think of in the more negative sense. Additionally, the AICPA, you may not be aware, has recently made its standards of tax practice to be mandatory, they're enforceable now, so that anyone violating, found to violate those standards, would be expelled from the AICPA. To take even a step further, we recently made those not only enforceable,	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	tax transactions, which we all wish never happened and which we hope will not happen again, and that's not to say that there won't be differences of opinion on tax transactions as companies enter into them and they're reviewed by the IRS. But the mass marketing of these transactions that are tax motivated without business purpose, what is out there now to prevent them from happening again? It's something we all care about. Well, Cono and the IRS have taken a lot of steps that we need to be cognizant of if you all think through the rulemaking. Not only are there brand new regulations out there that require a whole web of
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	dramatically strengthening the circular 230 regulations, which will make it much more difficult for tax preparers or tax specialists to perform any of the sorts of activities that we think of in the more negative sense. Additionally, the AICPA, you may not be aware, has recently made its standards of tax practice to be mandatory, they're enforceable now, so that anyone violating, found to violate those standards, would be expelled from the AICPA. To take even a step further, we recently made those not only enforceable, but automatically enforceable in circumstances where	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	tax transactions, which we all wish never happened and which we hope will not happen again, and that's not to say that there won't be differences of opinion on tax transactions as companies enter into them and they're reviewed by the IRS. But the mass marketing of these transactions that are tax motivated without business purpose, what is out there now to prevent them from happening again? It's something we all care about. Well, Cono and the IRS have taken a lot of steps that we need to be cognizant of if you all think through the rulemaking. Not only are there brand new regulations out there that require a whole web of transparency that didn't exist before, whereby now the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	dramatically strengthening the circular 230 regulations, which will make it much more difficult for tax preparers or tax specialists to perform any of the sorts of activities that we think of in the more negative sense. Additionally, the AICPA, you may not be aware, has recently made its standards of tax practice to be mandatory, they're enforceable now, so that anyone violating, found to violate those standards, would be expelled from the AICPA. To take even a step further, we recently made those not only enforceable,	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	tax transactions, which we all wish never happened and which we hope will not happen again, and that's not to say that there won't be differences of opinion on tax transactions as companies enter into them and they're reviewed by the IRS. But the mass marketing of these transactions that are tax motivated without business purpose, what is out there now to prevent them from happening again? It's something we all care about. Well, Cono and the IRS have taken a lot of steps that we need to be cognizant of if you all think through the rulemaking. Not only are there brand new regulations out there that require a whole web of transparency that didn't exist before, whereby now the issuers and all the way down to the individuals have
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	dramatically strengthening the circular 230 regulations, which will make it much more difficult for tax preparers or tax specialists to perform any of the sorts of activities that we think of in the more negative sense. Additionally, the AICPA, you may not be aware, has recently made its standards of tax practice to be mandatory, they're enforceable now, so that anyone violating, found to violate those standards, would be expelled from the AICPA. To take even a step further, we recently made those not only enforceable, but automatically enforceable in circumstances where any member of the AICPA has been sanctioned by either	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	tax transactions, which we all wish never happened and which we hope will not happen again, and that's not to say that there won't be differences of opinion on tax transactions as companies enter into them and they're reviewed by the IRS. But the mass marketing of these transactions that are tax motivated without business purpose, what is out there now to prevent them from happening again? It's something we all care about. Well, Cono and the IRS have taken a lot of steps that we need to be cognizant of if you all think through the rulemaking. Not only are there brand new regulations out there that require a whole web of transparency that didn't exist before, whereby now the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	dramatically strengthening the circular 230 regulations, which will make it much more difficult for tax preparers or tax specialists to perform any of the sorts of activities that we think of in the more negative sense. Additionally, the AICPA, you may not be aware, has recently made its standards of tax practice to be mandatory, they're enforceable now, so that anyone violating, found to violate those standards, would be expelled from the AICPA. To take even a step further, we recently made those not only enforceable, but automatically enforceable in circumstances where any member of the AICPA has been sanctioned by either the SEC, the IRS, or the PCAOB. So we have standards now, and I might add that we've done a second interpretation to those standards that is very	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	tax transactions, which we all wish never happened and which we hope will not happen again, and that's not to say that there won't be differences of opinion on tax transactions as companies enter into them and they're reviewed by the IRS. But the mass marketing of these transactions that are tax motivated without business purpose, what is out there now to prevent them from happening again? It's something we all care about. Well, Cono and the IRS have taken a lot of steps that we need to be cognizant of if you all think through the rulemaking. Not only are there brand new regulations out there that require a whole web of transparency that didn't exist before, whereby now the issuers and all the way down to the individuals have to, if they meet certain requirements, file additional information with the IRS that they never had to before so they can better identify and target these
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	dramatically strengthening the circular 230 regulations, which will make it much more difficult for tax preparers or tax specialists to perform any of the sorts of activities that we think of in the more negative sense. Additionally, the AICPA, you may not be aware, has recently made its standards of tax practice to be mandatory, they're enforceable now, so that anyone violating, found to violate those standards, would be expelled from the AICPA. To take even a step further, we recently made those not only enforceable, but automatically enforceable in circumstances where any member of the AICPA has been sanctioned by either the SEC, the IRS, or the PCAOB. So we have standards now, and I might add that we've done a second interpretation to those standards that is very specifically related to tax opinions and taking tax	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	tax transactions, which we all wish never happened and which we hope will not happen again, and that's not to say that there won't be differences of opinion on tax transactions as companies enter into them and they're reviewed by the IRS. But the mass marketing of these transactions that are tax motivated without business purpose, what is out there now to prevent them from happening again? It's something we all care about. Well, Cono and the IRS have taken a lot of steps that we need to be cognizant of if you all think through the rulemaking. Not only are there brand new regulations out there that require a whole web of transparency that didn't exist before, whereby now the issuers and all the way down to the individuals have to, if they meet certain requirements, file additional information with the IRS that they never had to before so they can better identify and target these transactions early on.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	dramatically strengthening the circular 230 regulations, which will make it much more difficult for tax preparers or tax specialists to perform any of the sorts of activities that we think of in the more negative sense. Additionally, the AICPA, you may not be aware, has recently made its standards of tax practice to be mandatory, they're enforceable now, so that anyone violating, found to violate those standards, would be expelled from the AICPA. To take even a step further, we recently made those not only enforceable, but automatically enforceable in circumstances where any member of the AICPA has been sanctioned by either the SEC, the IRS, or the PCAOB. So we have standards now, and I might add that we've done a second interpretation to those standards that is very specifically related to tax opinions and taking tax return positions, so we've in a question and answer	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	tax transactions, which we all wish never happened and which we hope will not happen again, and that's not to say that there won't be differences of opinion on tax transactions as companies enter into them and they're reviewed by the IRS. But the mass marketing of these transactions that are tax motivated without business purpose, what is out there now to prevent them from happening again? It's something we all care about. Well, Cono and the IRS have taken a lot of steps that we need to be cognizant of if you all think through the rulemaking. Not only are there brand new regulations out there that require a whole web of transparency that didn't exist before, whereby now the issuers and all the way down to the individuals have to, if they meet certain requirements, file additional information with the IRS that they never had to before so they can better identify and target these transactions early on. Most recently, and something very pertinent
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	dramatically strengthening the circular 230 regulations, which will make it much more difficult for tax preparers or tax specialists to perform any of the sorts of activities that we think of in the more negative sense. Additionally, the AICPA, you may not be aware, has recently made its standards of tax practice to be mandatory, they're enforceable now, so that anyone violating, found to violate those standards, would be expelled from the AICPA. To take even a step further, we recently made those not only enforceable, but automatically enforceable in circumstances where any member of the AICPA has been sanctioned by either the SEC, the IRS, or the PCAOB. So we have standards now, and I might add that we've done a second interpretation to those standards that is very specifically related to tax opinions and taking tax return positions, so we've in a question and answer format and also a monologue format.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	tax transactions, which we all wish never happened and which we hope will not happen again, and that's not to say that there won't be differences of opinion on tax transactions as companies enter into them and they're reviewed by the IRS. But the mass marketing of these transactions that are tax motivated without business purpose, what is out there now to prevent them from happening again? It's something we all care about. Well, Cono and the IRS have taken a lot of steps that we need to be cognizant of if you all think through the rulemaking. Not only are there brand new regulations out there that require a whole web of transparency that didn't exist before, whereby now the issuers and all the way down to the individuals have to, if they meet certain requirements, file additional information with the IRS that they never had to before so they can better identify and target these transactions early on. Most recently, and something very pertinent to our discussion, is a new form that's going to be
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	dramatically strengthening the circular 230 regulations, which will make it much more difficult for tax preparers or tax specialists to perform any of the sorts of activities that we think of in the more negative sense. Additionally, the AICPA, you may not be aware, has recently made its standards of tax practice to be mandatory, they're enforceable now, so that anyone violating, found to violate those standards, would be expelled from the AICPA. To take even a step further, we recently made those not only enforceable, but automatically enforceable in circumstances where any member of the AICPA has been sanctioned by either the SEC, the IRS, or the PCAOB. So we have standards now, and I might add that we've done a second interpretation to those standards that is very specifically related to tax opinions and taking tax return positions, so we've in a question and answer format and also a monologue format. So there's been a lot of changes that have	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	tax transactions, which we all wish never happened and which we hope will not happen again, and that's not to say that there won't be differences of opinion on tax transactions as companies enter into them and they're reviewed by the IRS. But the mass marketing of these transactions that are tax motivated without business purpose, what is out there now to prevent them from happening again? It's something we all care about. Well, Cono and the IRS have taken a lot of steps that we need to be cognizant of if you all think through the rulemaking. Not only are there brand new regulations out there that require a whole web of transparency that didn't exist before, whereby now the issuers and all the way down to the individuals have to, if they meet certain requirements, file additional information with the IRS that they never had to before so they can better identify and target these transactions early on. Most recently, and something very pertinent to our discussion, is a new form that's going to be required to be filed with the 1120, with the corporate
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	dramatically strengthening the circular 230 regulations, which will make it much more difficult for tax preparers or tax specialists to perform any of the sorts of activities that we think of in the more negative sense. Additionally, the AICPA, you may not be aware, has recently made its standards of tax practice to be mandatory, they're enforceable now, so that anyone violating, found to violate those standards, would be expelled from the AICPA. To take even a step further, we recently made those not only enforceable, but automatically enforceable in circumstances where any member of the AICPA has been sanctioned by either the SEC, the IRS, or the PCAOB. So we have standards now, and I might add that we've done a second interpretation to those standards that is very specifically related to tax opinions and taking tax return positions, so we've in a question and answer format and also a monologue format. So there's been a lot of changes that have happened that have yet that are starting to take	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	tax transactions, which we all wish never happened and which we hope will not happen again, and that's not to say that there won't be differences of opinion on tax transactions as companies enter into them and they're reviewed by the IRS. But the mass marketing of these transactions that are tax motivated without business purpose, what is out there now to prevent them from happening again? It's something we all care about. Well, Cono and the IRS have taken a lot of steps that we need to be cognizant of if you all think through the rulemaking. Not only are there brand new regulations out there that require a whole web of transparency that didn't exist before, whereby now the issuers and all the way down to the individuals have to, if they meet certain requirements, file additional information with the IRS that they never had to before so they can better identify and target these transactions early on. Most recently, and something very pertinent to our discussion, is a new form that's going to be required to be filed with the 1120, with the corporate tax return. It's called an M-3, and the purpose of
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	dramatically strengthening the circular 230 regulations, which will make it much more difficult for tax preparers or tax specialists to perform any of the sorts of activities that we think of in the more negative sense. Additionally, the AICPA, you may not be aware, has recently made its standards of tax practice to be mandatory, they're enforceable now, so that anyone violating, found to violate those standards, would be expelled from the AICPA. To take even a step further, we recently made those not only enforceable, but automatically enforceable in circumstances where any member of the AICPA has been sanctioned by either the SEC, the IRS, or the PCAOB. So we have standards now, and I might add that we've done a second interpretation to those standards that is very specifically related to tax opinions and taking tax return positions, so we've in a question and answer format and also a monologue format. So there's been a lot of changes that have happened that have yet that are starting to take effect and I think are having positive effects, and I	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	tax transactions, which we all wish never happened and which we hope will not happen again, and that's not to say that there won't be differences of opinion on tax transactions as companies enter into them and they're reviewed by the IRS. But the mass marketing of these transactions that are tax motivated without business purpose, what is out there now to prevent them from happening again? It's something we all care about. Well, Cono and the IRS have taken a lot of steps that we need to be cognizant of if you all think through the rulemaking. Not only are there brand new regulations out there that require a whole web of transparency that didn't exist before, whereby now the issuers and all the way down to the individuals have to, if they meet certain requirements, file additional information with the IRS that they never had to before so they can better identify and target these transactions early on. Most recently, and something very pertinent to our discussion, is a new form that's going to be required to be filed with the 1120, with the corporate tax return. It's called an M-3, and the purpose of that is to highlight very specifically, not en banc but
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	dramatically strengthening the circular 230 regulations, which will make it much more difficult for tax preparers or tax specialists to perform any of the sorts of activities that we think of in the more negative sense. Additionally, the AICPA, you may not be aware, has recently made its standards of tax practice to be mandatory, they're enforceable now, so that anyone violating, found to violate those standards, would be expelled from the AICPA. To take even a step further, we recently made those not only enforceable, but automatically enforceable in circumstances where any member of the AICPA has been sanctioned by either the SEC, the IRS, or the PCAOB. So we have standards now, and I might add that we've done a second interpretation to those standards that is very specifically related to tax opinions and taking tax return positions, so we've in a question and answer format and also a monologue format. So there's been a lot of changes that have happened that have yet that are starting to take	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	tax transactions, which we all wish never happened and which we hope will not happen again, and that's not to say that there won't be differences of opinion on tax transactions as companies enter into them and they're reviewed by the IRS. But the mass marketing of these transactions that are tax motivated without business purpose, what is out there now to prevent them from happening again? It's something we all care about. Well, Cono and the IRS have taken a lot of steps that we need to be cognizant of if you all think through the rulemaking. Not only are there brand new regulations out there that require a whole web of transparency that didn't exist before, whereby now the issuers and all the way down to the individuals have to, if they meet certain requirements, file additional information with the IRS that they never had to before so they can better identify and target these transactions early on. Most recently, and something very pertinent to our discussion, is a new form that's going to be required to be filed with the 1120, with the corporate tax return. It's called an M-3, and the purpose of

	Page 198		Page 200
1	will allow the IRS obviously to go in more quickly,	1	MR. SCATES: Let's now take a look at the last
2	identify where there are problem areas, and try to	2	two remaining questions. Are there any special factors
3	address it either through rulemaking, through	3	that an audit committee should take into consideration
4	challenging it through audit, or going to try to get	4	before approving an engagement of an auditor to perform
5	the law changed if they find problems.	5	any of the services discussed today? Are there other
6	The audit committee involvement is clearly a	6	ethical issues an audit firm should consider before
7	new element. Sarbanes-Oxley and now the regulation of	7	providing tax planning advice, strategy, and other tax
8 9	the profession is something that we're all grappling with and trying to understand day in and day out and	8 9	services? MR. CARMICHAEL: It looks as if all souls have
10	with and trying to understand day in and day out and getting better and better at trying to effectuate is	9 10	been saved.
11	brand new, and it's taking hold, and we saw that the	11	(Laughter.)
12	audit committees are speaking loudly, significant	12	MR. SCATES: Tom Ochsenschlager.
13	reduction in the type of services, the amount of	13	MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: I'm not quite ready to
14	services we're providing to auditors.	14	respond here. I'm asking Sue here Tom
15	I think the real question is, over just a	15	Ochsenschlager with the AICPA. The AICPA does have a
16	year after we have the new rules in effect, what is the	16	practice guide that we've published, an audit committee
17	next step? Do we come in and decide to do rulemaking?	17	I'm sorry, late in the day, I guess an audit
18	Do we see how these IRS rules, how the audit committees	18	committee tool kit, which provides very specific bullet
19	take their charge, how the audit firms frankly respond	19	points that audit committees should consider before
20	and step up to where we need to step up to to do the	20	engaging an auditor to do services that are outside the
21	right things? Or do we come up with new rules, which	21	scope of the audit. So there is such an item out
22	will undoubtedly raise new issues? Because these	22	there, which I'd be glad to supply anyone that wants to
23	issues, every time we write rules, create new issues.	23	get in contact with me.
24 25	I think it's a tough issue that we're going to have to grapple with as we all move through this process, and I	24 25	MR. SCATES: Bruce Webb. MR. WEBB: Bruce Webb, McGladrey & Pullen. I
23	grappie with as we an move through this process, and r	23	MR. WEBB. Brace webb, McGradiey & Funen. T
	Page 199		Page 201
1	C C	1	
1 2	Page 199 think we all want to be constructive and appreciate the opportunity to be here today to talk through the	1 2	Page 201 just simply want to state that I believe it's incumbent upon both audit committees and auditors to consider the
	think we all want to be constructive and appreciate the	1 2 3	just simply want to state that I believe it's incumbent
2 3 4	think we all want to be constructive and appreciate the opportunity to be here today to talk through the issues. MR. SCATES: Barbara Roper.		just simply want to state that I believe it's incumbent upon both audit committees and auditors to consider the
2 3 4 5	think we all want to be constructive and appreciate the opportunity to be here today to talk through the issues. MR. SCATES: Barbara Roper. MS. ROPER: On this issue of the world's	3 4 5	just simply want to state that I believe it's incumbent upon both audit committees and auditors to consider the overriding principles and the spirit of the rules, not just the letter of the rules, before agreeing to engage the auditor for any non-audit services.
2 3 4 5 6	think we all want to be constructive and appreciate the opportunity to be here today to talk through the issues. MR. SCATES: Barbara Roper. MS. ROPER: On this issue of the world's changed, I see it somewhat differently. I hope audit	3 4 5 6	just simply want to state that I believe it's incumbent upon both audit committees and auditors to consider the overriding principles and the spirit of the rules, not just the letter of the rules, before agreeing to engage the auditor for any non-audit services. MR. SCATES: Any other comments on audit
2 3 4 5 6 7	think we all want to be constructive and appreciate the opportunity to be here today to talk through the issues. MR. SCATES: Barbara Roper. MS. ROPER: On this issue of the world's changed, I see it somewhat differently. I hope audit committees are being more responsible in making these	3 4 5 6 7	just simply want to state that I believe it's incumbent upon both audit committees and auditors to consider the overriding principles and the spirit of the rules, not just the letter of the rules, before agreeing to engage the auditor for any non-audit services. MR. SCATES: Any other comments on audit committees or these two remaining questions? I've got
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	think we all want to be constructive and appreciate the opportunity to be here today to talk through the issues. MR. SCATES: Barbara Roper. MS. ROPER: On this issue of the world's changed, I see it somewhat differently. I hope audit committees are being more responsible in making these decisions and I hope firms are abandoning practices	3 4 5 6 7 8	just simply want to state that I believe it's incumbent upon both audit committees and auditors to consider the overriding principles and the spirit of the rules, not just the letter of the rules, before agreeing to engage the auditor for any non-audit services. MR. SCATES: Any other comments on audit committees or these two remaining questions? I've got one question here. Mark Weinberger, you alluded to the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	think we all want to be constructive and appreciate the opportunity to be here today to talk through the issues. MR. SCATES: Barbara Roper. MS. ROPER: On this issue of the world's changed, I see it somewhat differently. I hope audit committees are being more responsible in making these decisions and I hope firms are abandoning practices that have created problems in the past, and I believe	3 4 5 6 7 8 9	just simply want to state that I believe it's incumbent upon both audit committees and auditors to consider the overriding principles and the spirit of the rules, not just the letter of the rules, before agreeing to engage the auditor for any non-audit services. MR. SCATES: Any other comments on audit committees or these two remaining questions? I've got one question here. Mark Weinberger, you alluded to the M-3, new schedule M-3. I have a question on this, not
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	think we all want to be constructive and appreciate the opportunity to be here today to talk through the issues. MR. SCATES: Barbara Roper. MS. ROPER: On this issue of the world's changed, I see it somewhat differently. I hope audit committees are being more responsible in making these decisions and I hope firms are abandoning practices that have created problems in the past, and I believe that that's likely to be the case. But I also believe	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	just simply want to state that I believe it's incumbent upon both audit committees and auditors to consider the overriding principles and the spirit of the rules, not just the letter of the rules, before agreeing to engage the auditor for any non-audit services. MR. SCATES: Any other comments on audit committees or these two remaining questions? I've got one question here. Mark Weinberger, you alluded to the M-3, new schedule M-3. I have a question on this, not directed to you, but anyone. With the new schedule M-3
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	think we all want to be constructive and appreciate the opportunity to be here today to talk through the issues. MR. SCATES: Barbara Roper. MS. ROPER: On this issue of the world's changed, I see it somewhat differently. I hope audit committees are being more responsible in making these decisions and I hope firms are abandoning practices that have created problems in the past, and I believe that that's likely to be the case. But I also believe that memories fade and that you have a window of	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	just simply want to state that I believe it's incumbent upon both audit committees and auditors to consider the overriding principles and the spirit of the rules, not just the letter of the rules, before agreeing to engage the auditor for any non-audit services. MR. SCATES: Any other comments on audit committees or these two remaining questions? I've got one question here. Mark Weinberger, you alluded to the M-3, new schedule M-3. I have a question on this, not directed to you, but anyone. With the new schedule M-3 requiring certain reconciliations to financial
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	think we all want to be constructive and appreciate the opportunity to be here today to talk through the issues. MR. SCATES: Barbara Roper. MS. ROPER: On this issue of the world's changed, I see it somewhat differently. I hope audit committees are being more responsible in making these decisions and I hope firms are abandoning practices that have created problems in the past, and I believe that that's likely to be the case. But I also believe that memories fade and that you have a window of opportunity while memories are fresh to	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	just simply want to state that I believe it's incumbent upon both audit committees and auditors to consider the overriding principles and the spirit of the rules, not just the letter of the rules, before agreeing to engage the auditor for any non-audit services. MR. SCATES: Any other comments on audit committees or these two remaining questions? I've got one question here. Mark Weinberger, you alluded to the M-3, new schedule M-3. I have a question on this, not directed to you, but anyone. With the new schedule M-3 requiring certain reconciliations to financial statements and characterization of book to tax
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	think we all want to be constructive and appreciate the opportunity to be here today to talk through the issues. MR. SCATES: Barbara Roper. MS. ROPER: On this issue of the world's changed, I see it somewhat differently. I hope audit committees are being more responsible in making these decisions and I hope firms are abandoning practices that have created problems in the past, and I believe that that's likely to be the case. But I also believe that memories fade and that you have a window of opportunity while memories are fresh to institutionalize the changes you would like to see as	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	just simply want to state that I believe it's incumbent upon both audit committees and auditors to consider the overriding principles and the spirit of the rules, not just the letter of the rules, before agreeing to engage the auditor for any non-audit services. MR. SCATES: Any other comments on audit committees or these two remaining questions? I've got one question here. Mark Weinberger, you alluded to the M-3, new schedule M-3. I have a question on this, not directed to you, but anyone. With the new schedule M-3 requiring certain reconciliations to financial statements and characterization of book to tax differences as either permanent or temporary based on
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	think we all want to be constructive and appreciate the opportunity to be here today to talk through the issues. MR. SCATES: Barbara Roper. MS. ROPER: On this issue of the world's changed, I see it somewhat differently. I hope audit committees are being more responsible in making these decisions and I hope firms are abandoning practices that have created problems in the past, and I believe that that's likely to be the case. But I also believe that memories fade and that you have a window of opportunity while memories are fresh to	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	just simply want to state that I believe it's incumbent upon both audit committees and auditors to consider the overriding principles and the spirit of the rules, not just the letter of the rules, before agreeing to engage the auditor for any non-audit services. MR. SCATES: Any other comments on audit committees or these two remaining questions? I've got one question here. Mark Weinberger, you alluded to the M-3, new schedule M-3. I have a question on this, not directed to you, but anyone. With the new schedule M-3 requiring certain reconciliations to financial statements and characterization of book to tax
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	think we all want to be constructive and appreciate the opportunity to be here today to talk through the issues. MR. SCATES: Barbara Roper. MS. ROPER: On this issue of the world's changed, I see it somewhat differently. I hope audit committees are being more responsible in making these decisions and I hope firms are abandoning practices that have created problems in the past, and I believe that that's likely to be the case. But I also believe that memories fade and that you have a window of opportunity while memories are fresh to institutionalize the changes you would like to see as permanent changes. And if we have identified changes where there are clear independence problems with tax services, I	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	just simply want to state that I believe it's incumbent upon both audit committees and auditors to consider the overriding principles and the spirit of the rules, not just the letter of the rules, before agreeing to engage the auditor for any non-audit services. MR. SCATES: Any other comments on audit committees or these two remaining questions? I've got one question here. Mark Weinberger, you alluded to the M-3, new schedule M-3. I have a question on this, not directed to you, but anyone. With the new schedule M-3 requiring certain reconciliations to financial statements and characterization of book to tax differences as either permanent or temporary based on financial accounting principles, is there enhanced efficiencies by having the audit firm prepare the issuer's income tax returns, including the new schedule
$\begin{array}{c} 2\\ 3\\ 4\\ 5\\ 6\\ 7\\ 8\\ 9\\ 10\\ 11\\ 12\\ 13\\ 14\\ 15\\ 16\\ 17\\ \end{array}$	think we all want to be constructive and appreciate the opportunity to be here today to talk through the issues. MR. SCATES: Barbara Roper. MS. ROPER: On this issue of the world's changed, I see it somewhat differently. I hope audit committees are being more responsible in making these decisions and I hope firms are abandoning practices that have created problems in the past, and I believe that that's likely to be the case. But I also believe that memories fade and that you have a window of opportunity while memories are fresh to institutionalize the changes you would like to see as permanent changes. And if we have identified changes where there are clear independence problems with tax services, I think the opportunity is now to write those rules. And	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	just simply want to state that I believe it's incumbent upon both audit committees and auditors to consider the overriding principles and the spirit of the rules, not just the letter of the rules, before agreeing to engage the auditor for any non-audit services. MR. SCATES: Any other comments on audit committees or these two remaining questions? I've got one question here. Mark Weinberger, you alluded to the M-3, new schedule M-3. I have a question on this, not directed to you, but anyone. With the new schedule M-3 requiring certain reconciliations to financial statements and characterization of book to tax differences as either permanent or temporary based on financial accounting principles, is there enhanced efficiencies by having the audit firm prepare the issuer's income tax returns, including the new schedule M-3?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	think we all want to be constructive and appreciate the opportunity to be here today to talk through the issues. MR. SCATES: Barbara Roper. MS. ROPER: On this issue of the world's changed, I see it somewhat differently. I hope audit committees are being more responsible in making these decisions and I hope firms are abandoning practices that have created problems in the past, and I believe that that's likely to be the case. But I also believe that memories fade and that you have a window of opportunity while memories are fresh to institutionalize the changes you would like to see as permanent changes. And if we have identified changes where there are clear independence problems with tax services, I think the opportunity is now to write those rules. And if we have identified areas where there are sort of	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	just simply want to state that I believe it's incumbent upon both audit committees and auditors to consider the overriding principles and the spirit of the rules, not just the letter of the rules, before agreeing to engage the auditor for any non-audit services. MR. SCATES: Any other comments on audit committees or these two remaining questions? I've got one question here. Mark Weinberger, you alluded to the M-3, new schedule M-3. I have a question on this, not directed to you, but anyone. With the new schedule M-3 requiring certain reconciliations to financial statements and characterization of book to tax differences as either permanent or temporary based on financial accounting principles, is there enhanced efficiencies by having the audit firm prepare the issuer's income tax returns, including the new schedule M-3? MR. WEINBERGER: Oh, wow. It's a tough
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	think we all want to be constructive and appreciate the opportunity to be here today to talk through the issues. MR. SCATES: Barbara Roper. MS. ROPER: On this issue of the world's changed, I see it somewhat differently. I hope audit committees are being more responsible in making these decisions and I hope firms are abandoning practices that have created problems in the past, and I believe that that's likely to be the case. But I also believe that memories fade and that you have a window of opportunity while memories are fresh to institutionalize the changes you would like to see as permanent changes. And if we have identified changes where there are clear independence problems with tax services, I think the opportunity is now to write those rules. And if we have identified areas where there are sort of questions about independence problems, the opportunity	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	just simply want to state that I believe it's incumbent upon both audit committees and auditors to consider the overriding principles and the spirit of the rules, not just the letter of the rules, before agreeing to engage the auditor for any non-audit services. MR. SCATES: Any other comments on audit committees or these two remaining questions? I've got one question here. Mark Weinberger, you alluded to the M-3, new schedule M-3. I have a question on this, not directed to you, but anyone. With the new schedule M-3 requiring certain reconciliations to financial statements and characterization of book to tax differences as either permanent or temporary based on financial accounting principles, is there enhanced efficiencies by having the audit firm prepare the issuer's income tax returns, including the new schedule M-3? MR. WEINBERGER: Oh, wow. It's a tough question, and without my independence person here
$\begin{array}{c} 2\\ 3\\ 4\\ 5\\ 6\\ 7\\ 8\\ 9\\ 10\\ 11\\ 12\\ 13\\ 14\\ 15\\ 16\\ 17\\ 18\\ 19\\ 20\\ \end{array}$	think we all want to be constructive and appreciate the opportunity to be here today to talk through the issues. MR. SCATES: Barbara Roper. MS. ROPER: On this issue of the world's changed, I see it somewhat differently. I hope audit committees are being more responsible in making these decisions and I hope firms are abandoning practices that have created problems in the past, and I believe that that's likely to be the case. But I also believe that memories fade and that you have a window of opportunity while memories are fresh to institutionalize the changes you would like to see as permanent changes. And if we have identified changes where there are clear independence problems with tax services, I think the opportunity is now to write those rules. And if we have identified areas where there are sort of questions about independence problems, the opportunity is now to clarify those issues for audit committees so	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	just simply want to state that I believe it's incumbent upon both audit committees and auditors to consider the overriding principles and the spirit of the rules, not just the letter of the rules, before agreeing to engage the auditor for any non-audit services. MR. SCATES: Any other comments on audit committees or these two remaining questions? I've got one question here. Mark Weinberger, you alluded to the M-3, new schedule M-3. I have a question on this, not directed to you, but anyone. With the new schedule M-3 requiring certain reconciliations to financial statements and characterization of book to tax differences as either permanent or temporary based on financial accounting principles, is there enhanced efficiencies by having the audit firm prepare the issuer's income tax returns, including the new schedule M-3? MR. WEINBERGER: Oh, wow. It's a tough question, and without my independence person here telling me what we can and cannot do, I'm a little
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	think we all want to be constructive and appreciate the opportunity to be here today to talk through the issues. MR. SCATES: Barbara Roper. MS. ROPER: On this issue of the world's changed, I see it somewhat differently. I hope audit committees are being more responsible in making these decisions and I hope firms are abandoning practices that have created problems in the past, and I believe that that's likely to be the case. But I also believe that memories fade and that you have a window of opportunity while memories are fresh to institutionalize the changes you would like to see as permanent changes. Mnd if we have identified changes where there are clear independence problems with tax services, I think the opportunity is now to write those rules. And if we have identified areas where there are sort of questions about independence problems, the opportunity is now to clarify those issues for audit committees so there's something that they can look to going forward	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	just simply want to state that I believe it's incumbent upon both audit committees and auditors to consider the overriding principles and the spirit of the rules, not just the letter of the rules, before agreeing to engage the auditor for any non-audit services. MR. SCATES: Any other comments on audit committees or these two remaining questions? I've got one question here. Mark Weinberger, you alluded to the M-3, new schedule M-3. I have a question on this, not directed to you, but anyone. With the new schedule M-3 requiring certain reconciliations to financial statements and characterization of book to tax differences as either permanent or temporary based on financial accounting principles, is there enhanced efficiencies by having the audit firm prepare the issuer's income tax returns, including the new schedule M-3? MR. WEINBERGER: Oh, wow. It's a tough question, and without my independence person here telling me what we can and cannot do, I'm a little leery to answer it. I certainly think I think the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	think we all want to be constructive and appreciate the opportunity to be here today to talk through the issues. MR. SCATES: Barbara Roper. MS. ROPER: On this issue of the world's changed, I see it somewhat differently. I hope audit committees are being more responsible in making these decisions and I hope firms are abandoning practices that have created problems in the past, and I believe that that's likely to be the case. But I also believe that memories fade and that you have a window of opportunity while memories are fresh to institutionalize the changes you would like to see as permanent changes. And if we have identified changes where there are clear independence problems with tax services, I think the opportunity is now to write those rules. And if we have identified areas where there are sort of questions about independence problems, the opportunity is now to clarify those issues for audit committees so there's something that they can look to going forward that will direct the decisions that they make and hold	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	just simply want to state that I believe it's incumbent upon both audit committees and auditors to consider the overriding principles and the spirit of the rules, not just the letter of the rules, before agreeing to engage the auditor for any non-audit services. MR. SCATES: Any other comments on audit committees or these two remaining questions? I've got one question here. Mark Weinberger, you alluded to the M-3, new schedule M-3. I have a question on this, not directed to you, but anyone. With the new schedule M-3 requiring certain reconciliations to financial statements and characterization of book to tax differences as either permanent or temporary based on financial accounting principles, is there enhanced efficiencies by having the audit firm prepare the issuer's income tax returns, including the new schedule M-3? MR. WEINBERGER: Oh, wow. It's a tough question, and without my independence person here telling me what we can and cannot do, I'm a little leery to answer it. I certainly think I think the M-3 generally, and again, for those who aren't familiar
$\begin{array}{c} 2\\ 3\\ 4\\ 5\\ 6\\ 7\\ 8\\ 9\\ 10\\ 11\\ 12\\ 13\\ 14\\ 15\\ 16\\ 17\\ 18\\ 19\\ 20\\ 21\\ 22\\ 23\\ \end{array}$	think we all want to be constructive and appreciate the opportunity to be here today to talk through the issues. MR. SCATES: Barbara Roper. MS. ROPER: On this issue of the world's changed, I see it somewhat differently. I hope audit committees are being more responsible in making these decisions and I hope firms are abandoning practices that have created problems in the past, and I believe that that's likely to be the case. But I also believe that memories fade and that you have a window of opportunity while memories are fresh to institutionalize the changes you would like to see as permanent changes. And if we have identified changes where there are clear independence problems with tax services, I think the opportunity is now to write those rules. And if we have identified areas where there are sort of questions about independence problems, the opportunity is now to clarify those issues for audit committees so there's something that they can look to going forward that will direct the decisions that they make and hold them accountable for making good decisions, even when	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	just simply want to state that I believe it's incumbent upon both audit committees and auditors to consider the overriding principles and the spirit of the rules, not just the letter of the rules, before agreeing to engage the auditor for any non-audit services. MR. SCATES: Any other comments on audit committees or these two remaining questions? I've got one question here. Mark Weinberger, you alluded to the M-3, new schedule M-3. I have a question on this, not directed to you, but anyone. With the new schedule M-3 requiring certain reconciliations to financial statements and characterization of book to tax differences as either permanent or temporary based on financial accounting principles, is there enhanced efficiencies by having the audit firm prepare the issuer's income tax returns, including the new schedule M-3? MR. WEINBERGER: Oh, wow. It's a tough question, and without my independence person here telling me what we can and cannot do, I'm a little leery to answer it. I certainly think I think the M-3 generally, and again, for those who aren't familiar with it, it is a brand new schedule that I think goes
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	think we all want to be constructive and appreciate the opportunity to be here today to talk through the issues. MR. SCATES: Barbara Roper. MS. ROPER: On this issue of the world's changed, I see it somewhat differently. I hope audit committees are being more responsible in making these decisions and I hope firms are abandoning practices that have created problems in the past, and I believe that that's likely to be the case. But I also believe that memories fade and that you have a window of opportunity while memories are fresh to institutionalize the changes you would like to see as permanent changes. And if we have identified changes where there are clear independence problems with tax services, I think the opportunity is now to write those rules. And if we have identified areas where there are sort of questions about independence problems, the opportunity is now to clarify those issues for audit committees so there's something that they can look to going forward that will direct the decisions that they make and hold	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	just simply want to state that I believe it's incumbent upon both audit committees and auditors to consider the overriding principles and the spirit of the rules, not just the letter of the rules, before agreeing to engage the auditor for any non-audit services. MR. SCATES: Any other comments on audit committees or these two remaining questions? I've got one question here. Mark Weinberger, you alluded to the M-3, new schedule M-3. I have a question on this, not directed to you, but anyone. With the new schedule M-3 requiring certain reconciliations to financial statements and characterization of book to tax differences as either permanent or temporary based on financial accounting principles, is there enhanced efficiencies by having the audit firm prepare the issuer's income tax returns, including the new schedule M-3? MR. WEINBERGER: Oh, wow. It's a tough question, and without my independence person here telling me what we can and cannot do, I'm a little leery to answer it. I certainly think I think the M-3 generally, and again, for those who aren't familiar

51 (Pages 198 to 201)

	Washing		
	Page 202		Page 204
$ \begin{array}{c} 1\\2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\\23\\24\end{array} $	It's a limited effect for the first year and then it will be fully in effect the year after, but it really is going to highlight the all the book tax differences that per account. And obviously, to the extent that the auditor is working with the books and records and the work papers, they would have efficiency to work on the M-3 schedule for sure. I just don't know when you come to a situation where we can't prepare it because it's somehow used in a financial statement and where that issue arises, so I'm going to leave the independence issue to somebody else. But at first blush, it certainly seems like the information would be at the auditor's fingertips. MR. SCATES: Pat Walters. MS. WALTERS: I'm certainly not talking about the M-3. I would like to go back for a minute to the audit committee issue and sort of throw something out on the table which I'm not sure falls within the purview of the PCAOB or not, and that is, what would be the minimum level of due diligence that an audit committee should go through in determining whether to award a tax services contract to their auditor? For example, should they be required to do an RFP, a request for proposals, from others? Should they be	$\begin{array}{c}1\\2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\\23\\24\end{array}$	on, I think investors need more confidence that the audit committees are going to do extensive due diligence around these issues. And to say we're going to just leave it to the audit committee means that audit committees who don't do requisite due diligence will become lazier and lazier, and those audit committees who see that others don't have to do that, because I would expect that a lot of these people are on at least one other audit committee in life, they will get lazier and lazier, and I'm really not encouraged by let's leave it to the audit committee. I would like there to be some document, documented best practices issued by some authoritative body that says, we think that these are the minimum steps that an audit committee should take on issues that reflect on the independence of their auditor. And I think that the simple fact that we've had a day-long discussion around this particular topic, and there's pretty much unanimity on the part of the investor advocates in these rooms that tax services is an issue for them, that someone, if it's not the PCAOB maybe it's the SEC, or someone should come out and say, we think these are minimum best practices in this area. MR. SCATES: Scott Bayless.
25	required to consider some of the issues that we have	25	MR. BAYLESS: Just to address the M-3
	Page 203		Page 205
$ \begin{array}{c} 1\\2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\\23\end{array} $	placed out on the table today with respect to concerns about providing tax services and document their discussions and decision-making surrounding those issues? Those are just some thoughts that I've had in terms of what a reasonable investor would expect the audit committee to have done before they award such a service to their auditor. And certainly I would be interested in hearing what others around the table might say about that. MR. SCATES: Mark Weinberger. MR. WEINBERGER: I just don't want you to have an unanswered question, Pat. I guess my view would be we certainly have all circumstances in our firm, some do issue RFPs regularly routinely and some don't. And again I think this, because of the diversity of clients and the diversity of taxpayers and the issues they face, that I would suggest that that's probably best left to the audit committee as under current processes. MR. SCATES: Can I? MR. SCATES: I'm sorry. Pat Walters. MS. WALTERS: Going back to everything that	$ \begin{array}{c} 1\\2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\\23\end{array} $	question, in terms of the process, of course, the process is typically that the client has gone through and prepared books and records that incorporate its tax position that's weaved into the financial statements. The auditor then comes in with the assistance of a tax expert that works for the firm to assess whether the positions laid out by the client in their books and records with respect to taxes are accurate and reflect the auditors through the tax eyes, tax expert's eyes, views of what is appropriate in the financial statement disclosures. We heard Lynn Turner describe that the tax return typically is not done at that time, that the tax return is typically done months later, and it's the ministerial act of filling out the form, putting numbers that the client has generated into a reporting format, that then is filed with the SEC or excuse me, filed with the IRS. The significant intervening event is that management is ensuring that the numbers that are placed in that form are consistent with what they're reported in their books and records to ensure that they can then sign the return, that it reflects the information that
23 24 25	Barbara said, and I really wish I had said that, your last series of comments were absolutely perfectly right	23 24 25	they believe is correct and accurate. So significant management involvement in both the process of

	Page 206	
1	generating the books and records that are then placed	
2	into that format, it's a form. The auditors are not	
3	responsible for maintaining that information that is	
4	set forth in the M-3. That is the management's	
5	responsibility and they keep the books and records to	
6	ensure that those that information is reflected in	
7	their books and records.	
8	MR. SCATES: Bruce Webb.	
9	MR. WEBB: The Board may wish to consider an	
10	amendment to ethics interpretation 101-3 that was	
11	adopted last June, became effective last fall, so	
12	therefore is not included in the interim independence	
13	standards. But I think it represents a significant	
14	strengthening of the overall non-audit service	
15 16	requirements in that it requires a number of things that the old interpretation didn't. Perhaps first and	
10	that the old interpretation didn't. Perhaps first and most importantly is a documented understanding	
17	regarding several aspects of the engagement, the	
19	members' responsibilities, the client's	
20	responsibilities, the objectives of the engagements,	
21	some of the things that I believe Pat was getting at	
22	that the audit committee should want to understand as	
23	they approve those activities.	
24	Secondly, it requires that management	
25	designate a competent employee to oversee those	
1	Page 207	
1	Page 207 services so that make all management decisions in	
2		
2 3	services so that make all management decisions in connection with those services. So that might be useful to the Board.	
2 3 4	services so that make all management decisions in connection with those services. So that might be useful to the Board. MR. SCATES: Any other comments?	
2 3 4 5	services so that make all management decisions in connection with those services. So that might be useful to the Board. MR. SCATES: Any other comments? MR. CARMICHAEL: Okay, we're ahead of	
2 3 4 5 6	services so that make all management decisions in connection with those services. So that might be useful to the Board. MR. SCATES: Any other comments? MR. CARMICHAEL: Okay, we're ahead of schedule. That's fine. We would like to thank you all	
2 3 4 5 6 7	services so that make all management decisions in connection with those services. So that might be useful to the Board. MR. SCATES: Any other comments? MR. CARMICHAEL: Okay, we're ahead of schedule. That's fine. We would like to thank you all very much for the information that you've provided to	
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	services so that make all management decisions in connection with those services. So that might be useful to the Board. MR. SCATES: Any other comments? MR. CARMICHAEL: Okay, we're ahead of schedule. That's fine. We would like to thank you all very much for the information that you've provided to us today. Many of you have traveled a long way to get	
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	services so that make all management decisions in connection with those services. So that might be useful to the Board. MR. SCATES: Any other comments? MR. CARMICHAEL: Okay, we're ahead of schedule. That's fine. We would like to thank you all very much for the information that you've provided to us today. Many of you have traveled a long way to get here and we appreciate your willingness to do that and	
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	services so that make all management decisions in connection with those services. So that might be useful to the Board. MR. SCATES: Any other comments? MR. CARMICHAEL: Okay, we're ahead of schedule. That's fine. We would like to thank you all very much for the information that you've provided to us today. Many of you have traveled a long way to get here and we appreciate your willingness to do that and wish you safe travels as you return home. Thank you.	
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	services so that make all management decisions in connection with those services. So that might be useful to the Board. MR. SCATES: Any other comments? MR. CARMICHAEL: Okay, we're ahead of schedule. That's fine. We would like to thank you all very much for the information that you've provided to us today. Many of you have traveled a long way to get here and we appreciate your willingness to do that and wish you safe travels as you return home. Thank you. (Whereupon, at 3:58 p.m., the meeting was	
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	services so that make all management decisions in connection with those services. So that might be useful to the Board. MR. SCATES: Any other comments? MR. CARMICHAEL: Okay, we're ahead of schedule. That's fine. We would like to thank you all very much for the information that you've provided to us today. Many of you have traveled a long way to get here and we appreciate your willingness to do that and wish you safe travels as you return home. Thank you.	
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	services so that make all management decisions in connection with those services. So that might be useful to the Board. MR. SCATES: Any other comments? MR. CARMICHAEL: Okay, we're ahead of schedule. That's fine. We would like to thank you all very much for the information that you've provided to us today. Many of you have traveled a long way to get here and we appreciate your willingness to do that and wish you safe travels as you return home. Thank you. (Whereupon, at 3:58 p.m., the meeting was	
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	services so that make all management decisions in connection with those services. So that might be useful to the Board. MR. SCATES: Any other comments? MR. CARMICHAEL: Okay, we're ahead of schedule. That's fine. We would like to thank you all very much for the information that you've provided to us today. Many of you have traveled a long way to get here and we appreciate your willingness to do that and wish you safe travels as you return home. Thank you. (Whereupon, at 3:58 p.m., the meeting was	
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	services so that make all management decisions in connection with those services. So that might be useful to the Board. MR. SCATES: Any other comments? MR. CARMICHAEL: Okay, we're ahead of schedule. That's fine. We would like to thank you all very much for the information that you've provided to us today. Many of you have traveled a long way to get here and we appreciate your willingness to do that and wish you safe travels as you return home. Thank you. (Whereupon, at 3:58 p.m., the meeting was	
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	services so that make all management decisions in connection with those services. So that might be useful to the Board. MR. SCATES: Any other comments? MR. CARMICHAEL: Okay, we're ahead of schedule. That's fine. We would like to thank you all very much for the information that you've provided to us today. Many of you have traveled a long way to get here and we appreciate your willingness to do that and wish you safe travels as you return home. Thank you. (Whereupon, at 3:58 p.m., the meeting was	
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	services so that make all management decisions in connection with those services. So that might be useful to the Board. MR. SCATES: Any other comments? MR. CARMICHAEL: Okay, we're ahead of schedule. That's fine. We would like to thank you all very much for the information that you've provided to us today. Many of you have traveled a long way to get here and we appreciate your willingness to do that and wish you safe travels as you return home. Thank you. (Whereupon, at 3:58 p.m., the meeting was	
$\begin{array}{c} 2\\ 3\\ 4\\ 5\\ 6\\ 7\\ 8\\ 9\\ 10\\ 11\\ 12\\ 13\\ 14\\ 15\\ 16\\ 17\\ 18\\ 19\\ \end{array}$	services so that make all management decisions in connection with those services. So that might be useful to the Board. MR. SCATES: Any other comments? MR. CARMICHAEL: Okay, we're ahead of schedule. That's fine. We would like to thank you all very much for the information that you've provided to us today. Many of you have traveled a long way to get here and we appreciate your willingness to do that and wish you safe travels as you return home. Thank you. (Whereupon, at 3:58 p.m., the meeting was	
$\begin{array}{c} 2\\ 3\\ 4\\ 5\\ 6\\ 7\\ 8\\ 9\\ 10\\ 11\\ 12\\ 13\\ 14\\ 15\\ 16\\ 17\\ 18\\ 19\\ 20\\ \end{array}$	services so that make all management decisions in connection with those services. So that might be useful to the Board. MR. SCATES: Any other comments? MR. CARMICHAEL: Okay, we're ahead of schedule. That's fine. We would like to thank you all very much for the information that you've provided to us today. Many of you have traveled a long way to get here and we appreciate your willingness to do that and wish you safe travels as you return home. Thank you. (Whereupon, at 3:58 p.m., the meeting was	
$\begin{array}{c} 2\\ 3\\ 4\\ 5\\ 6\\ 7\\ 8\\ 9\\ 10\\ 11\\ 12\\ 13\\ 14\\ 15\\ 16\\ 17\\ 18\\ 19\\ 20\\ 21\\ \end{array}$	services so that make all management decisions in connection with those services. So that might be useful to the Board. MR. SCATES: Any other comments? MR. CARMICHAEL: Okay, we're ahead of schedule. That's fine. We would like to thank you all very much for the information that you've provided to us today. Many of you have traveled a long way to get here and we appreciate your willingness to do that and wish you safe travels as you return home. Thank you. (Whereupon, at 3:58 p.m., the meeting was	
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	services so that make all management decisions in connection with those services. So that might be useful to the Board. MR. SCATES: Any other comments? MR. CARMICHAEL: Okay, we're ahead of schedule. That's fine. We would like to thank you all very much for the information that you've provided to us today. Many of you have traveled a long way to get here and we appreciate your willingness to do that and wish you safe travels as you return home. Thank you. (Whereupon, at 3:58 p.m., the meeting was	
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	services so that make all management decisions in connection with those services. So that might be useful to the Board. MR. SCATES: Any other comments? MR. CARMICHAEL: Okay, we're ahead of schedule. That's fine. We would like to thank you all very much for the information that you've provided to us today. Many of you have traveled a long way to get here and we appreciate your willingness to do that and wish you safe travels as you return home. Thank you. (Whereupon, at 3:58 p.m., the meeting was	
$\begin{array}{c} 2\\ 3\\ 4\\ 5\\ 6\\ 7\\ 8\\ 9\\ 10\\ 11\\ 12\\ 13\\ 14\\ 15\\ 16\\ 17\\ 18\\ 19\\ 20\\ 21\\ 22\\ \end{array}$	services so that make all management decisions in connection with those services. So that might be useful to the Board. MR. SCATES: Any other comments? MR. CARMICHAEL: Okay, we're ahead of schedule. That's fine. We would like to thank you all very much for the information that you've provided to us today. Many of you have traveled a long way to get here and we appreciate your willingness to do that and wish you safe travels as you return home. Thank you. (Whereupon, at 3:58 p.m., the meeting was	

A	35:15,19,20,23 37:12	62:5 150:15	142:9,24 143:6,16,17	aggressively 77:22,24
ABA 99:23	37:13,21 40:12 49:7	actuarial 170:22	143:24 145:3 146:10	78:3 79:22
abandoning 199:8	49:12,13 52:14,20,22	acute 111:5	147:5,5 161:21 167:7	ago 45:9 46:24 51:1
ability 49:2,15 133:3	54:10,10 56:4 61:5	add 150:21 181:16	174:18 175:2 179:10	52:7,7 66:21 158:21
143:5 148:5 152:12	62:17,18,19,25 74:9	184:9 195:16	179:13,19 189:11	agree 19:24 21:3 25:23
170:2 178:25	74:13 76:3 86:15	added 18:16 98:25	200:7	26:7,8 29:7 37:20
able 31:5 43:17 51:5	89:14 100:17,19	182:19	advise 69:21 88:3	50:1,3,20 61:24 62:20
53:8 54:4 57:11,11	102:1,10 104:20	addition 75:3 92:4,11	111:21 151:3,4	66:12 75:8 88:13
65:10,14 68:20 71:16	107:23 108:9,20	96:5 97:6,9 103:9	175:21,23 176:24	89:24 90:2,3 100:6
71:20 73:2 78:2 82:6	110:20,21 114:13	140:10 182:2 196:24	advised 81:3 87:18	105:7 107:9,17,21
95:5 116:25 119:11	117:23 125:15 129:20	additional 10:3,7 12:1	advisers 102:3 141:23	114:7,19 116:15
130:1 132:22 137:17	133:16,20,22 134:1	21:5 69:24,25 92:14	141:25	117:1 122:2 127:7
145:2 157:1 164:17	134:17,19,20 136:12	92:20 93:20 197:15	advises 111:18	141:14 147:9 158:18
164:24 190:17	136:13 137:4 138:13	Additionally 195:7	advising 47:17 90:11	160:11 163:2,4
abroad 192:10	138:15,20,25 141:3,8	address 5:19 12:10	105:5 142:6 169:16	169:12 171:7,13,17
absence 113:5 159:8	142:8 143:16 145:12	15:21 46:23 61:16	181:20	182:13 187:25
absolute 84:12	145:14 147:4 152:24	63:17 88:14 89:12	advisor 46:8 87:18 88:9	agreed 20:10 61:24
absolutely 64:17 67:25	169:2 176:7 201:14	90:17 164:11 198:3	advisors 89:2,9 90:21	agreeing 133:10 201:4
90:22 95:5 110:21	accounts 31:22,24	204:25	177:13	agreement 123:4
114:7 122:23 127:6	38:20 169:4 174:17	addressed 124:7	advisory 21:20 62:15	176:22
169:25 170:6,16	197:25	addressing 61:21	134:11 163:7 165:22	ahead 17:6 27:24 56:1
203:25	accrual 33:9,11,12 34:1	139:22 191:2	advisory-type 22:13	67:5 113:17 143:11
abstract 63:15,16	34:6 53:4 55:9 173:8	adds 148:9	advocacy 113:19 114:2	207:5
abusive 5:13 12:23	173:12,12	adequately 132:5	118:15 119:2 121:21	AICPA 24:12 45:3
121:8 175:10 193:24	accruals 169:1	adhere 83:9 159:1,9	122:12,13 165:21	73:18 93:2 163:12
194:1 196:25	accrue 123:18	adjourned 207:12	advocate 16:19 62:2	193:23 195:7,11,14
academicians 51:9,10	accumulations 32:19	adjust 88:5	71:23 72:4 81:20	200:15,15
academics 183:17	accuracy 36:11	administration 82:8,10	110:8 115:13 118:5	AICPA's 24:9
accept 137:20	accurate 128:1 205:8	82:14 84:20 146:7	119:16,21,25 120:20	aid 107:12
acceptable 107:3,4,25	205:24	adopted 5:8 11:12	154:17 155:5 193:8,9	aligned 196:21
108:18 133:14 152:16	achieve 69:15 100:17	21:12 24:16 57:15	advocated 7:17	allocation 83:3
152:16 192:24	100:24 101:25 102:9	149:21,22 206:11	advocates 7:20 204:20	allow 9:7 78:1 145:1
accepted 132:8	111:6 134:16	advanced 108:4	advocating 117:11	198:1
accepting 58:5 59:9	acknowledge 8:19,21	advancement 169:6	190:8,9	allowed 26:16 57:21
accepts 161:18	36:4	advantage 45:14 46:15	AF 135:5	118:4 130:12,14
accomplish 161:7	acknowledged 186:1	60:9 71:12 76:20	afar 48:23	144:23 191:7
account 34:25 77:21	acquiree 162:14	101:6,7	affairs 103:17	allowing 13:12
92:6 105:2 202:4	acquirer 162:14	advantages 63:11	affect 100:20 110:20	alluded 45:16 76:6 94:1
Accountability 3:11	acquisition 138:18	65:21 74:6 77:9	145:22 154:25 166:25	122:22 187:7 201:8
29:17	172:25	advice 11:25 28:15	177:21 192:21	alluding 93:13
accountable 199:23	acquisitions 76:8	41:20 44:20 48:24	affiliates 109:15 155:8	allusion 194:21
accountant 6:16 10:21	across-the-board 63:17	52:19,20,23 60:3,6	affiliation 164:15	ally 13:16
10:24 16:14,15,17,19	act 4:21,24 5:1 6:18	61:10,14 63:5 68:16	afield 49:14 108:10	alternative 120:23
37:13,14 38:9 62:1	7:25 11:13 77:3	74:3,10 76:5,7,17	AFL-CIO 2:11 56:23	ambiguity 121:13
108:4 114:12 137:8	113:23 192:22 205:15	79:6,12,15,20 80:2,5	57:15 151:21	157:18 183:24 188:8
137:14,20 141:1,6	acting 16:17 119:2	80:6,7,17,21,23 81:1	AFL-CIO's 106:11	ameliorate 124:20
143:22	120:20 157:17	86:16 89:15 90:24	afternoon 15:11 100:12	amending 4:23
accountants 2:9 16:9	action 97:2	91:24 94:2,10,12	121:7 163:2 167:13	amendment 140:21,23
38:14 83:8 143:24	actions 9:11,14 83:4	95:18,22 96:12,16	175:10 185:21 186:2	206:10
145:2	122:4	98:13 102:3,6,9 103:4	186:17 187:2	America 3:10 17:14
accounted 179:11	activities 40:2 120:10	104:3,20 108:1,10	agencies 155:20,21	33:23
accounting 1:7 4:10,15	184:11,21 185:2,9,13	111:21 118:21,21	age-old 123:6	American 2:8,12
4:18 5:22 8:5 11:9	195:5 206:23	119:12 121:2,13,14	aggressive 5:13 12:22	amount 99:9 111:22
12:14,24 13:5 21:9	activity 101:9 107:22	121:16 129:19 131:18	13:7 75:1 78:14 80:3	157:12 198:13
29:18 32:10 33:6	152:18 163:7	132:17 133:15 134:4	80:9 87:25 94:14,18	amounts 31:21
	actual 33:10 35:23 39:9	138:24,25 141:16	117:4 191:24	analogy 64:1 69:2

77:18	20:15 21:4,7 22:11	198:2 199:18	67:16 68:8 89:11	88:8 90:24 91:20,22
analysis 104:8 119:3,4	24:17 25:15 26:8,15	arena 134:11	160:8,15 166:7,11	92:4,13,15,18 93:22
119:10	155:16 161:3,25	argue 50:24 95:22	173:10	94:1,2 95:4,6,10
analyzing 20:9	applying 30:14 65:24	argues 120:9	association 2:12 36:23	96:15 97:4,12 99:12
Andersen 106:1,1,8	appreciate 7:11 11:6	arguing 96:7 97:10	45:7 49:20 51:14	100:20,21 101:9,10
ANDREW 2:7	34:17 73:4 78:22	argument 17:18,21	assume 39:7 135:9	101:13,17 103:1,6,21
Andy 6:17	85:1 118:1 199:1	18:23 19:8 78:9	149:23	103:22 104:9 105:10
anecdotal 194:18	207:9	163:12,13	assuming 88:4 116:9	105:16 106:15,21
Anecdotally 43:24	approach 57:21 58:5	arguments 25:25 26:11	122:22,22 147:19	107:1,2,5,6,13,14,15
Angelone 2:12 99:21	59:10 129:13	59:1,3 95:7 120:7	149:14	110:10,13,22,22
99:22,22	approached 113:8	161:1,13,23 163:5	assumption 37:7	111:7,10 112:9 117:8
annual 31:21 53:17	160:5	181:5	assurance 19:12,14,17	117:9,23 118:3,5,12
178:2	appropriate 4:18 18:9	arisen 95:3	31:23	118:12,14 119:3,9
Anson 2:15 30:19,21,22	24:19 25:10 31:24	arises 202:10	assure 83:8 148:21	120:19 122:20,23
66:19,20,20 110:17	41:3 64:14 67:14	arms 186:7	193:11	123:1 124:10,17,25
110:18,18 146:2,3,3	68:3 74:3 75:1,24,24	arm's 110:22,25	attempt 63:10 181:5	125:1,3,24,25 126:1
150:6,7 160:10,11	81:16 90:2,5 102:2,6	arm's-length 110:25	attempts 109:25	126:12,13,14 127:24
answer 36:1 38:17	102:10 105:15,17	arose 106:12	attendant 163:6	128:5,5,18 129:5,6
63:16 78:15,17,22	111:21 112:17 113:11	arrangement 157:9	attention 5:10 82:20	131:12,12,21 133:3
79:3 87:10,13 89:5	118:24 120:2,16	arrangements 109:18	90:16,21 139:12	135:4,8,11 136:7,17
98:18 102:14 110:21	121:9,11 122:7,18	175:11	attest 36:11 52:10	136:19 137:3,16,17
112:7 121:10 126:17	124:9 125:15 140:14	array 176:14	attorneys 83:8 169:17	139:9,10 140:1,5,12
128:9 135:6 137:5,7	141:20 152:17,18	arriving 20:2	attracting 160:13	140:15 142:16,19
145:23 146:19 151:16	153:10,12 154:18,20	Arthur 106:1,1	attributes 159:20	145:3,4,13,21 146:5,9
155:19 174:19 180:19	168:25 174:4 185:10	article 51:21	AT&T 152:23	146:12,14,15,20
182:14 195:19 201:21	190:18 205:10	articulate 122:12	AU 171:16	147:2,3,4,25 148:4,5
201:25	appropriately 8:14	articulated 75:15	audience 15:16 168:13	148:7,20 149:5,9,9,14
answering 38:1,2 73:4	12:4 71:2 158:4	articulately 50:4	audit 4:19 5:4,5,7,11,25	149:18,21,25 150:5,9
0		ĩ	addie 1.17 5.1,5,7,11,25	11,2010,21,20100.0,7
answers 32:4 35:18	annronriateness 17·2	articulating 82.24	6.4557.229.1920	150.22 151.2 8 9 11
answers 32:4 35:18 37:8	appropriateness 17:2 119:4	articulating 82:24 aside 185:22	6:4,5,5 7:22 9:19,20 11:9.22 12:25 13:6.7	150:22 151:2,8,9,11 151:12.22.23 152:11
37:8	119:4	aside 185:22	11:9,22 12:25 13:6,7	151:12,22,23 152:11
37:8 anticipate 15:11	119:4 approval 122:21	aside 185:22 asked 53:2 87:9,10	11:9,22 12:25 13:6,7 16:15,18,20 17:3,25	151:12,22,23 152:11 152:18,24,25 153:2,3
37:8 anticipate 15:11 anticipation 14:7	119:4 approval 122:21 approve 28:4,20 77:3	aside 185:22 asked 53:2 87:9,10 91:10 128:9 192:9	11:9,22 12:25 13:6,7 16:15,18,20 17:3,25 18:11,12,17,21 19:4	151:12,22,23 152:11 152:18,24,25 153:2,3 154:17,19 157:3
37:8 anticipate 15:11 anticipation 14:7 anybody 36:4 78:9	119:4 approval 122:21 approve 28:4,20 77:3 93:25 151:23 173:13	aside 185:22 asked 53:2 87:9,10 91:10 128:9 192:9 asking 18:18 78:25	11:9,22 12:25 13:6,7 16:15,18,20 17:3,25 18:11,12,17,21 19:4 19:11,14,15,18 22:23	151:12,22,23 152:11 152:18,24,25 153:2,3 154:17,19 157:3 159:16 160:22 161:2
37:8 anticipate 15:11 anticipation 14:7 anybody 36:4 78:9 129:7 174:16	119:4 approval 122:21 approve 28:4,20 77:3 93:25 151:23 173:13 194:14 206:23	aside 185:22 asked 53:2 87:9,10 91:10 128:9 192:9 asking 18:18 78:25 190:1,6,6 200:14	11:9,22 12:25 13:6,7 16:15,18,20 17:3,25 18:11,12,17,21 19:4 19:11,14,15,18 22:23 23:1,18 24:25 25:3,7	151:12,22,23 152:11 152:18,24,25 153:2,3 154:17,19 157:3 159:16 160:22 161:2 161:9,9,10 162:13,15
37:8 anticipate 15:11 anticipation 14:7 anybody 36:4 78:9 129:7 174:16 anybody's 182:23	119:4 approval 122:21 approve 28:4,20 77:3 93:25 151:23 173:13 194:14 206:23 approved 5:6 27:8	aside 185:22 asked 53:2 87:9,10 91:10 128:9 192:9 asking 18:18 78:25 190:1,6,6 200:14 asks 73:14	11:9,22 12:25 13:6,7 16:15,18,20 17:3,25 18:11,12,17,21 19:4 19:11,14,15,18 22:23 23:1,18 24:25 25:3,7 25:11 26:14,21 27:5	151:12,22,23 152:11 152:18,24,25 153:2,3 154:17,19 157:3 159:16 160:22 161:2 161:9,9,10 162:13,15 162:16 165:17,24
37:8 anticipate 15:11 anticipation 14:7 anybody 36:4 78:9 129:7 174:16 anybody's 182:23 anymore 138:3	119:4 approval 122:21 approve 28:4,20 77:3 93:25 151:23 173:13 194:14 206:23 approved 5:6 27:8 76:22 103:5,16	aside 185:22 asked 53:2 87:9,10 91:10 128:9 192:9 asking 18:18 78:25 190:1,6,6 200:14 asks 73:14 aspect 156:20 185:6	11:9,22 12:25 13:6,7 16:15,18,20 17:3,25 18:11,12,17,21 19:4 19:11,14,15,18 22:23 23:1,18 24:25 25:3,7 25:11 26:14,21 27:5 27:10,13,16,18,22	151:12,22,23 152:11 152:18,24,25 153:2,3 154:17,19 157:3 159:16 160:22 161:2 161:9,9,10 162:13,15 162:16 165:17,24 166:5,8 168:11,21,24
37:8 anticipate 15:11 anticipation 14:7 anybody 36:4 78:9 129:7 174:16 anybody's 182:23 anymore 138:3 anyone's 94:11	119:4 approval 122:21 approve 28:4,20 77:3 93:25 151:23 173:13 194:14 206:23 approved 5:6 27:8 76:22 103:5,16 149:25	aside 185:22 asked 53:2 87:9,10 91:10 128:9 192:9 asking 18:18 78:25 190:1,6,6 200:14 asks 73:14 aspect 156:20 185:6 aspects 59:15 77:11	11:9,22 12:25 13:6,7 16:15,18,20 17:3,25 18:11,12,17,21 19:4 19:11,14,15,18 22:23 23:1,18 24:25 25:3,7 25:11 26:14,21 27:5 27:10,13,16,18,22 28:18,19,21 33:7,25	151:12,22,23 152:11 152:18,24,25 153:2,3 154:17,19 157:3 159:16 160:22 161:2 161:9,9,10 162:13,15 162:16 165:17,24 166:5,8 168:11,21,24 169:3,8,13,25 170:20
37:8 anticipate 15:11 anticipation 14:7 anybody 36:4 78:9 129:7 174:16 anybody's 182:23 anymore 138:3 anyone's 94:11 apologize 53:14 63:25	119:4 approval 122:21 approve 28:4,20 77:3 93:25 151:23 173:13 194:14 206:23 approved 5:6 27:8 76:22 103:5,16 149:25 approving 200:4	aside 185:22 asked 53:2 87:9,10 91:10 128:9 192:9 asking 18:18 78:25 190:1,6,6 200:14 asks 73:14 aspect 156:20 185:6 aspects 59:15 77:11 131:25 159:25 161:20	11:9,22 12:25 13:6,7 16:15,18,20 17:3,25 18:11,12,17,21 19:4 19:11,14,15,18 22:23 23:1,18 24:25 25:3,7 25:11 26:14,21 27:5 27:10,13,16,18,22 28:18,19,21 33:7,25 34:6 36:2 37:11,15,20	151:12,22,23 152:11 152:18,24,25 153:2,3 154:17,19 157:3 159:16 160:22 161:2 161:9,9,10 162:13,15 162:16 165:17,24 166:5,8 168:11,21,24
37:8 anticipate 15:11 anticipation 14:7 anybody 36:4 78:9 129:7 174:16 anybody's 182:23 anymore 138:3 anyone's 94:11 apologize 53:14 63:25 appear 18:5 120:8	119:4 approval 122:21 approve 28:4,20 77:3 93:25 151:23 173:13 194:14 206:23 approved 5:6 27:8 76:22 103:5,16 149:25 approving 200:4 approximately 36:24	aside 185:22 asked 53:2 87:9,10 91:10 128:9 192:9 asking 18:18 78:25 190:1,6,6 200:14 asks 73:14 aspect 156:20 185:6 aspects 59:15 77:11 131:25 159:25 161:20 185:5 197:25 206:18	11:9,22 12:25 13:6,7 16:15,18,20 17:3,25 18:11,12,17,21 19:4 19:11,14,15,18 22:23 23:1,18 24:25 25:3,7 25:11 26:14,21 27:5 27:10,13,16,18,22 28:18,19,21 33:7,25 34:6 36:2 37:11,15,20 38:2,11,22 40:16,22	151:12,22,23 152:11 152:18,24,25 153:2,3 154:17,19 157:3 159:16 160:22 161:2 161:9,9,10 162:13,15 162:16 165:17,24 166:5,8 168:11,21,24 169:3,8,13,25 170:20 171:2,8,9,10,15,20 172:6,10,18 173:5,6,9
37:8 anticipate 15:11 anticipation 14:7 anybody 36:4 78:9 129:7 174:16 anybody's 182:23 anymore 138:3 anyone's 94:11 apologize 53:14 63:25	119:4 approval 122:21 approve 28:4,20 77:3 93:25 151:23 173:13 194:14 206:23 approved 5:6 27:8 76:22 103:5,16 149:25 approving 200:4	aside 185:22 asked 53:2 87:9,10 91:10 128:9 192:9 asking 18:18 78:25 190:1,6,6 200:14 asks 73:14 aspect 156:20 185:6 aspects 59:15 77:11 131:25 159:25 161:20	11:9,22 12:25 13:6,7 16:15,18,20 17:3,25 18:11,12,17,21 19:4 19:11,14,15,18 22:23 23:1,18 24:25 25:3,7 25:11 26:14,21 27:5 27:10,13,16,18,22 28:18,19,21 33:7,25 34:6 36:2 37:11,15,20	151:12,22,23 152:11 152:18,24,25 153:2,3 154:17,19 157:3 159:16 160:22 161:2 161:9,9,10 162:13,15 162:16 165:17,24 166:5,8 168:11,21,24 169:3,8,13,25 170:20 171:2,8,9,10,15,20
37:8 anticipate 15:11 anticipation 14:7 anybody 36:4 78:9 129:7 174:16 anybody's 182:23 anymore 138:3 anyone's 94:11 apologize 53:14 63:25 appear 18:5 120:8 185:22	119:4 approval 122:21 approve 28:4,20 77:3 93:25 151:23 173:13 194:14 206:23 approved 5:6 27:8 76:22 103:5,16 149:25 approving 200:4 approximately 36:24 arbitrary 84:14	aside 185:22 asked 53:2 87:9,10 91:10 128:9 192:9 asking 18:18 78:25 190:1,6,6 200:14 asks 73:14 aspect 156:20 185:6 aspects 59:15 77:11 131:25 159:25 161:20 185:5 197:25 206:18 assert 52:10	$\begin{array}{c} 11:9,22 \ 12:25 \ 13:6,7\\ 16:15,18,20 \ 17:3,25\\ 18:11,12,17,21 \ 19:4\\ 19:11,14,15,18 \ 22:23\\ 23:1,18 \ 24:25 \ 25:3,7\\ 25:11 \ 26:14,21 \ 27:5\\ 27:10,13,16,18,22\\ 28:18,19,21 \ 33:7,25\\ 34:6 \ 36:2 \ 37:11,15,20\\ 38:2,11,22 \ 40:16,22\\ 41:5,11 \ 42:6,22 \ 43:3 \end{array}$	151:12,22,23 152:11 152:18,24,25 153:2,3 154:17,19 157:3 159:16 160:22 161:2 161:9,9,10 162:13,15 162:16 165:17,24 166:5,8 168:11,21,24 169:3,8,13,25 170:20 171:2,8,9,10,15,20 172:6,10,18 173:5,6,9 173:23 174:5,6,8,12
37:8 anticipate 15:11 anticipation 14:7 anybody 36:4 78:9 129:7 174:16 anybody's 182:23 anymore 138:3 anyone's 94:11 apologize 53:14 63:25 appear 18:5 120:8 185:22 appearance 5:24	119:4 approval 122:21 approve 28:4,20 77:3 93:25 151:23 173:13 194:14 206:23 approved 5:6 27:8 76:22 103:5,16 149:25 approving 200:4 approximately 36:24 arbitrary 84:14 area 8:22 12:8 16:25	aside 185:22 asked 53:2 87:9,10 91:10 128:9 192:9 asking 18:18 78:25 190:1,6,6 200:14 asks 73:14 aspect 156:20 185:6 aspects 59:15 77:11 131:25 159:25 161:20 185:5 197:25 206:18 assert 52:10 assess 205:6	$\begin{array}{c} 11:9,22 \ 12:25 \ 13:6,7\\ 16:15,18,20 \ 17:3,25\\ 18:11,12,17,21 \ 19:4\\ 19:11,14,15,18 \ 22:23\\ 23:1,18 \ 24:25 \ 25:3,7\\ 25:11 \ 26:14,21 \ 27:5\\ 27:10,13,16,18,22\\ 28:18,19,21 \ 33:7,25\\ 34:6 \ 36:2 \ 37:11,15,20\\ 38:2,11,22 \ 40:16,22\\ 41:5,11 \ 42:6,22 \ 43:3\\ 43:7,9 \ 45:18 \ 46:9,12\\ \end{array}$	151:12,22,23 152:11 152:18,24,25 153:2,3 154:17,19 157:3 159:16 160:22 161:2 161:9,9,10 162:13,15 162:16 165:17,24 166:5,8 168:11,21,24 169:3,8,13,25 170:20 171:2,8,9,10,15,20 172:6,10,18 173:5,6,9 173:23 174:5,6,8,12 174:24,25,25 175:2,7
37:8 anticipate 15:11 anticipation 14:7 anybody 36:4 78:9 129:7 174:16 anybody's 182:23 anymore 138:3 anyone's 94:11 apologize 53:14 63:25 appear 18:5 120:8 185:22 appearance 5:24 180:15,24 182:20,21	119:4 approval 122:21 approve 28:4,20 77:3 93:25 151:23 173:13 194:14 206:23 approved 5:6 27:8 76:22 103:5,16 149:25 approving 200:4 approximately 36:24 arbitrary 84:14 area 8:22 12:8 16:25 24:18,21 29:6 35:14	aside 185:22 asked 53:2 87:9,10 91:10 128:9 192:9 asking 18:18 78:25 190:1,6,6 200:14 asks 73:14 aspect 156:20 185:6 aspects 59:15 77:11 131:25 159:25 161:20 185:5 197:25 206:18 assert 52:10 assess 205:6 assessments 84:11	$\begin{array}{c} 11:9,22 \ 12:25 \ 13:6,7\\ 16:15,18,20 \ 17:3,25\\ 18:11,12,17,21 \ 19:4\\ 19:11,14,15,18 \ 22:23\\ 23:1,18 \ 24:25 \ 25:3,7\\ 25:11 \ 26:14,21 \ 27:5\\ 27:10,13,16,18,22\\ 28:18,19,21 \ 33:7,25\\ 34:6 \ 36:2 \ 37:11,15,20\\ 38:2,11,22 \ 40:16,22\\ 41:5,11 \ 42:6,22 \ 43:3\\ 43:7,9 \ 45:18 \ 46:9,12\\ 46:13 \ 47:5,10,18,19\\ \end{array}$	151:12,22,23 152:11 152:18,24,25 153:2,3 154:17,19 157:3 159:16 160:22 161:2 161:9,9,10 162:13,15 162:16 165:17,24 166:5,8 168:11,21,24 169:3,8,13,25 170:20 171:2,8,9,10,15,20 172:6,10,18 173:5,6,9 173:23 174:5,6,8,12 174:24,25,25 175:2,7 176:12,21,24,25
37:8 anticipate 15:11 anticipation 14:7 anybody 36:4 78:9 129:7 174:16 anybody's 182:23 anymore 138:3 anyone's 94:11 apologize 53:14 63:25 appear 18:5 120:8 185:22 appearance 5:24 180:15,24 182:20,21 185:17,21	119:4 approval 122:21 approve 28:4,20 77:3 93:25 151:23 173:13 194:14 206:23 approved 5:6 27:8 76:22 103:5,16 149:25 approving 200:4 approximately 36:24 arbitrary 84:14 area 8:22 12:8 16:25 24:18,21 29:6 35:14 47:16 72:14 78:16	aside 185:22 asked 53:2 87:9,10 91:10 128:9 192:9 asking 18:18 78:25 190:1,6,6 200:14 asks 73:14 aspect 156:20 185:6 aspects 59:15 77:11 131:25 159:25 161:20 185:5 197:25 206:18 assert 52:10 assess 205:6 assessments 84:11 assignment 142:19	$\begin{array}{c} 11:9,22\ 12:25\ 13:6,7\\ 16:15,18,20\ 17:3,25\\ 18:11,12,17,21\ 19:4\\ 19:11,14,15,18\ 22:23\\ 23:1,18\ 24:25\ 25:3,7\\ 25:11\ 26:14,21\ 27:5\\ 27:10,13,16,18,22\\ 28:18,19,21\ 33:7,25\\ 34:6\ 36:2\ 37:11,15,20\\ 38:2,11,22\ 40:16,22\\ 41:5,11\ 42:6,22\ 43:3\\ 43:7,9\ 45:18\ 46:9,12\\ 46:13\ 47:5,10,18,19\\ 47:24\ 48:1,7,10,20\\ \end{array}$	151:12,22,23 152:11 152:18,24,25 153:2,3 154:17,19 157:3 159:16 160:22 161:2 161:9,9,10 162:13,15 162:16 165:17,24 166:5,8 168:11,21,24 169:3,8,13,25 170:20 171:2,8,9,10,15,20 172:6,10,18 173:5,6,9 173:23 174:5,6,8,12 174:24,25,25 175:2,7 176:12,21,24,25 177:2,8,9,11,12,19
37:8 anticipate 15:11 anticipation 14:7 anybody 36:4 78:9 129:7 174:16 anybody's 182:23 anymore 138:3 anyone's 94:11 apologize 53:14 63:25 appear 18:5 120:8 185:22 appearance 5:24 180:15,24 182:20,21 185:17,21 appearances 185:17	119:4 approval 122:21 approve 28:4,20 77:3 93:25 151:23 173:13 194:14 206:23 approved 5:6 27:8 76:22 103:5,16 149:25 approving 200:4 approximately 36:24 arbitrary 84:14 area 8:22 12:8 16:25 24:18,21 29:6 35:14 47:16 72:14 78:16 101:15 105:12,15	aside 185:22 asked 53:2 87:9,10 91:10 128:9 192:9 asking 18:18 78:25 190:1,6,6 200:14 asks 73:14 aspect 156:20 185:6 aspects 59:15 77:11 131:25 159:25 161:20 185:5 197:25 206:18 assert 52:10 assess 205:6 assessments 84:11 assignment 142:19 145:11,17 161:18	$\begin{array}{c} 11:9,22\ 12:25\ 13:6,7\\ 16:15,18,20\ 17:3,25\\ 18:11,12,17,21\ 19:4\\ 19:11,14,15,18\ 22:23\\ 23:1,18\ 24:25\ 25:3,7\\ 25:11\ 26:14,21\ 27:5\\ 27:10,13,16,18,22\\ 28:18,19,21\ 33:7,25\\ 34:6\ 36:2\ 37:11,15,20\\ 38:2,11,22\ 40:16,22\\ 41:5,11\ 42:6,22\ 43:3\\ 43:7,9\ 45:18\ 46:9,12\\ 46:13\ 47:5,10,18,19\\ 47:24\ 48:1,7,10,20\\ 50:2,11,12\ 51:4\ 54:15\\ \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 151:12,22,23 \\ 152:18,24,25 \\ 153:2,3 \\ 154:17,19 \\ 157:3 \\ 159:16 \\ 160:22 \\ 161:9,9,10 \\ 162:13,15 \\ 162:16 \\ 165:17,24 \\ 166:5,8 \\ 168:11,21,24 \\ 169:3,8,13,25 \\ 170:20 \\ 171:2,8,9,10,15,20 \\ 172:6,10,18 \\ 173:23 \\ 174:5,6,8,12 \\ 174:24,25,25 \\ 175:2,7 \\ 176:12,21,24,25 \\ 177:2,8,9,11,12,19 \\ 178:1,11,15,19,20,21 \\ \end{array}$
37:8 anticipate 15:11 anticipation 14:7 anybody 36:4 78:9 129:7 174:16 anybody's 182:23 anymore 138:3 anyone's 94:11 apologize 53:14 63:25 appear 18:5 120:8 185:22 appearance 5:24 180:15,24 182:20,21 185:17,21 appearances 185:17 appearing 31:21	119:4 approval 122:21 approve 28:4,20 77:3 93:25 151:23 173:13 194:14 206:23 approved 5:6 27:8 76:22 103:5,16 149:25 approving 200:4 approximately 36:24 arbitrary 84:14 area 8:22 12:8 16:25 24:18,21 29:6 35:14 47:16 72:14 78:16 101:15 105:12,15 108:5,6,13,18 124:9	aside 185:22 asked 53:2 87:9,10 91:10 128:9 192:9 asking 18:18 78:25 190:1,6,6 200:14 asks 73:14 aspect 156:20 185:6 aspects 59:15 77:11 131:25 159:25 161:20 185:5 197:25 206:18 assert 52:10 assess 205:6 assessments 84:11 assignment 142:19 145:11,17 161:18 assignments 154:25	$\begin{array}{c} 11:9,22 \ 12:25 \ 13:6,7\\ 16:15,18,20 \ 17:3,25\\ 18:11,12,17,21 \ 19:4\\ 19:11,14,15,18 \ 22:23\\ 23:1,18 \ 24:25 \ 25:3,7\\ 25:11 \ 26:14,21 \ 27:5\\ 27:10,13,16,18,22\\ 28:18,19,21 \ 33:7,25\\ 34:6 \ 36:2 \ 37:11,15,20\\ 38:2,11,22 \ 40:16,22\\ 41:5,11 \ 42:6,22 \ 43:3\\ 43:7,9 \ 45:18 \ 46:9,12\\ 46:13 \ 47:5,10,18,19\\ 47:24 \ 48:1,7,10,20\\ 50:2,11,12 \ 51:4 \ 54:15\\ 54:21,24 \ 55:2,10\\ \end{array}$	151:12,22,23 152:11 152:18,24,25 153:2,3 154:17,19 157:3 159:16 160:22 161:2 161:9,9,10 162:13,15 162:16 165:17,24 166:5,8 168:11,21,24 169:3,8,13,25 170:20 171:2,8,9,10,15,20 172:6,10,18 173:5,6,9 173:23 174:5,6,8,12 174:24,25,25 175:2,7 176:12,21,24,25 177:2,8,9,11,12,19 178:1,11,15,19,20,21 179:19 180:7,8
37:8 anticipate 15:11 anticipation 14:7 anybody 36:4 78:9 129:7 174:16 anybody's 182:23 anymore 138:3 anyone's 94:11 apologize 53:14 63:25 appear 18:5 120:8 185:22 appearance 5:24 180:15,24 182:20,21 185:17,21 appearances 185:17 appearing 31:21 applicability 17:8	119:4 approval 122:21 approve 28:4,20 77:3 93:25 151:23 173:13 194:14 206:23 approved 5:6 27:8 76:22 103:5,16 149:25 approving 200:4 approximately 36:24 arbitrary 84:14 area 8:22 12:8 16:25 24:18,21 29:6 35:14 47:16 72:14 78:16 101:15 105:12,15 108:5,6,13,18 124:9 134:14,22 140:25	aside 185:22 asked 53:2 87:9,10 91:10 128:9 192:9 asking 18:18 78:25 190:1,6,6 200:14 asks 73:14 aspect 156:20 185:6 aspects 59:15 77:11 131:25 159:25 161:20 185:5 197:25 206:18 assert 52:10 assess 205:6 assessments 84:11 assignment 142:19 145:11,17 161:18 assignments 154:25 assist 87:3 159:3	$\begin{array}{c} 11:9,22 \ 12:25 \ 13:6,7\\ 16:15,18,20 \ 17:3,25\\ 18:11,12,17,21 \ 19:4\\ 19:11,14,15,18 \ 22:23\\ 23:1,18 \ 24:25 \ 25:3,7\\ 25:11 \ 26:14,21 \ 27:5\\ 27:10,13,16,18,22\\ 28:18,19,21 \ 33:7,25\\ 34:6 \ 36:2 \ 37:11,15,20\\ 38:2,11,22 \ 40:16,22\\ 41:5,11 \ 42:6,22 \ 43:3\\ 43:7,9 \ 45:18 \ 46:9,12\\ 46:13 \ 47:5,10,18,19\\ 47:24 \ 48:1,7,10,20\\ 50:2,11,12 \ 51:4 \ 54:15\\ 54:21,24 \ 55:2,10\\ 57:12 \ 58:20,21 \ 59:12\\ \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 151:12,22,23 \\ 152:18,24,25 \\ 153:2,3 \\ 154:17,19 \\ 157:3 \\ 159:16 \\ 160:22 \\ 161:9,9,10 \\ 162:13,15 \\ 162:16 \\ 165:17,24 \\ 166:5,8 \\ 168:11,21,24 \\ 166:5,8 \\ 168:11,21,24 \\ 169:3,8,13,25 \\ 170:20 \\ 171:2,8,9,10,15,20 \\ 172:6,10,18 \\ 173:5,6,9 \\ 173:23 \\ 174:5,6,8,12 \\ 174:24,25,25 \\ 175:2,7 \\ 176:12,21,24,25 \\ 177:2,8,9,11,12,19 \\ 178:1,11,15,19,20,21 \\ 179:19 \\ 180:7,8 \\ 181:18,19,20,20,21 \\ \end{array}$
37:8 anticipate 15:11 anticipation 14:7 anybody 36:4 78:9 129:7 174:16 anybody's 182:23 anymore 138:3 anyone's 94:11 apologize 53:14 63:25 appear 18:5 120:8 185:22 appearance 5:24 180:15,24 182:20,21 185:17,21 appearances 185:17 appearing 31:21 applicability 17:8 application 20:20 21:8	119:4 approval 122:21 approve 28:4,20 77:3 93:25 151:23 173:13 194:14 206:23 approved 5:6 27:8 76:22 103:5,16 149:25 approving 200:4 approximately 36:24 arbitrary 84:14 area 8:22 12:8 16:25 24:18,21 29:6 35:14 47:16 72:14 78:16 101:15 105:12,15 108:5,6,13,18 124:9 134:14,22 140:25 141:19 145:10 152:17	aside 185:22 asked 53:2 87:9,10 91:10 128:9 192:9 asking 18:18 78:25 190:1,6,6 200:14 asks 73:14 aspect 156:20 185:6 aspects 59:15 77:11 131:25 159:25 161:20 185:5 197:25 206:18 assert 52:10 assess 205:6 assessments 84:11 assignment 142:19 145:11,17 161:18 assignments 154:25 assist 87:3 159:3 assistance 145:18 157:1	$\begin{array}{c} 11:9,22\ 12:25\ 13:6,7\\ 16:15,18,20\ 17:3,25\\ 18:11,12,17,21\ 19:4\\ 19:11,14,15,18\ 22:23\\ 23:1,18\ 24:25\ 25:3,7\\ 25:11\ 26:14,21\ 27:5\\ 27:10,13,16,18,22\\ 28:18,19,21\ 33:7,25\\ 34:6\ 36:2\ 37:11,15,20\\ 38:2,11,22\ 40:16,22\\ 41:5,11\ 42:6,22\ 43:3\\ 43:7,9\ 45:18\ 46:9,12\\ 46:13\ 47:5,10,18,19\\ 47:24\ 48:1,7,10,20\\ 50:2,11,12\ 51:4\ 54:15\\ 54:21,24\ 55:2,10\\ 57:12\ 58:20,21\ 59:12\\ 59:14\ 60:9,24\ 63:20\\ \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 151:12,22,23 \ 152:11\\ 152:18,24,25 \ 153:2,3\\ 154:17,19 \ 157:3\\ 159:16 \ 160:22 \ 161:2\\ 161:9,9,10 \ 162:13,15\\ 162:16 \ 165:17,24\\ 166:5,8 \ 168:11,21,24\\ 169:3,8,13,25 \ 170:20\\ 171:2,8,9,10,15,20\\ 172:6,10,18 \ 173:5,6,9\\ 173:23 \ 174:5,6,8,12\\ 174:24,25,25 \ 175:2,7\\ 176:12,21,24,25\\ 177:2,8,9,11,12,19\\ 178:1,11,15,19,20,21\\ 179:19 \ 180:7,8\\ 181:18,19,20,20,21\\ 182:7,10,11,24 \ 183:8\\ \end{array}$
37:8 anticipate 15:11 anticipation 14:7 anybody 36:4 78:9 129:7 174:16 anybody's 182:23 anymore 138:3 anyone's 94:11 apologize 53:14 63:25 appear 18:5 120:8 185:22 appearance 5:24 180:15,24 182:20,21 185:17,21 appearances 185:17 appearing 31:21 applicability 17:8 application 20:20 21:8 26:11 30:18 42:2	119:4 approval 122:21 approve 28:4,20 77:3 93:25 151:23 173:13 194:14 206:23 approved 5:6 27:8 76:22 103:5,16 149:25 approving 200:4 approximately 36:24 arbitrary 84:14 area 8:22 12:8 16:25 24:18,21 29:6 35:14 47:16 72:14 78:16 101:15 105:12,15 108:5,6,13,18 124:9 134:14,22 140:25 141:19 145:10 152:17 154:23 156:24 162:3	aside 185:22 asked 53:2 87:9,10 91:10 128:9 192:9 asking 18:18 78:25 190:1,6,6 200:14 asks 73:14 aspect 156:20 185:6 aspects 59:15 77:11 131:25 159:25 161:20 185:5 197:25 206:18 assert 52:10 assess 205:6 assessments 84:11 assignment 142:19 145:11,17 161:18 assignments 154:25 assist 87:3 159:3 assistance 145:18 157:1 157:3 158:23 205:5	$\begin{array}{c} 11:9,22\ 12:25\ 13:6,7\\ 16:15,18,20\ 17:3,25\\ 18:11,12,17,21\ 19:4\\ 19:11,14,15,18\ 22:23\\ 23:1,18\ 24:25\ 25:3,7\\ 25:11\ 26:14,21\ 27:5\\ 27:10,13,16,18,22\\ 28:18,19,21\ 33:7,25\\ 34:6\ 36:2\ 37:11,15,20\\ 38:2,11,22\ 40:16,22\\ 41:5,11\ 42:6,22\ 43:3\\ 43:7,9\ 45:18\ 46:9,12\\ 46:13\ 47:5,10,18,19\\ 47:24\ 48:1,7,10,20\\ 50:2,11,12\ 51:4\ 54:15\\ 54:21,24\ 55:2,10\\ 57:12\ 58:20,21\ 59:12\\ 59:14\ 60:9,24\ 63:20\\ 63:22\ 64:9,12,22,23\\ \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 151:12,22,23 \ 152:11\\ 152:18,24,25 \ 153:2,3\\ 154:17,19 \ 157:3\\ 159:16 \ 160:22 \ 161:2\\ 161:9,9,10 \ 162:13,15\\ 162:16 \ 165:17,24\\ 166:5,8 \ 168:11,21,24\\ 169:3,8,13,25 \ 170:20\\ 171:2,8,9,10,15,20\\ 172:6,10,18 \ 173:5,6,9\\ 173:23 \ 174:5,6,8,12\\ 174:24,25,25 \ 175:2,7\\ 176:12,21,24,25\\ 177:2,8,9,11,12,19\\ 178:1,11,15,19,20,21\\ 179:19 \ 180:7,8\\ 181:18,19,20,20,21\\ 182:7,10,11,24 \ 183:8\\ 183:8,10,12,18,22\\ \end{array}$
37:8 anticipate 15:11 anticipation 14:7 anybody 36:4 78:9 129:7 174:16 anybody's 182:23 anymore 138:3 anyone's 94:11 apologize 53:14 63:25 appear 18:5 120:8 185:22 appearance 5:24 180:15,24 182:20,21 185:17,21 appearances 185:17 appearing 31:21 applicability 17:8 application 20:20 21:8 26:11 30:18 42:2 52:20 85:15 141:3,7	119:4 approval 122:21 approve 28:4,20 77:3 93:25 151:23 173:13 194:14 206:23 approved 5:6 27:8 76:22 103:5,16 149:25 approving 200:4 approximately 36:24 arbitrary 84:14 area 8:22 12:8 16:25 24:18,21 29:6 35:14 47:16 72:14 78:16 101:15 105:12,15 108:5,6,13,18 124:9 134:14,22 140:25 141:19 145:10 152:17 154:23 156:24 162:3 166:20 172:21,21	aside 185:22 asked 53:2 87:9,10 91:10 128:9 192:9 asking 18:18 78:25 190:1,6,6 200:14 asks 73:14 aspect 156:20 185:6 aspects 59:15 77:11 131:25 159:25 161:20 185:5 197:25 206:18 assert 52:10 assess 205:6 assessments 84:11 assignment 142:19 145:11,17 161:18 assignments 154:25 assist 87:3 159:3 assistance 145:18 157:1 157:3 158:23 205:5 assistant 14:10 136:5	$\begin{array}{c} 11:9,22\ 12:25\ 13:6,7\\ 16:15,18,20\ 17:3,25\\ 18:11,12,17,21\ 19:4\\ 19:11,14,15,18\ 22:23\\ 23:1,18\ 24:25\ 25:3,7\\ 25:11\ 26:14,21\ 27:5\\ 27:10,13,16,18,22\\ 28:18,19,21\ 33:7,25\\ 34:6\ 36:2\ 37:11,15,20\\ 38:2,11,22\ 40:16,22\\ 41:5,11\ 42:6,22\ 43:3\\ 43:7,9\ 45:18\ 46:9,12\\ 46:13\ 47:5,10,18,19\\ 47:24\ 48:1,7,10,20\\ 50:2,11,12\ 51:4\ 54:15\\ 54:21,24\ 55:2,10\\ 57:12\ 58:20,21\ 59:12\\ 59:14\ 60:9,24\ 63:20\\ 63:22\ 64:9,12,22,23\\ 68:3,5\ 69:13,15\ 70:11\\ \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 151:12,22,23 \ 152:11\\ 152:18,24,25 \ 153:2,3\\ 154:17,19 \ 157:3\\ 159:16 \ 160:22 \ 161:2\\ 161:9,9,10 \ 162:13,15\\ 162:16 \ 165:17,24\\ 166:5,8 \ 168:11,21,24\\ 169:3,8,13,25 \ 170:20\\ 171:2,8,9,10,15,20\\ 172:6,10,18 \ 173:5,6,9\\ 173:23 \ 174:5,6,8,12\\ 174:24,25,25 \ 175:2,7\\ 176:12,21,24,25\\ 177:2,8,9,11,12,19\\ 178:1,11,15,19,20,21\\ 179:19 \ 180:7,8\\ 181:18,19,20,20,21\\ 182:7,10,11,24 \ 183:8\\ 183:8,10,12,18,22\\ 184:4,5,17,17,18,20\\ \end{array}$
37:8 anticipate 15:11 anticipation 14:7 anybody 36:4 78:9 129:7 174:16 anybody's 182:23 anymore 138:3 anyone's 94:11 apologize 53:14 63:25 appear 18:5 120:8 185:22 appearance 5:24 180:15,24 182:20,21 185:17,21 appearances 185:17 appearing 31:21 applicability 17:8 application 20:20 21:8 26:11 30:18 42:2 52:20 85:15 141:3,7 142:15	119:4 approval 122:21 approve 28:4,20 77:3 93:25 151:23 173:13 194:14 206:23 approved 5:6 27:8 76:22 103:5,16 149:25 approving 200:4 approximately 36:24 arbitrary 84:14 area 8:22 12:8 16:25 24:18,21 29:6 35:14 47:16 72:14 78:16 101:15 105:12,15 108:5,6,13,18 124:9 134:14,22 140:25 141:19 145:10 152:17 154:23 156:24 162:3 166:20 172:21,21 173:11 175:6 176:11	aside 185:22 asked 53:2 87:9,10 91:10 128:9 192:9 asking 18:18 78:25 190:1,6,6 200:14 asks 73:14 aspect 156:20 185:6 aspects 59:15 77:11 131:25 159:25 161:20 185:5 197:25 206:18 assert 52:10 assess 205:6 assessments 84:11 assignment 142:19 145:11,17 161:18 assignments 154:25 assist 87:3 159:3 assistance 145:18 157:1 157:3 158:23 205:5 assistant 14:10 136:5 171:23	$\begin{array}{c} 11:9,22\ 12:25\ 13:6,7\\ 16:15,18,20\ 17:3,25\\ 18:11,12,17,21\ 19:4\\ 19:11,14,15,18\ 22:23\\ 23:1,18\ 24:25\ 25:3,7\\ 25:11\ 26:14,21\ 27:5\\ 27:10,13,16,18,22\\ 28:18,19,21\ 33:7,25\\ 34:6\ 36:2\ 37:11,15,20\\ 38:2,11,22\ 40:16,22\\ 41:5,11\ 42:6,22\ 43:3\\ 43:7,9\ 45:18\ 46:9,12\\ 46:13\ 47:5,10,18,19\\ 47:24\ 48:1,7,10,20\\ 50:2,11,12\ 51:4\ 54:15\\ 54:21,24\ 55:2,10\\ 57:12\ 58:20,21\ 59:12\\ 59:14\ 60:9,24\ 63:20\\ 63:22\ 64:9,12,22,23\\ 68:3,5\ 69:13,15\ 70:11\\ 72:20\ 73:3,3,7,8,9,10\\ \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 151:12,22,23\ 152:11\\ 152:18,24,25\ 153:2,3\\ 154:17,19\ 157:3\\ 159:16\ 160:22\ 161:2\\ 161:9,9,10\ 162:13,15\\ 162:16\ 165:17,24\\ 166:5,8\ 168:11,21,24\\ 169:3,8,13,25\ 170:20\\ 171:2,8,9,10,15,20\\ 172:6,10,18\ 173:5,6,9\\ 173:23\ 174:5,6,8,12\\ 174:24,25,25\ 175:2,7\\ 176:12,21,24,25\\ 177:2,8,9,11,12,19\\ 178:1,11,15,19,20,21\\ 179:19\ 180:7,8\\ 181:18,19,20,20,21\\ 182:7,10,11,24\ 183:8\\ 183:8,10,12,18,22\\ 184:4,5,17,17,18,20\\ 184:21,24\ 185:3,12\\ \end{array}$
37:8 anticipate 15:11 anticipation 14:7 anybody 36:4 78:9 129:7 174:16 anybody's 182:23 anymore 138:3 anyone's 94:11 apologize 53:14 63:25 appear 18:5 120:8 185:22 appearance 5:24 180:15,24 182:20,21 185:17,21 appearances 185:17 appearing 31:21 applicability 17:8 application 20:20 21:8 26:11 30:18 42:2 52:20 85:15 141:3,7 142:15 applications 170:15	119:4 approval 122:21 approve 28:4,20 77:3 93:25 151:23 173:13 194:14 206:23 approved 5:6 27:8 76:22 103:5,16 149:25 approving 200:4 approximately 36:24 arbitrary 84:14 area 8:22 12:8 16:25 24:18,21 29:6 35:14 47:16 72:14 78:16 101:15 105:12,15 108:5,6,13,18 124:9 134:14,22 140:25 141:19 145:10 152:17 154:23 156:24 162:3 166:20 172:21,21 173:11 175:6 176:11 176:19,24 177:4	aside 185:22 asked 53:2 87:9,10 91:10 128:9 192:9 asking 18:18 78:25 190:1,6,6 200:14 asks 73:14 aspect 156:20 185:6 aspects 59:15 77:11 131:25 159:25 161:20 185:5 197:25 206:18 assert 52:10 assess 205:6 assessments 84:11 assignment 142:19 145:11,17 161:18 assignments 154:25 assist 87:3 159:3 assistance 145:18 157:1 157:3 158:23 205:5 assistant 14:10 136:5 171:23 assisting 37:10 47:18	$\begin{array}{c} 11:9,22\ 12:25\ 13:6,7\\ 16:15,18,20\ 17:3,25\\ 18:11,12,17,21\ 19:4\\ 19:11,14,15,18\ 22:23\\ 23:1,18\ 24:25\ 25:3,7\\ 25:11\ 26:14,21\ 27:5\\ 27:10,13,16,18,22\\ 28:18,19,21\ 33:7,25\\ 34:6\ 36:2\ 37:11,15,20\\ 38:2,11,22\ 40:16,22\\ 41:5,11\ 42:6,22\ 43:3\\ 43:7,9\ 45:18\ 46:9,12\\ 46:13\ 47:5,10,18,19\\ 47:24\ 48:1,7,10,20\\ 50:2,11,12\ 51:4\ 54:15\\ 54:21,24\ 55:2,10\\ 57:12\ 58:20,21\ 59:12\\ 59:14\ 60:9,24\ 63:20\\ 63:22\ 64:9,12,22,23\\ 68:3,5\ 69:13,15\ 70:11\\ 72:20\ 73:3,3,7,8,9,10\\ 73:13\ 74:13,15,16\end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 151:12,22,23\ 152:11\\ 152:18,24,25\ 153:2,3\\ 154:17,19\ 157:3\\ 159:16\ 160:22\ 161:2\\ 161:9,9,10\ 162:13,15\\ 162:16\ 165:17,24\\ 166:5,8\ 168:11,21,24\\ 169:3,8,13,25\ 170:20\\ 171:2,8,9,10,15,20\\ 172:6,10,18\ 173:5,6,9\\ 173:23\ 174:5,6,8,12\\ 174:24,25,25\ 175:2,7\\ 176:12,21,24,25\\ 177:2,8,9,11,12,19\\ 178:1,11,15,19,20,21\\ 179:19\ 180:7,8\\ 181:18,19,20,20,21\\ 182:7,10,11,24\ 183:8\\ 183:8,10,12,18,22\\ 184:4,5,17,17,18,20\\ 184:21,24\ 185:3,12\\ 185:14\ 186:10,11,12\\ \end{array}$
37:8 anticipate 15:11 anticipation 14:7 anybody 36:4 78:9 129:7 174:16 anybody's 182:23 anymore 138:3 anyone's 94:11 apologize 53:14 63:25 appear 18:5 120:8 185:22 appearance 5:24 180:15,24 182:20,21 185:17,21 appearing 31:21 applicability 17:8 application 20:20 21:8 26:11 30:18 42:2 52:20 85:15 141:3,7 142:15 applications 170:15 applied 17:4 20:17 28:2 28:2 30:8 57:25 61:3 110:14 177:16	119:4 approval 122:21 approve 28:4,20 77:3 93:25 151:23 173:13 194:14 206:23 approved 5:6 27:8 76:22 103:5,16 149:25 approving 200:4 approximately 36:24 arbitrary 84:14 area 8:22 12:8 16:25 24:18,21 29:6 35:14 47:16 72:14 78:16 101:15 105:12,15 108:5,6,13,18 124:9 134:14,22 140:25 141:19 145:10 152:17 154:23 156:24 162:3 166:20 172:21,21 173:11 175:6 176:11 176:19,24 177:4 181:16 204:23	aside 185:22 asked 53:2 87:9,10 91:10 128:9 192:9 asking 18:18 78:25 190:1,6,6 200:14 asks 73:14 aspect 156:20 185:6 aspects 59:15 77:11 131:25 159:25 161:20 185:5 197:25 206:18 assert 52:10 assess 205:6 assessments 84:11 assignment 142:19 145:11,17 161:18 assignments 154:25 assist 87:3 159:3 assistance 145:18 157:1 157:3 158:23 205:5 assistant 14:10 136:5 171:23 assisting 37:10 47:18 114:9 174:20 associate 14:9 56:23 68:11	$\begin{array}{c} 11:9,22\ 12:25\ 13:6,7\\ 16:15,18,20\ 17:3,25\\ 18:11,12,17,21\ 19:4\\ 19:11,14,15,18\ 22:23\\ 23:1,18\ 24:25\ 25:3,7\\ 25:11\ 26:14,21\ 27:5\\ 27:10,13,16,18,22\\ 28:18,19,21\ 33:7,25\\ 34:6\ 36:2\ 37:11,15,20\\ 38:2,11,22\ 40:16,22\\ 41:5,11\ 42:6,22\ 43:3\\ 43:7,9\ 45:18\ 46:9,12\\ 46:13\ 47:5,10,18,19\\ 47:24\ 48:1,7,10,20\\ 50:2,11,12\ 51:4\ 54:15\\ 54:21,24\ 55:2,10\\ 57:12\ 58:20,21\ 59:12\\ 59:14\ 60:9,24\ 63:20\\ 63:22\ 64:9,12,22,23\\ 68:3,5\ 69:13,15\ 70:11\\ 72:20\ 73:3,3,7,8,9,10\\ 73:13\ 74:13,15,16\\ 75:21,22\ 76:23\ 77:3,8\\ \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 151:12,22,23\ 152:11\\ 152:18,24,25\ 153:2,3\\ 154:17,19\ 157:3\\ 159:16\ 160:22\ 161:2\\ 161:9,9,10\ 162:13,15\\ 162:16\ 165:17,24\\ 166:5,8\ 168:11,21,24\\ 169:3,8,13,25\ 170:20\\ 171:2,8,9,10,15,20\\ 172:6,10,18\ 173:5,6,9\\ 173:23\ 174:5,6,8,12\\ 174:24,25,25\ 175:2,7\\ 176:12,21,24,25\\ 177:2,8,9,11,12,19\\ 178:1,11,15,19,20,21\\ 179:19\ 180:7,8\\ 181:18,19,20,20,21\\ 182:7,10,11,24\ 183:8\\ 183:8,10,12,18,22\\ 184:4,5,17,17,18,20\\ 184:21,24\ 185:3,12\\ 185:14\ 186:10,11,12\\ 186:16,22,25\ 187:19\\ \end{array}$
37:8 anticipate 15:11 anticipation 14:7 anybody 36:4 78:9 129:7 174:16 anybody's 182:23 anymore 138:3 anyone's 94:11 apologize 53:14 63:25 appear 18:5 120:8 185:22 appearance 5:24 180:15,24 182:20,21 185:17,21 appearances 185:17 appearing 31:21 applicability 17:8 application 20:20 21:8 26:11 30:18 42:2 52:20 85:15 141:3,7 142:15 applications 170:15 applied 17:4 20:17 28:2 28:2 30:8 57:25 61:3 110:14 177:16 applies 188:11	119:4 approval 122:21 approve 28:4,20 77:3 93:25 151:23 173:13 194:14 206:23 approved 5:6 27:8 76:22 103:5,16 149:25 approving 200:4 approximately 36:24 arbitrary 84:14 area 8:22 12:8 16:25 24:18,21 29:6 35:14 47:16 72:14 78:16 101:15 105:12,15 108:5,6,13,18 124:9 134:14,22 140:25 141:19 145:10 152:17 154:23 156:24 162:3 166:20 172:21,21 173:11 175:6 176:11 176:19,24 177:4 181:16 204:23 areas 12:2 47:17 60:12 65:14 105:8,10 143:1 157:13 158:17 176:14	aside 185:22 asked 53:2 87:9,10 91:10 128:9 192:9 asking 18:18 78:25 190:1,6,6 200:14 asks 73:14 aspect 156:20 185:6 aspects 59:15 77:11 131:25 159:25 161:20 185:5 197:25 206:18 assert 52:10 assess 205:6 assessments 84:11 assignment 142:19 145:11,17 161:18 assignments 154:25 assist 87:3 159:3 assistance 145:18 157:1 157:3 158:23 205:5 assistant 14:10 136:5 171:23 assisting 37:10 47:18 114:9 174:20 associate 14:9 56:23 68:11 associated 22:19 23:3	$\begin{array}{c} 11:9,22\ 12:25\ 13:6,7\\ 16:15,18,20\ 17:3,25\\ 18:11,12,17,21\ 19:4\\ 19:11,14,15,18\ 22:23\\ 23:1,18\ 24:25\ 25:3,7\\ 25:11\ 26:14,21\ 27:5\\ 27:10,13,16,18,22\\ 28:18,19,21\ 33:7,25\\ 34:6\ 36:2\ 37:11,15,20\\ 38:2,11,22\ 40:16,22\\ 41:5,11\ 42:6,22\ 43:3\\ 43:7,9\ 45:18\ 46:9,12\\ 46:13\ 47:5,10,18,19\\ 47:24\ 48:1,7,10,20\\ 50:2,11,12\ 51:4\ 54:15\\ 54:21,24\ 55:2,10\\ 57:12\ 58:20,21\ 59:12\\ 59:14\ 60:9,24\ 63:20\\ 63:22\ 64:9,12,22,23\\ 68:3,5\ 69:13,15\ 70:11\\ 72:20\ 73:3,3,7,8,9,10\\ 73:13\ 74:13,15,16\\ 75:21,22\ 76:23\ 77:3,8\\ 77:10,12\ 78:25\ 79:19\\ \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 151:12,22,23\ 152:11\\ 152:18,24,25\ 153:2,3\\ 154:17,19\ 157:3\\ 159:16\ 160:22\ 161:2\\ 161:9,9,10\ 162:13,15\\ 162:16\ 165:17,24\\ 166:5,8\ 168:11,21,24\\ 169:3,8,13,25\ 170:20\\ 171:2,8,9,10,15,20\\ 172:6,10,18\ 173:5,6,9\\ 173:23\ 174:5,6,8,12\\ 174:24,25,25\ 175:2,7\\ 176:12,21,24,25\\ 177:2,8,9,11,12,19\\ 178:1,11,15,19,20,21\\ 179:19\ 180:7,8\\ 181:18,19,20,20,21\\ 182:7,10,11,24\ 183:8\\ 183:8,10,12,18,22\\ 184:4,5,17,17,18,20\\ 184:21,24\ 185:3,12\\ 185:14\ 186:10,11,12\\ 186:16,22,25\ 187:19\\ 187:20\ 188:17,19\\ \end{array}$
37:8 anticipate 15:11 anticipation 14:7 anybody 36:4 78:9 129:7 174:16 anybody's 182:23 anymore 138:3 anyone's 94:11 apologize 53:14 63:25 appear 18:5 120:8 185:22 appearance 5:24 180:15,24 182:20,21 185:17,21 appearing 31:21 applicability 17:8 application 20:20 21:8 26:11 30:18 42:2 52:20 85:15 141:3,7 142:15 applications 170:15 applied 17:4 20:17 28:2 28:2 30:8 57:25 61:3 110:14 177:16	119:4 approval 122:21 approve 28:4,20 77:3 93:25 151:23 173:13 194:14 206:23 approved 5:6 27:8 76:22 103:5,16 149:25 approving 200:4 approximately 36:24 arbitrary 84:14 area 8:22 12:8 16:25 24:18,21 29:6 35:14 47:16 72:14 78:16 101:15 105:12,15 108:5,6,13,18 124:9 134:14,22 140:25 141:19 145:10 152:17 154:23 156:24 162:3 166:20 172:21,21 173:11 175:6 176:11 176:19,24 177:4 181:16 204:23 areas 12:2 47:17 60:12 65:14 105:8,10 143:1	aside 185:22 asked 53:2 87:9,10 91:10 128:9 192:9 asking 18:18 78:25 190:1,6,6 200:14 asks 73:14 aspect 156:20 185:6 aspects 59:15 77:11 131:25 159:25 161:20 185:5 197:25 206:18 assert 52:10 assess 205:6 assessments 84:11 assignment 142:19 145:11,17 161:18 assignments 154:25 assist 87:3 159:3 assistance 145:18 157:1 157:3 158:23 205:5 assistant 14:10 136:5 171:23 assisting 37:10 47:18 114:9 174:20 associate 14:9 56:23 68:11	$\begin{array}{c} 11:9,22\ 12:25\ 13:6,7\\ 16:15,18,20\ 17:3,25\\ 18:11,12,17,21\ 19:4\\ 19:11,14,15,18\ 22:23\\ 23:1,18\ 24:25\ 25:3,7\\ 25:11\ 26:14,21\ 27:5\\ 27:10,13,16,18,22\\ 28:18,19,21\ 33:7,25\\ 34:6\ 36:2\ 37:11,15,20\\ 38:2,11,22\ 40:16,22\\ 41:5,11\ 42:6,22\ 43:3\\ 43:7,9\ 45:18\ 46:9,12\\ 46:13\ 47:5,10,18,19\\ 47:24\ 48:1,7,10,20\\ 50:2,11,12\ 51:4\ 54:15\\ 54:21,24\ 55:2,10\\ 57:12\ 58:20,21\ 59:12\\ 59:14\ 60:9,24\ 63:20\\ 63:22\ 64:9,12,22,23\\ 68:3,5\ 69:13,15\ 70:11\\ 72:20\ 73:3,3,7,8,9,10\\ 73:13\ 74:13,15,16\\ 75:21,22\ 76:23\ 77:3,8\\ 77:10,12\ 78:25\ 79:19\\ 79:21\ 80:4,25\ 81:5,12\\ \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 151:12,22,23\ 152:11\\ 152:18,24,25\ 153:2,3\\ 154:17,19\ 157:3\\ 159:16\ 160:22\ 161:2\\ 161:9,9,10\ 162:13,15\\ 162:16\ 165:17,24\\ 166:5,8\ 168:11,21,24\\ 169:3,8,13,25\ 170:20\\ 171:2,8,9,10,15,20\\ 172:6,10,18\ 173:5,6,9\\ 173:23\ 174:5,6,8,12\\ 174:24,25,25\ 175:2,7\\ 176:12,21,24,25\\ 177:2,8,9,11,12,19\\ 178:1,11,15,19,20,21\\ 179:19\ 180:7,8\\ 181:18,19,20,20,21\\ 182:7,10,11,24\ 183:8\\ 183:8,10,12,18,22\\ 184:4,5,17,17,18,20\\ 184:21,24\ 185:3,12\\ 185:14\ 186:10,11,12\\ 186:16,22,25\ 187:19\\ 187:20\ 188:17,19\\ 189:1\ 190:3\ 192:21\\ \end{array}$

198:19 199:6,20,24	119:24,25 120:2,8,12	available 78:20 165:3	181:13 184:23 199:4	193:16,19
200:3,6,16,17,19,21	121:14 124:10 126:15	avenues 85:21 142:23	203:24	believe 5:16 6:20 8:11
201:2,6,15 202:17,20	127:18,21 130:21	avoid 144:4	Barbara's 107:17	8:13 9:11 12:23 20:7
203:7,19 204:2,4,5,6	132:16,23 136:3,5	award 36:25 202:22	base 64:3 142:20	23:13,20 28:12,15,18
203:7,17 204:2,4,3,0	132:10,23 130:3,5	203:7	193:19	84:19 87:25 101:15
		aware 31:18 68:23		
audited 47:11 117:7	141:1,6 142:16,18		baseball 63:25 64:2	101:18,19 102:8,24
160:19	146:1 149:2 162:20	82:18 177:20 195:8	69:2	103:3 106:23 108:19
auditing 8:5 16:16 21:1	164:19 165:18,24	awful 190:1	based 8:8,19 16:11	112:23 116:16,22
21:9 28:14 31:22	166:5,25 170:7	a.m 1:15 4:2	17:20 18:2,16,20 34:8	117:5 121:21 123:21
32:25 39:11 40:12,12	171:24 172:21 173:21		42:18 91:18 94:12	124:1 134:6 138:9
44:4 102:25 106:17	173:24 174:20 176:7	<u> </u>	99:6,7,10,12 132:20	139:24 142:5 151:22
110:24 120:17 130:4	179:7,13 180:6,7,9,11	B 126:14 157:20	154:15 161:21 164:15	153:12 156:12 158:20
136:11 140:22 160:19	183:1 184:13 185:3	back 8:3 24:9 28:3 33:3	192:2,3 194:18	159:23 167:24 174:22
160:22 168:22 178:6	185:10,17 193:7,18	45:8 51:23 53:1	201:13	179:16 180:9 188:4,6
178:10,11 179:14	200:4,20 201:5 202:5	69:10 70:17 77:11	bases 122:7	188:19 189:4 196:8
191:23 196:2	202:22 203:8 204:16	79:3,24 80:24 81:5,7	basic 17:19 18:13 20:15	199:9,10 201:1
auditor 1:10 4:8,23 5:9	205:5	81:12 97:25 98:6	23:11 71:23 81:23	205:24 206:21
5:15,18,24 6:3,18	auditors 4:12,14 5:2	105:24 107:24 109:8	122:2,15 173:25	believed 57:16 98:24
7:14,18,21 8:6 9:7,25	9:18 11:25 16:1	110:4 115:1 126:7	186:10 187:5	106:18
10:2 11:4,8,13,14,17	18:24 22:25 25:6	131:11 132:9,19	basically 60:15 75:16	believer 152:15
11:22 12:7 13:20	38:13,21 39:6 40:6	134:24 136:23 140:10	101:11 120:1 135:12	Bella 2:18 14:9 100:9
14:9,10 16:3,6,11	41:1,5 42:15 52:9	142:14 152:22 155:15	153:1 156:4	168:18
17:3 18:13 21:4,17	54:24 62:16,18,20		basis 19:19 31:20 40:1	beneficial 69:8 77:1
		160:3 166:3 168:9		
23:22 24:18 28:17	72:25 73:20 83:14,17	169:12 174:22 175:1	46:3 49:4,10 52:16	172:22
30:4 31:7,11,23 34:14	84:1 85:4 105:4	178:12,13 185:18	87:4 90:8 100:2	benefit 6:13 48:11 49:5
36:9,12,15 38:7 39:8	111:23 113:1 122:6	190:18 191:3 192:3	102:6 114:16 134:3	56:12 58:15,25 59:3,7
39:21 41:9,10,22	125:7,16,18,23	202:16 203:23	139:8,8 142:5 149:1	59:9,10 67:16 68:4,8
43:16,18,25 44:3,5,20	138:14 139:13 141:23	backdrop 23:21 142:12	164:25 169:20 171:5	70:4,5 76:9 113:6
44:24 45:13,23,25	141:24 155:1,17	background 22:6	172:13 173:17 176:11	162:17 185:2,3
46:5,16 47:2,5,7,18	163:14 170:13 175:22	101:12 158:10	189:7 191:17	192:13,14
50:1,3 51:19 52:13,18	175:22 179:5,6,20,22	backgrounds 6:8	Bayless 3:7 40:17,18,18	benefits 56:16 63:13
53:3 55:8,16,21 56:17	180:17 181:2 185:8	backwards 120:16	44:18 84:23,24,24	76:13 90:17 91:3
56:19 57:10,16 59:12	189:16 198:14 201:2	Bailey 2:7 6:17	99:14,15 104:5,6	142:15 160:8 174:3
60:8,10,17,19 61:23	205:9 206:2	balance 35:9 182:4	118:17,18 139:20,21	benign 72:16,18
62:8,25 63:12 64:5,14	auditor's 8:7 16:12	balanced 191:20	139:21 152:2,3 177:5	best 30:10 65:16 77:18
64:18,25 65:5,8,18	20:22 23:10,16 28:13	balancing 181:25	177:6,6 188:12,13,13	97:1,15 193:15
66:25 67:4,8 68:8,12	57:20 73:25 80:21,23	187:14	203:20 204:24,25	203:18 204:12,23
69:19 70:2,6 73:13,24	81:1 113:15 115:20	ball 64:3	bear 21:5 47:21 69:23	better 6:4 22:8 26:25
74:6 75:3,4,18 76:14	124:11,13 135:25	Ballroom 1:19	81:8 123:2 142:7,8	44:12 45:12 50:5
76:16,21 77:17,23	143:4 145:22 171:21	ban 105:9,12,16	143:1,1 171:20	54:18 60:17,19,22
78:12,14,16 79:1,5,8	173:22 180:12,15	banc 197:23	177:12,18	65:10 93:10,10 95:22
79:17 80:1,1,4,13	182:4 202:13	Bankers 2:12	bears 80:11	101:16 133:5 151:16
81:2,19,20 84:2 86:2	audits 16:9 37:24 42:25	banking 136:15	becoming 11:24 52:12	164:20 177:15 193:19
87:20 88:16,16,18	43:2,20,21 47:8 52:6	banned 19:7 105:14	66:11	197:17 198:10,10
89:1,4,9,13,16,24	52:12 53:22 75:11,14	106:25 107:13 109:4	began 12:16	beyond 42:12 107:17
90:4,8,12,14,15,20,22	147:7 162:14,15,16	109:6 137:4,25	begging 21:7	189:21
91:2,13 92:6,19,21	162:16 169:24 176:5	bar 29:23,24 30:1,7,13	beginning 4:2 59:1	biased 8:19
			62:24 95:1 182:16	
93:14,18,19 94:19,20	176:6 188:21,22	Barb 109:8 Barbara 3:10 17:12 12		bifurcated 176:1
95:21 96:11,16,18,25	189:12	Barbara 3:10 17:12,12	begins 96:15	big 54:20 57:6,6,9
97:8,15 104:16	audit's 174:13	17:13 25:24 26:12	begun 92:11	70:12 117:7 128:10
106:11 108:3 109:1	audit-related 181:21	27:4 44:16 79:23	behalf 28:10 62:5 76:23	129:2 146:3 148:24
110:7 111:7,18 112:9	authoritative 204:13	83:13 91:9 95:1	99:23 133:23 152:19	164:21 166:17 191:11
113:15,19,22 114:8	authority 11:17 122:8	96:21 105:6,20	163:25 193:12	192:25
114:11 115:25 116:11	122:9	106:24 114:24 116:1	behavior 9:15 128:6	bill 3:13 4:7 82:4 99:9
116:17,18 117:12,15	automatic 70:8	124:15 130:17 149:7	192:17,23	billed 98:19
118:22,22,23 119:1	automatically 195:13	152:23 154:13 173:18	belief 21:19 106:23	billion 39:1,1 54:2 57:4
	1	I	1	

1

bit 7:12 12					
bit 7:12,12,43:645:14 72:12 182:3 byting 144:8 cases 33:24 39:7,7 challenged 32:23 1244 146:24 147:10 bright-line 68:2 C 54:24 60:164:17 114:13 119:1 136:16 18:124 bring 30:45 46:12 C2:13:1,11:41 65:19 100:7,153:15 114:13 Blackberries 15:23 64:21 90:152.1 calculate 31:18 casting 9:5 calculate 31:18 121:1.19 Blackberries 15:23 64:21 90:152.1 call 44:44:23:46:8 16:79 188:10 chance 9:15 120:20 Blende 143:15 bring 32:1 6:10 77.1 67:14 64:5 78:25 categorize 167:3 19:61 12:10:12 Burred 179:19 13:11 165:16 180:13 88:16 89:13 94:17 137:24 canues 6:23 13:61 109:7 29:18 194:12 196:1 Dard 17:4:11,11 5:16 17:62 191:22 160:20 187:9 canues 3:16 109:7 29:18 194:12 196:1 7:12 22:11:12 broader 13:53 101:35 called X:19 19:72 called X:19 19:72 cell 15:22 19:52:14 19:62 7:12:12:14:14:14:22 broader 13:53 101:35 called X:31 91:72 cell 15:22 19:52:14 19:62 7:12:12:14:14:14:22 broader 15:53 101:35	bipartisan 82:21	briefly 14:10 44:17	buyer's 12:20	154:20 199:10	113:16 144:25 155:22
86:11 98:1 101:4 124:4 146:24 147:10 binds 70:19 bright 165:25 187:23 bright 165:25 187:23 114:13 119:11 124:4 146:24 147:10 binds 70:19 bright 165:25 187:23 bright 155:12 114:13 119:12 161:10 181:24 bright 165:25 187:23 binds 71:19 121:11:19 181:24 64:21 90:15:21 0:11:19:13:19:13:19:13:12 calculate 31:18 calculate 31:18 calculate 31:18 calculate 31:18 casting 9:5 categories 56:16:62:24 167:9 188:31:0 chance 125:91:32: 16:22:18:12 bines 84:6 bring 32:1:6:10 17:4:11.11:5:16 79:18:0:4,0,14 84:23 cause 6:23:13:15 19:12 176:23:19:13:25 19:22:18:12 bines 82:6 bring 32:1:6:10 17:4:11:11:21:16 176:22:19:12 call 64:18:31:19:17:22 calling 138:14 167:16 cause 6:23:18:10:17:2 178:19:12:12 changed 12:16:19:3 19:12 bines 82:15 broedure 135:3: 19:13:2: 19:21:12:28:11 18:6:7 calling 138:14 167:16 cause 6:32:18:10:17 19:12:12 changes 71:6 19:13:14:12 114:12:19:1 brochures 77:6 brochures 77:6 brochures 77:6 cauling 13:8:14:17:10 cauling 13:8:16:17 19:21:14:14:12:16:17 19:12:18:20:69 177:18:12:37:14:22:17:10 brochures 77:6 cauling 13:18:14:17:10:10 cauling 13:18:10 19:12:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11 111:12:12:					
$\begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $					-
161:16 brilliant 25:12 C2:13:1,114:1 183:13:19:123 121:1.19 Blackberries 15:23 64:21:90:15:21 calculate 31:18 cattorian 20:12 chance 123:13:12 13:12:12 chance 123:13:12 16:22:18:12 16:23:13:15 16:22:18:12 16:24:13:13:15 16:24:13:13:15 16:24:13:13:15 16:24:13:13:15 16:24:13:13:15 16:24:13:13:15 16:24:13:13:15 16:24:13:13:15 16:24:13:13:15 16:24:13:13:15 16:24:13:13:15 16:24:13:13:15 16:24:13:13:15 16:24:13:13:15 16:24:13:13:15 16:24:13:13:15 16:24:13:13:15 17:22:12:12 broady 22:12:29:23 calling:13:81:41:67:16 calling:13:81:41:67:16 calling:13:81:41:67:16 certain:53:20:23:16:167:17 19:52:12:14:96:22 19:52:12:14:96:22 19:52:12:14:96:22 19:52:12:14:96:22 19:52:12:14:96:22 19:52:12:14:96:22 19:52:12:14:96:22 19:52:12:14:96:22 19:52:12:14:96:22 19:52:12:14:96:22 19:52:12:14:96:22 19:52:12:14:96:22 19:52:12:14:96:22 19:52:12:14:96:22 19:52:12:14:96:22 19:52:12:14:96:22 19:52:12:14:14:14:14:14:14:14:14:14:14:14:14:14:			С		
black Oro19 bring 30:4.5 46:12 cadre 176:10 cateball 166:21 challenging 198:4 Blackberries 15:3 64:21 90:15.21 califormia 30:23 cateball 166:21 cateball 166:21 challenging 198:4 blends 143:15 175:1 califormia 30:23 cateball 166:21 life 38:10 life 39:15 life 39:16			C 2:1 3:1.11 4:1		
Blackberries 15:23 64/21 90:15,21 calculate 31:18 catch_all 166:21 chance 122:9,13 132 blend 89:1 103:10 113:19 135:15 Calformia 30:23 call 44:18 44:23 46.8 categorize 167:3 169:22 181:12 bles 56:423 91:15 bringing 33:23 63:0 79:1 80:4,6,14 46:23 167:9 188:3,10 176:3 191:13,18 blue 58:6 bringing 32:1 66:10 79:1 80:4,6,14 46:22 categorize 167:3 176:3 191:13,18 blush 20:12 broadt 52:1 91:22 131:11 165:16 180:13 88:16 89:13 94:17 categorize 167:3 176:3 191:3,18 59:22 81:25 82:15 broadt 23:1 91:52 call 83:19 197:22 calling 138:14 167:16 call 83:19 197:22 catious 32:18 changes 51:8 94:7 112:11,14 140:22 broadt 23:5: 191:3: catagorize 17:17					
blends 103:10 113:19 125:1 California 30:23 categories 566 169:22 1169:22 1169:22 1169:22 1169:22 1169:22 1169:22 1169:22 1169:22 1169:22 1169:22 1169:22 1169:21 1169:12 1169:21 1161:21 1169:21					
blends 143:15 175:1 call 14:18 44:23 468 167:9 188:3.00 change 91:5 129:20 blues 64:23 91:5 brings 32:1 66:10 79:1 80:4.6.14 86:21 cause 6:23 135:15 176:3 191:13.18 blues 02:12 131:11 165:16 180:13 88:16 89:13 94:17 137:24 change 91:12 29:02 board 17:4:11,11 5:16 176:23 191:23 caule 48:319 197:2 cause 6:23 135:15 cause 13:16 109:7 29:18 194:12 196:1 20:22 81:25 82:15 broadt 22:12 89:23 caule 33:19 10:5.1 cause 3:16 109:7 cause 5:13 94:7 21:12 28:11 33:15 broadt 22:12 89:23 caule 33:19 17:7 cause 5:25 7:17 CEO 148:8 157:24 certain 5:20:20 3:61 199:13,14.15 126:6,13 175:5 1771 69:1 96:1 123:5 110:18 1463:6,6 48:24 49:18 65:15 change 17:18 caudidates 172:25 caudidates 172:25 caudidates 172:25 caudidates 172:25 caudidates 172:25 caudidates 172:25 caudidates 172:22 cauadidates 172:22:21 caudidates 172:22:2					
bless 64:23 91:15 bringing 13:23 139:7 61:14 64:5 78:25 actegorize 167:3 176:3 191:13,18 blue 58:6 brings 32:1 66:10 79:18 194:6,14 86:21 causes 6:31 55:15 196:1 bluer 71 79:19 131:11 165:16 180:13 88:16 89:13 94:17 137:24 causes 13:16 109:7 29:18 194:12 193: baard 1:7 4:11,11 5:16 froid 2:12 122 16:02 118:9 causes 13:16 109:7 29:18 194:12 195: 7:12 5:12 11:13:15 broadt 9:2:12 28:12 causes 13:16 109:7 celling 191:12 changes 7:18 94:7 50:22 81:25 82:15 186:7 called 33:19 197:22 celling 13:8:14 167:16 celling 191:12 changes 7:16 5:17:1 146:6,14 152:19 brought 45:24 47:21 9:5 66:20 67:8 center 9:16 center 9:16 changing 176:5 187:1 192:15,18 206:9 177:18,23 candor 10:10 79:18 81:14,17 10:8 characterize 10:0:5 150:14 30:19 7:14,15,15 t43:12 s52:057:4 86:2 105:9:10 12:21 characterize 10:0:5 150:14 30:19 7:14,15,15 t43:12 caracterize 10:0:5 characterize 10:0:5 characterize 10:0:5 150:14					
blue S8:6 brings 32:1 66:10 79:1 80:4, 6, 14 86:21 cause 6:23 135:15 196:1 blurred 17:9:19 131:11 16:16 180:13 88:16 89:13 94:17 137:24 changed 12:16 19:3 broad 59:20 135:17 176:22 191:22 160:20 187:9 cautious 32:18 198:51 99:6 7:2,6 10:5,7 12 11:2 broader 135:3 191:3,5 broader 135:3 191:3,5 calling 138:14 167:16 causes 13:16 109:7 calling 138:14 167:16 cell 15:22 195:21,24 196:22 20:23 82:55 28:15 broader 135:3 191:3,5 broader 135:3 197:1 cell 15:22 195:21,24 196:22 195:21,24 196:22 195:21,24 196:22 195:21,24 196:22 195:21,24 196:22 195:21,24 196:22 199:31,41.51 causes 13:16 109:7 cell 15:22 199:31,41.51 causes 13:16 109:7 cell 35:13 81:14,171 10:53 cell 35:13 81:14 193:17 causes 13:16 108:17 cell 35:13 81:14 cell 35:17 cell 35:14:12 16:12 characer 12:17 characer 13:16 characer 13:17 charace					-
blured 131:11 165:16 188:16 137:24 changed 12:16:19:32 bush poard 17:42:11,11 160:20 187:9 causes 13:16 198:5199.6 7:2.6 10:5,12 broadd 29:18 198:5199.6 causes 13:16 198:5199.6 7:2.6 10:522 19:22 10:522 19:23.14 160:20 187:9 causes 13:12 14:14:022 broadly 22:12 19:31.14 19:51.22 19:32.14 19:51.12 19:51.12 19:51.12 19:51.12 19:51.14 19:51.14 19:51.14 19:51.14 19:51.14 19:51.14 19:51.14 19:51.14 19:31 11:31:				8	
blush 202:12 board 1:7 4:11,11 5:16 broad 59:20 135:17 176:22 191:22 98:13 101:5,16 176:22 191:22 causes 13:61 109:7. 160:20 187:9 29:18 194:12 190:21 cautious 32:18 29:18 194:12 190:21 (atlos 33:18 37:13 37:17) 21:12 28:11 33:15 broader 135:3 191:3,5 broader 22:12 89:23 called 83:19 197:22 calling 138:14 167:16 cell 52:15 cell 52:22 broader 135:3 197:15 cell 63:17:18 (cell 52:19) cell 63:17:24 (cell 63:17:55) cell 63:17:24 (cell 63:17:55) cell 63:17:24 (cell 63:17:24) cell 63:17:24 (cell 63:17:24) change 51:89:17 (cell 63:17:24) change 71:18 (cell 63:17:22) cell 63:17:24 (cell 63:17:24) change 63:82:98:17 (cell 63:17:18):12 change 71:18 (cell 63:17:22) change 63:82:98:67 (cell 63:17:18):17 (characterize132:17) characterize132:17 (characterize132:17) characterize132:17 (characterize132:17) characterize132:17 (characterize132:17) characterize132:17 (characterize132:17) characterize132:17 (characterize132:17) characterize132:17 (characterize132:17) characterize132:17 (characterize137:11 characterize137:17 (characterize137:17) characterize137:17 (characterize137:17) characterize137:17 (characterize137:17) characterize137:17 (characterize137:17) characterize137:17 (characterize137:17) characterize137:17 (characterize137:17) characteri					changed 12:16 19:3
board 1:7.4:11,11.5:16 176:22 191:22 160:20 187:9 catutous 32:18 198:5 199:6 7:2,6 10:5,12 11:2 broadt 135:3 191:5; called 83:19 197:22 ceiling 191:12 changes 5:18 94:7 59:22 81:25 82:15 186:7 Caller 33:18 17:17 Center 9:16 199:13,14,15 112:11,14 14:022 broadty 22:47:21 9:5 6:20 67:8 certain 53 0:20 36:1 199:13,14,15 126:16,13 75:5 17:71 69:196:1 123:5 110:18 146:3,6 48:24 49:18 6:15 change 7:18'8:2 207:3 Brown 2:10 29:3,4 candoi 10:10 79:18 81:147 105:9:10 12:21 chancet rizzation 130:14 53:24 25:25 50:18.19 capability 35:2 142:18 135:7 144:17 105:8 characterizzation 130:14 79:2,2 143:7,8,8 capatity 19:3 127:19 183:9 197:15 201:11 characterizz 132:17 8bod 14:4.7,8 39:13,14 48:14 51:25 Capital 67:21 69:22 certainty 16:5 20:7 charge 98:20 book 83:15,17 197:24 29:22 50:27,32 card 14:17 15:19 89:9.19 00:3,12,19:22 charge 53:25 50:18 132:01 14:9,10 11:17 201:12 202:3 99:17,18 11:43 card 14:17 15:19					
7:2.6 10:5,12 11:2 broadty 22:12 89:23 called 83:19 197:22 celling 191:12 changes 5:18 94:7 21:12 28:11 33:15 broadty 22:12 89:23 calling 138:14 167:16 celling 138:14 17 celling 138:14 18 celling 138:14 18 celling 138:14 17 celling 138:14 17 celling 138:14 18 celling 138:14 18 celling 138:14 18 celling 138:14					
21:12 28:11 33:15 broadly 22:12 89:23 calling 138:14 167:16 cell 15:22 195:21,24 196:22 59:22 81:25 82:15 186:7 CALPERS 21:5 7:17 CE0 148:8 157:24 charging 176:5 187:1 146:6,14 152:19 broght 45:24 47:21 9:5 66:20 67:8 certain 53:30:20:36:1 193:1 122:11,14 14:0:22 broght 45:24 47:21 9:5 66:20 67:8 certain 53:30:20:36:1 193:1 122:15,18 20:9 177:18,23 candor 10:10 79:18 81:144:17 10:53 characterization 207:3 Brown 2:10 29:3,4,4 cap 53:20 57:4 86:9 105:9,10 12:21 characterize 132:17 board's 16:1 143:11 79:22, 143:7,8,8 capability 35:2 142:18 135:7144:12 161:20 characterize 132:17 Bob 61:6 183:16 capacity 119:3 127:19 183:9 197:15 201:11 98:19 103:17 198:1 Bob 61:11 43:11 79:22, 143:7,8,8 capacity 119:3 127:19 183:9 197:12 201:11 98:19 90:39:17 198:1 book 83:51,71 197:24 39:13,14 48:14 51:25 Capital 67:21 69:22 certainly 16:5 20:7 charge 98:20 book 83:0:60:01,7,23 193:4,42:142:12 capacity 19:61 112:10 12:14 <td< td=""><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></td<>					
59:22 81:25 82:15 112:11,14 140:22 186:7 calls 72:13 87:17 Center 9:16 199:13,14,15 112:11,14 140:22 brouhures 27:6 0:41,252:19 10:21,17,17 (figue 14:52:19) 10:21,17 certain 5:2 0:20 36:1 193:1 146:6,1,4 152:19 150:2 171;19 177:11 0:19 96:1 123:5 110:18 14:63:6,6 48:24 49:18 65:15 channel 71:18 183:19 185:7 189:20 150:2 171;19 177:11 candidates 172:25 70:23;25 75:16 78:17 characterize 132:17 192:15,18 206:9 177:18,23 candor 10:10 79:18 81:14,17 105:8 201:12 207:3 Brown 2:10 29:3,4,4 cap ability 35:2 142:18 135:7 144:12 161:20 characterize 132:17 150:14 50:19 77:14,15,15 148:25 158:17 164:3 172:22 175:10 charge 66:3 82:9 86:7 Bod 6:16 183:16 183:10 17:17 Q:20:12 2:23: 30:17 Q:12:22:175:10 charge 68:3 82:9 86:7 Bod 8:16,17 197:24 52:2 60:2 87:7,8 capat 47:17 5:19 89:919 90:31:21,92:3 charge 98:20 201:12 20:23 99:17,18 114:3 card 41:17 15:19 89:919 90:31:21,92:3 chief 6:16 10:21,23 book 8				0	-
112:11.14 140:61,41 152:19 brought 45:24 CALPERS 2:15 7:17 CEO 14:88 157:24 changing 176:5187:1 146:61,41 152:19 69:196:1123:5 110:18 146:63,66 48:24 49:18 65:15 channel 71:18 183:19 185:71 189:2.9 150:21 171:19 177:11:19 candor 10:10 79:18 81:147 105:2 01:12 characterization 207:3 Brown 2:10 29:3,4.4 cap 5:20 57:16 164:31 77:22 17:16 characterize132:17 characterize132:17 characterize132:10 characterize132:17 characterize132:16:13 17:21:19:13 183:9197:15 201:12 cap 14:17:15:19 83:9197:15 201:12 characterize132:17 characterize132:17 characterize132:17 characterize132:17 characterize132:17 characterize133:11 19:10:11:13:12 10:11:10:11:11		-			
1465.04 152:19 brought 45:24 47:21 9:5 66:20 67:8 certain 5:3 20:20 36:1 193:1 162:6,13 175:5 177:1 69:1 96:1 123:5 110:18 146:3,6,6 48:24 49:18 65:15 channel 71:18 183:19 150:2 171:19 177:11 candidates 172:25 70:23,25 75:16 78:17 characterization 207:3 Brown 2:10 29:3,4,4 cap 53:20 57:4 86:9 105:9) 102:17 characterize 132:17 boards 30:8 146:4 50:19 77:14,15,15 148:25 158:17 164:3 172:22 175:10 characterize 106:5 Board's 16:1 143:11 79:2,2 143:7,8,8 capatilit 72:16 92:22 certain y 16:5 20:7 charge 66:3 82:9 86:7 Bod 61:6 183:16 capital 67:21 69:22 certain y 16:5 20:7 charge 58:20 bodk 3:15,17 197:24 52:2 60:2 87:7.8 caps 42:10 61:9 67:1 85:9,11 charge 58:18 201:12 202:3 99:17,18 114:3 card 41:17 15:19 89:9,190:3,12,1922 chief 6:16 10:2,123 32:24 171:11,12 179:2,3 card 14:17 15:19 89:9,190:6 13:20 14:9,10 114: 32:24 171:11,12 179:2,3 card 48:3 192:13 1122:19 12:13 chief					changing 176:5 187:2
162;6,13 175:5 177:1 69 ⁵ 96:1 123:5 110:18 146:3,6,6 48:24 49:18 65:15 chame171:18 183:19 185:7 189:2,9 150:2 171:19 177:11 candidates 172:25 70:23,25 75:16 78:17 characterization 207:3 Brown 2:10 29:3,4.4 cap 5:20 57:4 86:9 105:9,10 122:17 characterize 132:17 boards 30:8 146:4 50:19 77:14,15,15 148:25 158:17 164:3 172:22 175:10 characterize 132:17 Board's 16:1 143:11 79:2,2 143:7,88 capatity 119:3 127:19 183:19 197:15 201:11 98:19 103:17 198:10 Bob 6:16 183:16 capital 67:21 69:22 certainly 16:5 20.7 charage 68:3 20:9 80: book 81:4.7,8 39:13,14 48:14 51:25 Capitol 1:17 40:20 41:12 55:5 charge 88:20 201:12 202:3 99:17,18 114:3 card 14:17 15:19 89:9.19 90:3,12,19,22 chief 6:16 10:21,23 201:12 202:3 99:17,18 114:3 card 14:17 15:19 10:2:10 179,16 112:6 146:16 32:24 177:11,12 179:2,3 card 14:17 15:19 89:9.19 90:3,12,19,22 chief 6:16 10:21,23 201:12 202:3 199:14 52:00:24,25 care 148:3 192:13 112:10 12:19 2:21:4					0 0
183:19 185:7 189:2.9 150:2 171:19 177:18,23 70:23,25 75:16 78:17 characterization 207:3 Brown 2:10 29:3,44 cap 53:20 70:38 114:17 105:9,10 122:17 characterize 132:17 boards 30:8 16:14 50:19 77:14,15,15 148:25 135:7 144:12 161:20 characterize 105:9,10 123:7 183:16 capatility 35:2 142:18 136:7 144:12 161:30 197:15 201:17 characterize 106:3 172:27 183:9 171:19:17 89:19 103:17 183:9 171:19:17 183:9 171:19:17 charge 66:3 82:9 82:10 183:9 171:19:17 charge 66:3 82:9 82:10 111:17 40:20 41:12 55: charge 73:1 16:14:37:1 99:17:13 111:11 121:12 121:17 charge 66:3 82:9 121:11 121:11:12 121:11 121:11:11 121:11:11 121:12 121:11:11 121:11:11:11 121:11:11:11:11:11:11<		-			
192:15,18 206:9 177:18,23 candor 10:10 79:18 81:14,17 105:8 201:12 207:3 Brown 2:10 29:3,4,4 cap 53:20 57:4 86:9 capsitify 35:2 142:18 135:71 44:12 161:20 characterize 132:17 boards 30:8 146:4 50:19 77:14,15,15 148:25 158:17 164:3 172:22 175:10 characterize 132:17 bodr 30:6 16:1 183:16 capatity 19:3 127:19 183:9 197:15 201:11 98:19 103:17 198:1 bod 414:7,8 39:13,14 48:14 51:25 Capitol 1:17 40:20 41:12 55:5 charateerize 38:20 book 83:15,17 197:24 52:2 60:2 87:7.8 cap 42:10 61:9 67:1 85:9,11 charateerize 58:18 201:12 202:3 99:17,18 114:3 card 14:17 15:19 89:9,19 90:3,12,19.22 chief 6:16 10:21,23 books 30:6 60:17,23 193:4,5 200:24,25 care 148:3 192:13 112:10 121:9 122:14 chire 53:25 200:5:27,02 206:8 196:11 197:8 122:25 136:18 137:11 Chizek 2:10,13 29:4 200:5:37,22 206:8 196:11 197:8 139:24 140'7,23 35:25 50:19 66:3 borders 68:24 brushed 185:22 70:14 75:12 84:15 150:22 151:10 156:25 77:15					
207:3 Brown 2:10 29:3,4,4 cap 53:20 57:4 86:9 105:9,10 122:17 characterize 132:17 boards 30:8 146:4 35:24,25,25 50:18,19 capability 35:2 142:18 135:7 144:12 161:20 characterize 100:5 Board's 16:1 143:11 79:2,2 143:7,8,8 capatility 35:2 158:17 164:3 17:221 75:10 characterize 132:17 stars 17:1 characterize 132:17 characterize 1	,				
boards 30:8 146:4 35:24,25,25 50:18,19 capability 35:2 142:18 135:7 144:12 161:20 characterized 106:5 150:14 50:19 77:14,15,15 148:25 158:17 164:3 172:22 175:10 charge 66:3 82:9 80:1 Bob 6:16 183:16 capately 119:3 127:19 183:9197:15 20:11 98:19 103:17 198 body 191:4 204:13 Bruce 3:8 20:25 21:1 82:22 169:18 22:17 23:7 30:17 CHARLES 2:3 bonds 144:7.8 39:13,14 48:14 51:25 Capitol 1:17 40:20 41:12 55:5 chartered 37:1 book 83:15,17 197:24 52:2 60:2 87:7.8 card 14:17 15:19 89:9,19 90:3,12,19,22 chief 6:16 10:21,23 201:12 202:3 99:17,18 114:3 card 14:17 15:19 89:9,19 90:3,12,19,22 chief 6:16 10:21,23 202:5 205:3,7,22 206:8 171:11,12 179:2,3 care 148:3 192:13 112:10 12:19 122:14 chime 53:25 chief 6:15 10:21,23 20:5 205:3,7,22 206:8 196:11 197:8 122:25 136:18 137:11 Chize 5:25 77:15 100:5 143:8 bounds 189:4,9 build 54:3 Carmichael 2:20 6:25 173:15 174:15,20 choose 156:17 boutdig 83:20 buile 200:18					characterize 132:17
150:1450:19 77:14,15,15148:25 158:17164:3 172:22 175:10charge 66:3 82:9 86:Bod c16183:16capatity 119:3 127:19133:9 197:15 201:1198:19 103:17 198:1Bob c16183:16capatity 16:22certainly 16:5 20.7charge 98:20body 191:4 204:13Bruce 3:8 20:25 21:182:22 169:1822:17 23:7 30:17CHARLES 2:3books 8:15,17 197:2439:13,14 48:14 51:25Capitol 1:1740:20 41:12 55:5chartered 37:1books 80:6 60:17,2399:17,18 114:3card 14:17 15:1989:9,19 90:3,12,19,22chief 6:16 10:12,12,33books 30:6 60:17,23193:4,5 200:24,25card 14:17 15:1992:8 94:11 96:613:20 14:9,10 114:32:24171:11,12 179:2,3card 15:20102:1 2168:1792:8 94:11 96:613:20 14:9,10 114:32:24193:4,5 200:24,25care 14:8:3 192:13112:10 121:9 122:1chine 53:25books 30:6 60:17,23193:4,5 200:24,25care ful 18:11 34:13139:24 140:7,2335:25 50:19 66:3borders 68:24brushed 185:2270:14 75:12 84:15150:22 151:10 156:2577:15 100:5 143:8bottom 193:2bug 123:14107:10158:25 170:25 171:14choice 45:20 112:18bounds 189:4,9build 54:320:14 21:23 24:2,19187:25 188:6,15,23choice 45:20 112:18bounds 189:4,9build 54:320:14 21:23 24:2,19187:25 188:6,15,23circumstance 151:17bounds 189:4,9build 54:320:14 21:33 24:2,19187:25 180:6,12circumstance 151:17bounds 189:4,9build 54:320:14 21:32	boards 30:8 146:4				characterized 106:5
Board's 16:1 143:1179:2,2 143:7,8,8capacity 119:3 127:19183:9 197:15 201:1198:19 103:17 198:1Bob 6:16183:16capital 67:21 69:22certainly 16:5 20:7charges 98:20body 191:4 204:13Bruce 3:8 20:25 21:182:22 169:1822:17 23:7 30:17CHARLES 2:3books 83:15,17 197:2452:2 60:2 87:7,8capital 67:121 69:22capital 67:121 69:23charges 98:20books 83:15,17 197:2452:2 60:2 87:7,8capital 67:15140:20 41:12 55:5chartered 37:1books 63:15,17 197:2452:2 60:2 87:7,8capital 67:15192:8 94:11 96:613:20 14:9,10 114:201:12 20:399:17,18 114:3card 14:17 15:1989:9,19 90:3,12,19,22chief 6:16 10:21,23books 30:6 60:17,23193:4,5 200:24,25care 148:3 192:13112:10 121:9 122:14chime 53:25202:5 205:3,7,22206:8196:11 197:8122:25 136:18 137:11Chiczek 2:10,13 29:4206:1,5,7brush 59:20 181:6careful 18:11 34:13139:24 140:7,2335:25 50:19 66:3bottom 193:2bugi 23:14107:10158:22 170:55 171:14choice 45:20 112:18bounds 189:4,9build 54:3Carmichael 2:20 6:25173:15 174:15.20choose 156:17bounds 189:4,9build 11:1 13:7613:20.23 17:10 9:23175:19 180:20 186:23circular 195:2brake 85:6,8,19,23builde 20:1820:14 21:23 24:21.9187:52 188:6,15,23circular 195:2brake 85:0,24build 54:320:14 21:23 17:16circular 195:2circular 195:2brake 13:19:11111:113:21 187:18<					
Bob 6:16183:16capital 67:21 69:22certainly 16:5 20:7charges 98:20body 191:4 204:13Bruce 3:8 20:25 21:182:22 169:1822:17 23:7 30:17CHARLES 2:3book 83:15,17 197:2452:2 60:2 87:7,8caps 42:1061:9 67:1 85:9,11cheaper 58:18201:12 202:399:17,18 114:3card 14:17 15:1989:9,19 90:3,12,19,22cheif 6:16 10:21,23book 83:05135:22,23 140:19,20102:12 168:1792:8 94:11 96:613:20 14:9,10 14:32:24171:11,12 179:2,3card 14:17 15:1989:9,19 90:3,12,19,22cheif 6:16 10:21,2320:5 205:3,7,22206:8196:11 197:812:225 136:18 137:11Chize 42:10, 13:2920:5 205:3,7,22206:8196:11 197:812:225 136:18 137:11Chize 42:10, 13:2920:6:1,5,7brush 59:20 181:6careful 81:1 34:13139:24 140:7,2335:25 50:19 66:3borders 68:24brushed 185:2270:14 75:12 84:15150:22 151:10 156:2577:15 100:51 43:8boutigue 55:23build 54:3Carmichael 2:20 6:25173:15 174:15,20chocse 156:17boutigue 55:23build 1137:625:18 27:1 28:8 29:2189:3 19:225 196:9circular 195:2branch 123:24Burns 2:5 6:1729:15 30:16 31:14201:21 20:21,21.5circular 195:2branch 123:24Burns 2:5 6:1729:15 30:16 31:14201:21 20:21,21.5circular 195:2branch 123:24Burns 2:5 6:1729:15 30:16 31:14201:21 20:21,21.5circular 195:2branch 123:24Burns 2:5 6:1729:15 30:16 31:14201:21 20:21,21.5 <td< td=""><td>Board's 16:1 143:11</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>98:19 103:17 198:19</td></td<>	Board's 16:1 143:11				98:19 103:17 198:19
body 191:4 204:13Bruce 3:8 20:25 21:1\$2:22 169:1822:17 23:7 30:17CHARLES 2:3bonds 144:7,839:13,14 48:14 51:25Capitol 1:1740:20 41:12 55:5chartered 37:1book 83:15,17 197:2452:2 60:2 87:7,8caps 42:1061:9 67:1 85:9,11charger 58:1820:12 20:399:17,18 114:3card 14:17 15:1989:9,19 90:3,12,19,22thief 6:16 10:21,23bookkeeping 30:5135:22,23 140:19,20102:12 168:1792:8 94:11 96:613:20 14:9,10 114:32:24171:11,12 179:2,3care 148:3 192:13112:10 121:9 122:14chime 53:25202:5 205:3,7,22206:8196:11 197:812:225 136:18 137:11Chizek 2:10,13 29:4206:1,5,7brush 59:20 181:6careful 18:11 34:13139:24 140:7,2335:25 50:19 66:3borders 68:24brushed 185:2270:14 75:12 84:15150:22 151:10 156:2577:15 100:51 143:8bounds 189:4,9build 54:3Carmichael 2:20 6:25173:15 174:15,20chocse 156:17boutique 55:23building 116:1 137:613:20,23 17:10 19:23175:19 180:20 186:23choose 156:17braking 83:20burdensome 117:1625:18 27:1 28:8 29:2189:3 192:25 196:9circular 195:2braking 83:20burdensome 117:1632:13 97:17 98:6,16203:8,14151:22 157:15brake 123:24105:13 197:11business 12:24 41:1632:13 97:17 98:6,16203:8,14151:22 157:15198:11 201:2355:13 60:8 64:898:21 99:4,14,17,21certaid 99:9 75:1165:23 88:25 89:11198:14 120:2316:5: 164:5: 170:5					
bonds 144:7,839:13,14 48:14 51:25Capitol 1:1740:20 41:12 55:5chartered 37:1book 83:15,17 197:2452:2 60:2 87:7,8caps 42:1061:9 67:1 85:9,11cheaper 58:18201:12 202:399:7,18 114:3card 14:17 15:1989:9,19 90:3,12,19,22chief 6:16 10:21,23bookkeeping 30:5135:22,23 140:19,20102:12 168:1792:8 94:11 96:613:20 14:9,10 114:32:24171:11,12 179:2,3cards 15:20102:21 07:9,16 112:6146:16books 30:6 60:17,23193:4,5 200:24,25care 148:3 192:13112:10 121:9 122:14chime 53:25202:5 205:3,7,22206:8196:11 197:8122:25 136:18 137:11Chizek 2:10,13 29:4206:1,5,7brush 59:20 181:6careful 18:11 34:13139:24 140:7,2335:25 50:19 66:3borders 68:24brushed 185:2270:14 75:12 84:15150:22 151:10 156:2577:15 100:5 143:8bounds 189:4,9build 54:3Carmichael 2:20 6:25173:15 174:15,20choose 156:17boutique 55:23builleng 116:1 137:613:20,23 17:10 19:23175:19 180:20 186:23circular 195:2brake 85:6,819,23buillet 200:1820:14 21:23 24:2,19187:25 188:6,15,23circular 195:2brake 123:24Burns 2:5 6:1729:15 30:16 31:1420:38,14151:22 157:15brake 123:24Burns 2:5 6:1729:15 30:16 31:1420:38,14151:22 157:15brake 123:24107:12 111:18,18,20207:5certained 99:75:1165:23 88:25 89:11198:11 201:2355:13 60:8 64:898:21 99:4,14,17,21certained 99:75:11 </td <td></td> <td></td> <td>-</td> <td></td> <td>-</td>			-		-
book 83:15,17 197:24 201:12 202:352:2 60:2 87:7,8 99:17,18 114:3caps 42:10 card 14:17 15:19 102:12 168:1761:9 67:1 85:9,11 99:9,19 90:3,12,19,22cheaper 58:18 chief 6:16 10:21,23bookkeeping 30:5135:22,23 140:19,20 135:22,23 140:19,23102:12 168:17 cards 15:2099:8 94:11 96:6 102:2 107:9,16 112:613:20 14:9,10 114: 13:20 14:9,10 114: 13:20 14:9,10 114: 12:25 136:18 137:11cheaper 58:18 chief 6:16 10:21,23books 30:6 60:17,23 202:5 205:3,7,22 206:8196:11 197:8 196:11 197:8122:25 136:18 137:11 159:21 15:12 84:15Chizek 2:10,13 29:4 150:22 151:10 156:25borders 68:24 bounds 189:4,9build 54:3 build 54:3careful 18:11 34:13 107:10139:22 151:10 156:25 13:20 17:15 174:15,2077:15 100:5 143:8 choose 156:17bounds 189:4,9 build 54:3build 54:3 20:14 21:23 24:219Carmichael 2:20 6:25 13:15 174:15,20175:19 180:20 186:23 choose 156:17choose 156:17 choose 156:17boutique 55:23 building 116:1 137:6 198:12 20:123build 20:18 20:14 21:23 24:21920:12 20:212,215 21:15 19 180:20 186:23 circular 195:2circular 195:2 circular 195:2braking 83:20 burdensome 17:16builes 10:2:117 29:15 30:16 31:14 29:15 30:16 31:1420:121 202:12,15 20:122 1202:12,15circular 195:2 circular 195:2branch 123:24 Burns 2:5 6:17 business 12:24 41:16 198:11 20:12355:13 60:8 64:8 98:21 99:4,14,17,21 29:15 30:16 31:1420:21 202:12,15 20:21 202:12,15circular 195:2 circular 195:2branch 123:24 198:14 20:123107:12 111:18,18,20 207:5207:5 carry 175:22 176:21 	•	39:13,14 48:14 51:25	Capitol 1:17	40:20 41:12 55:5	chartered 37:1
201:12 202:399:17,18 114:3card 14:17 15:1989:9,19 90:3,12,19,22chief 6:16 10:21,23bookkeeping 30:5135:22,23 140:19,20102:12 168:1792:8 94:11 96:613:20 14:9,10 114:32:24171:11,12 179:2,3cards 15:20102:12 168:1792:8 94:11 96:6146:16books 30:6 60:17,23193:4,5 200:24,25card 14:3 192:13112:10 121:9 122:14146:16202:5 205:3,7,22206:8196:11 197:8122:25 136:18 137:11150:22 151:10 156:2577:15 100:5 143:8borders 68:24brushed 185:2270:14 75:12 84:15150:22 151:10 156:2577:15 100:5 143:8bounds 189:4,9build 54:3Carmichael 2:20 6:25173:15 174:15,20choese 156:17boutque 55:23building 116:1 137:613:20,23 17:10 19:23175:19 180:20 186:23circle 45:20 112:18brake 85:68,19,23builde 200:1820:14 21:23 24:19187:25 188:6,15,23circle 45:8branch 123:24Burns 2:5 6:1729:15 30:16 31:14201:21 202:12,15circle 45:8branch 123:24Burns 2:5 6:1729:15 30:16 31:14201:21 202:12,15circular 195:2branch 123:24Burns 2:5 6:1729:15 30:16 31:14201:21 202:12,15circular 195:2brand 196:13 197:11businesse 12:2				61:9 67:1 85:9,11	cheaper 58:18
32:24171:11,12 179:2,3 193:4,5 200:24,25cards 15:20 care 148:3 192:13102:2 107:9,16 112:6146:16books 30.6 60:17,23193:4,5 200:24,25206:8196:11 197:8112:10 121:9 122:14chime 53:25202:5 205:3,7,22206:8196:11 197:8122:25 136:18 137:11Chizek 2:10,13 29:4206:1,5,7brush 59:20 181:6careful 18:11 34:13139:24 140:7,2335:25 50:19 66:3borders 68:24brushed 185:2270:14 75:12 84:15150:22 151:10 156:2577:15 100:5 143:8bottom 193:2bugs 123:14107:10158:25 170:25 171:14choice 45:20 112:18bounds 189:4,9build 54:3Carmichael 2:20 6:25173:15 174:15,20choose 156:17boutique 55:23building 116:1 137:613:20,23 17:10 19:23175:19 180:20 186:23circle 45:8brake 85:68,19,23bullet 200:1820:14 21:23 24:2,19187:25 188:6,15,23circle 45:8brake 85:68,19,23bullet 200:1825:18 27:1 28:8 29:2189:3 192:25 196:9circumstance 151:17brand 196:13 197:11business 12:24 41:1632:13 97:17 98:6,16203:8,14151:22 157:15198:11 201:2355:13 60:8 64:898:21 99:4,14,17,21certainty 182:24circumstances 22:19207:5carried 58:6138:12102:4 114:22 12:14198:11 201:23,24107:12 111:18,18,20207:5carried 58:6138:12198:11 201:23150:17 181:2 187:18carried 58:6138:12102:4 114:22 12:14198:14 20:18 158:16161:5 164:5 170:5carried 58:6138:12			-		
32:24171:11,12 179:2,3 193:4,5 200:24,25cards 15:20 care 148:3 192:13102:2 107:9,16 112:6146:16books 30.6 60:17,23193:4,5 200:24,25206:8196:11 197:8112:10 121:9 122:14chime 53:25202:5 205:3,7,22206:8196:11 197:8122:25 136:18 137:11Chizek 2:10,13 29:4206:1,5,7brush 59:20 181:6careful 18:11 34:13139:24 140:7,2335:25 50:19 66:3borders 68:24brushed 185:2270:14 75:12 84:15150:22 151:10 156:2577:15 100:5 143:8bottom 193:2bugs 123:14107:10158:25 170:25 171:14choice 45:20 112:18bounds 189:4,9build 54:3Carmichael 2:20 6:25173:15 174:15,20choose 156:17boutique 55:23building 116:1 137:613:20,23 17:10 19:23175:19 180:20 186:23circle 45:8brake 85:68,19,23bullet 200:1820:14 21:23 24:2,19187:25 188:6,15,23circle 45:8brake 85:68,19,23bullet 200:1825:18 27:1 28:8 29:2189:3 192:25 196:9circumstance 151:17brand 196:13 197:11business 12:24 41:1632:13 97:17 98:6,16203:8,14151:22 157:15198:11 201:2355:13 60:8 64:898:21 99:4,14,17,21certainty 182:24circumstances 22:19207:5carried 58:6138:12102:4 114:22 12:14198:11 201:23,24107:12 111:18,18,20207:5carried 58:6138:12198:11 201:23150:17 181:2 187:18carried 58:6138:12102:4 114:22 12:14198:14 20:18 158:16161:5 164:5 170:5carried 58:6138:12	bookkeeping 30:5				13:20 14:9,10 114:12
books 30:6 60:17,23193:4,5 200:24,25care 148:3 192:13112:10 121:9 122:14chime 53:25202:5 205:3,7,22206:8196:11 197.8122:25 136:18 137:11Chizek 2:10,13 29:4206:1,5,7brush 59:20 181:6careful 18:11 34:13139:24 140:7,2335:25 50:19 66:3borders 68:24bugs 123:14107:10158:25 170:25 171:14choice 45:20 112:18bounds 189:4,9build 54:3Carmichael 2:20 6:25173:15 174:15,20choose 156:17boutique 55:23building 116:1 137:613:20,23 17:10 19:23175:19 180:20 186:23choosing 12:8 103:24brake 85:6,8,19,23bullet 200:1820:14 21:23 24:2,19187:25 188:6,15,23circular 195:2branch 123:24burdensome 117:1625:18 27:1 28:8 29:2189:3 192:25 196:9circular 195:2branch 123:24burdensome 117:1632:13 97:17 98:6,16203:8,14151:22 157:15198:11 201:2355:13 60:8 64:898:21 99:4,14,17,21certainty 182:24circumstance 52:1976:19,20 102:2,24107:12 111:18,18,20207:5cettainty 182:24circumstances 22:1976:19,20 102:2,24107:12 111:18,18,20207:5cettainty 182:24102:4 114:22 12:4177:3180:17 181:2 187:18174:21carry 175:22 176:21CFA 2:14 36:22 94:23122:6,18 127:13177:3180:17 181:2 187:18174:21169:14 170:1175:16 195:13 203:91:7 166:21 167:3197:6carry 175:22 176:21CFA 2:14 36:22 94:23citd 34:20 85:9168:8 184:10 185:20businesses 187:370:7 7			cards 15:20	102:2 107:9,16 112:6	
206:1,5,7brush 59:20 181:6careful 18:11 34:13139:24 140:7,2335:25 50:19 66:3borders 68:24brushed 185:2270:14 75:12 84:15150:22 151:10 156:2577:15 100:5 143:8bottom 193:2bugs 123:14107:10158:25 170:25 171:14choice 45:20 112:18bounds 189:4,9build 54:3Carmichael 2:20 6:25173:15 174:15,20choise 156:17boutique 55:23building 116:1 137:613:20,23 17:10 19:23175:19 180:20 186:23choose 156:17braking 83:20burdensome 117:1625:18 27:1 28:8 29:2189:3 192:25 196:9circular 195:2branch 123:24Burns 2:5 6:1729:15 30:16 31:14201:21 202:12,15circumstance 151:17brand 196:13 197:11business 12:24 41:1632:13 97:17 98:6,16203:8,14151:22 157:15198:11 201:2355:13 60:8 64:898:21 99:4,14,17,21certainty 182:24circumstances 22:19Brasher 2:24 28:8,973:10 95:14 103:2,21100:4,8 168:10 200:9certified 2:8 137:7,1923:3 51:6 63:21 65:148:17,18 150:18112:1 113:2 117:21carried 58:6138:12102:4 114:22 12:4177:3180:17 181:2 187:18carrying 60:4 152:19CFA 2:14 36:22 94:23122:6,18 127:13177:3180:17 181:2 187:18care 20:6 28:22 58:22chair 6:25 99:23cited 34:20 85:9177:16 195:13 203:197:6case 20:6 28:22 58:22chair 6:25 99:23cited 34:20 85:9177:16 195:13103:1386:22 113:5 115:511:1 13:23 18:17citam 150:13177:16 195:13103:1386:22 113:5	books 30:6 60:17,23	193:4,5 200:24,25	care 148:3 192:13	112:10 121:9 122:14	chime 53:25
206:1,5,7brush 59:20 181:6careful 18:11 34:13139:24 140:7,2335:25 50:19 66:3borders 68:24brushed 185:2270:14 75:12 84:15150:22 151:10 156:2577:15 100:5 143:8bottom 193:2bugs 123:14107:10158:25 170:25 171:14choice 45:20 112:18bounds 189:4,9build 54:3Carmichael 2:20 6:25173:15 174:15,20choise 156:17boutique 55:23building 116:1 137:613:20,23 17:10 19:23175:19 180:20 186:23choose 156:17braking 83:20burdensome 117:1625:18 27:1 28:8 29:2189:3 192:25 196:9circular 195:2branch 123:24Burns 2:5 6:1729:15 30:16 31:14201:21 202:12,15circumstance 151:17brand 196:13 197:11business 12:24 41:1632:13 97:17 98:6,16203:8,14151:22 157:15198:11 201:2355:13 60:8 64:898:21 99:4,14,17,21certainty 182:24circumstances 22:19Brasher 2:24 28:8,973:10 95:14 103:2,21100:4,8 168:10 200:9certified 2:8 137:7,1923:3 51:6 63:21 65:148:17,18 150:18112:1 113:2 117:21carried 58:6138:12102:4 114:22 12:4177:3180:17 181:2 187:18carrying 60:4 152:19CFA 2:14 36:22 94:23122:6,18 127:13177:3180:17 181:2 187:18care 20:6 28:22 58:22chair 6:25 99:23cited 34:20 85:9177:16 195:13 203:197:6case 20:6 28:22 58:22chair 6:25 99:23cited 34:20 85:9177:16 195:13103:1386:22 113:5 115:511:1 13:23 18:17citam 150:13177:16 195:13103:1386:22 113:5			196:11 197:8		Chizek 2:10,13 29:4
borders 68:24brushed 185:2270:14 75:12 84:15150:22 151:10 156:2577:15 100:5 143:8bottom 193:2bugs 123:14107:10158:25 170:25 171:14choice 45:20 112:18bounds 189:4,9build 54:3Carmichael 2:20 6:25173:15 174:15,20choose 156:17boutique 55:23building 116:1 137:613:20,23 17:10 19:23175:19 180:20 186:23choosing 12:8 103:24brake 85:68,19,23buile 200:1820:14 21:23 24:2,19187:25 188:6,15,23circular 195:2braking 83:20burdensome 117:1625:18 27:1 28:8 29:2189:3 192:25 196:9circular 195:2branch 123:24Burns 2:5 6:1729:15 30:16 31:14201:21 202:12,15circumstance 151:17brasher 2:24 28:8,973:10 95:14 103:2,21100:4,8 168:10 200:9certified 2:8 137:7,1923:3 51:6 63:21 65:76:19,20 102:23,24107:12 111:18,18,20207:5cetra 69:9 75:1165:23 88:25 89:11148:17,18 150:18112:1 113:2 117:21carried 58:6138:12102:4 114:22 121:4breadth 142:18 158:16161:5 164:5 170:5carry 175:22 176:21CFA 2:14 36:22 94:23122:6,18 127:13177:3180:17 181:2 187:18carrying 60:4 152:19CFO 33:3 148:8 157:24141:5,10,18 142:3197:16 10:51 167:3197:6case 20:6 28:22 58:22chair 6:25 99:23cited 34:20 85:9168:8 184:10 185:20busineses 187:370:7 72:5 83:10 84:5Chair 6:25 99:23cited 34:20 85:9168:8 184:10 185:20busineses 187:370:7 72:5 83:10 84:511:1 13:23 18:17claim 150:13		brush 59:20 181:6		139:24 140:7,23	
bounds 189:4,9build 54:3Carmichael 2:20 6:25173:15 174:15,20choose 156:17boutique 55:23building 116:1 137:613:20,23 17:10 19:23175:19 180:20 186:23choosing 12:8 103:24brake 85:6,8,19,23bullet 200:1820:14 21:23 24:2,19187:25 188:6,15,23circle 45:8braking 83:20burdensome 117:1625:18 27:1 28:8 29:2189:3 192:25 196:9circluar 195:2branch 123:24Burns 2:5 6:1729:15 30:16 31:14201:21 202:12,15circumstance 151:17brand 196:13 197:11business 12:24 41:1632:13 97:17 98:6,16203:8,14151:22 157:15198:11 201:2355:13 60:8 64:898:21 99:4,14,17,21certainty 182:24circumstances 22:19Brasher 2:24 28:8,973:10 95:14 103:2,21100:4,8 168:10 200:9certified 2:8 137:7,1923:3 51:6 63:21 65:76:19,20 102:23,24107:12 111:18,18,20207:5certainty 182:24circumstances 22:19148:17,18 150:18112:1 113:2 117:21carry 175:22 176:21CFA 2:14 36:22 94:23102:4 114:22 121:4177:3180:17 181:2 187:18carry ing 60:4 152:19138:12102:4 114:52.10,18 142:3177:3197:6case 20:6 28:22 58:22chair 6:25 99:23cited 34:20 85:9168:8 184:10 185:20businesses 187:370:7 72:5 83:10 84:5Chair 6:25 99:23cited 34:20 85:9168:8 184:10 185:20businesses 187:370:7 72:5 83:10 84:511:1 13:23 18:17claim 150:13168:8 184:10 185:20businesses 187:370:7 72:5 83:10 84:511:1 13:23 18:17claim 150:13<	borders 68:24	brushed 185:22	70:14 75:12 84:15	150:22 151:10 156:25	77:15 100:5 143:8
boutique 55:23 brake 85:6,8,19,23building 116:1 137:6 builet 200:1813:20,23 17:10 19:23 20:14 21:23 24:2,19175:19 180:20 186:23 187:25 188:6,15,23circle 45:8 circle 45:8braking 83:20 branch 123:24burdensome 117:16 Burns 2:5 6:1725:18 27:1 28:8 29:2 29:15 30:16 31:14187:25 188:6,15,23 20:21 202:12,15circle 45:8 circluar 195:2brand 196:13 197:11 198:11 201:23business 12:24 41:16 55:13 60:8 64:832:13 97:17 98:6,16 98:21 99:4,14,17,21201:21 202:12,15 circumstance 151:17Brasher 2:24 28:8,9 76:19,20 102:23,2473:10 95:14 103:2,21 107:12 111:18,18,20100:4,8 168:10 200:9 207:5certainty 182:24 circumstances 22:19Breakt 17,18 150:18 177:3112:1 113:2 117:21 180:17 181:2 187:18 180:17 181:2 187:18carried 58:6 carry 175:22 176:21 carry 175:22 176:21 care 20:6 28:22 58:22 chair 6:25 99:23CFO 33:3 148:8 157:24 circu 34:20 85:9break 15:9,11 76:2 168:8 184:10 185:20businesse 187:3 	bottom 193:2	bugs 123:14	107:10	158:25 170:25 171:14	choice 45:20 112:18
brake 85:6,8,19,23 braking 83:20bullet 200:18 burdensome 117:1620:14 21:23 24:2,19 25:18 27:1 28:8 29:2 29:15 30:16 31:14 32:13 97:17 98:6,16 203:8,14187:25 188:6,15,23 189:3 192:25 196:9 201:21 202:12,15 201:21 202:12,15circle 45:8 circular 195:2 circumstance 151:17 151:22 157:15brand 196:13 197:11 198:11 201:23business 12:24 41:16 55:13 60:8 64:8 76:19,20 102:23,24 16:15 164:5 170:5 176:19,20 102:23,2455:13 60:8 64:8 17:12 111:18,18,20 207:598:21 99:4,14,17,21 207:5certainty 182:24 circumstances 22:19 certified 2:8 137:7,19 23:3 51:6 63:21 65: 23:8 25 89:11 65:23 88:25 89:11 65:23 88:25 89:11 100:4,8 168:10 200:9breadth 142:18 158:16 177:3161:5 164:5 170:5 180:17 181:2 187:18 180:17 181:2 187:18 197:6carried 58:6 carry 175:22 176:21 carry 175:22 176:21 care 20:6 28:22 58:22 chair 6:25 99:23cited 34:20 85:9 cited 34:20 85:9break 15:9,11 76:2 168:8 184:10 185:20businesses 187:3 buy 137:18 193:970:7 72:5 83:10 84:5 86:22 113:5 115:5Chair man 2:2 4:7 7:5 11:1 13:23 18:17 claim 150:13 claims 63:13	bounds 189:4,9	build 54:3	Carmichael 2:20 6:25	173:15 174:15,20	choose 156:17
brake 85:6,8,19,23 braking 83:20bullet 200:1820:14 21:23 24:2,19187:25 188:6,15,23circle 45:8braking 83:20burdensome 117:1625:18 27:1 28:8 29:2189:3 192:25 196:9circular 195:2branch 123:24Burns 2:5 6:1729:15 30:16 31:14201:21 202:12,15circumstance 151:17brand 196:13 197:11business 12:24 41:1632:13 97:17 98:6,16203:8,14151:22 157:15198:11 201:2355:13 60:8 64:898:21 99:4,14,17,21certainty 182:24circumstances 22:19Brasher 2:24 28:8,973:10 95:14 103:2,21100:4,8 168:10 200:9certified 2:8 137:7,1923:3 51:6 63:21 65:76:19,20 102:23,24107:12 111:18,18,20207:5cetera 69:9 75:1165:23 88:25 89:11148:17,18 150:18112:1 113:2 117:21carried 58:6138:12102:4 114:22 121:4breadth 142:18 158:16161:5 164:5 170:5carrying 60:4 152:19CFA 2:14 36:22 94:23122:6,18 127:13177:3180:17 181:2 187:18carrying 60:4 152:19CFO 33:3 148:8 157:24141:5,10,18 142:391:7 166:21 167:3197:6case 20:6 28:22 58:22chair 6:25 99:23cited 34:20 85:9168:8 184:10 185:20businesses 187:370:7 72:5 83:10 84:5Chairman 2:2 4:7 7:5City 32:10breaking 71:23buy 137:18 193:986:22 113:5 115:511:1 13:23 18:17claim 150:13breaks 150:17buyer 66:5,8,8117:10 127:21 140:3189:23claims 63:13		building 116:1 137:6	13:20,23 17:10 19:23		choosing 12:8 103:24
branch123:24Burns2:5 6:1729:1530:16 31:14201:21202:12,15circumstance151:17brand196:13197:11business12:2441:1632:1397:1798:6,16203:8,14151:22157:15198:11201:2355:1360:864:898:2199:4,14,17,21certainty182:24circumstances22:19Brasher2:2428:8,973:1095:14103:2,21100:4,8168:10200:9certainty182:24circumstances22:1976:19,20102:23,24107:12111:18,18,20207:5certainty182:24circumstances22:19148:17,18150:18112:1113:2117:21carried58:6138:12102:4114:22121:4breadth142:18158:16161:5164:5170:5carry 175:22176:21CFA2:1436:2294:23122:6,18127:13177:3180:17189:6,14,20190:11174:21carry of 60:4152:19CFO33:3148:8157:24141:5,10,18142:391:7166:21167:3197:6case20:628:2258:226hair6:2599:23cited34:2085:9168:8184:10185:20businesses187:1893:986:22113:511:113:2318:17Claim150:13breaking71:23buy137:18193:986:22113:5511:1 </td <td>brake 85:6,8,19,23</td> <td>bullet 200:18</td> <td>20:14 21:23 24:2,19</td> <td>187:25 188:6,15,23</td> <td>circle 45:8</td>	brake 85:6,8,19,23	bullet 200:18	20:14 21:23 24:2,19	187:25 188:6,15,23	circle 45:8
brand 196:13 197:11business 12:24 41:1632:13 97:17 98:6,16203:8,14151:22 157:15198:11 201:2355:13 60:8 64:898:21 99:4,14,17,21certainty 182:24circumstances 22:19Brasher 2:24 28:8,973:10 95:14 103:2,21100:4,8 168:10 200:9certified 2:8 137:7,1923:3 51:6 63:21 65:76:19,20 102:23,24107:12 111:18,18,20207:5cetra 69:9 75:1165:23 88:25 89:11148:17,18 150:18112:1 113:2 117:21carried 58:6138:12102:4 114:22 121:4breadth 142:18 158:16161:5 164:5 170:5carry 175:22 176:21CFA 2:14 36:22 94:23122:6,18 127:13177:3180:17 181:2 187:18carrying 60:4 152:19CFO 33:3 148:8 157:24141:5,10,18 142:3break 15:9,11 76:2189:6,14,20 190:11174:21169:14 170:1175:16 195:13 203:91:7 166:21 167:3197:6case 20:6 28:22 58:22chair 6:25 99:23cited 34:20 85:9168:8 184:10 185:20businesses 187:370:7 72:5 83:10 84:5Chairman 2:2 4:7 7:5City 32:10breaking 71:23buy 137:18 193:986:22 113:5 115:511:1 13:23 18:17claim 150:13breaks 150:17buyer 66:5,8,8117:10 127:21 140:3189:23claims 63:13	braking 83:20	burdensome 117:16	25:18 27:1 28:8 29:2	189:3 192:25 196:9	circular 195:2
198:11 201:2355:13 60:8 64:898:21 99:4,14,17,21certainty 182:24circumstances 22:19Brasher 2:24 28:8,973:10 95:14 103:2,21100:4,8 168:10 200:9certified 2:8 137:7,1923:3 51:6 63:21 65:76:19,20 102:23,24107:12 111:18,18,20207:5certified 2:8 137:7,1923:3 51:6 63:21 65:148:17,18 150:18112:1 113:2 117:21carried 58:6138:1265:23 88:25 89:11breadth 142:18 158:16161:5 164:5 170:5carry 175:22 176:21CFA 2:14 36:22 94:23122:6,18 127:13177:3180:17 181:2 187:18carrying 60:4 152:19CFO 33:3 148:8 157:24141:5,10,18 142:3break 15:9,11 76:2189:6,14,20 190:11174:21169:14 170:1175:16 195:13 203:91:7 166:21 167:3197:6case 20:6 28:22 58:22chair 6:25 99:23cited 34:20 85:9168:8 184:10 185:20businesses 187:370:7 72:5 83:10 84:5Chairman 2:2 4:7 7:5City 32:10breaking 71:23buy 137:18 193:986:22 113:5 115:511:1 13:23 18:17claim 150:13breaks 150:17buyer 66:5,8,8117:10 127:21 140:3189:23claims 63:13			29:15 30:16 31:14		circumstance 151:17
Brasher2:2428:8,973:1095:14103:2,21100:4,8168:10200:9certified2:8137:7,1923:351:663:2165:2376:19,20102:23,24107:12111:18,18,20207:5cetra69:975:1165:2388:2589:11148:17,18150:18112:1113:2117:21carried58:6138:12102:4114:22121:4breadth142:18158:16161:5164:5170:5carry175:22176:21CFA2:1436:2294:23122:6,18127:13177:3180:17181:2187:18carryi75:22176:21CFO33:3148:8157:24141:5,10,18142:3break15:9,1176:189:6,14,20190:11174:21169:14170:1175:16195:13203:91:7166:21167:3197:6case20:628:2258:22chaircited34:2085:9168:8184:10185:20businesses187:370:772:583:1084:5Chairman2:24:77:5City32:10breaking71:23buy137:18193:986:22113:511:113:2318:17claim150:13claim12:13breaks150:17buyer66:5,8,8117:10127:21140:3189:23claims63:13	brand 196:13 197:11	business 12:24 41:16	32:13 97:17 98:6,16		151:22 157:15
76:19,20 102:23,24107:12 111:18,18,20207:5cetera 69:9 75:1165:23 88:25 89:11148:17,18 150:18112:1 113:2 117:21carried 58:6138:12102:4 114:22 121:4breadth 142:18 158:16161:5 164:5 170:5carry 175:22 176:21CFA 2:14 36:22 94:23122:6,18 127:13177:3180:17 181:2 187:18carrying 60:4 152:19CFO 33:3 148:8 157:24141:5,10,18 142:3break 15:9,11 76:2189:6,14,20 190:11174:21169:14 170:1175:16 195:13 203:91:7 166:21 167:3197:6case 20:6 28:22 58:22chair 6:25 99:23cited 34:20 85:9168:8 184:10 185:20businesses 187:370:7 72:5 83:10 84:5Chairman 2:2 4:7 7:5City 32:10breaking 71:23buy 137:18 193:986:22 113:5 115:511:1 13:23 18:17claim 150:13breaks 150:17buyer 66:5,8,8117:10 127:21 140:3189:23claims 63:13	198:11 201:23	55:13 60:8 64:8	98:21 99:4,14,17,21	certainty 182:24	circumstances 22:19
148:17,18 150:18112:1 113:2 117:21carried 58:6138:12102:4 114:22 121:4breadth 142:18 158:16161:5 164:5 170:5carry 175:22 176:21CFA 2:14 36:22 94:23122:6,18 127:13177:3180:17 181:2 187:18carrying 60:4 152:19CFO 33:3 148:8 157:24141:5,10,18 142:3break 15:9,11 76:2189:6,14,20 190:11174:21case 20:6 28:22 58:22chair 6:25 99:23cited 34:20 85:991:7 166:21 167:3197:6case 20:6 28:22 58:22chair 6:25 99:23cited 34:20 85:9breaking 71:23buy 137:18 193:986:22 113:5 115:511:1 13:23 18:17City 32:10breaks 150:17buyer 66:5,8,8117:10 127:21 140:3189:23claim 63:13	Brasher 2:24 28:8,9	73:10 95:14 103:2,21	100:4,8 168:10 200:9	certified 2:8 137:7,19	23:3 51:6 63:21 65:7
breadth 142:18 158:16161:5 164:5 170:5carry 175:22 176:21CFA 2:14 36:22 94:23122:6,18 127:13177:3180:17 181:2 187:18carrying 60:4 152:19CFO 33:3 148:8 157:24141:5,10,18 142:3break 15:9,11 76:2189:6,14,20 190:11174:21169:14 170:1175:16 195:13 203:91:7 166:21 167:3197:6case 20:6 28:22 58:22chair 6:25 99:23cited 34:20 85:9168:8 184:10 185:20businesses 187:370:7 72:5 83:10 84:5Chairman 2:2 4:7 7:5City 32:10breaking 71:23buy 137:18 193:986:22 113:5 115:511:1 13:23 18:17claim 150:13breaks 150:17buyer 66:5,8,8117:10 127:21 140:3189:23claims 63:13	76:19,20 102:23,24				65:23 88:25 89:11
177:3180:17 181:2 187:18carrying 60:4 152:19CFO 33:3 148:8 157:24141:5,10,18 142:3break 15:9,11 76:2189:6,14,20 190:11174:21169:14 170:1175:16 195:13 203:91:7 166:21 167:3197:6case 20:6 28:22 58:22chair 6:25 99:23cited 34:20 85:9168:8 184:10 185:20businesses 187:370:7 72:5 83:10 84:5Chairman 2:2 4:7 7:5City 32:10breaking 71:23buy 137:18 193:986:22 113:5 115:511:1 13:23 18:17claim 150:13breaks 150:17buyer 66:5,8,8117:10 127:21 140:3189:23claims 63:13	·				102:4 114:22 121:4
break 15:9,11 76:2189:6,14,20 190:11174:21169:14 170:1175:16 195:13 203:91:7 166:21 167:3197:6case 20:6 28:22 58:22chair 6:25 99:23cited 34:20 85:9168:8 184:10 185:20businesses 187:370:7 72:5 83:10 84:5Chairman 2:2 4:7 7:5City 32:10breaking 71:23buy 137:18 193:986:22 113:5 115:511:1 13:23 18:17claim 150:13breaks 150:17buyer 66:5,8,8117:10 127:21 140:3189:23claims 63:13	breadth 142:18 158:16				
91:7 166:21 167:3 168:8 184:10 185:20197:6case 20:6 28:22 58:22 70:7 72:5 83:10 84:5chair 6:25 99:23cited 34:20 85:9businesses 187:3 breaking 71:23buy 137:18 193:9 buyer 66:5,8,886:22 113:5 115:511:1 13:23 18:17City 32:10breaks 150:17buyer 66:5,8,8117:10 127:21 140:3189:23claims 63:13					
168:8 184:10 185:20businesses 187:370:7 72:5 83:10 84:5Chairman 2:2 4:7 7:5City 32:10breaking 71:23buy 137:18 193:986:22 113:5 115:511:1 13:23 18:17claim 150:13breaks 150:17buyer 66:5,8,8117:10 127:21 140:3189:23claims 63:13	break 15:9,11 76:2				175:16 195:13 203:14
breaking 71:23 breaks 150:17buy 137:18 193:9 buyer 66:5,8,886:22 113:5 115:5 117:10 127:21 140:311:1 13:23 18:17 189:23claim 150:13 claims 63:13			case 20:6 28:22 58:22	chair 6:25 99:23	
breaks 150:17 buyer 66:5,8,8 117:10 127:21 140:3 189:23 claims 63:13			70:7 72:5 83:10 84:5		
DITICING 14:0 DUYERS 12:19 149:20 153:24 154:11 Challenge 105:12 Clarify 199:20	briefing 14:6	buyers 12:19	149:20 153:24 154:11	challenge 105:12	clarify 199:20

Page	5
------	---

clarity 26:18,24 29:25	189:1 191:25 196:4	commenting 25:22	community 7:24 8:11	178:2 182:3 189:17
59:25 101:15 107:16	203:16	comments 13:9 32:7	112:18 148:19 178:21	competent 159:2
154:21	client's 90:21 103:14	68:12 72:12 84:25	companies 2:22 4:12	206:25
classic 153:24	114:13 115:17 116:3	85:1 107:4 109:2	9:17 10:1 11:21 16:2	competing 130:20
clean 125:8	175:15 179:15 206:19	111:25 141:12 147:10	16:10 31:18 33:18	competitor 124:18
clear 8:4 9:23 30:8	close 49:19 68:1	152:6 156:3 160:12	34:3,3,5 35:5 36:6,14	131:4
36:13 50:13 61:20	code 24:10 70:23 71:9	162:2 165:9 175:4,13	36:16 38:23,25 39:3	completed 141:4
67:9 68:6,24 71:15	71:13 110:6 113:4	177:7 185:19 187:25	42:6,7,9,12,15,20	168:17 179:16
80:21 102:6,17	116:13 127:11 136:23	188:14 201:6 203:25	43:6,11,13,15,25	completely 17:20 19:21
106:24 107:1 109:21	142:15 179:22 189:8	207:4	45:11 46:25 47:1,13	19:22 72:19 78:19
112:6 121:10 128:15	codified 11:15	Commission 4:22 5:8	50:1,3 51:3,18,18	107:4 128:11
130:11 133:14 154:4	cognizant 197:10	11:11,16 13:11 22:17	53:3,16,16,18,20,22	completing 179:9
157:6,16 160:12	collapsed 105:24	118:6	54:9 55:4,6 57:3,6	complex 34:17 47:14
167:16 184:25 185:8	colleague 180:3	Commissioner 6:11	58:15 67:11 70:22	48:7,22 49:14 57:7
188:2,10 199:16	colleagues 6:15 8:21	Commission's 5:4	73:1 77:4 78:15,15	88:24 112:22 134:13
clearly 26:2 34:21	13:11 87:14	11:20	79:15 85:5 96:4	134:22 158:13,17
43:17 45:20 52:17	Colleen 3:4 49:23 72:9	commitment 10:10	105:1,5 117:7,7	170:21 172:18 175:6
61:9 68:5 76:22 84:5	75:5,6 102:11 119:13	committed 26:6	120:18 124:14 153:16	175:16 176:14,19
89:6 90:15 91:2	119:14 120:6 172:15	committee 5:7 18:1,22	153:18 155:22 156:25	177:3 186:3,4 187:21
134:11 142:16,23	172:16 183:3,4	25:7 27:5,11,14,16	157:2 165:1 184:2	192:10
154:9 163:8 172:4,22	186:24	28:20 41:5 46:12,13	197:4	complexes 164:16
189:8 198:6	combination 32:3	63:20,22 64:22,23	company 1:7 2:10,13	complexities 35:9
clear-cut 110:5 154:11	106:18	75:22 76:23 77:3,8,12	4:10 32:6 33:16 34:9	49:21
client 5:25 7:22 8:16	come 5:9 24:9,11 27:22	81:17 85:6,8,18,23	34:11 36:3,19 41:15	complexity 49:3 108:6
11:10 12:18 16:15,20	28:2 33:14 44:1,10	91:22 92:16,18 93:22	41:18,18 48:25 53:5,7	compliance 21:20 22:7
17:3 44:1,10 45:25	51:23 62:6,18 63:15	99:24 101:13,17	55:3 56:14,16 57:7,11	22:13 36:17 41:12
46:11 61:11,11 62:2,6	69:10 74:19 80:24	103:6,22 108:17	58:18 69:19 72:4	56:8,9,11,20 57:17,25
74:1,2,3 81:20 87:17	81:5,7 87:5 88:23	122:20 140:13,15	77:21 78:2,9 79:13,21	62:4 63:4 66:7 68:17
88:3,18,20,23,25	91:13 97:25 110:4	146:14 148:20 149:5	95:10,11 99:24	70:18 71:6 79:11,20
90:12,16,16 91:22	117:13 118:4 125:18	149:9,9,14,18,21,25	100:16 104:18 109:17	82:20 83:18 84:9
96:15 100:21 103:1	126:6,25 138:1	150:5,9,15,16,22	111:1,19 119:15,20	87:21 97:18 99:5
103:11,22 112:3	139:12 146:17 153:24	151:2,8,11,12,23	120:21 124:11,12	103:4 121:4 145:18
113:7 114:9 116:1,8,9	162:19 166:12 169:11	152:12,25 153:1,2	126:14,15 133:24	156:11,16,20 157:11
117:9,11 118:14	179:5,7,14 198:17,21	154:19 184:4,5	139:6 143:20 145:16	158:20 159:8,12,24
121:2,15,16 126:5,7	202:8 204:22	186:25 198:6 200:3	145:23 147:20,21,22	160:13 164:7 183:24
127:2,4 135:8,10,11	comes 67:5 77:11 80:13	200:16,18 202:17,21	148:2,8 149:11,13	189:10
135:14,15 136:19	97:8 113:9 133:15	203:7,19 204:4,9,11	150:21 151:1,25	compliance-type 166:8
137:16 142:6,25	137:22 160:3 170:13	204:15 206:22	152:8,10,20 154:6	complicated 18:3 26:17
145:21 151:10,19	178:12 205:5	committees 9:25 11:22	156:4,9 157:8 160:14	36:5 66:11 147:14
156:14 159:16,17	comfort 49:1	18:11,12,18 22:23	160:18,20,23 162:16	158:16 172:19
161:9,10 173:23	comfortable 148:20	23:1 24:25 25:3,11	162:21,23 163:16,17	complicates 187:15,15
175:23 177:15 182:5	coming 20:9 25:4 44:1	26:14,22 27:18,22	163:18,24 164:3	complies 158:5
182:11 190:9 193:8	51:9 53:1 63:10	40:22 45:18 64:9,13	185:4	comply 36:7 88:4 156:5
193:12,18 205:2,7,16	175:20	85:14 97:4,13 105:10	company's 5:6 31:21	156:7,19
clients 5:4,12,12 9:20	commended 12:12	105:16 107:2,15	59:15 79:11 128:1,6	complying 66:18
13:1,6,7 16:18 32:16	comment 14:12 17:7	110:10,14 122:23	148:10,11	component 11:5 16:4
32:20 39:11 40:7	30:20,24 39:16 52:3	146:5 153:3 154:17	comparable 19:16	comprehend 154:1,2
47:20 86:8,9,12,16	60:2 67:25 75:9	194:13,15 198:12,18	128:22 131:1	compromise 19:6
87:4 92:13 94:13	98:23 107:17 115:11	199:7,20 200:19	compared 68:10	132:24 133:3,4,19
95:6 99:12 100:20	122:19 124:5 140:21	201:2,7 204:2,5,7	compatible 155:14	174:12 178:11,25
101:10 104:9 107:14	141:13 142:5 144:20	common 77:20 113:3	compensated 104:11	185:13
123:8 124:17,25	150:19 169:9	117:22 137:5 157:10	174:10	compromised 148:1
131:13 136:17 137:3	commentary 23:8	commonality 97:22	compensation 76:8	178:24
140:1,5 145:13	186:18	commonly 38:19 76:4	151:20,25 152:4	compromises 134:12
146:20 147:3 162:20	commented 95:1	communication 75:20	153:20 161:21,25	146:21,22
162:21 181:20 186:22	commenters 180:2	183:12	167:22 169:6 177:24	compromising 108:12

computation 39:24	connected 23:22	contest 174:3	corridor 83:14	35:7 90:24 101:3
computer 170:23	connection 28:14 40:16	context 18:15 22:18	cost 59:11,11,13 66:15	133:25 134:15 169:14
con 26:1	151:9 188:19 207:2	23:2,11,15,19 72:15	66:21 67:7,10,11,15	criticism 9:5
concept 57:2 66:16	Cono 2:25 6:11 83:4	118:19,24 119:8	67:17 68:8 69:8,25	cross 118:16
96:1,1 140:2	197:9 201:24	122:20 123:1 129:15	70:4,10 72:21 73:21	Crowe 2:10,13 29:4
conception 72:19	consequence 49:19	141:15 147:15 151:25	99:8	35:25 50:19 66:2
concepts 186:13	79:18	165:15 185:20 186:7	costly 67:4	77:15 100:5 143:8
concern 34:11 48:22	consequences 126:2	contingency 99:25	costs 69:24 70:3,13	crystal 157:16
81:11 82:21 85:20	187:9	continue 11:21 15:8	73:22 75:11	cultural 191:13,17
88:21 89:7 106:11	conservative 78:6	44:7 57:22 136:13	cost-savings 75:3	193:1
132:14 134:5,5	conservatively 78:1	146:24 168:18 187:11	Council 3:9 67:24	culture 74:1
143:19 148:15 157:21	consider 16:24 22:24	188:24	counsel 7:16 56:23 78:2	cup's 50:24,25 51:1
concerned 48:20 57:15	44:4 87:20 101:13	continued 85:22 191:8	counter 49:6	current 16:10 75:22
130:3 155:24 173:25	145:8 162:8,23	continuing 29:14 95:17	countries 65:10,12	101:11 102:18 136:23
187:8	167:15,22 177:1,3	103:3 146:23	108:8 109:14 142:17	203:19
concerning 16:8	186:2 189:2 200:6,19	continuity 134:12	164:6,17 175:17	currently 12:3 33:15
concerns 4:22 5:9,10	201:2 202:25 206:9	continuous 41:15 45:24	country 145:18 159:10	78:9 107:9 168:1
5:19 84:13 174:1	consideration 24:25	52:13 57:1 73:2	couple 42:5,9 91:10	curtailed 49:17
180:14,17,24 181:6,7	41:6 44:25 86:1	169:25 179:17	143:17 158:10 167:20	curve 194:17
181:9 185:21 203:1	141:21 187:1 200:3	continuum 131:20	course 23:14,19 44:8	custom 76:11
conclude 15:12 48:14	considerations 85:18	contract 38:6 97:11,16	45:15 46:5 73:9 82:5	customers 162:15
72:9 125:23	87:23 100:22 187:5	160:17,19,23 161:10	84:1 87:17,19 93:6,16	customized 103:14
conclusion 51:11	considered 22:20 115:6	202:22	97:2 103:5,13 106:10	128:12,20
102:10 114:15 118:23	178:1	contracts 95:13	123:15 128:16 131:4	cut 25:17 71:19,21
119:11 120:20	considering 17:1 20:19	contradictions 118:10	146:19 150:2 170:19	189:22
conclusions 114:16	175:6	contribute 6:9	179:8,9 182:13,14	cuts 190:15
conduct 24:10 28:17	consistent 5:1 103:7	contribution 177:25	205:1	cutting 110:9
177:8,12 179:22	104:14 113:22 121:23	control 52:11,16,22	court 116:6	Cyprus 2:22 61:17,18
189:12	121:25 136:23 154:1	104:7 152:12	cover 14:8 15:3 98:3	61:18 104:13,14
conducting 19:15	180:22 182:25 205:21	controller 61:18	covered 151:7	107:3 123:3,4 138:6,7
170:19 176:25	consolidated 144:3	controls 93:5 190:23	CPA 37:16 39:10 40:9	152:21,22
confidence 4:13 6:19	consolidating 58:16	controversial 12:10	179:23 194:11	152.21,22
11:6 16:5 29:1 69:11	constraints 145:9	115:7 144:2	CPAs 21:8 194:22,23	D
69:14 180:8 186:9	constructive 199:1	controversy 9:4	crazy 124:2	D 2:1,3 3:1 4:1
204:1	consult 62:25 73:2	conversant 173:7	create 18:5 75:19 81:15	damage 138:4 170:11
confined 172:10 174:8	138:19	conversation 107:24	138:22,23 182:1	Damon 2:11 56:21,22
confirm 20:15	consultant 9:7 45:12	184:9	190:22,29 102.1	63:12 66:21 72:9,11
confirmation 20:6	66:5 127:20 138:10	conversations 69:7	created 18:6 146:11	78:7 105:19 117:17
conflict 72:1 113:1.5	consultants 45:19	135:1	199:9	127:14 147:8 151:15
118:8 128:9,10,10,14	consultation 41:6,15	convincing 95:8	creates 16:13 50:5	156:23 161:16 165:7
128:16 131:5 148:9	consultations 41:11	cool 8:24	75:18 182:18	178:3
154:9 174:12	177:17	core 158:20	creating 4:10 75:14	Damon's 87:9
conflicted 164:15	consulted 41:23 86:11	corporate 8:23,25 9:15	107:5 113:7	DANIEL 2:4
conflicting 16:14 81:21	149:14 177:19	9:25 82:16 128:24	credentialed 47:16	data 32:19 42:19
162:22 182:19,20	consulting 10:4 52:19	129:4 175:19 197:21	89:2 186:20	David 2:23 34:15 48:13
conflicts 124:20 128:25	57:22,25 58:4 99:11	corporation 110:23	credibility 4:16	48:16 50:3 107:20
129:1,1,2,3,8,10,11	138:23 139:18 141:17	144:4,11 190:3	credible 59:4	114:17 132:20 133:7
131:9 154:10 165:14	151:24 165:15,21	corporations 67:2	credit 155:20,21	138:8 152:14 162:24
confused 39:22	167:22 183:25	correct 67:25 107:4	creditors 31:4	168:7 169:12 170:16
confusing 50:6	Consumer 3:10 17:13	127:20 135:20 170:16	criteria 88:2 110:12,13	184:10
confusion 46:19 168:2	contact 10:21 200:23	178:25 193:17 194:9	110:15 155:16,17	day 13:21 15:21 23:14
175:12	contained 7:25 31:5	205:24	159:22 189:8	23:19 37:6 60:20
Congress 4:11,20 17:21	193:16	corrected 188:9	critical 134:9,22	69:9 108:7,7 116:6
17:24 18:7	contemplating 179:8	correctly 186:15	141:24 142:12 143:3	190:11,11 192:12
Congress's 18:1	contemporaneous	187:14	175:4 176:20 186:9	198:9,9 200:17
conjunction 33:8	52:16	correlated 183:17	critically 23:6 34:18	days 8:24 53:20

Page 7

day-long 204:18	132:4	dialogues 67:2	disadvantages 56:18	documentation 32:2
deafening 101:2	Deloitte 3:7 40:18	differ 32:5 41:17 98:12	63:11 65:21 66:24	33:5 50:9
deal 30:12 49:2,15 51:5	84:24 99:15 104:6	difference 9:12 36:14	76:15 77:9	documented 204:12
51:22 52:5 91:16	139:21 152:6 177:6	39:19,20 42:1 80:21	disagree 161:15 165:8	206:17
108:7 123:7 155:3	188:13,16	101:24 102:20 115:14	178:5	documents 56:15
158:17	demand 134:20	126:16 130:7 163:18	disagrees 41:24 44:20	dodge 88:8
dealing 35:10 114:12	denominator 77:20	173:20,25	disallowing 119:25	doing 12:12 32:24 34:1
147:16 176:11	deny 58:14 106:8	differences 20:16 97:23	disbursements 60:18	39:24 43:1 44:13
deals 170:14,15	department 33:17	121:6 131:18 197:3	discharging 179:21	54:14,20 55:2,8,9,9
dealt 84:17 136:11	62:12 74:15 80:3	197:24 201:13 202:4	disciplinary 11:19	55:12,13,16,25 58:12
Dean 2:13 66:1,2 100:4	124:24	different 6:2 21:7	disciplined 192:19	60:8,24 62:3,22 70:7
100:5	depend 35:18 145:23	22:21 40:2,3 51:23	disclose 151:12	70:11,20,21 71:6,17
dear 7:2,15	dependence 182:5	52:6 60:3 61:7,15	disclosed 86:1 132:5	74:4,18 79:20 83:7
debate 26:13 122:10	dependent 36:3	62:9 68:15 80:20	disclosure 23:2 88:5	109:20,22,24 110:5
196:14	depending 32:5 100:22	88:2 90:7 100:22	122:24 132:2 151:2	112:18 120:10,21
debates 10:15	depends 36:1,19 95:12	111:16,16 112:4	153:8,20	125:25 127:2,2
decide 28:6 65:8 67:20	109:24 128:11	114:11 115:7 127:4	disclosures 31:25 70:24	137:23 147:7 151:13
149:2 182:9 189:21	depth 58:4 64:10 88:22	130:10 135:2 147:18	71:2 153:21 187:24	155:18,22 163:22
189:22 190:14 196:17	89:8 142:18	147:25 165:19,22,23	188:1,3,4,7,9 205:11	164:5 169:20 170:14
196:20 198:17	describe 112:23 185:7	169:22 170:22 171:8	disconnect 125:4	171:3,25 178:9,10,17
decided 41:14	205:12	171:18 194:22	discover 90:13	191:16 192:20
decides 34:11	described 25:25 58:3	differential 70:12	discuss 7:10 14:2 17:6	dollars 188:24
deciding 29:11 64:13	111:17 127:3	differentiate 68:15,20	23:15 166:23	Don 6:16 10:20,25
decision 9:10 51:24	describing 16:8 119:3	101:5 159:15	discussed 16:25 85:25	13:14 16:3 83:19
96:3,10 146:8 149:6	deserves 87:10	differentiates 34:8	117:4 133:18 165:20	DONALD 2:6
150:11 154:17,19	designate 206:25	differently 61:3 63:3	180:14,16 181:17,17	door 166:11
decisions 21:18 27:20	designation 37:1	182:6 196:19 199:6	200:5	double 144:5
63:23 148:21,25	designed 12:18 19:13	difficult 30:3 35:6	discussing 89:22	doubled 83:6
150:20 199:8,22,23	100:16,23 113:14	47:10,15,25 79:13	106:20 112:25 119:16	doubt 4:16,17 7:22
207:1	115:25 119:23 120:4	97:4 105:3 107:18	discussion 4:8 5:21 6:7	42:24 59:2,8 132:5
decision-making 105:2	120:11 121:25 132:1	115:20 116:19 119:8	6:12,24 13:2 14:4,6	Doug 6:24 13:20,21,22
132:16 184:12 185:4	150:25	122:16,17 131:7	15:6,10 16:23 17:11	31:17
203:3	designing 120:2 124:25	147:1 165:4 180:25	22:11 26:3 28:11	Douglas 2:20 24:3
decline 9:17	desirable 49:9	181:4 182:23 186:6	56:3,24 58:11 59:19	30:21
declined 150:3	desire 15:18 152:13	187:21 190:11 195:3	67:6 73:19 81:9 82:6	downplayed 185:22
deduction 123:22	despite 9:4 69:3	difficulty 78:4 84:7	86:19 95:3 101:17	draconian 194:10
deep 47:22,22	detail 25:4,7,12 27:19	118:25 121:12 131:17	108:2 112:12 118:9	drafting 40:20
deeply 47:15 186:20	147:10	diligence 172:24	120:25 121:6 122:11	dramatic 195:24
defend 115:16 116:12	details 17:16 126:24	202:20 204:3,5	142:14 146:24 154:16	dramatically 195:2
119:22	determination 24:21	diligent 45:19	168:11 173:20 178:14	draw 18:8 89:23
defense 113:19,20	61:2 63:21 75:23	dimensions 49:16	185:6,16 187:21	105:13 108:6 115:2
defer 128:5	177:21	134:8	197:20 204:18	143:13 146:25
deferred 131:25	determine 125:16,17	diminished 85:12	discussions 83:22 95:20	drawing 84:7 107:24
define 107:18 109:10	125:19 183:20	direct 23:7 72:1 167:23	203:3	drawn 166:1
109:24 130:9 185:7	determined 5:17	199:22	distancing 108:4	drew 115:11
defines 130:8	104:10	directed 201:10	distinction 50:15	drive 192:17
definite 50:15,15	determining 26:5 97:14	direction 120:9 173:22	105:17 115:12 158:18	driven 88:24 121:3
137:15	127:19 140:11 202:21	directly 21:24 32:14	159:11 168:6	141:17
definitely 19:24 42:12	detracted 47:25	106:14 139:25 140:5	distinctions 89:23	drives 124:2
definitional 175:12	develop 141:25 142:1	140:9 182:7	distinguished 13:20	driving 186:22
184:1	developed 116:9 142:9	Director 21:1	distributed 35:13	drop 71:21 110:6
deftly 178:13	developing 83:25	directors 9:6 77:6	diversity 203:16,17	dropped 9:21,22
degree 34:9 35:1 56:25	development 100:13	146:4,14 149:24	divide 15:6	dry 116:4
60:2 71:15 82:23	develops 142:20	150:14	Dixon 3:6 86:6 98:22	dual 158:1,5
128:16 176:8	dialogue 28:13 73:1	disadvantage 77:16	162:5	due 9:24 135:16 145:9
delighted 6:7 11:3	101:17 174:22,24	97:13	document 203:2 204:12	172:24 202:20 204:2

Alderson Reporting Company, Inc.

Page 8

				Page 8
204:5	efforts 6:19 8:21	201:4	establishing 24:13	28:24
dumb 124:23	either 9:1 40:11 43:19	engaged 185:1,2	60:13	exclude 85:19
duties 45:19 76:11	62:9 77:22 87:5 92:1	191:15	estate 145:18	excludes 85:17
171:4	102:2 105:4 125:5	engagement 168:25	estimate 99:9	excuse 205:17
duty 61:13 88:19	127:13 131:9 141:4	169:4 171:15,20	et 69:8 75:11 138:11	executive 76:8 145:11
151:19 153:4 192:9	164:16 168:3 169:18	200:4 206:18	ethic 189:20	146:5,12,16 148:24
D.C 1:20	177:21 195:14 198:3	engagements 206:20	ethical 180:10 200:6	151:14,20,24,25
	201:13	engages 12:1	ethics 21:11 116:13	152:3 161:19,24
E	elaborate 45:14	engaging 6:6 56:18	180:6,17 181:3,8	167:22
E 2:1,1,16 3:1,1 4:1,1	element 41:4 82:25	66:25 76:15 77:17	182:23 189:15,25	executives 3:4 5:12
earlier 34:20 46:18,20	97:19 172:14 198:7	200:20	190:23 192:25 196:21	13:6 75:7 119:15
50:14 60:11 64:12	elements 51:23 165:21	engineered 12:17 83:19	206:10	145:12,21,24 147:5
72:14,21 90:6 94:1	eliminate 46:18 154:21	83:25	evaluate 22:24 23:5	147:12,17,23 148:23
105:7 106:20 115:1	194:10	enhance 23:18,25	63:10 87:1 90:24	149:13,19 151:6
122:22 132:21 141:22	Elliot 3:9 67:22,23	47:19 166:5 183:6	91:13 92:13 105:11	152:8 153:15 154:4
147:19 160:4 161:2	146:18 182:12	185:11,12	162:20 171:4	161:24 162:7,11
164:2 165:20 175:13	elongated 64:19	enhanced 47:9 70:5	evaluated 22:20 171:2	172:17 183:5
181:15 183:16 187:8	eloquently 112:10	183:11,21 201:14	172:7,8 173:16	executive's 148:11
194:21	elucidation 38:13	enhancement 47:5	174:11	exercise 25:8 28:5
early 4:21 48:8 81:1	embedded 48:5 167:12	enhances 41:10 48:10	evaluating 64:9 86:17	134:2,9,21 153:2
154:7 170:17 197:18	emphasized 11:14	48:25 142:6 156:16	evaluation 40:23 81:17	exercising 153:3
easier 54:8 65:25 117:5	employee 16:18 56:12	183:9	172:13,14	exist 131:10 168:1
easily 95:10 161:10	76:8 152:20 157:7,10	Enron 105:24,24 106:4	evenly 35:13	197:13
easy 8:22 164:14 165:1	157:14,20 158:4	106:7 136:25	event 62:21 103:6	existence 59:8 194:16
190:10	163:18 165:15 192:9	ensure 41:2 43:3 57:24	205:19	existing 148:10
echo 98:23 105:20	192:12,14 206:25	67:12 86:2 104:3,8	events 41:16	exists 82:15
131:17 175:4 177:7	employees 30:23	140:3,17 152:7,11	Everson 3:2 6:11 36:4	expanding 11:23
187:25	145:15 154:24 156:19	174:11 188:25 205:22	82:1,2	expatriate 163:13,16
echoing 141:13	157:2 158:23 160:14	206:6	everybody 14:14 82:18	192:8
economic 8:15 67:17	employer 157:9,10,14	ensuring 35:11 205:20	everybody's 98:6	expatriates 145:19
67:18 84:4 103:2,20	157:17 165:14	enter 172:18 197:4	everyday 41:13	156:6
edge 117:25	employer's 157:17	entities 60:16 106:3,4	everyone's 109:20	expats 155:14
effect 74:14 96:2,3,5,6	158:2	entity 141:5 170:21	everything's 70:19	expect 12:2 37:5 43:13
96:9,17,18 163:22,24	empty 50:25 51:2	190:2,5	evidence 194:18	87:14 143:23 145:2
195:23,25 198:16	en 197:23	entity's 193:2	evident 85:10	161:17 172:9 203:6
201:24 202:1,2	enable 100:16	entrusted 149:6	evolved 158:11	204:8
effective 47:8 108:19	enables 183:11	enumerate 81:25	exactly 80:19 106:24	expected 42:14 43:12
133:3 176:5,6 184:17 184:17 194:20 206:11	enactment 7:19	environment 142:4 158:13 190:19,21	114:1 164:23 181:15 exaggerated 63:14	95:16 116:12
	encompass 187:5 encompassed 156:3		exaggerating 59:5	expects 95:12 expelled 195:11
effectively 94:8 effectiveness 24:1 47:6	encourage 101:14	environments 47:14 117:22 175:17	exaggerating 59.5 exam 174:21	expend 188:24
52:11 59:14 172:6	108:17 162:8 183:18	equally 169:21	examination 8:9 46:5	expense 99:16
174:25 185:12	189:2	equation 139:19 181:22	114:9 174:21	expenses 152:23 163:20
effects 132:2,12,14	encouraged 130:22	182:8,9	examine 5:22 52:14	experience 33:19 37:12
195:23	204:11	equivalent 171:23	169:1	40:21 42:16 44:4
effectuate 126:9 198:10	encouraging 108:23	Ernst 3:5 25:20 149:25	example 6:1 9:18 70:17	45:6,6 53:15 80:11
efficiencies 64:7 66:15	endangered 106:15	erosion 82:19	70:20 87:3 95:8	92:10 94:12,21
73:23 161:12 201:15	endemic 129:4	escaping 125:4	108:16 117:7 128:23	106:13
efficiency 23:25 47:20	endorse 40:20	ESOP 162:17	151:7 202:23	experienced 22:22
75:19 80:2 81:10	ends 41:25	especially 48:21 49:22	examples 143:18	expert 8:25 40:6 44:21
174:25 202:6	enforceable 195:9,12	109:2 136:25 168:23	167:20	119:2 178:9,19,22,23
efficient 28:18 30:11	195:13	espoused 22:17	excellent 24:13 25:13	178:24 205:6
44:12 50:5 54:8 67:3	enforcement 82:24	essence 27:7 68:13	55:24 84:25 108:16	expertise 6:13 12:2
69:8 75:11 183:14	83:2	essentially 172:8	exception 117:19	17:17 30:4,5 34:19
efficiently 15:3	engage 56:17 76:14	established 68:2	excess 69:22	35:8,14 36:6,16 37:21
effort 6:23 157:6	79:14 105:4 185:10	establishes 68:6	exchange 4:22 10:3	38:7,23 41:3,17 43:14

r				
43:18 46:16 47:12,21	115:12 119:1 122:21	feeling 115:24	financials 59:15 79:9	165:24 169:2 173:3,4
47:22 48:2,5 53:6,9	123:18 127:3 130:5	feels 148:20	106:7 128:1	173:15 176:12 181:19
53:24 54:4,11,12	130:14 134:19 135:14	fees 8:16 9:17,19 51:13	financial-accounting	182:10 183:8 186:22
56:15 57:5,8,9,20	139:1 141:2 159:5	99:20,25 100:7	90:25	193:2,10 194:11
62:10,10 65:15,17	162:25 166:10 167:17	181:18,21,25	financial-analyst 37:1	200:6 201:15 203:14
66:8,10,16 84:10 89:1	179:22 180:24 186:1	fee-structure 97:19	financial-reporting	205:6
89:2 142:20 168:22	204:17	fellow 7:2,6	96:2,3,8,17	firms 4:18 5:11,22 6:5
170:2,13 174:4,20	factor 187:14	fence 66:4	financial-statement	6:5 9:19 12:14,16
175:14,14 176:4,7	factors 18:20 200:2	fewer 51:17	16:9 40:16 42:1	27:6,21 35:12 37:20
177:3 178:8,15 179:1	facts 22:18 23:2 63:20	fiduciary 151:19 153:4	find 40:11 43:12 44:9	37:21 39:9,10,10,11
186:20 187:12	65:23 88:24 89:10	154:3,5	47:3 51:12 55:7	45:16 55:23,23 58:22
experts 21:8 41:20	102:4 103:14 121:3	field 134:7	68:20 84:15 94:7	65:13,15 70:21 72:16
47:16 175:18 176:3,3 176:10 178:6,17	124:10 127:10 141:5 141:10,17 142:2	FIFO 144:1,13 fight 77:25, 116:5	108:11 110:15 138:2 198:5	74:9 76:3 86:14,15,15 87:14 95:4 102:25
expert's 44:22 205:9	141:10,17 142.2	fight 77:25 116:5 figure 36:7 55:15	finding 38:23 39:5	106:16,22 107:1,13
explain 116:2,7 118:4	fade 199:11	127:25 143:12 151:16	115:8	108:20,24 109:23
122:7 132:4	faded 199:25	178:23	findings 42:13 102:7	110:22,22 117:23,23
explaining 115:15	failure 132:23 133:1	figuring 144:25	fine 71:14 207:6	124:24 126:12 129:6
117:10	failures 90:1	file 144:3 197:15	fingertips 202:13	131:12 133:16 134:17
explicated 58:9	fair 157:12 174:24	filed 197:21 205:17,18	firm 8:13 11:9 12:20,24	134:19,20 136:12
explicitly 26:16 27:7	fairly 18:4 31:24 34:25	filing 108:8 121:16	13:5,6 22:6 25:21	140:2 145:12,14
explore 5:21	71:10 102:17 172:19	122:4 163:24	28:21 29:7 32:10	147:2,4,4 148:25
explored 122:11,16	188:10,10	filings 121:5	33:7,20,23 34:23	157:3 158:16 161:7
exploring 89:22	fairness 4:13	fill 15:19 168:15	35:15,19,20,21,23	164:12,16,18,21
express 79:8	fall 21:21 61:9 173:4	filling 205:15	36:2,2,19 37:11 38:5	166:10 168:20,21,23
expressed 11:15 77:18	206:11	filter 196:18	39:18,19 40:4,5,9,10	168:23 186:17,19
84:14 112:10 181:9	falls 202:18	final 30:19,24 52:1	43:8 44:3,6,22,23	187:12 188:15,23
expresses 77:8	familiar 95:10,11 161:5	120:19 136:6 177:18	46:7,9 48:20 49:7,13	191:15,23 196:2,9,20
expressly 77:2	183:15 201:22	finally 81:9 92:15	50:11 54:10,10,17,17	196:23 198:19 199:8
extend 162:12,12	familiarities 161:12	96:20 97:3 104:2	54:20,23 55:2,22 56:4	firm's 73:10 86:7 87:13
extensive 204:2	familiarity 73:25 74:7	169:5	58:17,17,20 61:5	100:20 101:7 110:20
extent 12:16 24:12,22	95:8	financial 3:4 4:15 8:9	65:17 68:4 70:11	119:4 120:17 130:23
34:7 49:18 59:21	far 38:5 49:13 95:2	10:3 23:24 31:1,6,8	73:3,6,7 74:4,14,15	157:18
108:3 140:2 172:4	108:10 110:2 173:24	31:11,21,25 34:21	74:17,18,23 77:10	first 7:8 17:21 29:12
175:25 178:9 188:7 202:5	181:7,8 farm 46:14	35:11 36:12 37:23 38:2,21 39:25 46:1	79:19,21 80:4,16 84:3	31:15 32:1 45:15
external 9:2 37:9 57:9	far-reaching 162:9	47:11 49:12 50:10,12	86:21 91:14,20 92:5 94:1,3 95:11,24 97:10	49:25 56:8,13 59:18 59:23 61:20 72:12
95:13,23	fascinating 134:25	50:17 52:9,11 67:12	98:19,23 99:19	95:1,4 98:9 100:18
extra 19:12	fashion 14:20 52:6 73:2	67:19 69:12 74:1,12	100:19 101:10 103:19	103:12 110:18,19,24
extreme 83:25 148:15	85:6 190:19	74:22 75:6 82:17	103:23 107:5,23	114:6 127:16 129:2
extremely 5:13 26:22	fault 135:16	86:25 89:14,20 90:23	108:9 112:20 118:3,5	129:15 145:20 160:11
32:16 57:15 115:19	faulty 17:20	91:1 94:3,17 96:6,8,9	118:13 119:6,9	166:3 182:17 202:1
117:16 177:8	favor 10:15 120:7	96:24 100:17,24	124:11,12,13 125:1	202:12 206:16
eyes 189:19 205:9,9	133:17	101:20 102:1,9,21	125:25,25 126:13,14	first-in 144:1
e-mail 15:20	favorable 46:10	103:12 104:25 109:5	127:17 128:17 130:14	first-out 144:1
	February 16:21	111:6,8,9 116:22,23	130:23 131:5,21	five 15:12 38:25 39:1
F	federal 31:19 56:10	119:14 124:10 125:15	133:20,22 134:1	57:4
F 126:17	60:21 66:12 176:15	125:19 126:1 131:25	135:4,10 136:15	five-thousand 55:6
face 121:19 144:25	Federation 3:10 17:14	132:2,9,13 134:18	137:4 139:9 146:9,12	fixed 99:6,9,15,19
203:18	fee 43:10 51:16 56:19	137:25 145:24 155:24	146:15 147:6,7,20	100:7
faced 60:12	73:9 76:16 97:22	164:16 169:20 170:4	148:5,7 149:21	fixed-fee 100:2
facing 79:7 121:1	98:10,10 99:6,10,15	170:5,15 172:16	150:25 151:11,18,23	flawed 17:20 19:21
fact 7:18 22:24 23:17	184:22,24,25 187:24	173:12 174:18 179:16	151:23,24 152:18,24	flexibility 101:16
25:6 27:13 38:10	188:1,3 192:1	182:4 183:4,7 201:11	157:5,16 160:19,22	floor 13:19 148:19
43:14 48:19 54:9	feel 22:8 32:23 37:3	201:14 202:9 205:4	161:3,5,9,14,22	191:12
83:13 88:6 108:25	156:25 189:11	205:10	162:14,15,16 165:17	focus 66:22 192:16

Page	10
------	----

focused 7:20 73:2197:6 102:18 114:2158:7,8 167:10,1165:6,17 68:22 69:18184:14196:10,12121:19 122:14 145:6174:14,15 185:15,1669:18,19 70:1,8 77:7195:24focuses 148:15162:1 164:21 182:17gain 89:10 148:678:11 81:12 83:13198:4,2focusing 66:7framework 22:15 23:4game 8:23 64:1 69:385:12 91:3 92:6202:3,1folks 144:2523:20 141:15,20GAO 13:15 60:1297:20 103:25 104:9204:2,3follow 14:5 27:3 52:3frankly 33:25 36:16gathered 142:12105:23 107:12,17Goldstein78:8,21,21 83:1043:11 54:16,18 58:1gauntlet 77:7109:12 110:3,2498:17 1087:24 104:6 111:1263:23 70:12 75:1geared 82:8 177:25111:20 113:17,23Goldstein151:5 152:6 160:25125:13 156:13 192:429:18 56:6,23 57:16132:19 134:24 135:2good 4:6,following 9:3 16:24198:1957:22 117:20 128:25136:15 137:8 140:313:16 22follows 58:2frequently 23:25 44:137:24 40:7 56:9 64:6155:10,15 166:1566:22 6follow-on 129:1767:1 88:22 159:4201:22169:15 173:14 181:7102:25foolish 52:13163:16generated 87:6 205:16184:5 185:18 189:21120:25foolish 52:13163:16generating 206:1190:11,23 192:9140:24	n 3:3 32:9 173:2 3 32:9 98:17 ,16 8:23 10:19 24:6,15,23 30:14 38:1,2
focused 7:20 73:2197:6 102:18 114:2158:7,8 167:10,1165:6,17 68:22 69:18184:14196:10,12121:19 122:14 145:6174:14,15 185:15,1669:18,19 70:1,8 77:7195:24focuses 148:15162:1 164:21 182:17gain 89:10 148:678:11 81:12 83:13198:4,2focusing 66:7framework 22:15 23:4gain 89:10 148:678:11 81:12 83:13198:4,2folks 144:2523:20 141:15,20GAO 13:15 60:1297:20 103:25 104:9204:2,3follow 14:5 27:3 52:3frankly 33:25 36:16gathered 142:12105:23 107:12,17Goldstein78:8,21,21 83:1043:11 54:16,18 58:1gauntlet 77:7109:12 110:3,2498:17 1087:24 104:6 111:1263:23 70:12 75:1geared 82:8 177:25111:20 113:17,23Goldstein151:5 152:6 160:25125:13 156:13 192:429:18 56:6,23 57:16132:19 134:24 135:2good 4:6,following 9:3 16:24198:1957:22 117:20 128:25136:15 137:8 140:313:16 22:33103:10free 144:8generally 21:21 32:17144:24 150:4 151:254:25 5follows 58:2frequently 23:25 44:137:24 40:7 56:9 64:6155:10,15 166:1566:22 6follow-on 129:1767:1 88:22 159:4201:22169:15 173:14 181:7102:25fooths 52:13163:16generated 87:6 205:16184:5 185:18 189:21120:25foothotes 132:6fresh 199:12generating 206:1190:11,23 192:9140:24	4 192:15 194:14 4 196:7 197:20 24 199:21 10 203:23 3 n 3:3 32:9 173:2 3 32:9 98:17 ,16 8:23 10:19 24:6,15,23 30:14 38:1,2
196:10,12121:19 122:14 145:6174:14,15 185:15,1669:18,19 70:1,8 77:7195:24focuses 148:15162:1 164:21 182:17gain 89:10 148:678:11 81:12 83:13198:42focusing 66:7framework 22:15 23:4game 8:23 64:1 69:385:12 91:3 92:6202:3,1folks 144:2523:20 141:15,20GAO 13:15 60:1297:20 103:25 104:9204:2,3follow 14:5 27:3 52:3frankly 33:25 36:16gathered 142:12105:23 107:12,17Goldstein78:8,21,21 83:1043:11 54:16,18 58:1gauntlet 77:7109:12 110:3,2498:17 1087:24 104:6 111:1263:23 70:12 75:1geared 82:8 177:25111:20 113:17,23Goldstein151:5 152:6 160:25125:13 156:13 192:429:18 56:6,23 57:16132:19 134:24 135:2good 4:6following 9:3 16:24198:1957:22 117:20 128:25136:15 137:8 140:313:16 22follows 58:2frequently 23:25 44:137:24 40:7 56:9 64:6155:10,15 166:1566:22 6follow-on 129:1767:1 88:22 159:4201:22169:15 173:14 181:7102:25foolish 52:13163:16generated 87:6 205:16184:5 185:18 189:21120:25foolish 52:13163:16generating 206:1190:11,23 192:9140:24	 4 196:7 197:20 24 199:21 10 203:23 3 n 3:3 32:9 173:2 3 32:9 98:17 ,16 8:23 10:19 24:6,15,23 30:14 38:1,2
focuses 148:15162:1 164:21 182:17gain 89:10 148:678:11 81:12 83:13198:42focusing 66:7framework 22:15 23:4game 8:23 64:1 69:385:12 91:3 92:6202:3,1folks 144:2523:20 141:15,20GAO 13:15 60:1297:20 103:25 104:9204:2,3follow 14:5 27:3 52:3frankly 33:25 36:16gathered 142:12105:23 107:12,17Goldstein78:8,21,21 83:1043:11 54:16,18 58:1gathered 142:12109:12 110:3,2498:17 187:24 104:6 111:1263:23 70:12 75:1geared 82:8 177:25111:20 113:17,23Goldstein138:8 140:21 150:777:6 94:15 107:13general 7:16 21:11116:5 119:10 132:9173:2151:5 152:6 160:25125:13 156:13 192:429:18 56:6,23 57:16132:19 134:24 135:2good 4:6,following 9:3 16:24198:1957:22 117:20 128:25136:15 137:8 140:313:16 22follows 58:2free 144:8generally 21:21 32:17144:24 150:4 151:254:25 5follow-on 129:1767:1 88:22 159:4201:22169:15 173:14 181:7102:25foolish 52:13163:16generated 87:6 205:16184:5 185:18 189:21120:25foolish 52:13163:16generating 206:1190:11,23 192:9140:24	24 199:21 10 203:23 3 n 3:3 32:9 173:2 3 32:9 98:17 ,16 8:23 10:19 24:6,15,23 30:14 38:1,2
focusing 66:7framework 22:15 23:4game 8:23 64:1 69:385:12 91:3 92:6202:3,1folks 144:2523:20 141:15,20GAO 13:15 60:1297:20 103:25 104:9204:2,3follow 14:5 27:3 52:3frankly 33:25 36:16gathered 142:12105:23 107:12,17Goldstein78:8,21,21 83:1043:11 54:16,18 58:1gauntlet 77:7109:12 110:3,2498:17 1087:24 104:6 111:1263:23 70:12 75:1geared 82:8 177:25111:20 113:17,23Goldstein151:5 152:6 160:25125:13 156:13 192:429:18 56:6,23 57:16132:19 134:24 135:2good 4:6,following 9:3 16:24198:1957:22 117:20 128:25136:15 137:8 140:3131:16 260:15 73:4 85:2fraud 93:8163:15163:15140:10 143:21 144:1326:23 3follow-on 129:1767:1 88:22 159:4201:22169:15 173:14 181:7102:25foolish 52:13163:16generated 87:6 205:16184:5 185:18 189:21120:25foolish 52:13163:16generating 206:1190:11,23 192:9140:24	10 203:23 n 3:3 32:9 173:2 3 32:9 98:17 ,16 8:23 10:19 24:6,15,23 30:14 38:1,2
folks 144:2523:20 141:15,20GAO 13:15 60:1297:20 103:25 104:9204:2,3follow 14:5 27:3 52:3frankly 33:25 36:16gathered 142:12105:23 107:12,17Goldstein78:8,21,21 83:1043:11 54:16,18 58:1gauntlet 77:7109:12 110:3,2498:17 187:24 104:6 111:1263:23 70:12 75:1geared 82:8 177:25111:20 113:17,23Golub 3:138:8 140:21 150:777:6 94:15 107:13general 7:16 21:11116:5 119:10 132:9173:2151:5 152:6 160:25125:13 156:13 192:429:18 56:6,23 57:16132:19 134:24 135:2good 4:6,following 9:3 16:24198:1957:22 117:20 128:25136:15 137:8 140:313:16 260:15 73:4 85:2fraud 93:8163:15140:10 143:21 144:1326:23 3103:10free 144:8generally 21:21 32:17144:24 150:4 151:254:25 5follows 58:2follow-on 129:1767:1 88:22 159:437:24 40:7 56:9 64:6155:10,15 166:1566:22 6follow-s 132:6fresh 199:12generating 206:1190:11,23 192:9140:24	n 3:3 32:9 173:2 3 32:9 98:17 ,16 8:23 10:19 24:6,15,23 30:14 38:1,2
follow 14:5 27:3 52:3frankly 33:25 36:16gathered 142:12105:23 107:12,17Goldstein78:8,21,21 83:1043:11 54:16,18 58:1gauntlet 77:7109:12 110:3,2498:17 1087:24 104:6 111:1263:23 70:12 75:1geared 82:8 177:25111:20 113:17,23Golub 3:138:8 140:21 150:777:6 94:15 107:13general 7:16 21:11116:5 119:10 132:9173:2151:5 152:6 160:25125:13 156:13 192:429:18 56:6,23 57:16132:19 134:24 135:2good 4:6,following 9:3 16:24198:1957:22 117:20 128:25136:15 137:8 140:313:16 260:15 73:4 85:2fraud 93:8163:15140:10 143:21 144:1326:23 3103:10free 144:8generally 21:21 32:17144:24 150:4 151:254:25 5follows 58:2frequently 23:25 44:137:24 40:7 56:9 64:6155:10,15 166:1566:22 6follow-on 129:1767:1 88:22 159:4201:22169:15 173:14 181:7102:25foolish 52:13163:16generated 87:6 205:16184:5 185:18 189:21120:25foolish 52:13163:16generating 206:1190:11,23 192:9140:24	173:2 :3 32:9 98:17 ,16 8:23 10:19 24:6,15,23 30:14 38:1,2
78:8,21,21 83:1043:11 54:16,18 58:1gauntlet 77:7109:12 110:3,2498:17 187:24 104:6 111:1263:23 70:12 75:1geared 82:8 177:25111:20 113:17,23Golub 3:138:8 140:21 150:777:6 94:15 107:13general 7:16 21:11116:5 119:10 132:9173:2151:5 152:6 160:25125:13 156:13 192:429:18 56:6,23 57:16132:19 134:24 135:2good 4:6,following 9:3 16:24198:1957:22 117:20 128:25136:15 137:8 140:313:16 260:15 73:4 85:2fraud 93:8163:15140:10 143:21 144:1326:23 3103:10free 144:8generally 21:21 32:17144:24 150:4 151:254:25 5follows 58:2frequently 23:25 44:137:24 40:7 56:9 64:6155:10,15 166:1566:22 6follow-on 129:1767:1 88:22 159:4201:22169:15 173:14 181:7102:25foolish 52:13163:16generated 87:6 205:16184:5 185:18 189:21120:25footnotes 132:6fresh 199:12generating 206:1190:11,23 192:9140:24	173:2 :3 32:9 98:17 ,16 8:23 10:19 24:6,15,23 30:14 38:1,2
87:24 104:6 111:1263:23 70:12 75:1geared 82:8 177:25111:20 113:17,23Golub 3:138:8 140:21 150:777:6 94:15 107:13general 7:16 21:11116:5 119:10 132:9173:2151:5 152:6 160:25125:13 156:13 192:429:18 56:6,23 57:16132:19 134:24 135:2good 4:6,following 9:3 16:24198:1957:22 117:20 128:25136:15 137:8 140:313:16 260:15 73:4 85:2fraud 93:8163:15140:10 143:21 144:1326:23 3103:10free 144:8generally 21:21 32:17144:24 150:4 151:254:25 5follows 58:2frequently 23:25 44:137:24 40:7 56:9 64:6155:10,15 166:1566:22 6follow-on 129:1767:1 88:22 159:4201:22169:15 173:14 181:7102:25foolish 52:13163:16generated 87:6 205:16184:5 185:18 189:21120:25footnotes 132:6fresh 199:12generating 206:1190:11,23 192:9140:24	,16 8:23 10:19 24:6,15,23 30:14 38:1,2
138:8 140:21 150:777:6 94:15 107:13general 7:16 21:11116:5 119:10 132:9173:2151:5 152:6 160:25125:13 156:13 192:429:18 56:6,23 57:16132:19 134:24 135:2good 4:6,following 9:3 16:24198:1957:22 117:20 128:25136:15 137:8 140:313:16 260:15 73:4 85:2fraud 93:8163:15140:10 143:21 144:1326:23 3103:10free 144:8generally 21:21 32:17144:24 150:4 151:254:25 5follows 58:2frequently 23:25 44:137:24 40:7 56:9 64:6155:10,15 166:1566:22 6follow-on 129:1767:1 88:22 159:4201:22169:15 173:14 181:7102:25foolish 52:13163:16generated 87:6 205:16184:5 185:18 189:21120:25footnotes 132:6fresh 199:12generating 206:1190:11,23 192:9140:24	,16 8:23 10:19 24:6,15,23 30:14 38:1,2
151:5 152:6 160:25125:13 156:13 192:429:18 56:6,23 57:16132:19 134:24 135:2good 4:6,following 9:3 16:24198:1957:22 117:20 128:25136:15 137:8 140:313:16 260:15 73:4 85:2fraud 93:8163:15140:10 143:21 144:1326:23 3103:10free 144:8generally 21:21 32:17144:24 150:4 151:254:25 5follows 58:2frequently 23:25 44:137:24 40:7 56:9 64:6155:10,15 166:1566:22 6follow-on 129:1767:1 88:22 159:4201:22169:15 173:14 181:7102:25foolish 52:13163:16generated 87:6 205:16184:5 185:18 189:21120:25footnotes 132:6fresh 199:12generating 206:1190:11,23 192:9140:24	24:6,15,23 30:14 38:1,2
following 9:3 16:24198:1957:22 117:20 128:25136:15 137:8 140:313:16 260:15 73:4 85:2fraud 93:8163:15140:10 143:21 144:1326:23 3103:10free 144:8generally 21:21 32:17144:24 150:4 151:254:25 5follows 58:2frequently 23:25 44:137:24 40:7 56:9 64:6155:10,15 166:1566:22 6follow-on 129:1767:1 88:22 159:4201:22169:15 173:14 181:7102:25foolish 52:13163:16generated 87:6 205:16184:5 185:18 189:21120:25footnotes 132:6fresh 199:12generating 206:1190:11,23 192:9140:24	24:6,15,23 30:14 38:1,2
60:15 73:4 85:2 103:10fraud 93:8 free 144:8163:15 generally 21:21 32:17140:10 143:21 144:13 144:24 150:4 151:226:23 32 54:25follows 58:2 follow-on 129:17frequently 23:25 44:1 67:1 88:22 159:437:24 40:7 56:9 64:6 201:22155:10,15 166:15 169:15 173:14 181:766:22 6 102:25foolish 52:13 footnotes 132:6163:16 fresh 199:12generated 87:6 205:16 generating 206:1184:5 185:18 189:21 190:11,23 192:9120:25 140:24	
follows 58:2frequently 23:25 44:137:24 40:7 56:9 64:6155:10,15 166:1566:22 6follow-on 129:1767:1 88:22 159:4201:22169:15 173:14 181:7102:25foolish 52:13163:16generated 87:6 205:16184:5 185:18 189:21120:25footnotes 132:6fresh 199:12generating 206:1190:11,23 192:9140:24	55.2 65.2 2
follows 58:2frequently 23:25 44:137:24 40:7 56:9 64:6155:10,15 166:1566:22 6follow-on 129:1767:1 88:22 159:4201:22169:15 173:14 181:7102:25foolish 52:13163:16generated 87:6 205:16184:5 185:18 189:21120:25footnotes 132:6fresh 199:12generating 206:1190:11,23 192:9140:24	JJ.J 0J:2,3
follow-on 129:1767:1 88:22 159:4201:22169:15 173:14 181:7102:25foolish 52:13163:16generated 87:6 205:16184:5 185:18 189:21120:25footnotes 132:6fresh 199:12generating 206:1190:11,23 192:9140:24	69:2 100:12
footnotes 132:6 fresh 199:12 generating 206:1 190:11,23 192:9 140:24	5 110:13 120:14
footnotes 132:6 fresh 199:12 generating 206:1 190:11,23 192:9 140:24	5 122:25 123:1
	141:15 145:7
force 186:23 friend 6:10 7:2 gentleman 10:23 37:19 195:25 196:17 198:1 150:13	3 153:14 163:5
foreign 109:14 156:7 friends 194:25 gentlemen 4:3,4,6 202:16,21 167:2 1	170:11 190:12
163:19,24 176:16,17 fringe 192:13 genuine 157:22 goal 102:9 183:6,21 199:23	i i
	7:6 120:22
forget 184:3 189:15 geographically 65:9 GOELZER 2:4 170:10)
form 31:20 40:1 104:17 full 23:2 50:25 51:2 156:18 164:23 goes 49:21 63:8 64:2,4 governar	nce 8:24,25
129:4 130:3 144:11 122:24 188:6 geography 66:13 64:23 69:5,20 89:7 77:11 8	82:16 102:25
163:8 197:20 205:15 fully 126:4 130:1 getting 25:3,11 27:18 109:1 123:13 126:4 128:24	÷
205:21 206:2 140:16 179:16 202:2 42:8 49:9 60:21 126:10,11 128:2 governm	nent 3:11 19:11
formally 150:15full-time 139:880:21,23 143:25134:4 137:15 150:1929:17 6	60:21 85:21
format 195:20,20 function 34:12 60:4 152:22 158:9 166:18 162:6 174:22 187:20 123:24	F
205:17 206:2 64:21 103:18 129:5 189:24 192:3 198:10 201:23 governm	ents 60:14
formed 140:16 176:21 177:10,19 206:21 going 14:1,5,8,13,22 governor	r 92:15,20
former 8:21 33:20 194:23,24 Gillan 3:14 7:3,5 15:6,8,9,10,15,17 governor	rs 92:24
141:18 functions 6:4 21:17 give 7:12 8:18 19:12 17:15 20:18 23:13 gradation	ns 112:13
	SON 3:13
Forming 144:4fund 164:1687:15 91:18,24 92:2334:13 37:3 39:5,8,1253:10	
formulating 12:17 fundamental 12:13 125:8 143:17,20,24 42:24 49:14,16 54:5 Grant 45	
	84:13 198:25
190:18 206:4 173:19,25 155:19 189:23 190:19 63:17,24 65:1,8 70:10 grapplin	
forthright 153:22 fundamentally 121:20 given 20:5 35:3 37:8 71:16,20 72:6 75:16 grasp 11	
fortunate 6:13 10:22192:544:20 48:24 97:1080:8 81:6,18,19 82:3grateful	
fortune 10:19 42:6,13 funds 188:24 105:10 107:1 108:5 83:6 87:12,19 88:14 grave 124	
42:20 43:10,13 55:19 further 28:25 84:19 122:11,24 91:5,10,11,15,18,25 gray 68:2	
ů –	:1,19 12:2
	68:7 69:13
	49:20 168:20
20:9 28:24 133:23 195:25 glad 95:25 200:22 113:23 115:3 116:1 greater 1	
161:2 173:14 177:11 futures 62:13 Glass 2:16 42:4 116:21 118:23 119:22 greatest	
183:20 191:17 194:15 fuzzy 184:15 global 35:2 47:13 48:7 124:1 125:8 130:3 greatly 7	
195:24,25 199:21 48:22 49:4,22 90:8,8 132:8,21 136:12 greed 19	
	9 14:8 31:15
5 .	50:7 63:7
foundation 30:14 GAAP 106:7 127:21,24 globe 65:14 142:4,14 144:2 180:3	
four 16:11,18 24:4,17 128:1 179:11 go 24:9 27:22,24 29:9 145:10 146:15,23 Greg's 39	
28:1,5 29:6,11,22 Gagnon 2:17 22:3,4,5 30:18,25 32:23 33:24 147:17 154:15 157:21 grey 191:	
48:12 55:6 60:5 61:2 25:1 35:21 46:21,22 35:7 38:9 39:3 42:7 158:21 166:20 168:10 grip 117:	
72:7 76:12 82:24 88:12,13 101:1,2 54:9 55:10 56:1 57:8 170:1,3,4,20 174:7 grossly 2	

Page	1	1
------	---	---

				1 450 11
group 2:22 56:13 61:19	108:24 132:4 135:1	165:23 196:19 197:2	implement 24:20 125:1	189:6
62:11 76:12 168:14	heard 10:5 22:1 51:1	199:6,8	125:8	included 80:19 184:24
175:10 177:18	57:2,6,10 109:2 110:9	hornet's 148:12	implemented 104:3	206:12
grouped 56:5 168:2	153:4 181:11 189:23	horrified 132:4	132:7	includes 14:7 22:7
groups 65:2	205:12	host 87:24 108:14	implications 6:3 11:8	56:11 76:7 100:13
growing 43:4 82:20	hearing 203:9	145:18 159:10	52:15,23 78:25	including 5:6,13 21:14
guess 19:25 20:2 38:18	hearings 18:2 105:25	hosting 28:11	124:13 128:6 138:18	35:14 53:16 70:2
48:18 50:23,25 66:6	106:1,9 113:10	hourly 99:2,2,6 100:7	159:7,25 175:6	71:11 136:14 154:4
111:13 112:22 115:24	heart 106:3	192:2	imply 193:6	179:25 192:22 201:16
126:4,6 148:18 149:4	Heartland 33:23	hours 99:6,7,10,12,12	import 85:15	income 31:22 56:10
150:18 152:15 156:12	hearts 7:15	99:19	importance 11:14 16:6	109:19 144:5 145:14
158:9 163:23 164:11	heavily 58:20 86:16	house 43:19	16:20 26:19 41:8	176:13,15 201:16
167:20 181:2,7 187:8	96:12	housing 163:20	86:3 177:10 187:19	inconceivable 96:4
192:8 196:6 200:17	heavy 108:12	huge 92:2	188:16,17,18,21	105:1
203:13	held 18:2 38:19 85:24	Hughes 3:6 86:7 98:23	important 6:21 7:10	inconsistent 113:25
guests 7:6	help 29:24 34:7 36:18	162:5	8:5 11:5 13:16 14:1	incorporate 205:3
guidance 11:22,25	62:10 84:18 86:18	hundred 42:10	14:22 16:4 22:11,14	incorrect 93:8
26:18 30:9 87:24	109:12,13,15 116:25	hung 116:4	22:16,21 23:1,6,9,21	increased 52:8
105:11,16 106:19	144:14 156:5,19	hungry 93:4	25:2 27:5,17 32:11	increasing 45:17
107:1 110:10 140:25	183:2	hurt 107:16 139:17	34:18 35:6,8 40:25	increasingly 146:25
184:1,1 188:2	helpful 26:14 159:21	hypothetical 141:8,16	41:4 44:24 50:2 52:4	incumbent 105:9 201:1
guide 7:1 200:16	184:2	141:19	74:9 82:9 85:2,19	independence 1:10 4:9
guidelines 133:14	helping 47:17 61:10		88:25 89:17,22 91:2	4:23 5:9,19 6:3,18
guides 83:3,3	117:9	I	93:21 96:10 101:3,5	7:14,18 8:6 11:5,8,13
guiding 16:21	helps 6:23 127:5	idea 64:22 68:19 73:22	101:20 112:15 118:18	11:14,17,22 12:3,8
gut 115:24	Hey 79:13 144:5	80:8 81:6 86:24	129:2 130:9 133:13	16:4,6,8,11,12 18:5,6
guy 25:21	Hi 36:21	103:11,11,16,20	133:25 134:15 140:1	18:14 19:7 20:22
guys 181:12	hidden 178:13	120:14 135:15	141:23,24 159:2,18	21:2,13,15,16 22:7
	high 29:23 35:1 71:15	ideas 87:5 90:20,20	164:3 165:25 167:11	25:22 31:7,11 44:24
<u> </u>	144:6	103:15 112:16	168:6 169:14,21	50:1 52:17 57:16
half 50:24,25 54:2,2	higher 51:16 67:7,10	identical 131:6	174:9 175:3,18	59:12,14 60:13 67:13
110:19 194:16	67:15 68:10 70:10	identified 46:14 199:15	176:23 177:8 179:4	68:7,12 70:6 80:1
hand 33:20 34:19 84:9	highlight 121:18	199:18	182:21 184:6,22	81:11,15 86:2,20
109:1,1 114:8 133:25	197:23 202:3	identify 14:21 15:2	185:6,18 186:14,24	89:18,19 91:14 96:22
141:6 172:9 187:20	highlighted 35:4	109:13,15 197:17	187:1 189:22 190:24	96:25 97:1,6,14
187:20	highlights 121:1	198:2	191:16 192:16	100:21,22 101:8,11
handle 78:4	highly 12:17 49:8 71:10	ignore 196:24	importantly 164:20	106:12 108:3,12,20
handled 12:4 158:3	83:19 high quality 42:1 50:2	illegal 88:1 191:25	177:24 206:17	109:2 110:21 111:5
happen 79:4 92:2,3 184:13 197:2	high-quality 43:1 50:2 Hilton 1:17	illegal-act 87:23	impossible 84:2 104:24 135:13	115:23 121:20 122:14 124:13 126:7 130:16
happened 56:24 195:22	hire 67:3,14	imagine 35:4,12 44:18 47:10 194:14	impression 186:16	131:3 132:25 133:5
197:1	hiring 67:7 73:7	impact 5:23 35:19 87:2	187:17	131:3 132:25 133:5
happening 148:22	historical 163:1	112:24 170:4 176:8	improve 28:25	133.19 134.2,8,10,17
197:8	historically 11:11	impacts 47:4 101:7	improvements 52:21	139:23 140:14 141:22
happens 88:15 127:9	88:17	138:20	improving 82:10	142:6 143:5 145:23
happy 8:17 53:12	history 17:23 18:24	impair 5:14 21:15,16	impugn 182:22	146:21,22 147:24
hard 63:15 65:22 118:6	22:22	115:22 126:7 180:12	inappropriate 101:6,21	150:17 152:4 155:1
126:9,23 127:12	hit 54:7 125:13 155:6	impaired 16:13	105:18 107:22 108:16	155:23 156:13 157:22
harder 107:19	hold 67:2 194:19	impairing 152:5	130:25 131:8 152:1	157:24 159:12 160:21
hat 8:3 40:10 190:7,18	198:11 199:22	impairment 20:21	185:13	162:9 164:7 166:25
hate 114:18 134:24	holding 5:20	impairs 31:7	inappropriately 90:14	167:16 173:24 174:13
head 83:4 125:13	home 132:10 145:17	impartial 143:6 160:6	inaudible 20:4,11,12,13	175:5 180:6,12,15
headings 80:20	207:10	imperative 122:23	28:9 77:4 86:4	182:1 185:11,14,18
headquarters 175:19	honest 63:24 80:18	impermissible 115:3	incentive 8:15 130:24	186:5 187:1,6,20
hear 10:6,12 15:5 53:11	honestly 153:22	impetus 193:23	inception 12:14	188:17,25 189:1
53:11 67:1 69:7	hope 25:5 93:23 132:21	impinges 31:6	include 145:17 151:7	191:2 199:16,19

Page	12
------	----

201:19 202:11 204:16	92:12	195:1	involve 41:15 141:9	166:17 169:12 182:4
206:12	inspections 192:20	internally 78:11 87:6	involved 24:5 39:23	191:1,3 194:7,8
independent 7:21 8:8	instance 50:10 181:19	international 3:4 75:7	41:9 47:15,25 48:6,8	198:24 199:5 202:10
8:14 19:5 46:15 62:1	instances 75:17 83:11	76:10 109:13,16,16	78:2 79:6,10 83:21	202:11,17 203:15
68:5 72:6 78:10	84:5 130:22 157:10	119:15 139:4 145:11	88:17 89:16 92:5,19	202:11,17 203:15
81:13 86:23 89:1,6	186:21	145:16 147:15 148:24	96:12 106:2,9 113:20	issued 136:14 204:13
103:18,23 104:1	Institute 2:8,14 36:22	154:25 155:8 161:18	117:9 131:22 132:16	issuer 32:3 35:22 37:10
111:2,10 122:5	94:23	172:17 183:5	132:23 133:22 132:10	38:6 52:19 58:18
127:12 130:4 138:21	instituted 103:10	interplay 170:12	132:23 133:22 134:3	64:18 65:3,24 73:6,6
141:25 142:1,10,24	institution 153:9	176:17 186:8,12	149:15 154:7 165:21	76:13 78:20 91:21
155:14 179:20 180:9	Institutional 3:9 67:24	188:8	169:13 172:5,5	95:12,19 96:6 117:16
182:24 184:18 191:5	institutionalize 199:13	interpretation 21:11	177:17 178:6,8,15	118:5 148:6,7 157:8
index 15:19,20	instrumental 108:19	135:2 195:17 206:10	179:1 184:15	158:4 161:3 197:25
indicate 14:17 15:18	integral 189:11	206:16	involvement 12:7 25:8	issuers 16:10 40:8,8
indicated 18:21 42:16	integrally 188:20	interpretations 11:12	41:10 49:7 85:22	164:14 179:4 181:11
85:7 174:7	integrated 117:23	interpreted 111:15	89:24 90:4 133:16	185:8 197:14
indicates 20:16,21	127:17 157:3	interpretive 12:3	169:16 189:17 198:6	issuer's 113:14 119:24
43:17	integrity 28:25 31:1,8	Interpretive 12:5 Interpublic 2:22 61:19	205:25	158:2 201:16
indirect 140:8	31:12 34:20 35:11	62:11	involves 56:9	issuer's-community
indirectly 139:25 140:4	49:1,11 67:12,18	interrupt 119:17	involving 141:5 163:14	48:17
140:18	69:11 82:13 83:17	intertwine 186:4	in-depth 121:6	issuer-specific 21:19
individual 13:9 20:23	84:18,20 89:19 96:24	intertwined 186:13	in-firm 136:1,3	issues 11:13,23 12:1,3
38:9 65:24 112:3	101:18 132:15 134:18	intervening 205:19	in-house 32:17 43:14	12:10 13:5 20:9
141:17 151:10 158:23	182:25 183:7,21	intimately 48:21	53:6,24 54:4 56:14	26:24 41:11,12,13,13
159:5	182.23 183.7,21	introduce 14:10	57:5 62:10	41:19 46:3,3,7,17
individuals 8:22 156:5	integrity-of-an-audit	introduce 14.10 introduction 12:7	iron 117:20	48:9 58:24 67:1 73:3
159:3 160:1 197:14	90:19	introductory 30:25	IRRC 9:16,21	48.9 58.24 07.1 75.5 81:10 86:18 92:7
indulge 8:2	intend 68:1	invariably 96:13	IRS 6:11 12:21 36:5	96:13,22 106:12
industries 65:16	intended 27:25 132:22	120:21	71:11,21 82:12 83:2	107:19 111:18 115:21
industry 53:25 66:5	intense 10:15	inventory 144:1	90:18 113:13,24	117:10,14 122:10
influence 83:20	interact 6:4	invest 67:20	114:9 115:9 116:3	139:24 144:9 145:3
influenced 176:6	interacts 148:7	investment 8:11 36:23	117:24 119:22 120:8	157:24 160:13 165:10
information 23:2 24:24	interest 12:11 16:2,14	36:25 136:15 148:19	122:8 132:8 137:12	173:24 175:12 177:20
25:4 27:6,18 31:5	28:6,12,17,19 64:18	investor 7:20,23 8:3	144:14 195:15 197:5	181:10 183:23 185:25
32:21 74:2 97:5,22	72:1 81:21,21 84:4,12	9:15 11:6 16:5 28:6	197:9,16 198:1,18	186:3,3,5 189:3,18,21
98:10 100:8 142:11	86:25 98:2,7 123:18	65:1 67:19 69:11,18	205:18	192:10,21 194:18
150:10 197:16 202:12	144:5 146:11 148:10	69:20 70:4,5,9 72:6	issue 6:18,22 7:14 8:5	192.10,21 194.18
205:23 206:3,6 207:7	144:5 146:11 148:10	112:18 150:8 153:9	10:14 25:22,24 29:11	196:12,12,23 198:22
informative 188:5	158:2,2 162:22	153:11 180:21 181:4	34:10 40:24 45:10	200:6 202:25 203:4
informed 27:20 142:11	182:19,20 187:10	186:9 190:10 193:9	46:9,10,14 50:21	203:17 204:3,15
inherent 35:9 49:21	190:8,9 193:3	203:6 204:20	58:23 59:25 62:17,17	issuing 109:4 136:17
122:12,13	interested 13:3 73:10	investors 3:9 6:20 8:5	66:6 73:24 75:2,3	137:2 141:7
inherently 81:23	92:3 203:9	8:12 9:14 10:4 12:11	79:7,24 80:17,25 83:1	item 15:22 200:21
inherited 49:2	interesting 22:10 37:17	16:2 31:2,3,4 56:16	83:13 89:22 91:1	items 170:13,14
initial 44:2 105:24	42:14 51:8,21 69:6	67:24 69:21 72:2	106:11 111:4 115:20	it'll 91:17
106:9 183:1	42.14 51.8,21 09.0 95:25 134:25 153:13	76:13,24 86:3 91:21	115:22 116:16 119:7	1, 11 71.17
initially 24:16 72:14	95:25 154:25 155:15 155:4	106:14 132:14 137:13	122:14 123:20 124:6	J
130:19	interests 6:20 147:21	137:18 140:16 148:3	122.14 125.20 124.0	J 2:2 3:14
initials 29:19	147:21,22 157:14,19	148:16 153:22,23,25	135:24,24 136:13	J 2:2 5:14 JAMES 2:10
innocent 58:14	162:22	148.10 133.22,23,23	137:8 139:22 140:7	Jeff 13:16,17 29:15,16
input 125:2 146:5,7	interfere 19:15,18	180:10 181:6 182:23	141:1,2,22 142:9	59:17 102:15 115:18
150:10,12	interim 21:12 206:12	185:9 188:22 196:10	141:1,2,22 142:9 143:10 144:16 148:4	129:14 170:18 171:13
inside 83:23 93:18	internal 2:25 3:2 9:2			129:14 170:18 171:13
insight 44:13 177:14	34:24 38:23 39:5	196:10 204:1 invitation 11:7	150:8 152:4,25 156:13 157:23 160:15	JEFFREY 3:11
insight 44:15 177:14 insist 32:19		invite 14:12	160:21 163:14 164:7	
inspection 11:18 25:5	52:11,16,21 54:3 57:8 74:6 93:5 94:19	inviting 168:13	164:8,11 165:13	Jim 2:24 28:8 29:3,4
mspection 11.10 25.5	74.0 75.5 74.17	mynung 100.15	104.0,11 103.13	35:24,25 50:18,19

				Tage 15
76:19 77:14,15 78:8	know 6:1 7:10 11:11	168:23 173:4 191:6	let's 17:10 56:1,8 76:1	139:5 207:8
79:2 102:23 143:7,8	14:2 18:18 26:10	larger 33:18 34:11	76:2 100:9,18 113:12	longer 70:7 106:22
148:17 150:7 153:13	32:24 37:22,22,23	38:23 40:10 55:21	124:8 129:12 154:22	long-term 44:6 154:25
183:15	38:3,18 39:2,18 40:5	largess 192:4	166:19 193:2 200:1	look 9:13 11:23 13:2
job 4:11 10:6 24:13,23	43:2 47:9 48:20	largest 31:2	204:11	28:24 29:8 30:7
54:25 62:9 167:2	50:10,16 51:22 61:12	large-case 117:8	level 25:3,7,12 27:19	36:10 50:23 56:8
187:13,13	61:25 62:6,20 63:17	lastly 184:3	49:1,8 68:7,10 124:7	61:8 66:6 71:25
join 6:23	65:23 68:6 71:1,18	late 139:14 200:17	202:20	92:12 108:17 110:14
joining 6:17	72:15 73:13 75:8,10	latest 105:22	levels 93:15,20 175:7	119:24 128:4 130:2
joint 105:2	75:11,16 76:22 77:2,9	latitude 157:12	lever 79:17	131:9 132:9 137:21
joint-venturing 54:16	77:12 78:17 80:18	Laughter 10:16 24:7	Levitt 18:17	140:25 144:5,10
journal 9:14 38:1 51:10	84:17 86:17 87:18	29:21 53:13 69:4	Lewis 2:16 42:4	159:21 170:8 174:9
judge 97:6	94:5 96:5 98:6 99:7	87:11 98:15 114:20	liability 31:19 100:17	181:18 183:19 192:21
judgement 9:8 25:9	115:13 123:25 124:2	126:18 133:11 163:3	100:24 129:20 132:1	194:6 199:21 200:1
27:13,16 28:5 134:21	126:23 129:10 130:21	165:12 167:4 200:11	163:17	looked 42:20,21 43:5
159:23 187:4	130:24 132:3 139:3	law 27:25 39:10 66:18	life 7:16 171:1 204:9	72:14 130:18
judgment 76:25	142:4 143:21 144:11	79:11 83:10 86:15	LIFO 144:2,13	looking 30:6 49:10 79:4
July 1:14 4:24	144:21,21 149:12,19	113:5 115:5 125:18	light 18:19 112:14,15	83:12 93:15 102:4
jump 17:14	150:13 156:18 157:20	127:8 151:23 156:18	likelihood 71:15 110:6	125:21 128:21 129:24
jumping 67:5	158:8 172:21 180:25	198:5	limit 91:5	130:19 139:23 155:4
juncture 118:25	182:24 192:10 201:24	laws 19:10,13 36:7,18	limitations 58:7,9	165:14 189:10
June 206:11	201:24 202:8	66:11 87:21 121:24	limited 72:16 202:1	looks 169:9 200:9
jurisdiction 158:14,24	knowledge 47:22 48:25	121:25 126:24 156:6	limiting 57:23 164:18	loop 178:13
jurisdictional 156:8	60:7,8 62:15 65:17	156:8 177:16	line 18:8 61:12 63:23	lose 49:5
jurisdictions 156:7,15	108:13 111:20 113:3	lawyer 117:24	68:21,22 84:7 105:13	losing 182:11
156:19 158:15 176:18	142:20 158:25 163:6	lay 59:22	115:2 118:16 127:23	lost 69:15 83:18
	172:3,23 175:21	layer 148:9	143:13 144:22 145:1	lot 14:18 15:4 37:4 40:5
K	176:4,8,19 177:2	lazier 204:6,6,10,10	147:23 179:18 187:23	43:19,20 46:18 48:18
K 170:8	183:11 184:16 193:16	lead 31:15 100:10	193:2	50:23 51:24 60:14
Kayla 3:14 7:3,4 85:9	193:19	leading 18:2	lined 103:24	66:14 73:19 75:17
keep 9:2 30:6 31:10	knowledgeable 108:21	lean 22:9	lines 71:6 84:16 107:2	94:6 97:5 107:18
53:17 60:16 69:17	133:2 134:9 160:6	learning 194:17	146:25 166:1	108:2 123:4,21 134:8
75:25 83:6 119:9	175:14,15,19 187:12	leave 181:23 202:11	list 7:25 58:2	139:3 144:6,6,9,16,18
132:11 160:16 165:25	known 36:22 117:19	204:4,11	listed 81:24	144:19 146:23 147:18
172:11 183:5 196:10	knows 11:4 30:11	leaving 154:17	listen 69:6 150:14	153:8,14 155:5 156:4
206:5	Koren 3:3 32:8,8,15	led 7:19 59:9	181:4	156:9 162:18 163:4
keeping 54:19 183:21	43:22,23 98:17,17	leery 68:19 201:21	listened 181:5	190:1 192:10 193:6
keeps 112:15	112:5,6 173:1,2,2	left 98:25 118:20	listening 14:24	193:25 195:21 196:16
Kessler 3:3 32:9 98:18	KPMG 2:24 28:10	129:11 164:21 181:24	litany 87:24	197:9 204:8
173:3	103:9	203:19	litigation 117:21	lots 30:4 37:2,21
key 66:9 79:25 150:8	Ks 169:22	legal 117:20 127:7	little 14:25 38:13 39:21	139:11
172:21	kudos 149:20 150:1	154:4	43:6,8 98:1 112:8	loudly 198:12
kick 166:6		legislation 18:3,10,16	146:24 147:10,18	lousy 43:19,21
kind 34:10 39:2 56:24	L	76:9	158:9,24 161:16	lower 39:2 43:10 70:4
57:19 62:19 72:21	L 2:4,10	legislative 7:19 17:23	165:3 181:23 201:20	166:14
101:9 112:23 116:4	lack 69:13 103:2	legitimacy 131:21	living 137:1	lowest 77:20
118:10 127:2 130:13	154:21	legitimate 116:18 125:2	LLC 2:10,13	lump 181:20
139:15,17 147:25	lacks 163:4	125:5,6 161:8	LLP 2:17,24 3:5,8	lumped 168:5
166:21 171:4 174:4	ladies 4:3,4,6	lend 187:22	local 31:19 44:3,6	lunch 15:9 72:10 76:2
191:17 192:15	laid 25:24 26:12 154:9	length 17:15 110:23	56:10 60:14 66:3,12	82:3 91:7 93:3 97:20
kinds 12:25 56:19	205:7	111:1	90:9 158:25 159:9	104:23 185:20
68:15 76:16 90:5	language 106:19	lesser-quality 75:14	176:16	Luncheon 98:5
95:17 97:7 118:15	large 6:5 8:15 34:23,25	letter 18:17 26:10	located 65:9	lunchtime 98:1
124:17 181:11 184:23	36:14 46:25 47:13	201:4	locations 139:5	lying 106:10 123:25
185:12	48:7 53:21 92:17	letters 109:3 110:1	long 18:24 19:6 65:4	Lynn 2:16 24:2 25:23
kit 200:18	155:21 158:19 159:4	letting 148:20	71:14 129:5 138:21	26:14 27:1 33:1

				r uge r
34:24 35:4 40:19	146:3 150:6,18 154:1	180:19 194:13 196:24	107:25 119:9 121:18	164:16 182:18
42:3 46:24 47:3	156:1 160:10 164:2,9	means 30:9 168:9	132:12 157:4 160:16	M-3 197:22 201:9,9,10
52:25 53:10 68:25	165:9 196:5 201:8	204:4	165:25 183:6,22	201:17,22 202:7,16
108:22 111:17 113:17	203:11	meant 25:15	187:15,22	201:17,22 202:7,10 204:25 206:4
	market 9:12 10:4 42:10	measure 194:10	minds 150:19	204.23 200.4
114:7,19 115:1,11				N
121:22 122:22 123:5 123:7 127:3 133:10	53:20 57:4 86:9 130:23 187:11	measured 182:5,6 189:9	mine 9:10 146:17	N 2:1,1 3:1,1 4:1
			minimize 71:13 93:7	
136:9 139:22 141:14	marketed 12:19 112:3 113:14 114:5 115:25	medium 32:9	121:25 127:6	nail 125:13
149:16 153:4,6 155:2		meet 91:23 144:13 197:15	minimum 202:20	naive 58:1
156:2 158:9,21 163:2	116:3,10 119:23	meeting 6:25 13:21	204:14,23	naivete 58:4
166:2 169:9 171:7	120:4,11 121:2 128:13	29:24 69:10 150:15	ministerial 61:13 192:9 205:15	name 14:17 15:1,20
174:15 189:13 205:12 Lynn's 75:8 111:13			203:13 minor 168:5	19:2 22:4 29:17,19
140:21 150:20 152:6	marketing 13:6 103:15 120:3,18 127:1	150:16 194:4 207:11	minute 175:1 202:16	37:19 39:15
140.21 150.20 152.0		member 2:3,4 3:13,14		nameplate 133:10
139:19	128:17,18 130:2,5 131:6,12 194:1 197:5	7:2 27:5 33:15 168:17 171:14 195:14	minutes 15:12,14 166:20	name's 25:19 32:8 99:22
M				
main 7:24	marketplace 63:25 186:23	members 5:17 7:6 10:12 11:2 27:11	misleading 27:10,21 misnomer 70:12	Namorato 2:25 6:11 narrowly 57:25
	markets 44:1 84:18	10:12 11:2 27:11 106:13 139:11 145:22	109:22	e
maintain 188:25 maintained 60:24 86:3		106:13 139:11 145:22 168:13 206:19	misreading 17:23	national 138:16 natural 83:20
maintaining 34:20	101:20 124:14 Mark's 120:7	memories 199:11,12,24	misreading 17:23 missing 125:9	
e	Mark's 120:7 mass 112:2 114:5 127:1	memories 199:11,12,24 mention 29:5 51:7	missing 125:9 mission 16:1 143:11	nature 5:14 12:15 19:1
69:11 206:3 major 10:14,21 117:7	128:12 194:1 197:5	77:16	mission 16:1 143:11 mistake 93:8 129:9	35:3 103:16 129:4 163:21 178:8 179:1
139:4 161:6 196:1	mass-marketed 105:23	mentioned 10:20 16:3	139:14 179:12	103:21 178:8 179:1 194:2
making 9:11 39:24	117:4 121:8 128:13	19:1 25:1,10 27:4	mistaken 115:10	near 7:15
60:23 84:10 90:11	117.4 121.8 128.15	45:13 46:24 50:8	model 85:17	necessarily 13:10 39:19
138:14 145:25 146:9	match 140:14 156:17	60:11 66:21 69:21	moment 51:1 66:21	74:19 80:11 136:17
199:7,23	164:23	75:20 85:2 93:13	143:10 163:1	165:16 185:4 187:23
manage 13:21 69:22	material 103:12	144:23 166:24 171:22	momentarily 15:8	194:10
170:24	matter 19:5 22:2 52:5	183:16 186:25	moments 45:9	necessary 10:8 139:2
management 16:17	89:12,15 121:15	mere 135:14	money 163:25	necessity 58:12,12
21:16,17,18 22:7	128:19 129:11 157:19	merger 62:22 138:18	monologue 195:20	need 7:20 9:13 14:19
36:23 41:2 46:7 52:8	164:1 179:22,23	mergers 76:7	months 205:14	17:25 19:7 21:5 29:9
60:11 62:3 81:19	matters 28:18 35:2,10	merger-type 169:19	morality 191:4	36:18 38:8 41:19
83:23 93:17 97:9	45:13 49:3,22 88:17	method 144:1 182:2	morning 4:6 11:3 57:3	49:20 52:1 54:6
118:13 145:22 146:6	90:5,12,13 117:24	methods 113:2 144:13	59:19 76:6 101:4	62:15,19 69:17 73:1
146:11,12 150:11,12	121:3 136:13 142:7	mic 32:14	104:15 106:21 108:2	77:25 78:3 89:10
150:14 152:20 161:19	142:25 143:25 145:1	Michael 2:17 22:3	121:22 123:7 167:13	103:25 105:10,12
162:12 205:20,25	148:8 158:3 169:2	174:14	174:23 179:14	110:8 142:9 144:12
206:24 207:1	178:6 187:2	microphone 21:25	morning's 107:24	160:5 171:19,24
management's 206:4	maximized 134:6	middle 147:14	178:14	172:2,12 175:4 187:5
managerial 72:20	McDONOUGH 2:2 4:3	middle-level 162:12	morph 44:14	190:13 194:6,10
managers 147:15 185:5	4:7 10:11,17 11:2	middle-market 39:2	motivated 100:14	197:10 198:20 204:1
mandatory 195:9	13:14,24 189:23	mid-cap 47:1	189:7 197:6	needed 5:19 158:22
manipulation 82:17	McGladrey 3:8 21:2	mid-sized 35:5,12	motivation 107:11	193:3
manner 66:17 89:6	39:14 52:2 87:8	migrate 12:4	move 17:6,10 31:14	needs 19:22 23:11
121:23,24 129:21	99:18 135:23 140:20	Mike 22:4 25:9 46:21	48:15 52:1 56:1	57:10 90:16 96:22
188:5	171:12 179:3 193:5	48:19 88:12 91:11	71:17 72:10 76:2	106:23,25,25 124:7
Mark 2:15 3:2,5 25:18	200:25	96:1 101:1 102:13,19	78:15 100:9 113:12	138:1 157:20 161:4
25:19 27:4 30:19,22	McNAIRY 3:6 86:5,6,6	120:24 123:4 141:12	124:8 145:10 154:14	177:1 182:5,6 184:14
38:15 50:14 63:6	98:21,22,22 162:4,5,5	158:7 167:10 185:15	154:22 162:2 164:13	negative 9:9 190:22
66:13,19,20 69:1,20	mean 47:7 51:15 78:20	Mike's 160:11 177:7	166:19 180:2 198:25	195:6
82:1 91:8 99:4 100:6	80:25 83:23 111:15	million 42:10 54:2 86:9	moved 50:20 55:19	negatively 51:13,15
107:7 110:17,18	111:22 125:3 126:22	millions 188:24	multiple 72:25	negotiate 161:20
111:11 116:14 125:10	130:10 138:13 146:15	mind 7:23 21:6 31:10	municipal 144:8	negotiates 73:8
128:11 134:23 146:2	167:19 171:23 172:2	53:17 69:17 90:7	mutual 16:14 146:11	negotiation 161:17

Page 1	15
--------	----

neither 52:18 173:3	43:6 44:9 52:18	offering 44:2 130:20	111:14 122:5 125:8	oversee 16:1 172:1
nervous 158:10 174:16	53:21 66:24 67:5	159:16	136:13 137:2,9	178:25 206:25
174:19	76:12 110:15 112:7	offerings 118:20	141:16,19 195:18	overseeing 4:12
nest 148:12	126:13,14 155:10	office 3:12 10:20 12:4	opportunities 86:12	overseen 21:15
never 98:24 129:3	159:4 189:14 206:15	29:17,19 33:22,22	opportunity 8:20 15:16	oversight 1:7 4:11
135:12 153:8 192:18	numbers 8:12 36:10,11	83:5 114:12 138:16	86:17 92:23 156:16	11:17 25:8 76:23
197:1,16	53:21 61:12 64:15,24	officers 149:24	163:1 166:22 199:2	77:12 101:13 103:19
Nevertheless 32:18	69:12,14 205:16,20	offices 33:21	199:12,17,19	122:20 186:25
new 5:4,8,10,19 26:19	numerable 196:22	offshore 109:19	opposite 120:9	owe 113:24 127:8
29:16,19 32:10 43:25	numerous 12:19	off-balance 106:16	opposition 9:6	owes 151:18
64:10 95:10 96:8	N.W 1:18	oh 54:2 129:10 143:22	option 74:5	owners 10:1 55:12
196:13 197:11,20	14.00 1.10	201:18	order 4:12 14:4 140:3	Oxley 57:23
,	0			
198:7,11,16,21,22,23	$\overline{0}$ 4:1	okay 9:7 17:10,12	142:1 161:6 164:24	O'Malley 110:11
201:9,10,16,23		21:23 27:15,15,23	176:20 184:16 185:10	155:15,17 159:20
newspapers 144:19	object 20:3	28:3 29:2 31:14 72:7	orderly 14:4,20	166:6 187:7
189:15	objection 144:18	76:1 98:21 100:8	organization 36:24	Р
nice 94:24	objections 144:20	101:1 102:15 113:12	47:13,21,23 48:5,6,8	
niche 40:13	objective 8:8,14 89:7	120:12,24 123:13	90:9,10,11 102:5	P 4:1
Nick 2:22 61:17,18	122:5 142:10,24	124:8 126:19 135:21	142:17,21 143:2	packaged 116:10
104:13 107:3 123:3	143:6 160:6 179:21	144:24 145:9 154:22	159:6,7 160:1	page 111:15 189:15
132:4 137:6 138:6	179:24	155:2 165:5 166:19	organizations 8:23	paid 151:1 191:11
152:21 169:12	objectives 34:22 206:20	168:8,10 180:1	90:9 158:12 159:3	pain 199:24
Nicolaisen 2:6 6:16	objectivity 4:14,18	190:16 207:5	160:8 172:18 176:20	panel 110:11 159:20
10:20 11:1 16:3	5:15,23,24 150:13	old 206:16	oriented 189:11	166:6
NIEMEIER 2:3	185:11,14	onboard 46:16	original 61:23	panelists 11:2
night 64:1 170:1	obligation 87:20	once 13:12 17:16 41:14	originally 58:13 59:10	paper 14:6
night's 69:3	114:15 136:8,24	54:1 55:5 96:15	89:16	papers 202:6
nine 33:21 110:12,15	137:1 154:5	107:17 118:16 128:2	originating 104:17,18	paramount 31:1
155:15,16	obligations 70:23	160:20 189:24	origination 138:9	187:19
nod 10:2	obliged 149:9	ones 42:22 134:9 147:6	ought 68:4,23 102:3,3	parent 162:16
nominal 42:23 43:8,16	observe 142:22	148:13 163:5	109:5 119:11 122:11	parse 152:16
non 190:4	observing 85:5	one's 130:3	122:16 123:2 157:16	part 11:18 12:13 18:1
nonprofits 60:14	obtain 31:23 103:22,25	one-hour 15:9	175:5 178:5 188:6,8	21:12 25:5 26:2,3,4
non-audit 5:3,5 7:25	obtained 51:17	one-third 51:2	outlined 34:24 159:20	52:24 85:3 110:24,25
8:16 9:18,20 18:19	obvious 146:25 174:2,3	ongoing 49:10 134:3	outlining 24:24	111:3 115:1 125:1
21:14 68:3,9,16,18	obviously 26:4 32:15	176:11 194:8	outright 12:23	126:11 129:24 133:16
73:8 75:13 78:23,24	64:20 87:23 88:18	online 14:24 22:1	outside 17:19 19:20	145:3 147:13 157:18
126:5 135:10,14	91:20 92:4 101:3	onus 94:16	35:15 45:12,19 46:8	173:9 184:19,20
147:3 149:10,12	106:6 111:13 113:9	open 78:13	48:20 49:7,13,18	186:15 190:13,24
159:17 165:10 181:18	125:25 126:20 148:2	opening 7:3	67:14 74:4,17,18 80:8	191:2 192:25 204:19
181:25 201:5 206:14	156:3 157:11 158:12	operate 17:19 55:23	87:6 93:19 94:10,12	participants 6:8 13:4
noon 15:8	159:6,10 184:19	158:14,14 187:3	94:14 95:9 97:11	15:17 72:8 76:5 91:6
normal 14:5	198:1 202:4	operates 142:17 196:19	107:22 108:9 109:18	participate 11:7 13:13
normally 172:13		-	133:19,21 134:1,17	
normally 172:13 notable 89:24	occasionally 100:14	operating 108:7 175:17		82:6 145:16 154:24
	occur 184:12	operation 109:16	134:20 150:16 200:20	participated 40:19
note 174:16	occurred 130:21	operations 35:3 65:13	outsider 139:13	participating 6:12
notecard 168:16	occurrence 194:3	109:13 127:4 161:5	outsource 34:12	72:25 191:14
notice 48:9,9	Ochsenschlager 2:8	operative 119:23	overall 25:14 59:12	participation 35:15
notification 152:11	45:1,2,3 52:4 73:16	opined 120:12	206:14	particular 4:17 11:21
noting 129:7	73:17,18 92:25 93:1,1	opinion 8:7,18 9:1	overarching 16:11 17:1	12:18 19:9 30:15
notion 41:10 69:5 70:9	163:10,11,11 193:21	23:24 73:10 77:19	17:4,8 20:19 21:3,21	35:14 37:9 41:18
70:15 90:3 118:12	193:22,22 200:12,13	79:8,24 87:22 103:23	61:2,25 102:18,22	59:15 63:9 65:15
121:7,13 178:5,19	200:15	104:1 109:3 110:1	121:20 145:6	70:16 73:12,12 89:14
notwithstanding 58:7	odd 116:24	116:25 127:25 136:14	overlap 56:6	90:25 93:9 95:2
nuances 139:12	offer 5:22 7:3 76:3	140:6 141:3,7 197:3	overly 12:22	96:17,18 97:8 101:25
number 4:14 12:2 33:3	166:12	opinions 4:14 37:2,5,6	overriding 201:3	102:9 105:4 108:5,6
	100.12		- ,	102.2 105.7 100.5,0

				r age 1
108:18 113:10 117:25	25:5 27:17 79:5	permissible 17:22	119:6,12 131:19	117:11 122:4,7,8,8
121:14 142:2,8	81:22 92:11 105:9	105:15 115:2	132:24 133:2,15	137:9,23 140:12
152:17 180:11 181:10	106:23 124:7 130:9	permit 35:16 60:5	132.24 133.2,15	195:19 205:7
185:5,9 190:8 204:18	148:14 154:20 173:10	94:20	143:14 145:14,19	positive 101:8 108:24
	148:14 134:20 175:10 195:15 202:19 204:21	permitted 30:6 114:6	145:14 145:14,19	195:23
particularly 13:3 32:11		-		
47:3,13 48:5 66:23	PCAOB's 12:7 157:21	119:10 141:1 163:15	183:25 200:7	possess 186:19
74:8 106:12 111:4,5	penalties 123:18	191:10 196:3	plans 56:12 76:9	possibility 93:7
117:3 118:8 172:24	penalty 92:1	permitting 28:17	106:14 162:17	possible 7:21 116:11
175:16 176:17 188:16	pending 76:9	person 37:25 38:10,12	plate 192:11	124:20 129:8 176:1,9
parties 80:9 83:21,23	pension 106:14	93:6 151:13 161:19	play 25:2 66:14 82:9	possibly 79:3 111:10
95:13 97:11	people 7:15 9:3 14:18	170:24 171:7 177:16	83:17 117:23 148:7	posture 108:10
partner 32:9 34:6	14:22 15:4,15,23	201:19	162:19 192:18	post-implementation
47:11 48:1 73:13	21:24 22:1 24:5 33:4	personal 62:7 145:13	played 189:18	104:2
103:16 136:6 174:6	35:13 37:4,22,22,23	personally 12:23 37:12	player 139:4	potential 12:19 19:11
178:20,22	37:24 38:4 48:12	61:13 133:21 154:8	plays 66:13 165:24	124:18 131:4,10
partners 6:19 95:24	53:8,24,25 54:4,8,13	188:4	please 4:4,5 14:17,21	172:25 176:5 177:1
112:22	54:25 59:4 63:22	personnel 168:21	15:2,24 32:14 168:15	182:1
partnership 113:7	69:7 70:21 78:1 93:9	persons 39:1 151:7	pleasure 4:7	potentially 18:6 62:3
parts 127:5,11	98:14 104:11 105:21	173:10 177:11,13,18	plus 106:19 163:20	131:7 146:13 148:6
party 32:3,20 37:9 39:6	109:3,10,21 111:16	perspective 8:20 42:11	point 8:25 9:24 10:18	164:5 168:14
39:6,8 41:24 46:15,15	117:21 125:16,17	47:20 48:18 49:15	10:21 45:23 47:4,20	power 63:19
77:10 78:11 80:7	127:18 129:22 143:18	69:16 79:1 87:13	48:3 50:14 75:15	powers 173:11
86:23 95:23 118:22	143:23 144:19 151:7	88:23 89:18,18 90:15	82:7 84:11 87:25	practical 45:6 164:1,11
139:7 143:22 162:19	155:24 156:15 158:12	90:18,19,25 91:2,3	90:6 91:12 97:9	practically 72:18
part-time 139:8	158:13 162:1 165:5	101:18,21 125:3	101:12 110:2 111:7	practice 20:16 32:11,12
pass 8:20 9:8	166:7,12,16 167:3	137:21 140:13 142:10	111:13 115:1 123:10	32:16 39:12 58:21,21
passed 4:20,24 25:14	169:13 173:5,6,7	142:19 143:4,5 148:2	128:3 130:19 134:2,6	66:4 86:8 92:4
140:23 174:16	176:10 186:1 189:23	150:8 159:12 160:5	134:19 143:3 145:4	106:15 108:18 124:3
passing 128:18	190:1,5,7,12,17 191:5	179:11 185:23 194:7	153:14 158:21 159:19	133:14 165:3 169:3
Pat 36:20,21 39:15,17	191:7,14 204:8	persuaded 184:11	160:4,18,21 163:5	173:11 195:8 200:16
45:10 94:22,23	percent 9:19,22,22,24	pertinent 197:19	164:2 168:6,12	practiced 134:7
104:22 120:5 124:22	43:4,7 47:1 71:19	Pfizer 2:23 34:23	187:24	practices 168:12,24
125:11 131:14 138:7	123:8,13,17 132:7	132:20	points 16:24 50:7 88:14	199:8 204:13,23
160:24 163:2 165:9	153:11	phones 15:23	127:15 145:7 153:13	practitioner 168:21
167:5 180:18 182:14	percentage 12:20 43:9	phrases 112:22	158:10 200:19	173:3
184:7 185:19 202:14	55:21	phrasing 112:25	policies 65:12 151:4	practitioners 83:9
203:13,22 206:21	perception 89:19	picked 136:19	159:15	113:4
path 110:3 162:6	146:22	picking 141:14	policy 10:14 29:11	preapproval 18:22
Patricia 2:14 19:23	perfectly 81:16 94:6	piece 54:21 184:6	51:24 62:18 73:7	64:20 77:7 92:18
38:17	203:25	pitched 86:14	103:8 138:13,15	preapprove 149:10,12
pattern 127:4	perform 16:9 21:17	pitching 86:24	149:21,22 196:2	149:18 150:3
Pat's 141:22	50:4 56:17 73:7	place 35:8 58:8 59:25	pose 168:13	preapproved 152:8
Paul 3:3 32:8,14 43:22	76:14 98:19 99:3	65:12 71:9 83:21	posed 66:23 118:2	preclude 52:18 124:16
98:16,17 112:5 173:1	174:10 183:9 184:16	91:16 92:24 114:6	position 16:16,19 59:24	179:12
173:2	195:4 200:4	140:24 189:8	62:1,2,3,23 71:11,20	precluded 141:7 164:5
pay 67:10 111:21 127:7	performance 179:24	placed 59:20 203:1	72:3 74:15 87:21	164:22
152:10 153:15 164:1	performed 17:2 101:9	205:20 206:1	88:4 94:19 95:22	predates 105:22
payable 131:24	160:7 167:18	places 16:15,18	96:19 114:1,10,13	preferability 141:2
paying 9:17 58:24	performing 5:2 172:5	plain 144:17	115:4,7,8,15,17	premise 17:20 19:25
144:6,7 150:22	179:19	planning 22:13 44:2	116:20 119:1 120:22	20:2,10 122:2
153:17	performs 180:7	54:6 63:5 68:16 76:5	121:15,17 136:19	prepackaged 105:23
payroll 56:11 60:18	Periorino 100.7			
payron 50.11 00.18	period 30:25 42:2	76:17 80:18 83:24	137:14,19 138:3	118:19
PCAOB 1:8 2:2,3,4,18	-	76:17 80:18 83:24 84:8 95:18 96:12	137:14,19 138:3 140:16 142:23 150:19	118:19 preparation 41:4 50:16
	period 30:25 42:2			
PCAOB 1:8 2:2,3,4,18 2:19,20,21 3:13,14	period 30:25 42:2 177:23 194:3	84:8 95:18 96:12	140:16 142:23 150:19 154:20 205:4	preparation 41:4 50:16
PCAOB 1:8 2:2,3,4,18	period 30:25 42:2 177:23 194:3 perks 153:19,19	84:8 95:18 96:12 97:18 98:12 103:11	140:16 142:23 150:19	preparation 41:4 50:16 56:9 57:17 72:14

Meeting

				Page 17
56:15 61:11 73:24	96:14 114:2 119:25	33:11,16,19 46:18	nnononty 167.24	160:9 161:13 168:4
121:23 146:16,17	182:18	47:5,18,19 48:10,10	property 167:24 proposal 115:11	179:18 181:10 186:21
163:15 201:15 202:9	principles 9:4 16:12,21	52:13,24 57:14 59:13	proposals 202:24	192:13 198:14 200:7
prepared 14:6 33:4	17:1,4,8,19 18:13,19	64:19 72:20,20 75:22	proposed 76:9 141:4	203:2
40:15 57:21 75:18	19:21,25 20:4,7,8,15	81:2 85:3,3,19 86:3	protect 6:20 16:2 19:13	provision 18:15 22:19
164:4 205:3	20:19 21:3,22 22:12	104:10 140:10 142:12	140:16 188:20,21	23:3,9,17 28:15,20
preparer 41:24 75:4	22:15 23:5,11,20 24:4	142:16 145:25 146:9	protecting 157:19	39:24 41:6 74:11,12
88:10 94:15 179:8	24:14,15,17 26:1,15	149:15 166:11,15	protection 186:10	74:20,23 76:21 77:13
preparers 179:6,23	28:1,5 29:6,14,23	173:8 175:3 179:17	protective 92:7	85:10 88:6 103:7,19
195:4	30:1,18 40:20,21,23	192:19 198:25 205:1	provide 5:11 10:2	123:17 124:18 140:9
preparer's 41:24	52:20 57:24 60:5	205:2,25	11:21 15:15 19:14,16	151:6 183:17
prepares 32:2 39:21	61:3,25 71:23 81:23	processes 65:6 92:12	22:25 30:10,13 38:7	provisions 71:13 76:25
193:7	85:12,16 86:2 97:7	196:23 203:19	43:18 49:17 56:5	92:14 132:5 189:5
preparing 37:10 38:8	102:18,22 106:20	produce 6:2 32:20	60:9 61:5 62:9 68:4	proxy 9:6 64:24,25
40:24 61:23 62:5	114:2 118:7,8 121:20	produce 0.2 32.20 product 12:21 100:23	78:23,24 92:21 95:5	153:21
121:5 146:10 192:7	122:15 140:15 141:3	104:24 130:20	97:5 99:11 103:3	public 1:7 2:9 4:10,12
prerogative 94:11	141:8 145:7 182:17	productive 6:6	106:24 110:10 111:23	4:16 5:10 11:7 12:10
presence 6:22	187:6,7 201:3,14	productive 0.0 products 5:11 12:17,22	112:20 116:18 117:5	16:2,10 28:12,13,14
present 165:10	priorities 82:25 83:2,7	12:25 83:20 84:1	119:10 123:23 125:24	28:16,16,19 29:1
presentation 94:4	pro 25:25 171:4	100:15,15,20 104:8	126:5,8 129:6 135:4,8	30:23 34:3,3 36:6
presentations 146:8	probable 71:9,18	104:12 105:14 110:20	135:9 139:24,25	42:22 44:2 53:16
presented 188:5	probably 8:4 17:15	130:23 131:19 194:1	140:5,9 142:24	55:6 56:14 65:1
preserve 187:11	18:9 25:21 34:16	profession 4:17 12:15	145:12,15 149:3	67:11 103:8 111:1
preserving 67:18	42:9 54:1,18 55:6,9	24:11,12 117:20	151:8 153:1 155:13	136:24,25 137:1,8,14
President 45:3	55:12,14 61:16 62:7	136:11,22,22 137:1	157:3 161:6 164:24	137:18,20 145:2
Presidential 1:19	73:22 77:5,18 88:3	138:1,5 189:19	165:2 166:16 180:11	152:24 160:18,23
press 89:25	97:8 123:6 124:6	191:10 198:8	186:20 190:16 192:11	162:21,22 187:10
pressures 9:2	155:11 161:18 171:18	professional 24:10	provided 15:19 19:2,6	189:19 193:3
presumably 46:13	172:11 179:7 181:8	36:24 38:11 41:2,19	21:4 23:1 28:7,7 29:9	publicly 8:18
93:10,23 158:24	193:3,24 194:4,24	58:16 83:5,9 92:8	47:6 55:3 59:21 61:7	public's 4:13
pretty 33:16,18 42:8	203:18	112:24 137:7 151:18	77:2 101:10 104:9	public-company 5:3
48:19,20 109:21	problem 72:17 82:19	161:22 167:18 168:3	118:21 119:6,12	42:11 86:7,12
129:21 135:17 141:15	82:19 84:13,16	171:1	121:14 122:24 130:11	published 200:16
157:6 171:13 180:22	104:19,21 109:7	professionally 8:9	149:10,13 152:7	pulled 191:23
204:19	117:2 118:12 125:24	professionals 32:4	156:5 168:16 177:14	Pullen 3:8 21:2 39:14
prevail 123:12 124:1	131:3,10 135:16	36:25 37:10 60:22	187:17 188:2,2	52:2 87:8 135:23
137:11	137:24 139:1 146:4	82:13 83:1 185:1	194:11 207:7	171:12 193:5 200:25
prevailing 110:6 124:3	147:4,11,24 150:3	professions 86:14	provider 66:9 77:2,10	punch 157:23
prevent 197:7 previous 7:16 20:5 66:8	157:4 182:1 198:2 problematic 102:19	profits 12:20	159:3 166:18 providers 28:23 83:24	purely 189:7
129:17	128:7 181:3	program 7:1 15:15 145:17 148:24	166:9	purpose 18:12 29:24 103:2,21 106:2
previously 26:21 45:4	problems 18:5,7,25	programs 11:19 121:8	provides 5:25 96:16	105.2,21 106.2
171:22	57:5,7 81:15 82:16	prohibit 5:2 81:25	126:13,14 127:17	197:7,22
pre-approve 22:24	93:12 102:21 118:15	prohibited 7:25 79:5	158:22 200:18	purposes 38:21 89:14
27:24	130:16 131:2 148:13	79:10,12 81:24	providing 11:9 13:5	125:20 127:22 128:19
pre-shrink 103:15	148:14 155:6 194:9	prohibiting 79:19	18:24 19:15,17 25:6	purview 202:19
price 58:23 137:15,15	198:5 199:9,16,19	prohibitive 160:2	29:25 52:19,22 60:3	push 80:13 191:8,17
191:11	procedure 104:7	project 14:13	60:10 68:9 93:14	put 8:2 9:1,5 18:23
PricewaterhouseCoo	152:11	promulgated 16:7	94:2 95:17 96:12	19:8 50:4 61:12 62:1
2:17 22:5	procedures 14:6	proper 24:21 36:17	97:15 102:3,6,8	64:24 68:20 79:12
pricing 98:25	103:10 150:25 151:5	129:23 176:23	107:13 116:17 126:12	95:7 102:12 110:7,12
primarily 9:24 100:6	172:6 179:19	properly 23:5 34:19	127:24 140:4 142:13	114:1 115:8 123:8
primary 11:24,24 16:1	proceed 14:19	36:6 60:23 84:19	145:21 146:9,20	129:15 131:7 133:9
23:23 45:22	process 7:19 18:22	89:3 104:4 130:9	147:3,5,5,11,20	140:11 158:8,9 161:2
principally 65:8	19:13 20:23 23:18	142:25 164:4 176:21	153:19 154:24 155:8	165:5 169:18 196:22
principle 32:24 93:5	24:1 25:6,9 26:19	187:14	155:9,12 156:10	196:25

puts 17:21 63:22	184:23 186:19 187:15	read 37:20 39:15 51:12	recommendations	102:13,16 181:14
104:16 117:25 140:15	195:19 198:15 201:8	129:16 135:1 144:18	80:10,22 85:20 90:11	reiterated 16:20
putting 72:2 82:5 97:3	201:9,19 203:13	193:12	146:7 150:10	relate 5:10 169:5
162:6 205:15	205:1	readdress 112:8	recommended 103:24	183:24
puzzle 184:6	questionable 85:11	reading 37:25 135:18	reconcile 122:16	related 4:23 14:11 32:2
puzzled 181:8	191:24	135:19	reconciliations 201:11	33:5 50:9 56:15
p.m 1:15 98:1,5 207:11	questions 14:8,11	ready 200:13	reconciling 74:24	59:16 76:7 162:18
pini 1110 9011,0 207111	15:17 31:9 32:5	real 26:7,8 58:10,23,24	reconsideration 101:14	167:14 181:10 182:7
Q	35:18 37:3,4 38:2,3	60:9 79:16 82:18,19	101:22	185:17 195:18
Qs 169:21	56:13 58:2 59:23	118:11 128:21 148:22	records 60:23 202:6	related-party 162:10
qualified 160:14	63:9 71:4 76:12	178:16 198:15	205:3,8,22 206:1,5,7	relates 42:5 49:22
quality 41:11 43:3	88:20,23 89:5 97:7,18	reality 157:7	recovered 9:20	175:2 193:24
47:24 50:5 73:23	97:21 167:12,21	really 7:8,11 8:7 24:6,8	reduce 100:16,24	relating 5:9 157:24
75:2 88:22 89:8	180:5,22 182:2,15	29:24 30:10,12 34:2	129:20 132:1	relation 43:13 73:3
104:7 169:7 171:2	199:19 200:2 201:7	36:18 38:1 48:1	reduction 9:24 198:13	relationship 16:13 23:9
172:6 174:25 175:7	quick 79:3	57:18 58:25 59:24	reductions 70:3	44:6 45:25 95:17
177:2,9,10,25 180:8	quickly 4:25 151:17	60:16,18 61:1,21 63:8	redundant 15:1	128:8 151:21 152:13
183:7,9,21 186:11	198:1	63:22 68:9,18 74:10	reevaluated 19:22	168:11 182:18
187:19,20 188:18,19	quietly 181:16	93:15 98:24 101:23	reference 40:14	relationships 30:12
190:23 192:21	quirks 139:6	107:19 112:12 116:1	referencing 156:21	51:2 64:7 162:19
quarter 42:20,23 43:1	quite 8:3 33:25 43:11	116:8 117:22 120:8	referred 46:19 76:4	relative 32:5
43:3 46:25 47:7	54:15,16,18 70:11	123:20 124:23 126:9	100:15	relatively 43:25 68:9
177:22	75:15 86:11 124:3	126:24 129:20 130:7	referring 72:21 111:25	194:23,25
quarterly 46:1,3,11	153:22 159:4 165:22	130:8,25 132:11	reflect 13:10 204:15	release 16:22
52:9 87:4 169:20	165:23 192:12 200:13	138:8,25 139:1,6,15	205:8	relevant 29:8 34:2
quasi-fiduciary 151:19	quote 58:3	143:11,19 144:17,20	reflected 173:20 206:6	115:14 142:2 184:5
question 14:14 15:21	quote 58.5	154:9 155:5 158:1,5	reflects 205:23	reliance 36:15
20:2,4,12 24:16,19,20	R	166:4,21 167:2,7	regard 29:13 32:19	relied 46:6,6
25:14,16 26:7,8 31:15	R 4:1	170:21 171:6 174:19	110:19 111:3 125:20	relies 82:13 96:24
32:1,4,11,15 35:17	raise 71:3 88:21 126:21	178:13,24 180:23	156:12 173:12 194:12	146:7
37:9 38:4,17 39:17,22	180:14,16 182:15	181:11 191:2,2	regarding 11:12 39:18	relish 143:11
44:23 50:7 53:1	198:22	191:11 191:2,2	41:6 79:11 114:10	relocation 155:10
56:13,19 57:18 59:6	raised 24:19 45:11	202:2 203:24 204:10	163:12 173:8 179:10	159:14
60:7 63:8 66:23,24	72:24 135:25 139:23	reason 4:16 8:10 9:23	206:18	rely 31:5 36:8,12 38:10
67:4,5 70:17 72:24	157:4 158:21 174:1	26:23 28:2 64:19	regardless 51:4 54:13	48:1 67:20 86:16
73:5,14 76:16 78:13	180:23 182:16 184:23	95:15 161:8 163:7	71:23 137:2 180:6	146:5 150:9
78:18,18,22 80:5,6,13	180.23 182.10 184.23	165:19 178:14	registrant 151:14	relying 47:12 136:1
80:14 81:7 87:9	raises 71:3 126:3	reasonable 10:23 31:23	registrants 28:14,16	remaining 200:2 201:7
	180:23	203:6	29:9 85:5,14	remarks 7:3 13:8 14:13
88:15 89:4,11,13,17			,	
91:18 100:18 101:23	ramification 176:2,9	reasoning 20:22 78:21 115:15	registrars 38:19	16:3 20:5 59:2 72:8 82:7 91:6 165:6
109:9 110:19,24	ramifications 135:18 162:9 176:1 190:22		regret 114:19 regularly 91:23 203:15	
111:4 113:13 114:25		reasons 7:24 45:22		remember 41:1 118:19
117:25 118:2,2,3,11	ran 42:18	75:19 86:20 114:1	regulated 65:16 190:2	remind 21:24 105:21
121:10 123:6 124:9	range 171:3 192:21	163:23 170:10	190:5	145:6 168:12
124:24 125:12,14,21	rarely 174:7	recall 4:24	regulation 85:21 198:7	remove 124:19
126:3,10,11 128:8	rata 171:5	received 82:20	regulations 19:10	render 152:5
129:16,17,25 130:18	rate 99:1,2 166:14	recess 98:5	87:22 113:5 115:6	rendered 28:21,22
131:16 132:20 134:25	192:2	recognition 9:25 18:1	195:3 197:12	rendering 143:6 151:3
135:3 136:10 143:9	rates 99:2,19 100:7	36:13 88:6	regulator 113:13	repeat 53:10 119:18
143:23 145:20 146:4	rating 155:20,21	recognize 22:23 52:5	regulators 31:4 196:11	repeated 110:13
148:18 149:4,8 150:8	rational 137:19	84:6 179:4	regulatory 103:17	report 23:23 53:17
151:17 154:14,23	RAY 2:21	recognized 23:12	reimbursement 163:23	90:23 94:17 136:7
155:11 157:5 160:16	reach 114:14 118:23	recognizing 18:8	reimburses 163:18	174:17
	107.11			
160:21 165:16 168:13	127:11	112:17	reining 129:8	reported 9:19,21
	127:11 reached 10:17 react 73:11	112:17 recommendation 80:3 80:14,16 146:13	reinvigorated 83:6 reiterate 94:25 96:20	reported 9:19,21 173:10 205:21 reporting 4:15 37:23

Page	19
------	----

				1 450 17
38:3 52:12 96:6	respects 133:12	returns 37:11 38:8	123:3 124:8,22	11:12 16:7,10 22:17
102:21 104:25 109:5	respond 27:2 87:19	40:25 56:10,11,12,15	125:10 126:11,19	24:9 26:20 36:5 40:3
117:15 137:25 145:25	88:19 89:5 91:10	61:23 62:5 70:20,21	127:14 129:14 130:17	63:17 85:13,16
205:16	133:8 198:19 200:14	70:24 71:12,17 72:15	131:14 133:7 134:23	101:11 144:14 167:16
	responded 4:22,25		135:19,22 136:9	167:25 196:11 198:16
represent 30:22 36:22		73:20,24 86:22 108:9	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
representation 158:1,5	responding 38:5 44:17	121:23 145:14 146:10	138:6 139:20 140:19	198:18,21,23 199:17
193:20	89:3 188:14	146:16 163:13,15,16	141:11 143:7 145:9	201:3,4
representations 145:25	response 17:9 23:8	163:24 193:10,12	146:18 147:8 148:17	run 49:6,18 136:18
193:16	37:18 39:17 45:10	201:16	149:7,16 150:6	152:24
representatives 180:21	73:14 87:16 88:15,22	revenue 2:25 3:2	151:15 152:2,14,21	runner 64:2,4 69:6
represented 87:15	89:8 136:2 167:1	109:18 195:1	153:6 154:13,22	runs 93:3
158:6 174:5	responsibilities 23:16	revenues 54:3 109:18	156:1,23 158:7	rush 77:20 83:19
representing 13:17	26:22 28:13 64:11	review 17:25 18:11,19	160:10,24 162:1,24	Russell 42:8 53:19 55:5
31:2 117:21 151:24	92:8 143:4 175:23	28:20 31:9 33:7,8,13	163:10 164:9 165:5	
157:5,7,8,16 158:1	179:21 196:9 206:19	33:14 93:15,20,22,25	166:2,19 167:2,5,10	S
represents 206:13	206:20	104:3 122:21 136:4,8	168:7,20 170:18	S 4:1
reputational 159:7	responsibility 9:16	149:15 172:1 177:23	171:11 172:15 173:1	safe 64:4 207:10
request 202:24	22:6,23 23:10,23	reviewed 74:22 197:5	173:18 174:14 177:5	safeguard 149:5
require 5:5 81:18,20	36:10 52:8,10 83:5	reviewing 33:10 126:1	178:3 179:2 180:1	safeguards 91:16
171:16 197:12	88:8,19 91:21 94:16	126:1 127:23	ROBERT 2:5	sale 100:19 110:20
required 31:23 41:1	116:2,7 127:22	reviews 46:2,11 94:8	robust 85:5	sales 56:11
46:1 141:2 149:11	135:25 136:4,7 145:4	178:2 189:2	robustly 85:25	sanctioned 195:14
150:23 152:9 171:16	154:3,5 156:10	rewards 169:7	role 7:17 11:23 25:2	Sarbanes 57:22
179:23,24 187:11	171:21 193:14 206:5	re-emphasize 72:13	66:14,14 81:24 82:10	Sarbanes-Oxley 4:21
197:21 202:23,25	responsible 47:11 92:6	RFP 202:23	83:1,17 110:7 113:15	5:1 6:18 7:20 11:13
requirement 84:10	127:18 199:7 206:3	RFPs 203:15	115:12 117:24 129:23	26:4,20 27:7,12,14,23
149:17 151:2 159:1	rest 13:21 78:4 178:17	Rich 99:21,22	165:18,23	57:14 63:19 65:2
requirements 16:8	restate 132:22	RICHARD 2:12	roll 92:9	85:4 106:19 149:18
21:11,13 76:10 88:5	restatement 42:1 92:1	right 15:1 25:22 34:18	roof 190:4	150:4 196:13 198:7
158:25 159:9,9 188:2	restatements 51:14,17	35:8 36:17 60:25,25	room 7:16 14:14,23	SAS 140:21,24 141:15
197:15 206:15	51:19 170:10 183:18	63:2 65:22 66:10,16	22:2 26:13 37:19	sat 96:7 181:15
requires 121:5 206:15	restore 4:13 6:19	66:17 97:20 109:14	82:18 121:11 186:2	satisfied 178:18
206:24	restoring 11:5 16:4	109:16,17 117:1	rooms 204:20	satisfying 91:17 92:22
requiring 18:11 201:11	restraint 18:7	120:13 123:11,17	Roper 3:10 17:12,13,13	sausage 25:17
requisite 176:10 184:16	restricting 79:19	128:20 136:22 156:16	44:16,17 79:23,24	save 73:22
204:5	restrictions 162:7,11	156:17 169:16,23	105:6,7 114:24,25	saved 200:10
research 9:16 36:23	175:7	170:6 189:24 190:19	124:15,16 130:17,18	savings 73:21
114:14	result 49:9 60:22 88:9	190:20,21 196:11	149:7,8 154:13,15	saw 55:20 99:25 129:16
researched 110:12	91:25 92:1 100:17,25	198:21 203:25	173:18,19 181:13,14	167:20 191:11 198:11
resemble 58:21	101:25 102:1 104:11	rightfully 169:24	199:4,5	saying 19:19 30:1
reserve 123:18,19	104:25 111:7 124:21	Rightly 98:23	round 105:22,25	60:21 74:5 77:25
reserving 124:1 137:12	127:11	rigorous 92:11 104:10	roundtable 1:10 4:8	78:5 119:19 120:13
resolving 113:16	results 16:17 111:9	rise 191:4	5:20 11:7 12:6 14:5,7	125:7 137:12
resource 39:5 83:3	resume 15:10 168:10	risk 10:1 22:6 65:11	15:16 20:10 28:11	says 27:12 50:7 62:7
139:9,10,11,18	retaining 160:14	80:8 96:25 103:10,17	168:14	77:21 79:6,13 87:17
resources 34:24 39:4	Retirement 30:23	104:7 135:11 140:13	route 183:20	107:10 143:22 149:11
72:16 188:25	return 15:20 33:6,8,10	150:24 182:11	routine 60:3,6 61:10,14	204:13
respect 25:2 28:18,22	33:13,14 34:2,7 40:1	Rivshin 2:18 14:9	129:18	Sayther 3:4 49:23,24
37:8 40:24 41:12	53:5 55:11 61:11	100:9,12 102:11,15	routinely 203:15	75:5,6,6 102:11,12
59:13 69:2 70:24	74:11,19,23,25 88:4	102:23 104:5,13,22	royalty 109:17	119:13,14,14,20
75:10,20,20 77:12	114:10 117:6,11	102:23 104:3,13,22	rule 25:15 26:16 107:9	172:15,16,16 183:3,4
86:12 97:13 120:3	123:9,14,22 143:10	108:22 110:17 111:11	115:11 191:9,11	183:4
121:16 148:23,23	144:3,4 155:9 168:16	112:5 113:12 114:3	rulemaking 16:22 26:2	scandal 105:22
151:5 152:3 162:10	192:7 193:7,8,17	114:17,23 115:18	26:5 196:15 197:11	scandals 4:15 80:12
172:23 189:1 203:1	195:19 197:22 205:13	116:14 117:17 118:17	198:3,17	199:25
205:8	205:14,23 207:10	119:13,18 120:5,24	rules 4:23 5:2,4,8,18	Scates 2:19 14:9 31:17

33.1 3.1.3.1 3.1.3.3 (30.1.2.3.1.1.3.3 (30.1.2.3.1.1.3.3 (30.1.2.3.1.1.3.3 (30.1.2.3.1.1.3.3 (30.1.2.3.1.1.3.3 (30.1.2.3.1.1.3.3 (30.1.2.3.1.1.3.3 (30.1.2.3.1.1.3.3 (30.1.2.3.1.1.3.3 (30.1.2.3.1.1.3.3 (30.1.2.3.1.1.3.3 (30.1.2.3.1.1.3.3 (30.1.2.3.1.1.3.3 (30.1.2.3.1.1.3.3 (30.1.2.3.1.1.3.3 (30.1.2.3.1.1.3.3 (30.1.2.3.1.1.3.3 (30.1.2.3.1.3.1.3.1.3.1.3.1.3.1.3.1.3.1.3.1					Ç
362.02.88.15.39.13 590:6 101:23 111:23 rssparste 72:20 126:12 78:24 79:7 81:14,18 Needlarz 223 34:15,16 44:16 45:1 46:21 147:13 1489 158:21 128:143 168:23 88:12,24 84:34 48:4 48:14.17 107:20.21 44:16 45:1 46:21 147:13 1489 158:21 186:13 88:12,24 84:34 48:4 48:14.17 107:20.21 59:17 01:17 03:6 secondary 160:15 105:23 180:5 203:25 995:19 97:12,44 133:12 152:14,15 72:77 35:16 75:76:1 142:21 06:24 193:14 128:14 152:24 168:15 72:77 35:16 75:76:1 149:22 180:25 security 170:23 991:23 187:10 124:12 123:14 shett of c:21 75:11 78:12 189:23 184:7 sectinity 4:21 servers 28:16 149:71 41:11,15 70:22,25 71:71 121:8 91:22 180:35 181:13 security 170:23 91:23 187:10 143:17,21 146:20 shetter 12:23 13:7 190:25 193:4 21 49:21 55:24 15:14 servers 28:16 149:71 41:11 18:1 shetter 12:23 13:7 190:25 193:4 100:12 50:15,21 60:22 77:10 71:16 140:22 143:16 149:52 shetter 12:24 15:149:22 20:04:20 10:02 14:11 20:15,21 60:21 55:50:01:10 <t< td=""><td>33.1 34.15 35.16 23</td><td>second 8:3 18:23 48:18</td><td>sensitive 32.12</td><td>76.18 22 77.1 4 13</td><td>sharn 9·17</td></t<>	33.1 34.15 35.16 23	second 8:3 18:23 48:18	sensitive 32.12	76.18 22 77.1 4 13	sharn 9·17
40:14 42:3 4:322 126:3 129:24 131:23 128:3 144:3 168:23 88:12.22 4:82:48:48 4:84:14,17 107:20:21 44:16 45:14 4621 17:13 1489 158:21 18:65:13 85:78,10,11:24:93:14 114:17,18:21 133:9 51:25 52:25 55:16 recondary 160:15 105:25 180:5 20:32 98:11.13,19 10:03,11 102:22:16:32 16:87 50:17 76:17 63:6 93:25 118:9 128:8 118:81 18:25 18:63 105:91 10:01,11 12:21 shett er:2 175:11 71:17 78:17 75:5 76:1 148:4 150:24 164:2 serions 18:6 58:25 105:91 10:01,11 14:11 shett er:2 175:11 shett er:2 125:11 shett er:2 125:11:13:14 shett er:2 125:12:13:32 shett er:2 125:12:13:14 shett er:2 125:12:					
44:16 45:1 46:1 45:1 42:1 42:1 42:1 42:1 42:1 42:1 42:1 42:1 42:1 42:1 42:1 42:1 42:1 42:1 42:1 42:1 42:1 42:1 43:1 42:1 <t< td=""><td></td><td>,</td><td></td><td>-</td><td></td></t<>		,		-	
48:12 49:23 50:18 176:9 195:16 series 57:23 63:9 95:51 197:21.24 133:12 152:41.15 51:25 52:25 50:1 secondary 160:15 105:25 180:5 203:25 100:13 103:45,7 108:7 66:11:9 67:22 68:25 93:25 118:9 128:24 1188:18 182:25 186:3 105:9 109:11 112:21 shett 06:16 77:14 78:7 79:23 194:21 206:24 193:12 118:14 112:17:18 118:123 82:1 84:23 86:5 87.7 section 149:24 180:2 seriousness 59:2 129:6 130:11 134:11 shetter 06:16 94:22 180:32 181:13 section 149:24 180:2 serie 18:22 65:11,14 140:17 14:51:12,12 19:32:25 19:41 18:12 182:13 184:7 section 149:24 180:2 serie 27:15 140:22 14:33:12,12 13:12 16:33:18 shifting 18:6:23 19:05 199:42 180:15 section 14:14:15 service 22:23 21:81:21 15:14.46:018 15:29:01:55:2 76:17 19:25 20:31:10 20:21 44 71:22 75:17:10 15:42:16:64 15:52:10:15:22 16:62:1 20:31:10 20:22 14:71 10:22 10:42:1 12:24 15:51:18:32 16:62:1 16:7:11:18:12 20:31:10 20:22 14:71:13:10 17:22 7:25:17:77:10 15:9				,	
sb:12 52:25 56:1 second y:18 72:2 105:25 180:5 203:25 98:11,13,19 100:34,57 168:7 66:1,19 67:22 68:25 93:25 118:9 128:8 118:8 185:25 186:3 100:51 10:34,57 168:7 72:7 73:16 75:5 76:1 148:4 150:24 164:2 serious 186 58:25 121:4 122:13:24 sheet 106:16 82:1 84:23 86:5 87:7 148:4 150:24 164:2 serious ness 59:2 129:6 130:11 134:11 sheet 106:16 98:1 91:25 22:5 securitis 42:1 servi 18:22 65:11,14 144:17 19:127:18 181:23 98:22 180:3.5 18:13 25:6 38:12 42:14,17 serve 22:36 143:51.22 146:20 193:25 194:1 91:02 5 193:4 20:11,12 50:152 (16:33:24 25:15 26:6 30:11,15 152:9(10:153:2 shifting 186:23 90:25 193:4 20:11,2 50:152 (13:01) 172:27 21:57:17:20 30:15 55:36:01 154:24 155:10,12,13 shifting 186:23 90:26 103:41 13:52 (12:42:14) serve 22:51 (26:17:23:12 166:23 167:14;15,24 shorten 98:1 90:02 102:01 13:01 172:22:71:17:12 155:23 (16:11:13:16) 156:34:52:10:12:13 shorten 98:1 90:02 102:01 10:01 172:27:16:17:12:16 156:34:52:16:12					
59:17 61:17 63:6 secondly 41:8 72:24 serious 18:6 58:25 100:13 103:4,57 168:7 76:17 97:27 81:6 75:5 76:1 148:4 150:24 164:2 seriously 26:23 106:15 121:4 122:13.24 shelter 62:175:11 77:14 78:7 79:23 194:21 206:24 193:14 121:4 122:13.24 shelter 62:175:11 82:1 84:23 86:5 87:7 section 149:24 180:2 serve 18:22 65:11,14 124:17.19 127:18 181:23 94:22 180:33 184:7 security 170:23 91:23 187:10 145:17.21 146:20 193:25 194:1 182:12 183:13 184:7 serve 22:18 21 151:4,6,9.18 152:57 78:0179:717:121:8 190:25 193:4,21 43:23 452:1 48:1 service 22:5 32: 18:21 151:4,6,9.18 152:7 78:079:25 200:42 201:4 71:22 7:1,5 77:20 30:15 55:3 60:10 154:24 155:101.21,3 short 46:24 93:2 201:1 20:22 204:24 84:21 86:15 77:22 31:02 11:22 156:3,4,52 1158:2 short 46:24 93:2 201:1 20:22 204:24 84:21 86:15 77:22 10:21 11:17:8:1 159:12,13.14 161:36 short 82:1 201:1 20:22 14:22 16:22 150:22 16:22 150:22 short 82:1 short 82:1 2					
666:1,19 07:22 6825 93:25 118:9 128:8 118:8 185:25 186:3 105:9 109:11 112:41 sheet 106:16 77:7 73:6 55 76:1 194:21 206:24 193:14 193:14 121:41 22:13,24 sheet rof: 2.175:11 88:11 91:5 92:25 Security 170:23 91:23 187:10 145:17,21 146:20 193:25 194:1 94:21 208:3,5 18:13 security 170:23 91:23 187:10 145:17,21 146:20 193:25 194:1 91:25 193:4 20:11,2 Security 170:23 91:25 187:10 145:17,21 146:20 193:25 194:1 91:02 51 93:4 20:11,2 Social 24:24:14,17 serve 22:3 52 185:10 145:17,21 146:20 193:25 194:1 90:25 193:4 20:11,2 50:15,27:10 30:15 55:3 60:10 154:24 155:10,12,13 shifting 186:23 90:26 103:20 20:14:11 18:41 18:61:49:31,01 154:24 15:10,12,13 shorteg 14:3 90:21 103:21 11:20 100:21 10:20:11:0 17:22:25 16:17 12:31:2 165:34.52:10:12,13 shorteg 14:3 90:21 103:21 10:0 11:22:21 16:17 12:31:2 166:23 16:14:15:24 shorteg 14:3 shorteg 14:3 90:21 10:30 12:22 16:07 12:31:2 166:23 16:14:15:24 shorteg 14:3 <t< td=""><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></t<>					
72:73:16 73:16 148:41 140:17 121:41					· ·
77:14 78:7 79:23 194:21 206:24 193:14 124:17,19 127:18 181:123 88:11 91:5 92:25 Securities 4:21 serve 18:22 65:11,14 140:17 145:11,12,15 57:22,25 71:7 121:8 94:22 180:3; 5 18:13 security 170:23 91:23 187:10 145:17,221 146:20 149:32,20,25 184:1 199:25 194:1 181:12 189:13 security 170:23 91:23 187:10 145:17,221 146:20 147:3,20,25 148:1 199:25 194:1 190:25 193:42 11 35:33 12:42:14,17 serve 28:16 148:61 49:3,10,12 shifting 186:23 190:25 193:42 11 147:127 22:15 77:20 30:15 55:3 60:10 155:29,10 153:2 78:19 79:25 200:42 00:24 84:21 86:15 97:21 61:48,16 68:21,21 156:34,521 188:22 166:21 206:8 207:4 100:21 00:21 01:73:10 71:24,25 76:77:10 159:12,13,14 16:13 short 46:24 93:2 201:9 01:63:23 027:14 13:81:11 155:23 18:15:11,11 167:25 168:51 72:22 short 49:14 short 49:14 201:9 :01:03:23 027:14 13:16 178:14 169:22 159:22:15 02:22 166:21 16:17 show 45:17 140:18 show 45:17 140:18 201:9 :01:03:22:4 16:27 173:21 158:18:11 159:23 159:21 159:18:18:12 170:7 show 45:17 140:18 sh					
82:18 4:23 86:5 87.7 section 149:24 180:2 serie 8:59:2 129:6 130:11 43:11 thetters 12:23 13:7 88:11 91:5 92:25 Securities 4:21 serve 18:22 65:11,14 140:17 145:11,12,15 70:22,25 71:7 121:8 182:12 183:3 184:7 sec 9:14 10:1 14:15 served 97:15 140:22 147:3,12,20,22 148:1 19:25 19:44:1 190:25 193:4,21 43:23 45:21 48:1 serve 28:16 148:6 149:3,10,12 shifting 18:6:23 190:25 193:4,21 43:23 45:21 48:1 service 2:23 3:2 18:21 15:4:6,9,18 15:27 shopping 77:19 78:12 206:3 07:4 100:21 02:20,113:10 71:24:25 16:67 77:10 15:21,21,31 46:13, shortage 14:3 scenario 14:21,22,25 113:21 11:41:11 18:6 81:19 99:3 108:1 16:11,13 16:7 shortage 14:3 schedue 55:10 98:2,7 13:32 15:21 24:22 15:57,918 158:11.1 16:72 51:68:51 72:2 shortage 14:3 schedue 51:0 98:2,7 13:32 15:21 24:21 15:57,918 158:11.1 16:72 51:68:51 72:2 shortage 14:3 schedue 51:0 98:2,7 13:32 15:20 12:42:3 15:52 51:68:7,71 15:52 16:85 77:22 shortage 14:3 schedue 51:20 32:21 10:21:14:11 18:18:1 16:71:71,71:23:22				,	
88:11 91:5 92:25 Security 70:23 91:22 187:10 140:17 145:11.21:5 70:22.25 71:7 121:8 182:12 183:3 184:7 see 91:4 10:1 14:15 see 91:4 10:1 14:15 served 97:15 140:22 147:3,12,20,25 148:1 shelter-type 189:17 185:15 188:12 189:13 25:6 38:12 42:14.17 served 97:15 140:22 147:3,12,20,25 148:1 shelter-type 189:17 190:25 193:42.11 43:23 45:21 48:1 service 22:3 22 18:21 151:4.6.9,18 152:22 78:19 79:25 200:42 10:6 20:21:4 71:22 72:15,77:20 30:15 55:3 60:10 155:42 41:55:10,12:13 160:21 200:42 10:22 20:42:4 84:21 86:15 97:21 61:4.8.16 68:21,21 156:3.4,521 188:22 166:21 30:20 10:22 10:22 10:31:0 17:24.27 56'777:10 159:12.13.14 161:18 shortage 14:3 secnario 41:21,22,25 113:21 114:11 118:6 81:19 99:3 108:1 161:11,13 162:7 shortage 14:3 201:9,01,63 20:27 136:25 138:25 14:221 155:9,18 158:11,11 167:25 168:517:22 shortage 14:3 201:9,01,63 20:27 136:25 138:25 14:221 155:9,18 158:11,11 167:25 168:517:22 shortage 14:3 201:9,01,63 20:27 136:25 188:18 199:11 1					
94:22 180:3,5 181:13 security 170:23 91:23 187:10 145:17,21 146:20 193:25 194:1 182:12 183:1 188:12 189:13 25:6 38:12 42:14,17 serve 27:15 140:22 147:3,12,20,25 148:1 shifting 186:23 190:25 193:4,21 43:23 45:21 48:1 service 22:3 32 18:21 151:4,69,18 152:5,7 shifting 186:23 200:24 201:6 202:14 71:22 77:1,5 77:20 30:15 55:3 60:10 154:24 155:10:1,21 short 46:24 93:2 206:8 207.4 100:2 10:20 113:10 71:24 25 76:7 77:10 159:12.13,14 161:3,6 shortage 14:3 sechedule 51:0 98:27 13:62 13:82:5 14:22 155:9,18 158:11,11 164:24 155:22 166:22 Shortage 14:3 sechedule 51:0 98:27 13:62 13:82:5 14:22 155:9,18 158:11,11 164:24 165:22 166:22 Shortage 14:3 307:6 153:22 158:14 159:11 159:23 25 160:27,9 175:25 179					
182:12 183:3 184:7 see 9:4 10:1 14:15 served 97:15 140:22 147:3;1;2,20:5 148:1 shifting 186:23 185:15 188:12 189:42 143:3 142:14:17 serve 23:16 148:6 149:3;10:12 78:1979:25 200:24 201:6 202:14 71:22 72:157:20 30:155:53 60:10 152:42:155:10;12:13 short 46:24:93:2 200:24 201:6 202:14 71:22 72:157:20 30:155:53 60:10 152:42:155:10;12:13 short 46:24:93:2 206:8 2074 100:21 00:22 013:10 71:42:25 76:77:10 156:34,52:1158:22 166:21 3cemario 41:21,22,25 113:21 114:11 118:6 81:19 99:3 108:1 161:11,13 162:7 short 98:1 scemario 8189:3 125:24 130:7 133:10 125:22 150:22 162:21 167:14,152.4 short 98:1 201:9.10:63 202:7 136:25 138:7.19 159:92.16 177:410:11 175:81.3 show 80:13 201:5.20:10:22 170:22 177:10 159:12.13.41:52.4 show 80:13 show 80:13 201:9.20:10:32:21 170:21 171:61:78:14 160:12,16:77.2 show 80:13 show 80:13 201:9:20:12:21:24:01:15 159:20:14:10:14:15 180:11:12:14:14:11					
185:15 188:12 190:25 193:24 25:638:124:21:44:1 serves 28:16 148:61493:0.10.2 shipping 77:1978:12 190:25 193:42:41 30:32:45:14:48:1 serves 28:16:82:11 15:14:46:0.18:15:25:7 78:19 79:25 200:24:201:62:02:14 71:22:77:15:77:20 30:15:55:36:01:0 15:42:41:55:10:12,13 short 46:24:93:2 206:82:07:4 100:2:10:2:01:13:0 71:24:25:76:77:10 15:91:21:31:41:16:3:5 short 46:24:93:2 206:82:07:4 100:2:10:2:01:13:0 71:24:25:76:77:10 15:91:21:31:41:16:3:5 short 46:24:93:2 scenario 41:22:22:5:10:22:23 166:21:10:23:12 166:24:14:15:24 short 98:1 schedue 55:10:98:27 73:62:51:38:251:42:21 15:25:25:19:22:22 Short 98:1 207:6 15:32:21:58:11:59:11 158:19:20:15:10:62:79 175:25:17:92:25:2 170:7 schedues 31:20:32:2 170:21:17:16:178:41 166:16:16:10:16:06:3 181:21:22:22:32:2 170:7 schwart 29:67:22:24 194:20:19:22:14:11:11:18 186:11:12:11 8howed 4:18 showed 4:18 50:17:22:55:99:11 198:18 199:61:3 166:10:10:16:38 181:21:22:23:25:13:13:0 showed 4:18 50:17:22:35:24:61:24:24					
190:25 193:42143:23 45:21 48:1service 2:25 3:2 18:21151:46.91,81 52:57shopping 77:19 78:12196:5 199:4 200:1250:15 2:16 5:3.2425:15 26:6 30:11,15152:910 153:2shopping 77:19 78:12200:24 201:6 202:1484:21 86:15 97:2161:48,16 68:21,21155:24,21 158:22166:21206:8 207:4100:2 102:20 113:1071:24,25 76 77:10159:12,13,14 161:36shorte 46:24 93:2206:8 207:4100:2 102:20 113:1071:24,25 76 77:10159:12,13,14 161:36shorte 98:1scenario 41:21,22,25113:21 114:11 118:681:19 99:3 108:1166:11 162:1166:23 167:14,15,24shorte 98:1201:9,10,63 202:7135:22 138:25 142:21155:9,18 158:11,11167:25 166:51 07:22,25shorte 98:1201:9,10,63 202:7136:22 158:19 191158:19,20 12:24158:19,20 12:24showed 8:17 140:18207:6153:22 158:18 159:11159:22,16 17:41.01 11 75:81,3showed 4:1830:5,12 39:2,123 40:119:22 194:20 195:24160:12,16;7.22180:14,16 181:1,20showed 4:18207:6153:22 138:18 199:6,13166:4,9,13,13,16,18182:7,10,15 183:9,18showed 4:1850:17.22 53:2,4 6:22204:7167:17,17,11,19,23184:21,22,24,25137:16Schwartz 39 67:22,23seein 38:24 64:11,15180:11,12 181:21186:7,82,188:18shuder 37:1557:23 46:2404:53 34:24:22133:1619:21 19:21 19:21136:14:22,24 189:18shuder 37:15182:12,13seek 41:1919:51 203:8 206:1419:12 194:11 19:13side 45:7 68:21 75:2119:21	182:12 183:3 184:7			147:3,12,20,25 148:1	
$\begin{array}{llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll$	185:15 188:12 189:13	25:6 38:12 42:14,17	serves 28:16	148:6 149:3,10,12	shifting 186:23
200:24 201:6 202:1471:22 72:15 77:2030:15 55:3 60:10154:24 155:10,12.13short 4:6:24 93:2203:11,20,22 204:2484:21 86:15 97:2161:48,16 68:21,21156:3,4,5,21 158:22166:21206:8 207:4100:2 101:20 113:1071:24,25 76.777:10159:12,13,14 161:3,6short age 14:3scenario 41:21,22,25113:21 114:11 118:681:19 99:3 108:1161:11,11 161:27short age 14:3stenarios 189:3125:24 130:7 133:10125:22 150:22,23166:23 167:14,15.24short 98:1201:9,10,16,23 202:7136:25 138:25 142:21158:19,20 11167:25 168:5 172:22shore 08:13207:6153:22 158:18 159:11159:23,25 160:2.79175:25 179:25,25170:7schedules 31:20 32:2170:21 171:6 178:4166:10 106:31 81:12,22,23:25showe 4:1830:5,12 39:21,23 40:1192:22 194:20 195:24166:4,91:3,13,16,18182:7,10:15 183:9,18showe 4:1850:17,22 53:24 61:2204:7167:17,17,17,19,23184:21,22,23,42:5showing 12:9 153:2040:15,15,25 50:9,11198:12 10:11 18:11186:7,8,24 188:18shudder 37:1550:17,22 33:24 61:2seek 31:10195:12 03:8 206:14191:21 194:11 198:13side 45:7 68:21 75:21scope 158:16 200:21seek 317:15services 11:14 95:35198:14 199:16 200:5102:20,21 109:5,6.6128:24,32 49:91:4 100:653:3 54:22 55:2312:9,131:6 13:5 17:2207:1,2136:11 137:42scope 158:16 200:21seek 31:71:5serviens 38:17 11:9183:10,14:92.5serviens 48:19104:51 18:21,221 47:52,131:5 <td< td=""><td>190:25 193:4,21</td><td>43:23 45:21 48:1</td><td>service 2:25 3:2 18:21</td><td>151:4,6,9,18 152:5,7</td><td>shopping 77:19 78:12</td></td<>	190:25 193:4,21	43:23 45:21 48:1	service 2:25 3:2 18:21	151:4,6,9,18 152:5,7	shopping 77:19 78:12
200:24 201:6 202:1471:22 72:1,5 77:2030:15 55:3 60:10154:24 155:10,12.13short 46:24 93:2203:11,20,22 204:2484:21 86:15 97:2161:48,16 68:21,21156:3,4,5,21 158:22166:21206:8 207:4100:2 101:20 113:1071:24,25 76:7 77:10159:12,13,14 161:3,6short age 14:3scenario 41:21,22,25113:21 114:11 118:681:19 99:3 108:1161:11,13 162:7short age 14:3scenarios 189:3125:24 130:7 133:10125:22 150:22,23166:23 167:14,15,24short 98:12019;01,01,62 302:7136:25 138:25 142:21158:19,20 159:2,16174:10,11 175:81,3showt 45:17 140:18207:6153:22 158:18 159:11159:22,16 174:10,11 175:81,3showt 45:17 140:18207:6153:22 158:18 159:11159:22,16 16:23 174:10,11 175:81,3showet 4:1830:5,12 39:21,23 40:119:22 194:20 195:24166:4,9,13,13,16,1818:27,10,23 18:21,91,83showet 4:1850:17,22 53:24 61:2204:7167:17,17,17,19,23184:21,22,23,25showet 38:14 18:1150:17,22 33:24 61:2204:7167:17,17,17,19,23184:21,22,24,25shuft 9:1 166:1118:21,12 13seek 11:19195:12 03:8 206:1419:21 194:11 198:13shuft 57:68:175:2150:17,22 33:46:18,19158:2155:20 181:1919:21 194:11 198:13side 57:68:21 75:2150:20:13 7,26 9 40:17,18seem 9:16 33:2 40:228:16 9:18,21 119200:22 203:2 204:20127:24 128:5,5 131:5150:20:13 7,26 9 40:17,18seem 9:16 33:2 40:228:16 9:18,21 119200:22 203:2 204:20127:24 128:5,5 131:51 <td< td=""><td>196:5 199:4 200:1,12</td><td>50:15,21 63:3,24</td><td>25:15 26:6 30:11,15</td><td>152:9,10 153:2</td><td>78:19 79:25</td></td<>	196:5 199:4 200:1,12	50:15,21 63:3,24	25:15 26:6 30:11,15	152:9,10 153:2	78:19 79:25
203:11,20,22,20:42:4 84:21 86:15 97:21 61:4.8.16 68:21.21 156:21 156:21 206:8 207:4 100:2 102:20 113:10 71:24,25 76:77:10 159:12.13,14 161:3,6 shortage 14:3 3cenario 41:21,22,25 113:21 114:11 118:6 113:21 14:11 118:6 159:12.22:16:17 123:12 166:21 16:52 168:5 172:22 Shortup 4:20 scenarios 189:3 125:24 130:7 133:10 125:22 15:02:2,23 166:23 167:14.15,24 shove 80:13 201:9,10,16,23 202:7 136:25 138:25 142:21 155:9,18 158:11 167:25 168:5 172:22 showe 48:17 14:018 207:6 133:22 128:18 159:11 159:22,15 16:02.7,9 175:25 179:25,25 170:7 schedules 31:20 32:2 170:21 171:6 178:4 166:12,16,17,22 180:14,16 181:11,20 showe 48:18 201:5,25 50:9,11 198:18 199:6,13 166:4,9,13,13,16,18 182:7,10,15 183:9,18 showe 58:4 118:11 50:17,22 33:2,4 61:24 204:7 167:17,17,17,19,23 184:21,22,24,25 show 58:4 118:11 50:17,22 33:2,4 61:24 204:7 167:17,17,17,19,23 184:48:16 8.40der 37:15 showe 58:4 118:11 50:17,22 452:65,20 198:12,114:11 185:12,224 182:5 </td <td>200:24 201:6 202:14</td> <td>71:22 72:1,5 77:20</td> <td>30:15 55:3 60:10</td> <td>154:24 155:10,12,13</td> <td>short 46:24 93:2</td>	200:24 201:6 202:14	71:22 72:1,5 77:20	30:15 55:3 60:10	154:24 155:10,12,13	short 46:24 93:2
2068 207:4 100:2 102:20 113:10 71:24,25 76:7 77:10 159:11,31 141 161:3.6 shortage 14:3 scenario 41:21,22,25 113:21 114:11 118:6 81:19 99:3 108:1 161:11,13 162:7 shortage 14:3 scenarios 189:3 123:15,20 124:3 112:25 116:17 123:12 164:24 165:22 166:22 Shortage 14:3 schedule 55:10 98:2,7 136:25 138:25 142:21 155:9,18 158:11,11 167:25 168:5 172:22 show 49:17 140:18 207:6 133:22 158:18 159:11 195:23,25 160:2,79 175:25 179:25,25 170:7 schedules 31:20 32:2 170:21 17:16 178:4 160:12,167,22 180:14,16 181:1.20 showed 4:18 33:5,12 39:21,23 40:1 192:22 194:20 195:24 166:4,9,13,13,16,18 182:1,22,23,25 showes 28:4 118:11 50:17.22 35:2,4 6i:24 204:7 167:17,17,19,23 184:21,22,24,25 showes 78:4 118:11 50:17.25 32:3,24,6i:24 204:7 167:17,17,19,23 186:7,8,24 188:18 shudder 37:15 67:23 146:18,19 seck 41:19 166:11,13:42:23,25 191:21 194:11 198:13 shudder 37:15 scope 158:16 200:21 seek 41:19 195:1 203:82 061:4 191:21 194:11 198:13	203:11,20,22 204:24	84:21 86:15 97:21	61:4,8,16 68:21,21	156:3,4,5,21 158:22	166:21
scenario 41:21,22,25 113:21 114:11 118:6 81:19 99:3 108:1 161:11,13 162:7 shorten 98:1 44:19 140:6 123:15,20 124:3 112:25 116:17 123:12 164:24 165:22 166:22 Shorten 98:1 scenarios 189:3 125:24 130:71 33:10 125:25 102:22.3 166:23 167:14,15,24 shore 80:13 201:9,10,16,23 202:7 143:13,19 153:7,19 158:19,20 159:2,16 177:171:578,13 shore 41:8 301:5,12 39:21,23 40:1 192:22 194:20 195:24 166:16:10 166:3 181:21,22,2,32 showed 4:18 33:5,12 39:21,23 40:1 192:22 194:20 195:24 166:16:10 166:3 181:27,10,15 183:9,18 showed 4:18 50:17,22 53:2,4 61:24 204:7 167:17,17,17,19,23 184:21,22,24,25 showed 7:15 51:20 152: 107:5 seeing 38:24 64:11.5 180:11,21 218:21 183:42,122,24,25 137:16 51:21 2,13 seek 177:15 services 1:14:9:53:3 198:11 49:11 98:13 side 45:7 68:21 75:21 50:01 37 26:9 40:17,18 seeming 149:1 56:1,12,12,325 8:1 200:8,20 201:5 119:16,21 123:16 45:9,13,23 46:19 see1:16 33:2 40:22 81:6 9:18,21 11:9 20:22,20 3:2 20:22 20:22 20:22 2		100:2 102:20 113:10	71:24,25 76:7 77:10		shortage 14:3
44:19 140:6123:15.20 124:3112:25 116:17 123:12164:24 165:22 166:22Short 94:20scenarios 189:3125:24 130:7 133:10125:22 150:22.23166:23 167:14,15.24short 91:19schedue 55:10 98:2.7136:25 138:25 142:21155:9,18 158:11,1167:25 168:57 172:22short 90:132019,10,16,23 202:7143:13,19 153:7,19158:19,20 159:2,16174:10,11 175:8,13short 90:13207:6153:22 158:18 159:11159:23,25 160:2,79175:25 179:25.25170:7schedue 31:20 32:2170:21 171:6 178:4160:12,16,17.22180:14,16 181:11,20showed 4:1833:5,12 39:21,23 40:1192:22 194:20 195:24166:4:16 165:10 166:3181:21,22,23,25shows 58:4 118:1150:17,22 53:2,4 61:24204:7167:17,17,17,19,23184:21,22,24,25137:1667:23 146:18,19158:3186:10,21 192:12189:4,810 190:15shud 91:166:11182:12,13seek 41:19195:1 203:8 206:14191:21 194:11 198:13side 45:7 68:21 75:21scopt 158:16 200:21seek 177:15services 1:11 49:5:3,5198:14 199:16 200:5102:20,21 109:5,6,6520:13:12 42:32 49:11 40:653:3 54:22 55:23129:13,13,16 13:5 172200:8,20 201:5119:16,21 123:1644:23,24 99:14 10:653:2 0:153:20,21 175:7,17,8,22,25service wide 8:24138:2 139:18 153:11139:21 152:21 77:56self-interest 90:420:8,21,24 21:4,10,14secison 95:21 32:21139:21 152:21 77:56self-interest 90:422:14,20,22 53:4,01secison 95:21 32:21139:12 20:11 30:11 32:1321:14,21 22:12	scenario 41:21,22,25	113:21 114:11 118:6	81:19 99:3 108:1	161:11,13 162:7	
scenarios 189:3 125:24 130.7 133:10 125:22 150:22,23 166:23 167:14,15,24 shov 91:19 schedule 55:10 98:2,7 136:25 138:25 142:21 155:9,18 158:11,11 167:25 168:171:22 show 80:13 201:9,10,6,23 202.7 143:13,19 153:7,19 158:19,20 159:2,16 174:10,11 175:8,13 show 45:17 140:18 207:6 153:22 158:18 159:11 159:23,25 160:27,9 175:25 179:25,25 showed 4:18 33:5,12 39:21,23 40:1 198:18 199:6,13 166:4,9,13,13,16,18 181:21,22,23,25 showed 4:18 40:15,15,25 50:9,11 198:18 199:6,13 166:4,9,13,13,16,18 182:27,10,15 183:9,18 showed 8:12:19 5chwartz 3:9 67:22,23 seeing 38:24 64:11,15 180:11,12 181:21 186:7,8,24 188:18 shuder 37:15 67:23 146:18,19 158:3 seek 41:19 195:1 203:8 206:14 191:21 194:11 198:11 side 45:7 68:21 75:21 182:12,13 seek 41:19 195:1 203:8 206:14 191:21 194:11 198:13 side 45:7 68:21 75:21 182:12,13 see 9:16 33:2 40:22 81:6 9:18,11:19 136:15 17:2 207:1.2 136:11 137:4,25 184:12,13 20:22 see 9:16 33:2 40:22 81:		123:15,20 124:3	112:25 116:17 123:12		Shortly 4:20
schedule 55:10 98:2,7 136:25 138:25 142:21 155:9,18 158:11,11 167:25 168:5 172:22 show 80:13 201:9,10,16,23 202:7 143:13,19 153:7,19 158:19,20 159:2,16 175:25 179:25,25 170:7 schedules 31:20 32:2 170:21 171:6 178:4 160:12,16,17,22 180:14,16 181:11,20 show 45:17 140:18 33:5,12 39:21,23 40:1 192:22 194:20 195:24 164:16 165:10 166:3 181:21,22,23,25 showing 12:9 153:20 40:15,152 50:9,11 198:18 199:6,13 166:4,9,13,13,16,18 182:7,10,15 183:9,18 shows 58:4 118:11 50:17,22 53:2,4 61:24 204:7 167:17,17,17,19,23 184:21,22,24,25 should e37:15 67:23 146:18,19 158:3 186:20,21 192:12 189:4,810 190:15 shud e7 37:15 scopt 158:16 200:21 seek 177:15 services:111 4:9 5:3,5 198:14 199:16 200:5 102:20,21 109:5,6,6 132:12,13 seem 9:16 33:2 40:22 81:6 9:18,21 11:9 202:22 203:2 204:20 127:24 128:5,5 131:5 84:23,24 99:14 100:6 53:3 54:22 55:23 12:9,13,16 13:5 17:2 207:1,2 136:11 137:4,25 9:44 19:20 69:25 9:10 153:8,23 17:5,7,17,18,22,25 servic	scenarios 189:3	125:24 130:7 133:10	125:22 150:22,23	166:23 167:14,15,24	shot 91:19
$\begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $	schedule 55:10 98:2,7				shove 80:13
207:6153:22 158:18 159:11159:23,25 160:2,7,9175:25 179:25,25170:7schedules 31:20 32:2170:21 171:6 178:4160:12,16,17,22180:14,16 181:11,20showed 4:1833:5,12 39:21,23 40:124192:22 194:20 195:24166:16:63181:21,22,23,25showing 12:9 153:2040:15,15,25 50:9,11198:18 199:6,13166:4,9,13,13,16,18182:7,10,15 183:9,18shows 58:4 118:1150:17,22 53:2,4 61:24204:7167:17,17,17,19,23184:21,22,24,25137:16Schwartz 3:9 67:22,3seeing 38:24 64:11,15180:11,12 181:21186:7,8,24 188:18shudder 37:15scope 158:16 200:21seek 41:19195:1 203:8 206:14191:21 194:11 198:13side 45:7 68:21 75:21scope 158:16 200:21seeks 177:15services 1:11 4:9 5:3,2198:14 199:16 200:5102:20,21 109:5,6,6Scott 37 26:9 40:17,18seen 9:16 33:2 40:228:16 9:18,21 11:9200:22 203:2 204:20127:24 128:5,5 131:545:9,13,23 46:19seen 9:16 33:2 40:228:16 9:18,21 11:9200:22 203:2 204:20127:24 128:5,5 131:5104:5 118:17 139:2069:25 9:210 153:8,2317:5,7,17,18,22,25servicing 54:19183:12,12 189:22139:21 152:2 177:56155:20 181:1918:3,10,14,19,25 19:2serving 54:19183:12,12 189:25204:24self-wident 95:2119:5,9,16,17,20serving 54:19183:12,12 189:25204:24self-wident 95:2120:42,24 21:4,10,14side 51:24 66:4 151:20screen 9:10selling 12:25 118:1322:14,20 22:25 23:4,10serving 54:19183:12,12 189:25	201:9,10,16,23 202:7				show 45:17 140:18
schedules31:2032:2170:21171:6178:4160:12,16,17,22180:14,16181:11,20showed 4:1833:5,1239:21,2340:15,15,2550:9,11192:22194:20195:24166:4,9,13,13,16,18181:21,22,23,25showing 12:9153:2040:15,15,2550:9,11198:18199:6,13166:4,9,13,13,16,18182:7,10,15183:7,10,15showed 4:1850:17,2253:2,461:24204:7167:17,17,17,19,23184:21,22,42,55137:165chwartz3:967:22,23seeing 38:2464:11,15180:11,12181:81:1186:7,8,24188:1867:23146:18,19158:3186:20,21192:12189:48,10190:15shud 9:1166:11182:12,13seek 177:15services 1:114:9:5,35198:14199:16200:20,21102:20,21109:5,6,65cota 3:726:940:17,18seemigly195:1203:82200:15119:16,21123:1645:9,13,2346:19seeningly149:15:6,11,21,23,25207:1,2127:24128:11104:5118:17139:2069:2592:10138:3,21135:17207:1,2136:11136:11316:11316:11316:11316:11316:11316:11316:11316:11316:11316:11316:11316:11316:11316:11316:11316:11316:11316:12316:11316:11316:11316:11316:11316:11316:11316:12316:11316:11<					170:7
33:5,1239:21,2340:1192:22194:20195:24164:16165:10181:21,22,23,25showing12:9153:2040:15,15,2550:9,11198:18199:6,13166:4,9,13,13,16,18182:7,10,15183:9,18shows 58:4118:1150:17,2253:2,461:24204:7167:17,17,17,19,23184:21,22,24,25137:16Schwartz 3:957:22,23seeing 38:2464:11,15180:11,12186:78,24186:78,24188:1267:23146:18,19158:3186:20,21192:12189:48,10190:15shut 9:1scope 158:16200:21seek 177:15services 1:1149:53,5198:14199:1600:2,02,11scope 158:16200:17seemingly 149:15:6,11,21,23,25198:14199:1600:2,02,11109:5,6,6Scott 3:726:940:17,18seem 9:1633:240:228:169:18,2111:920:22,2220:22127:24128:5,5131:584:23,249:1410:653:35:425:2.212:9,13,1613:517:2207:1,213:6:1113:11.13:1317:5,7,17,18,22,25service wide 82:24138:21,2113:11.13:1313:12,12188:22,12,1213:1313:12,1218:22,12,1213:1313:12,1218:22,1213:1313:12,1218:22,1213:1313:12,1218:22,1213:1313:12,1212:14,2122:1413:1213:14,2112:14,2112:1412:1412:2418:21,1213:1313:12 <td>schedules 31:20 32:2</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>showed 4:18</td>	schedules 31:20 32:2				showed 4:18
40:15,15,25198:18198:18199:6,13166:4,9,13,13,16,18182:7,10,15183:9,18shows 58:4118:1150:17,2253:2,461:24204:7167:17,17,17,19,23184:21,22,24,25137:16Schwartz 3:967:22,23seeing 38:2446:11,15180:11,12181:21186:7,8,24188:18shuder 37:1557:23146:18,19158:3186:20,21192:12189:4,8,10190:15shud 9:166:11182:12,13seek 41:19195:1203:8206:14191:21194:11198:13side 45:768:2175:21scopt 158:16seen 9:1633:240:228:16918:21198:14199:16200:200102:20,21109:5,6,645:9,13,23seen 9:1633:240:228:16918:21198:14199:16200:22127:24128:5,5131:584:23,2499:14100:653:354:2252:3212:9,13,16135:17:2207:1,2136:11137:4,25104:5118:17139:2152:1018:3,10,14,19,25198:383:2138:12,12188:21,24188:18139:21152:2177:5155:2018:15201:42,2284:2138:12186:12186:20,21128:1436:15self-wident 95:2191:35,9,16,17,20serving 54:1983:12,12189:12183:12190:3192:6screen 29:10self-self-setf-setf-setf-setf-setf-setf-setf-set					
$\begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $					0
Schwartz 3:9 67:22,23 67:23 146:18,19 182:12,13seeing 38:24 64:11,15 158:3180:11,12 181:21 180:11,12 181:21186:7,8,24 188:18 189:4,8,10 190:15shuder 37:15 shut 9:1 166:11182:12,13 scope 158:16 20:21 scope 158:16 20:21 scope 158:16 20:21seek 41:19 scek 41:19195:1 203:8 206:14 services 1:11 4:9 5:3,3191:21 194:11 198:13 198:14 199:16 200:5side 45:7 68:21 75:21 side 45:7 68:21 75:21 side 45:7 68:21 75:21 store 1:14:95:3,23 46:1945:9,13,23 46:19 45:9,13,23 46:19 seen 9:16 33:2 40:22seein 9:16 33:2 40:22 53:3 54:22 55:238:16 9:18,21 11:9 19:3,54:12 17:8,22,25200:8,20 201:5 services 201:1 137:4,25 service 8:224136:11 137:4,25 136:11 137:4,25104:5 118:17 139:20 0:42:2469:25 92:10 153:8,23 155:20 181:1917:57,17,18,22,25 19:3,59,16,17,20 20:8,21,24 21:4,014 20:8,21,24 21:4,014service service 82:24 83:2138:12,12 189:25 19:3,12,12 189:25204:24 screen 29:10 serutinz 29:10 seling 12:25 118:13 screen 14:14self-interest 90:4 136:1520:8,21,24 21:4,014 20:8,21,24 21:4,014 20:8,21,71,940:67session 95:2 132:21 set 26:20 29:3,24 30:2 15:110:11 139:10 25:18 sersing 15:11 07:11 124:16 125:6 130:15 26:16 28:7,16,21,22 26:8 30:7,1940:67setting 30:13 set 26:20 29:3,24 30:2 19:8:14 19:3:10 19:3:12 98:8 30:7,1940:67 17:41,717 206:4 158:8 174:17 193:10SEC 2:5,67 4:25 5:2 sending 158:12 4:16:21 16:1349:17 50:4,16 51:13 29:8 30:7,1940:67 137:6 185:24 186:4 59:12 26:4;16 51:15 59:110:21 139:16:7,1020 24:9137:16 185:24 186:4 59:12,22 61:4,7,1621 59:11720 56:4,57,20 139:11 720:65:4,57,20 139:11 720:65:4,57,20 139:					
67:23 146:18,19158:3186:20,21 192:12189:4,8,10 190:15shut 9:1 166:11182:12,13seek 41:19195:1 203:8 206:14191:21 194:11 198:13side 45.7 68:21 75:21scop 158:16 200:21seeks 177:15services 1:11 4:9 5:3,5198:14 199:16 200:5102:20,21 109:5,6,6Scott 3:7 26:9 40:17,18seem nigly 149:15:6,11,21,23,25 8:1200:8,20 201:5119:16,21 123:1645:9,13,23 46:19seen 9:16 33:2 40:228:16 9:18,21 11:9202:22 203:2 204:20127:24 128:5,5 131:584:23,24 99:14 100:653:3 54:22 55:2312:9,13,16 13:5 17:2207:1,2136:11 137:4,25104:5 118:17 139:2069:25 92:10 153:8,2317:5,7,17,18,22,25service-wide 82:24138:1 139:18 153:11139:21 152:2 177:5,6155:20 181:1919:3,5,9,16,17,20servicing 54:19183:12,22 188:29204:24self-evident 95:2119:3,5,9,16,17,20serving 88:17 115:13190:3 192:6screen 29:10sell 103:1 130:1 135:1321:14,21 22:12,13,13156:14side 51:24 66:4 151:20screens 14:14136:1522:14,20,25 23:4,10session 95:2 132:21154:3,10 165:18scrutnize 29:10selling 12:25 118:1323:15,17,25 26:9,10sessions 15:7sigh 93:6,9 94:3 99:7se 126:25 167:15 168:5semantical 133:1329:8 30:7,19 40:6,785:4 88:2 123:17108:24 116:21 150:23set 4:4,5 98:8sending 158:1240:23 41:7,9 42:5,6174:17,17 206:4158:8 174:17 193:1013:9 16:7,10,20 24:9150:12,14 152:1951:17,20 56:4,5,7,20shape 106:6signed 74:1					
182:12,13seek 41:19195:1 203:8 206:14191:21 194:11 198:13side 45:7 68:21 75:21scopt 158:16 200:21seeks 177.15services 1:11 4:9 5:3,5198:14 199:16 200:5102:20,21 109:5,6,6Scott 3:7 26:9 40:17,18seemingly 149:15:6,11,21,23,25 8:1200:8,20 201:5119:16,21 123:1645:9,13,23 46:19seen 9:16 33:2 40:228:16 9:18,21 11:9202:22 203:2 204:20127:24 128:5,5 131:584:23,24 99:14 100:653:3 54:22 55:2312:9,13,16 13:5 17:2207:1,2136:11 137:4,25104:5 118:17 139:2069:25 92:10 153:8,2317:5,7,17,18,22,25service-wide 82:24138:2 139:18 153:11139:21 152:2 177:5,6155:20 181:1918:3,10,14,19,25 19:2serving 58:17183:2,12 189:25204:24self-interest 90:420:8,21,24 21:4,10,14serving 88:17 115:13190:3 192:6screen 29:10sell 103:1 130:1 135:1321:14,21 22:12,13,13156:14side s51:24 66:4 151:20screens 14:14136:1522:14,20,25 23:4,10session 95:2 1 32:21i54:49:5scrutiny 65:1 107:11124:16 125:6 130:1526:16 28:7,16,21,22set 20:2 02:3,24 30:2sigh 93:6, 94:3 99:7se 126:25 167:15 168:5semantical 133:1329:8 30:7,19 40:6,785:4 88:2 123:17108:24 116:21 150:23set 25:2, 67, 4:25 5:2senior 51:12 146:1042:16 44:15,22set ating 30:13193:12 205:23set 16:2, 10:22 119:16137:16,21,23 150:1049:17 50:4,65:13shades 68:20significant 32:16 51:15set 2:42 2:5:12 2:6:3,520sense 20:5 37:18 44:857:18 58:13,1		•			
scope 158:16 200:21seeks 177:15services 1:11 4:9 5:3,5198:14 199:16 200:5102:20,21 109:5,6,6Scott 3:7 26:9 40:17,18seemingly 149:15:6,11,21,23,25 8:1200:8,20 201:5119:16,21 123:1645:9,13,23 46:19seen 9:16 33:2 40:22816 9:18,21 11:9202:22 203:2 204:20127:24 128:5,5 131:584:23,24 99:14 100:653:3 54:22 55:2312:9,13,16 13:5 17:2207:1,2136:11 137:4,25104:5 118:17 139:2069:25 92:10 153:8,2317:5,7,17,18,22,25service-wide 82:24138:2 139:18 153:11139:21 152:2 177:5,6155:20 181:1918:3,10,14,19,25 19:283:2181:22,24 182:8,9188:12,13 203:20self-evident 95:2119:3,5,9,16,17,20service wide 82:24138:12,12 189:25204:24self-interest 90:420:8,21,24 21:4,10,14serving 88:17 115:13190:3 192:6screen 14:14136:1522:14,20,25 23:4,10session 51:2 1 66:14sides 51:24 66:4 151:20scrutinize 29:10selling 12:25 118:1323:15,17,25 26:9,10sesion 51:57sign 49:5scrutiny 65:1 107:11124:16 125:6 130:1526:16 28:7,16,21,22set 26:20 29:23,24 30:2sign 93:6,9 94:3 99:7sel 26:25 167:15 168:5sending 158:1240:23 41:7,9 40:6,785:4 88: 21 23:17108:24 116:21 150:23set4:4,5 98:8sending 158:1240:23 41:7,9 40:6,785:4 88: 21 23:17108:24 116:21 150:23set5 4:4,5 98:8sending 158:1240:23 41:7,9 40:6,7174:17,172 06:4158:8 174:17 193:10set2 4:2,2 10:2,2 119:16147:12,16,23 150:1049:17 50:4,16 51:13<		seek 41:19			
Scott 3:7 26:9 40:17,18 45:9,13,23 46:19seemingly 149:1 seen 9:16 33:2 40:225:6,11,21,23,25 8:1 8:16 9:18,21 11:9200:8,20 201:5 202:22 203:2 204:20119:16,21 123:16 127:24 128:5,5 131:584:23,24 99:14 100:653:3 54:22 55:2312:9,13,16 13:5 17:2207:1,2136:11 137:4,25104:5 118:17 139:2069:25 92:10 153:8,2317:5,7,17,18,22,25service-wide 82:24138:2 139:18 153:11139:21 152:2 177:5,6155:20 181:1918:3,10,14,19,25 19:283:2181:22,24 182:8,9204:24self-wident 95:2119:3,5,9,16,17,20service wide 82:24138:12,12 189:25204:24self-interest 90:420:8,21,24 21:4,10,14serving 88:17 115:13190:3 192:6screen 29:10sell 103:1 130:1 135:1321:14,21 22:12,13,13156:14sides 51:24 66:4 151:20screen 14:14136:1522:14,20,25 23:4,10session 95:2 132:21sight 49:5scrutinize 29:10selling 12:25 118:1323:15,17,25 26:9,10session 95:2 132:21sight 49:5scrutiny 65:1 107:11124:16 125:6 130:1526:16 28:7,19 40:6,785:4 88:2 123:17108:24 116:21 150:23seats 4:4,5 98:8sending 158:1240:23 41:7,9 42:5,6174:17,17 206:4158:8 174:17 193:10SEC 2:5,6,7 4:25 5:2senior 5:12 146:1042:16 44:15,25 47:2,6setting 30:13193:12 205:236:16,21 10:22 11:9,16147:12,16,23 150:1049:17 50:4,16 51:13shades 68:20signal 106:2113:9 16:7,10,20 24:9150:12,14 152:1951:17,20 56:4,5,7,20shape 106:6signef 74:1324:23 25:12 2					
45:9,13,23 46:19seen 9:16 33:2 40:228:16 9:18,21 11:9202:22 203:2 204:20127:24 128:5,5 131:584:23,24 99:14 100:653:3 54:22 55:2312:9,13,16 13:5 17:2207:1,2136:11 137:4,25104:5 118:17 139:2069:25 92:10 153:8,2317:5,7,17,18,22,25service-wide 82:24138:2 139:18 153:11139:21 152:2 177:5,6155:20 181:1918:3,10,14,19,25 19:283:2188:12,13 203:20204:24self-wident 95:2119:3,5,9,16,17,20servicing 54:19183:12,12 189:25204:24self-interest 90:420:8,21,24 21:4,10,14serving 88:17 115:13190:3 192:6screen 29:10selling 12:25 118:1322:14,20,25 23:4,10session 95:2 132:21sides 51:24 66:4 151:20scrutinize 29:10selling 12:25 118:1323:15,17,25 26:9,10session 15:7sight 49:5scrutiny 65:1 107:11124:16 125:6 130:1526:16 28:7,16,21,22set 26:20 29:23,24 30:2sign 93:6,9 94:3 99:7set 34:4,5 98:8sending 158:1240:23 41:7,9 42:5,6174:17,17 206:4158:8 174:17 193:10SEC 2:5,6,7 4:25 5:2sending 158:1240:23 41:7,9 42:5,6setting 30:13193:12 205:236:16,21 10:22 11:9,16147:12,16,23 150:1049:17 50:4,16 51:13shade 68:20signal 106:2113:9 16:7,10,20 24:9150:12,14 152:1951:17,20 56:4,5,7,20shape 106:6signal 106:2124:23 25:12 26:3,5,20sense 20:5 37:18 44:859:12,22 61:4,7,16,21112:16 192:370:3 104:7,25 105:324:23 25:17 71:8 104:9137:6 185:24 186:461:22 62:5,15 63:4,5share 16:5 8	-		· · · · · ·		
84:23,24 99:14 100:653:3 54:22 55:2312:9,13,16 13:5 17:2207:1,2136:11 137:4,25104:5 118:17 139:2069:25 92:10 153:8,2317:5,7,17,18,22,25service-wide 82:24138:2 139:18 153:11139:21 152:2 177:5,6155:20 181:1918:3,10,14,19,25 19:2service-wide 82:24138:2 12,12 189:25204:24self-evident 95:2119:3,5,9,16,17,20servicing 54:19183:12,12 189:25204:24self-interest 90:420:8,21,24 21:4,10,14serving 88:17 115:13190:3 192:6screen 29:10sell 103:1 130:1 135:1321:14,21 22:12,13,13156:14sides 51:24 66:4 151:20screen 14:14136:1522:14,20,25 23:4,10session 95:2 132:21154:3,10 165:18scrutiny 65:1 107:11124:16 125:6 130:1526:16 28:7,16,21,22sesion 95:2 132:21sight 49:5set 4:4,5 98:8sending 158:1240:23 41:7,9 42:5,6174:17,17 206:4158:8 174:17 193:10SEC 2:5,6,7 4:25 5:2senior 5:12 146:1042:16 44:15,25 47:2,6setting 30:13193:12 205:236:16,21 10:22 11:9,16147:12,16,23 150:1049:17 50:4,16 51:13shades 68:20signal 106:2113:9 16:7,10,20 24:9150:12,14 152:1951:17,20 56:4,5,7,20share 10:5 84:13significant 32:16 51:1527:19 32:11 44:548:4 75:17 106:1359:21,22 61:4,7,16,21112:16 192:370:3 104:7,25 105:324:23 25:12 26:3,5,24185:24 186:461:22 62:5,15 63:4,5shared 81:21162:15 189:20 198:12110:13 115:11 138:14187:9 195:663:12 64:10,14 66:5,9shared 81:21162:15 1					
104:5 118:17 139:2069:25 92:10 153:8,2317:5,7,17,18,22,25service-wide 82:24138:2 139:18 153:11139:21 152:2 177:5,6155:20 181:1918:3,10,14,19,25 19:283:283:2188:12,13 203:20self-wident 95:2119:3,5,9,16,17,20serving 54:19183:12,12 189:25204:24self-interest 90:420:8,21,24 21:4,10,14serving 88:17 115:13190:3 192:6screen 29:10sell 103:1 130:1 135:1321:14,21 22:12,13,13156:14sides 51:24 66:4 151:20scrutiniz 29:10selling 12:25 118:1322:14,20:25 23:4,10session 95:2 132:21sight 49:5set 26:25 167:15 168:5semantical 133:1329:8 30:7,19 40:6,785:4 88:2 123:17108:24 116:21 150:23set 4:4,5 98:8sending 158:1240:23 41:7,9 42:5,6174:17,17 206:4158:8 174:17 193:10SEC 2:5,6,7 4:25 5:2senior 5:12 146:1042:16 44:15,25 47:2,6setting 30:13193:12 205:236:16,21 10:22 11:9,16147:12,16,23 150:1049:17 50:4,16 51:13shades 68:20signal 106:2113:9 16:7,10,20 24:9150:12,14 152:1951:17,20 56:4,5,7,20shape 106:6signed 74:1324:23 25:12 26:3,5,20sense 20:5 37:18 44:857:18 58:13,16 59:20shape 106:6signed 74:1327:19 32:11 44:548:4 75:17 106:1359:21,22 61:4,7,16,21112:16 192:370:3 104:7,25 105:327:19 32:11 44:548:4 75:17 106:1359:21,22 61:4,7,16,21112:16 192:370:3 104:7,25 105:327:19 32:11 44:548:4 75:17 106:1359:21,22 61:4,7,16,21112:16 192:370:3 104:7,25 10					,
139:21 152:2 177:5,6155:20 181:1918:3,10,14,19,25 19:283:2181:22,24 182:8,9188:12,13 203:20self-evident 95:2119:3,5,9,16,17,20servicing 54:19183:12,12 189:25204:24self-interest 90:420:8,21,24 21:4,10,14serving 88:17 115:13190:3 192:6screen 29:10sell 103:1 130:1 135:1321:14,21 22:12,13,13156:14sides 51:24 66:4 151:20screens 14:14136:1522:14,20,25 23:4,10session 95:2 132:21154:3,10 165:18scrutinize 29:10selling 12:25 118:1323:15,17,25 26:9,10sessions 15:7sight 49:5scrutiny 65:1 107:11124:16 125:6 130:1526:16 28:7,16,21,22set 26:20 29:23,24 30:2sign 93:6,9 94:3 99:7se 126:25 167:15 168:5semantical 133:1329:8 30:7,19 40:6,785:4 88:2 123:17108:24 116:21 150:23sets 4:4,5 98:8sending 158:1240:23 41:7,9 42:5,6174:17,17 206:4158:8 174:17 193:10SEC 2:5,6,7 4:25 5:2senior 5:12 146:1042:16 44:15,25 47:2,6setting 30:13193:12 205:236:16,21 10:22 11:9,16147:12,16,23 150:1049:17 50:4,16 51:13shades 68:20signal 106:2113:9 16.7,10,20 24:9150:12,14 152:1951:17,20 56:4,5,7,20share 106:6signal 74:1324:23 25:12 26:3,5,20sense 20:5 37:18 44:857:18 58:13,16 59:20share 16:5 84:13significant 32:16 51:1527:19 32:11 44:548:4 75:17 106:1359:21,22 61:4,7,16,21112:16 192:370:3 104:7,25 105:352:17 71:8 104:9137:6 185:24 186:461:22 62:5,15 63:4,5shared 81:21 </td <td>,</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>,</td> <td></td>	,			,	
188:12,13 203:20 204:24self-evident 95:21 self-interest 90:419:3,5,9,16,17,20 20:8,21,24 21:4,10,14servicing 54:19 serving 88:17 115:13183:12,12 189:25 190:3 192:6screen 29:10 screens 14:14sell 103:1 130:1 135:13 136:1521:14,21 22:12,13,13 22:14,20,25 23:4,10156:14sides 51:24 66:4 151:20 154:3,10 165:18scrutinize 29:10 scrutiny 65:1 107:11 selling 12:25 118:13selling 12:25 118:13 124:16 125:6 130:1526:16 28:7,16,21,22 29:8 30:7,19 40:67session 95:2 132:21 set 26:20 29:23,24 30:22sign 93:6,9 94:3 99:7 sign 93:6,9 94:3 99:7se 126:25 167:15 168:5 semantical 133:13 seats 4:4,5 98:8 sending 158:12sending 158:12 40:23 41:7,9 42:5,6set 26:20 29:23,24 30:22 set 26:20 29:23,24 30:22sign 93:6,9 94:3 99:7 sign 106:21 sign 106:21 100:23SEC 2:5,6,7 4:25 5:2 6:16,21 10:22 119,16sending 158:12 147:12,16,23 150:1040:13 41:5,9 42:5,6 49:17 50:4,16 51:13 51:17,20 56:4,57,20states 68:20 signal 106:21 shage 106:6signal 106:21 signel 74:13313:9 16:7,10,20 24:9 24:23 25:12 26:3,5,20sense 20:5 37:18 44:8 84:4 75:17 106:1359:21,22 61:4,7,16,21 59:21,22 61:4,7,16,21shage 106:6 signel 74:13significant 32:16 51:15 significant 32:16 51:1527:19 32:11 44:5 110:13 115:11 138:14 140:1,5 189:1 195:15137:6 185:24 186:4 187:9 195:663:12 64:10,14 66:5,9 63:12 64:10,14 66:5,9share 06:711 significantly 19:3 49:16140:1,5 189:1 195:15sensible 10:23 57:1968:3,9,16,19,22 70:16146:17significantly 19:3 49:16					
204:24self-interest 90:420:8,21,24 21:4,10,14serving 88:17 115:13190:3 192:6screen 29:10sell 103:1 130:1 135:1321:14,21 22:12,13,13156:14sides 51:24 66:4 151:20screens 14:14136:1522:14,20,25 23:4,10session 95:2 132:21154:3,10 165:18scrutinize 29:10selling 12:25 118:1323:15,17,25 26:9,10session 15:7sight 49:5scrutiny 65:1 107:11124:16 125:6 130:1526:16 28:7,16,21,22set 26:20 29:23,24 30:2sign 93:6,9 94:3 99:7se 126:25 167:15 168:5semantical 133:1329:8 30:7,19 40:6,785:4 88:2 123:17108:24 116:21 150:23sets 4:4,5 98:8sending 158:1240:23 41:7,9 42:5,6174:17,17 206:4158:8 174:17 193:10SEC 2:5,6,7 4:25 5:2senior 5:12 146:1042:16 44:15,25 47:2,6setting 30:13193:12 205:236:16,21 10:22 11:9,16147:12,16,23 150:1049:17 50:4,16 51:13shades 68:20signal 106:2113:9 16:7,10,20 24:9150:12,14 152:1951:17,20 56:4,5,7,20shape 106:6signed 74:1324:23 25:12 26:3,5,20sense 20:5 37:18 44:857:18 58:13,16 59:20share 16:5 84:13significant 32:16 51:1527:19 32:11 44:548:4 75:17 106:1359:21,22 61:4,7,16,21112:16 192:370:3 104:7,25 105:352:17 71:8 104:9137:6 185:24 186:461:22 62:5,15 63:4,5shared 81:21162:15 189:20 198:12110:13 115:11 138:14187:9 195:663:12 64:10,14 66:5,9shareowner 67:11205:19,24 206:13140:1,5 189:1 195:15sensible 10:23 57:1968:3,9,16,19,22 70:16 <td>· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>, , ,</td>	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·				, , ,
screen 29:10sell 103:1 130:1 135:1321:14,21 22:12,13,13156:14sides 51:24 66:4 151:20screens 14:14136:1522:14,20,25 23:4,10session 95:2 132:21154:3,10 165:18scrutinize 29:10selling 12:25 118:1323:15,17,25 26:9,10session 15:7sight 49:5scrutiny 65:1 107:11124:16 125:6 130:1526:16 28:7,16,21,22set 26:20 29:23,24 30:2sign 93:6,9 94:3 99:7se 126:25 167:15 168:5semantical 133:1329:8 30:7,19 40:6,785:4 88:2 123:17108:24 116:21 150:23seats 4:4,5 98:8sending 158:1240:23 41:7,9 42:5,6174:17,17 206:4158:8 174:17 193:10SEC 2:5,6,7 4:25 5:2senior 5:12 146:1042:16 44:15,25 47:2,6setting 30:13193:12 205:236:16,21 10:22 11:9,16147:12,16,23 150:1049:17 50:4,16 51:13shades 68:20signal 106:2113:9 16:7,10,20 24:9150:12,14 152:1951:17,20 56:4,5,7,20shape 106:6signed 74:1324:23 25:12 26:3,5,20sense 20:5 37:18 44:857:18 58:13,16 59:20share 16:5 84:13significant 32:16 51:1527:19 32:11 44:548:4 75:17 106:1359:21,22 61:4,7,16,21112:16 192:370:3 104:7,25 105:352:17 71:8 104:9137:6 185:24 186:461:22 62:5,15 63:4,5shared 81:21162:15 189:20 198:12110:13 115:11 138:14187:9 195:663:12 64:10,14 66:5,9shareowner 67:11205:19,24 206:13140:1,5 189:1 195:15sensible 10:23 57:1968:3,9,16,19,22 70:16146:17significantly 19:3 49:16					
screens14:14136:1522:14,20,25 23:4,10session 95:2 132:21154:3,10 165:18scrutinize29:10selling12:25 118:1323:15,17,25 26:9,10sessions 15:7sight 49:5scrutiny65:1 107:11124:16 125:6 130:1526:16 28:7,16,21,22set 26:20 29:23,24 30:2sign 93:6,9 94:3 99:7se 126:25 167:15 168:5semantical 133:1329:8 30:7,19 40:6,785:4 88:2 123:17108:24 116:21 150:23seats4:4,5 98:8sending 158:1240:23 41:7,9 42:5,6174:17,17 206:4158:8 174:17 193:10SEC 2:5,6,7 4:25 5:2senior 5:12 146:1042:16 44:15,25 47:2,6setting 30:13193:12 205:236:16,21 10:22 11:9,16147:12,16,23 150:1049:17 50:4,16 51:13shades 68:20signal 106:2113:9 16:7,10,20 24:9150:12,14 152:1951:17,20 56:4,5,7,20shape 106:6signed 74:1324:23 25:12 26:3,5,20sense 20:5 37:18 44:857:18 58:13,16 59:20share 16:5 84:13significant 32:16 51:1527:19 32:11 44:548:4 75:17 106:1359:21,22 61:4,7,16,21112:16 192:370:3 104:7,25 105:352:17 71:8 104:9137:6 185:24 186:461:22 62:5,15 63:4,5shared 81:21162:15 189:20 198:12110:13 115:11 138:14187:9 195:663:12 64:10,14 66:5,9shareowner 67:11205:19,24 206:13140:1,5 189:1 195:15sensible 10:23 57:1968:3,9,16,19,22 70:16146:17significantly 19:3 49:16				-	
scrutinize 29:10selling 12:25 118:1323:15,17,25 26:9,10sessions 15:7sight 49:5scrutiny 65:1 107:11124:16 125:6 130:1526:16 28:7,16,21,22set 26:20 29:23,24 30:2sign 93:6,9 94:3 99:7se 126:25 167:15 168:5semantical 133:1329:8 30:7,19 40:6,785:4 88:2 123:17108:24 116:21 150:23seats 4:4,5 98:8sending 158:1240:23 41:7,9 42:5,6174:17,17 206:4158:8 174:17 193:10SEC 2:5,6,7 4:25 5:2senior 5:12 146:1042:16 44:15,25 47:2,6setting 30:13193:12 205:236:16,21 10:22 11:9,16147:12,16,23 150:1049:17 50:4,16 51:13shades 68:20signal 106:2113:9 16:7,10,20 24:9150:12,14 152:1951:17,20 56:4,5,7,20shape 106:6signed 74:1324:23 25:12 26:3,5,20sense 20:5 37:18 44:857:18 58:13,16 59:20share 16:5 84:13significant 32:16 51:1527:19 32:11 44:548:4 75:17 106:1359:21,22 61:4,7,16,21112:16 192:370:3 104:7,25 105:352:17 71:8 104:9137:6 185:24 186:461:22 62:5,15 63:4,5shared 81:21162:15 189:20 198:12110:13 115:11 138:14187:9 195:663:12 64:10,14 66:5,9shareowner 67:11205:19,24 206:13140:1,5 189:1 195:15sensible 10:23 57:1968:3,9,16,19,22 70:16146:17significantly 19:3 49:16					
scrutiny 65:1 107:11124:16 125:6 130:1526:16 28:7,16,21,22set 26:20 29:23,24 30:2sign 93:6,9 94:3 99:7se 126:25 167:15 168:5semantical 133:1329:8 30:7,19 40:6,7set 26:20 29:23,24 30:2sign 93:6,9 94:3 99:7seats 4:4,5 98:8sending 158:1240:23 41:7,9 42:5,6174:17,17 206:4158:8 174:17 193:10SEC 2:5,6,7 4:25 5:2senior 5:12 146:1042:16 44:15,25 47:2,6setting 30:13193:12 205:236:16,21 10:22 11:9,16147:12,16,23 150:1049:17 50:4,16 51:13shades 68:20signal 106:2113:9 16:7,10,20 24:9150:12,14 152:1951:17,20 56:4,5,7,20shape 106:6signed 74:1324:23 25:12 26:3,5,20sense 20:5 37:18 44:857:18 58:13,16 59:20share 16:5 84:13significant 32:16 51:1527:19 32:11 44:548:4 75:17 106:1359:21,22 61:4,7,16,21112:16 192:370:3 104:7,25 105:352:17 71:8 104:9137:6 185:24 186:461:22 62:5,15 63:4,5shared 81:21162:15 189:20 198:12110:13 115:11 138:14187:9 195:663:12 64:10,14 66:5,9shareowner 67:11205:19,24 206:13140:1,5 189:1 195:15sensible 10:23 57:1968:3,9,16,19,22 70:16146:17significantly 19:3 49:16					
se 126:25 167:15 168:5 seats 4:4,5 98:8semantical 133:13 sending 158:1229:8 30:7,19 40:6,7 40:23 41:7,9 42:5,685:4 88:2 123:17 174:17,17 206:4108:24 116:21 150:23 158:8 174:17 193:10SEC 2:5,6,7 4:25 5:2 6:16,21 10:22 11:9,16senior 5:12 146:10 147:12,16,23 150:1042:16 44:15,25 47:2,6 49:17 50:4,16 51:13setting 30:13 shades 68:20193:12 205:23 signal 106:21319 16:7,10,20 24:9 24:23 25:12 26:3,5,20 27:19 32:11 44:5150:12,14 152:19 48:4 75:17 106:1351:17,20 56:4,5,7,20 59:21,22 61:4,7,16,21shape 106:6 112:16 192:3significant 32:16 51:15 70:3 104:7,25 105:352:17 71:8 104:9 110:13 115:11 138:14 140:1,5 189:1 195:15137:6 185:24 186:4 187:9 195:663:12 64:10,14 66:5,9 68:3,9,16,19,22 70:16share 0f:11 146:17205:19,24 206:13 significantly 19:3 49:16		0			
seats 4:4,5 98:8sending 158:1240:23 41:7,9 42:5,6174:17,17 206:4158:8 174:17 193:10SEC 2:5,6,7 4:25 5:2senior 5:12 146:1042:16 44:15,25 47:2,6setting 30:13193:12 205:236:16,21 10:22 11:9,16147:12,16,23 150:1049:17 50:4,16 51:13shades 68:20signal 106:2113:9 16:7,10,20 24:9150:12,14 152:1951:17,20 56:4,57,20shape 106:6signed 74:1324:23 25:12 26:3,5,20sense 20:5 37:18 44:857:18 58:13,16 59:20share 16:5 84:13significant 32:16 51:1527:19 32:11 44:548:4 75:17 106:1359:21,22 61:4,7,16,21112:16 192:370:3 104:7,25 105:352:17 71:8 104:9137:6 185:24 186:461:22 62:5,15 63:4,5shared 81:21162:15 189:20 198:12110:13 115:11 138:14187:9 195:663:12 64:10,14 66:5,9shareowner 67:11205:19,24 206:13140:1,5 189:1 195:15sensible 10:23 57:1968:3,9,16,19,22 70:16146:17significantly 19:3 49:16	l l				0
SEC 2:5,6,7 4:25 5:2senior 5:12 146:1042:16 44:15,25 47:2,6setting 30:13193:12 205:236:16,21 10:22 11:9,16147:12,16,23 150:1049:17 50:4,16 51:13shades 68:20signal 106:2113:9 16:7,10,20 24:9150:12,14 152:1951:17,20 56:4,57,20shape 106:6signed 74:1324:23 25:12 26:3,5,20sense 20:5 37:18 44:857:18 58:13,16 59:20share 16:5 84:13significant 32:16 51:1527:19 32:11 44:548:4 75:17 106:1359:21,22 61:4,7,16,21112:16 192:370:3 104:7,25 105:352:17 71:8 104:9137:6 185:24 186:461:22 62:5,15 63:4,5shared 81:21162:15 189:20 198:12110:13 115:11 138:14187:9 195:663:12 64:10,14 66:5,9shareowner 67:11205:19,24 206:13140:1,5 189:1 195:15sensible 10:23 57:1968:3,9,16,19,22 70:16146:17significantly 19:3 49:16					
6:16,21 10:22 11:9,16147:12,16,23 150:1049:17 50:4,16 51:13shades 68:20signal 106:2113:9 16:7,10,20 24:9150:12,14 152:1951:17,20 56:4,57,20shape 106:6signed 74:1324:23 25:12 26:3,5,20sense 20:5 37:18 44:857:18 58:13,16 59:20share 16:5 84:13significant 32:16 51:1527:19 32:11 44:548:4 75:17 106:1359:21,22 61:4,7,16,21112:16 192:370:3 104:7,25 105:352:17 71:8 104:9137:6 185:24 186:461:22 62:5,15 63:4,5shared 81:21162:15 189:20 198:12110:13 115:11 138:14187:9 195:663:12 64:10,14 66:5,9shareowner 67:11205:19,24 206:13140:1,5 189:1 195:15sensible 10:23 57:1968:3,9,16,19,22 70:16146:17significantly 19:3 49:16					
13:9 16:7,10,20 24:9150:12,14 152:1951:17,20 56:4,5,7,20shape 106:6signed 74:1324:23 25:12 26:3,5,20sense 20:5 37:18 44:857:18 58:13,16 59:20share 16:5 84:13significant 32:16 51:1527:19 32:11 44:548:4 75:17 106:1359:21,22 61:4,7,16,21112:16 192:370:3 104:7,25 105:352:17 71:8 104:9137:6 185:24 186:461:22 62:5,15 63:4,5shared 81:21162:15 189:20 198:12110:13 115:11 138:14187:9 195:663:12 64:10,14 66:5,9shareowner 67:11205:19,24 206:13140:1,5 189:1 195:15sensible 10:23 57:1968:3,9,16,19,22 70:16146:17significantly 19:3 49:16					
24:23 25:12 26:3,5,20sense 20:5 37:18 44:857:18 58:13,16 59:20share 16:5 84:13significant 32:16 51:1527:19 32:11 44:548:4 75:17 106:1359:21,22 61:4,7,16,21112:16 192:370:3 104:7,25 105:352:17 71:8 104:9137:6 185:24 186:461:22 62:5,15 63:4,5shared 81:21162:15 189:20 198:12110:13 115:11 138:14187:9 195:663:12 64:10,14 66:5,9shareowner 67:11205:19,24 206:13140:1,5 189:1 195:15sensible 10:23 57:1968:3,9,16,19,22 70:16146:17significantly 19:3 49:16					
27:19 32:11 44:548:4 75:17 106:1359:21,22 61:4,7,16,21112:16 192:370:3 104:7,25 105:352:17 71:8 104:9137:6 185:24 186:461:22 62:5,15 63:4,5shared 81:21162:15 189:20 198:12110:13 115:11 138:14187:9 195:663:12 64:10,14 66:5,9shareowner 67:11205:19,24 206:13140:1,5 189:1 195:15sensible 10:23 57:1968:3,9,16,19,22 70:16146:17significantly 19:3 49:16					
52:17 71:8 104:9137:6 185:24 186:461:22 62:5,15 63:4,5shared 81:21162:15 189:20 198:12110:13 115:11 138:14187:9 195:663:12 64:10,14 66:5,9shareowner 67:11205:19,24 206:13140:1,5 189:1 195:15sensible 10:23 57:1968:3,9,16,19,22 70:16146:17significantly 19:3 49:16					0
110:13 115:11 138:14187:9 195:663:12 64:10,14 66:5,9shareowner 67:11205:19,24 206:13140:1,5 189:1 195:15sensible 10:23 57:1968:3,9,16,19,22 70:16146:17significantly 19:3 49:16					
140:1,5 189:1 195:15 sensible 10:23 57:19 68:3,9,16,19,22 70:16 146:17 significantly 19:3 49:16					
100.22 200.17 100.20 100.00 100.10 107.10					
		130.23	13.0 13.13,10,23 10.4	5444 Hig 113.0	00.5,15 05.15 107.10

signing 90:23 136:7	slippery 68:14	souls 200:9	squares 118:7	57:13 67:12,19 69:12
193:13	slope 68:14	sound 59:4 103:7,13	squirming 25:21	74:12,22 82:17 88:13
signs 193:8	small 6:5 32:10 36:5,15	sounds 59:4 109:25	stack 159:22	89:20 90:23 94:18
Silence 101:2	38:25 43:25 53:5,19	154:16	staff 11:20,20 12:1 13:9	96:9,24 103:12
silenced 15:24	55:23 57:3,4 60:14,14	source 11:25 155:23	13:11 24:23 35:1	105:25 111:8 131:25
Silvers 2:11 56:21,22	60:16 68:7,9 72:16	speak 5:16 14:16,21	53:9 74:13,16 94:2,20	132:10,13,15 134:18
56:22 66:21 72:11,12	168:20	15:3 21:24 25:17	168:17	155:24 169:20 170:5
78:7,8 105:19,20	smaller 33:23 34:5 35:5	30:10 32:13 48:13	stage 115:22	173:13 174:18 179:16
117:17,18 127:14,15	35:12 38:24,25 39:1	99:24 127:13,23	stages 138:10	183:7 193:6 201:12
147:8,9 151:15,16	40:8 42:15 53:3,15,16	speaking 14:24 191:20	stake 182:10	205:4
156:23,24 165:7,8,13	54:7,17,17 55:4 86:10	192:7 198:12	stance 97:2	States 31:3 49:4
178:3,4	134:5	special 6:10,13 80:8	stand 110:16	stating 21:8
similar 87:15 104:6	smaller-sized 42:12	106:2 200:2	standard 52:18 68:18	statistic 43:23
127:3,10,10,10	small-business 86:10	specialist 56:18 66:25	85:25 96:8 98:18,20	statistically 51:14
128:22,22 136:10	soft-hearted 165:11	67:8,15 76:15 77:17	99:1,2 100:7	statistics 42:18 45:16
163:13	sold 70:22 111:6	77:23,24 93:17 95:9	standards 18:13 21:13	46:23 49:6 50:22,23
Similarly 52:22	116:11 124:11,12	95:16 136:2,3,8 169:3	41:2 52:17 60:5,13	51:1,5,8 55:18 85:9
simple 8:7 98:18	129:25 130:15 135:12	169:5 170:22,23,24	83:9 140:22 173:8	status 90:10
123:21 204:17	160:17,19,23 191:25	170:25 171:6,9,14,15	183:2 194:22,23	statutory 106:19
simpler 155:11	sole 107:11 168:21	171:17,18,22,25	195:8,10,15,17	stay 54:5,13 55:2 70:13
simplistic 123:25	172:12 173:3	172:3,4,5,20 173:21	206:13	104:14 196:12
simply 8:13 10:1 19:4	solely 99:5 112:2	173:23 184:20	standard-setter 11:24	staying 98:2,7
21:8 132:13 152:1	172:10	specialists 32:18	standard-setting 11:18	Steinhoff 3:11 13:17
176:12 201:1	solved 150:3	168:25 170:20 172:9	standing 14:17 68:14	29:15,16,16,22 59:17
simultaneously 118:13	solves 131:1	173:5,6,16 174:7	120:13	59:18 102:15,16
sincerely 11:6	somebody 36:8 77:25	176:24 195:4	standpoint 116:21,23	115:18,19 129:14,15
single 8:4	103:24 117:13 129:7	specialist's 169:6	162:10 196:21	131:17 170:18,19
singled 17:22,24 18:10	135:15 143:22 202:11	specialization 35:1	Star 64:1	190:25 191:1
82:25	someplace 36:18	specialized 145:15	start 22:14 48:13 54:3	Steinhoff's 68:12
sit 26:15 65:22 113:23	144:22	171:19	69:7 72:9 91:8 110:9	step 29:12 195:11
149:20	somewhat 8:19 20:1	specific 16:24 17:6,17	137:11 141:12 155:4	198:17,20,20
site 126:1	57:1 192:8 199:6	52:23 63:15 86:13	164:18 166:6 170:8	steps 197:10 204:14
sits 140:7	soon 51:9 77:6	88:24 89:10 121:3	started 15:7,25 26:12	stole 196:7
sitting 119:16 169:17	sophisticated 32:17	141:5,9,10 180:14,16	69:10	stood 138:15
170:2	33:17 44:3 113:4	200:18	starting 42:10 100:10	stopgap 184:4
situation 55:14 63:18	sophistication 34:4	specifically 17:22,24	110:2 145:20 194:19	straightforward 18:4
70:6 74:21 76:21,24	49:8	19:20 38:18 39:10	194:19 195:22	strategic 83:24 84:8
79:5,13 94:13 105:2	sorry 17:12 22:8	131:22 186:8 195:18	starts 110:6	strategies 5:14 86:13
111:17 115:4,16	119:17,17 200:17	197:23	state 16:12 31:19 56:10	89:25 100:19 101:6
131:7 153:16 154:8	203:22	specified 25:12	59:18 66:3,12 114:15	103:1 105:14,23
154:11 155:16 175:16	sort 19:20 39:16 45:8	specify 141:4	176:15 201:1	114:4 118:20 120:3
202:8	47:1 50:20 52:15	spectrum 192:6	stated 31:24 183:10	120:18 121:2 124:25
situations 54:14 55:7	56:25 57:17 58:5,13	speech 189:23	statement 31:12 37:18	125:3 126:22 131:12
55:14 69:25 70:9	72:13,16,18,19,22	speed 54:19	64:24 83:16 94:3	132:6,17,24 133:2
71:1 77:5 97:4 112:1	73:1 78:12,19 84:21	spend 37:25 39:4	100:25 111:6,9	135:7,9,13 137:10
112:4 136:21 153:14	86:18 102:8 105:22	spill-over 172:23	116:22,23 124:10	138:11 143:15 167:7
162:13,14	106:25 125:4 129:3	183:11	125:20 126:2 127:24	172:19 184:13
size 32:6 34:3,8 35:18	135:25 139:7 143:9	spirit 102:25 201:3	132:2,20 150:21	strategy 62:23 89:15
35:19,21,21 36:2,3,14	143:12,13,15 147:24	spoke 191:15	164:12 170:15 193:13	95:23 96:2 100:11,13
36:19 39:18,19 41:18	148:14 157:22 168:2	spoken 10:4	202:10 205:10 statements 8:10 10:2	100:23 104:17,18,19
53:7 54:7 83:6	168:4 180:25 184:4	sponsored 108:15	statements 8:10 10:3	104:24 109:1,11,21
sized 32:10	186:6,16 187:18,23	spot 46:7,9	23:24 27:10 31:1,6,8	109:22 111:6 112:21
skeptical 8:9,15	199:18 202:17	spotted 46:4,17	31:22,25 34:21 35:11	113:14 116:8,10,11
skills 171:16,19 172:11	sorts 57:13 58:7 159:13	spread 175:21	36:12 38:20 39:25	118:13 119:6,22
sleep 170:1	159:13 195:5	spring 142:9 Sprint 152:22 154:7	46:2 47:12 49:12	120:11 124:11,12,14
slice 109:9	sought 106:8	Sprint 153:23 154:7	50:10,12,17 52:9	125:5,9,14 126:5,8,13

Meeting

Page 22

				r age 22
126:16,25 128:19	suggests 72:22 178:21	taboo 153:1	24:20 25:15,20 26:9	113:13,14 116:21
129:18,25 130:6,13	suggests 72.22 176.21 summed 120:6 171:13	tagging 45:8	26:10,15 27:8 28:15	117:6 118:21,21,24
131:19,24 132:1	superb 55:24	tag's 15:1	28:15,18,21,22 30:7	119:5,6,12,22 120:3
133:22 135:12 138:22	superior 131:1	tailored 112:3	30:10 31:20,22,24	120:11 121:3,4,5,8,13
144:10 183:25 200:7	supervise 40:7 136:4,8	taint 146:13	32:2,17 33:4,4,5,6,8,9	120:11 121:3,4,5,8,15
Street 1:18 9:14	169:4	take 4:4,5 15:9 20:23	33:10,10,12,13,14,17	123:9 124:11,12,24
strengthen 29:1	supervising 171:21	41:5 42:9 54:21 56:8	34:1,2,6,7 35:2,10	125:14,16,17,18
strengthening 7:18	supervision 174:5	60:11 61:6,15 71:12	36:7,18 37:11,13,14	126:13,24 127:7,11
195:1,2 206:14	supplement 105:16	76:1 79:1 81:3 85:17	37:22 38:8,9,10,14,20	120.13,24 127.7,11
strictly 189:4	supplier 70:1,14	88:3 91:6 94:18,20	39:21 40:6,12,12,14	127:23,23 128:5,6
strong 10:12 106:21	supply 200:22	96:15 97:2 98:8	40:23 41:9,12,17,20	129:6,18,19,20
strongly 7:17 9:11	support 7:23 29:14,22	105:1 108:17 123:16	40:23 41:9,12,17,20 41:24,24 42:5,15,22	130:11,13 131:18,18
130:22 134:6	50:17 57:21 82:14	123:22 124:1 130:10	43:8,9,16 44:7,11,20	131:19,19,24,25
struck 191:20	110:5 163:9 190:16	137:9,14,20 141:11	44:21 45:12 46:2,3,10	131:19,19,24,25
structure 48:21 80:24	supported 113:4 115:5	152:12 162:2 166:20	46:16 47:2,6,12 48:21	132:1,0,13,25 133:2
90:10 99:1 102:5	115:6 140:23	168:8 183:19,20	48:24 49:3,14,22 50:4	133.13,13,13,22,23
109:15 127:5 144:12	supposed 110:22	194:19 195:11,22	48.24 49.3,14,22 30.4 50:8,11,16,21 51:12	136:1,3,8 137:9,9
structured 58:20	supposed 110.22 sure 15:24 25:3 27:17	194.19 195.11,22 198:19 200:1,3	51:17,20 52:15,23	138:2,11,11,18,20,23
100:14 129:19 169:1	29:25 34:13 50:13	204:15	53:4,5 54:3,14,15,17	139:10 140:6 141:15
191:22	60:23,25 62:24 63:1	taken 36:10 70:25	54:19,22,23,25 55:2,8	141:16,16,19,23,25
structures 56:20 76:17	65:11 77:4 78:8	85:14 114:10 115:5	55:9,11,12,22,24 56:4	141:10,10,19,25,25
97:23 98:10,11 106:5	91:17 93:24 113:17	116:20 120:9 121:15	56:7,8,9,10,10,11,15	143:16,23,24 144:3,4
106:6 107:5 191:25	117:1 119:21 123:9	122:5,7 197:9	56:18,20 57:5,7,10,17	144:7,8,10 145:3,11
192:1	123:23 126:4 138:14	takes 65:4 73:6 83:21	57:22,25 58:3,20	145:14,14,15,18,21
structuring 106:2,9,16	138:16 156:2,7,22	114:25 139:5 156:10	59:16,20 61:3,23	146:10,10,16,20
113:2 130:13	159:5,21 167:7	talk 8:23 17:15 61:22	62:11,16,21,22 63:5	147:5,11,20 148:1,8
study 51:8 183:15,19	172:17 187:10,12	62:14 63:11,14 65:20	63:12 64:21 66:3,7,11	148:10,11 151:8
stuff 51:24 106:25	190:17 193:9 196:23	67:13 69:7 75:13	66:25 67:8,14 68:16	154:24 155:9,9,12
109:1	202:7,18	81:10 108:24 129:17	70:2,17,20,21,24 71:6	156:6 157:11 158:13
stupid 125:12	surprised 10:11 55:18	139:11 143:20 192:1	71:7,12,17 73:3,12,20	158:25 160:16 161:3
subject 11:16 19:9,10	surprising 47:4	196:7 199:2	73:24 74:3,10,11,15	161:13,22 162:7
21:10 27:13,15 52:5	surprisingly 147:9	talked 64:12 83:13 86:1	74:18,22,23,25 75:18	163:6,6,15,17 165:15
57:16,18	surrounded 108:2	101:19 121:7 147:19	75:23 76:4,4,9,10,15	165:21,21 166:22,23
subjected 53:22	surrounding 203:3	153:9,10 167:13	76:17 77:6,17,23,23	167:7,15,17,18,19,23
subjects 14:8	surveys 42:5	177:9 182:22 186:5	78:25 79:6,8,11,20,20	167:24 168:3,5,12,22
submit 94:10	sustain 71:10,16,20	187:2,6 189:5 193:25	80:3,17,18 82:8,10,14	168:23,25 169:1,3,3
subordinate 178:19	sustained 88:1,7	talking 14:2 26:12 39:2	82:20 83:9,14,18,19	169:13 170:2,12,21
subscribe 73:21	switch 190:7,10,18	39:23,25 50:8,22	84:20 85:10,21 86:22	171:6,14,17 172:5,9
subsequent 33:10 42:2	sync 63:1	79:25 89:21 111:17	87:18,21 88:6,9,17,23	172:11,18,20,22
subsidiaries 164:17	synergies 161:12	114:4,8 115:4 117:3	89:2,9,15,15,15,25	173:5,6,7,8,15,21,22
substance 103:2,21	synonymous 31:11	126:22 128:11 129:18	90:10,15,18,20,20	174:7,18,20 175:2,7
130:3,7 163:8	system 28:25 30:23	129:19 138:8 143:14	91:1,13,24 92:5,13,14	175:11,14,14,18
substantial 40:5 70:13	82:14 84:20 121:21	147:14 172:24 176:13	93:14,17 94:10,12,20	176:2 177:10,16
sub-S 144:4,11	121:22 122:1,13	176:14 182:16 190:6	95:5,9,16,22,22 96:2	178:6,6,9,15,16,19,22
success 84:4	systematically 78:14	191:13,22,23 202:15	96:3,5,18 97:18 98:12	178:23,24 179:6,7,11
successful 51:3		talks 101:23	99:23,24 100:2,10,13	179:23,25 181:22,23
Sue 200:14	Т	tangential 135:24	100:13,15,15,16,19	183:9,12,17,25
sufficient 171:24	T 2:1,1 3:1,1	target 197:17	100:19,23,24 101:5,6	184:12,19,21,24
suggest 47:24 82:15,21	table 14:1,19,23 22:9	tax 1:11 4:9 5:6,10,13	101:6,25 102:2,3,6,20	185:1,9 186:7 188:18
83:12 108:5 111:22	37:4 38:5,14 42:24	5:21 6:1,4 11:9 12:9	103:1,4,13,17,18	189:7,10,10,17 190:5
116:24 159:24 160:2	66:10 87:15 95:20	12:13,17,23,25 13:5,7	104:17,18,19,24	190:6,9,15,17 192:7
203:18	96:7,23 97:12 98:25	17:2,4,6,18,22,24	105:13 106:5,12	193:7,10,12,17,25
suggested 64:16 68:13	118:20 169:18 180:21	18:3,10 19:2,13,16,17	107:12 108:1,1,8,25	194:1,11,18,24 195:4
suggesting 47:9	196:25 202:18 203:1	20:7,20,23 21:10,14	109:3,6,11,21,22	195:4,8,18,18 196:3,4
suggestion 83:16 126:6	203:9	21:20,20 22:12,14,19	110:1,20 111:5,21,22	197:1,3,6,22,24
143:21	tables 153:21	23:9,15,17,24 24:18	112:20,21,22 113:4	199:16 200:7,7

				1 age 25
201:12,16 202:3,22	tents 162:2 165:6	102:19 108:14 109:10	115:19,20 116:2,12	80:7,9 118:22 139:7
203:2 204:20 205:3,5	term 75:9,10,12 131:22	109:10 110:15 111:16	116:16 117:6,16,18	thirds 51:2
205:9,9,12,13	183:13 184:14	123:2 131:15,20	118:7,9,18 119:22,24	third-party 62:10 77:1
taxation 38:1 45:4	terms 26:19 34:19	132:12 133:17 139:11	120:6,7,13,15,15,25	95:16 103:23 104:1
47:16,17 144:5	35:10,13 39:20 41:8	142:22,22 143:9,18	121:5,7,10,12 122:1,6	THOMAS 2:21
176:15,18	48:9,23 49:2,9,19,20	144:10,12,17,18,23	122:9,15,18,19,23,25	Thornton 45:5
taxed 109:19	53:21 59:11 80:11	147:17 163:20 165:19	123:1,2,12 124:6	thorny 84:16
taxes 21:9 31:20 37:14	85:1 87:2 101:12,16	166:6 171:13 189:25	125:11,12,13 126:8	thoroughly 110:12
38:3 42:2 71:13	108:9,19 114:5 121:2	191:15 192:17 194:2	126:17,20 127:11	thought 24:6 37:15,17
83:15 113:24 122:1	121:19 122:4 130:10	198:21 206:15,21	128:9,11,23 129:9,21	42:17 58:8,13 65:2
127:6,25 131:24	133:14 134:3,12,15	think 8:3 9:6 11:4	129:22,24 130:2,6,8	123:25 144:8 153:10
143:1 163:19,20	139:22 158:22 159:19	15:23 17:19 19:21	130:16 131:1,3,8,11	thoughts 92:24 122:5
176:13,15,16,17	159:22 163:5 174:1	20:11,14,17 21:5,6	132:11 133:13,18	203:5
205:8	177:2,2,2 180:24	22:10,10,14,16,16,21	134:15 135:3,17	thousands 9:5
taxing 122:9	187:24 188:3,10,14	22:25 23:5,7,11,13,14	136:2,21,22 137:5,21	three 15:7 16:16 51:9
taxpayer 82:12 116:25	189:9 191:7 199:24	23:16,18 24:12,15,18	137:25 138:13 139:1	83:21,22 91:6 155:21
127:9	203:6 205:1	24:23 25:1,10,11,24	139:8,13,17,22 140:1	164:18 165:2 166:10
taxpayers 203:17	terrible 74:24 138:4	26:18,25 27:5,9,17,21	140:13,24 141:14,20	166:17 167:8 183:16
tax-compliance 6:2	154:9	27:25 28:1 29:7,23,23	141:20 142:14 143:19	throw 51:7 202:17
61:21 95:18	terribly 91:17 92:22	30:3,6,13,24 31:10	144:16,23 145:1,7	Thursday 29:18
tax-compliant 98:11	161:4	33:17 34:8 35:6 36:2	147:12,13,17 150:24	tie 64:2,4,6 69:5,17,17
tax-driven 142:22	test 68:2 110:16	36:3,13 38:18 39:15	152:4,17 153:3,4,9,11	69:18,19,19 70:8
tax-motivated 112:2	testimony 18:20	39:19 40:2,8,10,21,25	153:23 154:1,8,11,20	74:11,20
tax-planning 86:13	tests 187:23	43:20 44:10,11,24	156:13 157:4,22,25	tied 74:16 169:7 188:20
tax-related 147:21,22	text 167:21	45:10,20 46:24 47:4	158:11,22 159:17,19	ties 166:5 189:25 191:3
169:2 tax-reporting 48:10	thank 6:15 7:5,8 10:9 11:1 13:12,14,17,23	47:19 48:3,11 49:4,15 49:18,25 50:2,6,7,14	159:21 160:3,7 161:23 162:18 163:12	time 4:2 7:9,11,12 10:5 10:9 12:21 15:12,21
tax-return 41:3 75:4	21:23 22:4 25:19	51:5 52:4,22 53:6	164:2,7,13 165:9,24	19:6 34:1 37:25 42:2
tax-service 16:25 28:23	28:10 30:16,21 31:13	54:9,12,24 55:1,7	167:6,11,12,14,15	53:18 58:8 64:3,5
tax-services 51:16	31:17 38:16 45:2	57:2 58:1,1,8,14,19	169:14 171:13,16	69:21,21,23,23,25
97:11	46:22 49:24 82:2,5	58:24 59:8,20,23,24	172:13,20 173:15,19	70:1 91:23 98:2,18,20
teaching 37:13	84:21 88:11 91:9	60:4 61:1,5,8,12,15	174:2,2,8,24 175:3,5	99:9,16 107:23 124:2
team 169:4 171:8,9,15	97:17 98:4 102:24	61:23,24 62:4,6,8,9	175:9,11 176:2,9,12	133:24 135:1 139:5
173:9 174:5 176:24	107:8 116:15 168:9	62:19 63:3,4 64:5	176:22,25 177:7	140:22 145:9 156:4,9
184:20	207:6,10	65:3,21 66:9,15,22	178:6,18,20 179:3,12	160:18,21 178:17
teams 168:25 174:8	thanks 6:10 24:3 63:7	68:14,23 69:9,16,24	179:14,18,20 180:20	190:7,7 191:12,19
technical 61:14 172:2	134:24 164:10 196:6	70:8,8,14,18 71:8	182:3,20 183:1,5,8,23	198:23 205:13
194:18	themes 95:2	72:5,17,25 73:23,25	184:1,3,10 185:6,16	timeliness 49:11
technically 103:13	they'd 18:2 33:12,13	74:8 75:1,8,9,14,21	185:25 186:15,18	timely 48:9
150:4	54:21	75:21 76:20,24 77:8	188:1,9 189:5,18,20	times 9:2 72:25 74:24
tee 180:4	thing 8:24 10:13 19:12	79:25 80:10,10,14,20	189:24 190:13,13,20	81:15 91:11 100:1
teed 31:10	27:4 62:8,21 65:2,3	81:2,4,7,16,22 82:9	190:21,23 191:1,4,6	116:11 155:6 179:20
teeth 58:10	66:22 70:7 80:17	82:11 84:25 85:2	191:10,13,14 192:15	183:10
tell 13:3 42:25 55:22	81:1 91:24 96:21	86:20 87:3,9,10,13,19	192:25 193:1,15,23	timing 33:11
103:21 110:11 155:20	98:9 102:17 104:20	89:12,21,23 90:2,3,5	194:2,6,19 195:5,23	Title 7:24
170:9 185:23 193:17 tolling 170:3 201:20	122:25 123:1,5,11,11	90:17,22 91:3,3 93:8	196:1,16,17 197:10	today 6:9,14,17,22 7:7
telling 170:3 201:20 tells 178:7	128:4,21,22,22 130:6 130:14,15,15,24	93:21 94:7,24 97:3 100:1 101:3,4,7,8,11	198:15,24 199:1,17 201:21,21,23 203:16	7:9 10:6,10 12:6 13:2 13:9 15:6 22:21 25:3
temper 196:1	130.14,13,13,24 131:11,23 137:12,13	101:15,21 102:1,2	201.21,21,23 203.10 204:1,14,17,23	30:22 31:10 37:3
tempered 26:11	138:1,17 153:5 166:8	101:15,21 102:1,2	204.1,14,17,23	67:13 78:13,18 94:6
temporary 201:13	182:15 190:12 192:17	103:0 104:10,10,20	thinking 62:22 118:4	95:3 96:23 109:3
ten 33:21 52:7 69:22	things 20:18 21:6 25:1	107:3,15,19,24	138:17	112:11 122:20 147:19
tend 43:14 53:24 85:12	27:12 28:3 45:7	108:14,23,25 109:5,7	third 19:8 32:3,20 37:9	161:2 167:16 168:1
tends 44:14	48:18 54:5 55:2	109:8,24 110:8,14	39:6,6,8 41:23 46:8	176:13 178:21 180:14
tension 148:10	57:19 58:3 59:5 63:2	111:4,23 112:4,6,8,15	46:14,15 47:1,8 51:12	180:16,23 181:5
tensions 157:13	66:14 82:4 90:13	114:21,25 115:10,14	56:19 77:10 78:11	183:10,23 185:6

Page	24
------	----

186:6 188:1,6,9,15	21:20	two 14:14 16:15 18:25	139:6 140:2 142:3	valuable 7:10 160:12
189:5 191:2,14,21	transparency 47:15	23:22 47:23 51:1	198:9 206:22	value 19:4 81:13 98:24
192:6 193:6,24 194:5	48:4,8 49:11 197:13	58:16,18,21,24 59:23	understanding 13:4	vanilla 144:17
196:15 199:2 200:5	Traub 26:9	72:12 74:24 83:22	20:4 49:21 64:7	vantage 134:1,5,19
203:1 207:8	traveled 207:8	88:14 93:19 97:23	89:10 90:9 102:4,5	163:5
today's 6:25 11:7 28:11	travels 207:10	100:1 104:9 126:12	108:13 131:18 134:13	variety 6:8 10:13 76:4
86:19	treat 56:25	127:15 130:8 131:15	171:25 177:15,15	142:7 181:10
told 81:6 149:22	treated 90:14 91:1	135:6 141:11 144:22	185:8 206:17	various 5:21 31:19 56:4
Tom 2:8 45:1,2 52:4	116:23	147:10,17 159:15	understood 23:12 26:1	56:7 80:20 95:13
73:16,17 75:14,19	treatment 73:12 76:7	163:22 164:18,22,22	26:2 138:15	164:6 175:7 176:14
92:25 93:1 163:10,11	79:9 81:3 89:14	165:2,5 175:1 176:1	undertake 152:7	176:18 189:5 196:3
193:21,22 196:7	118:24 119:5 125:15	186:12 200:2 201:7	undertaken 188:23	vary 53:7
200:12,14	125:19 127:20 129:21	tying 156:21	undertakes 41:16	vehicle 133:23
tool 200:18	tremendous 49:5 150:1	type 24:24 25:8 57:24	undertaking 34:17	vehicles 106:16
top 54:5,13 55:2,5	trend 45:17	61:8,16 71:24,25 76:6	35:6 142:19	versus 77:10 81:4
148:9	trends 64:11	105:23 109:17,17	under-emphasize	159:17
topic 7:10 14:3 30:20	trillion 69:22	125:22 137:2,8,9	93:21	vested 92:3
35:17 48:15 56:2	trouble 57:13	153:19 155:18 157:1	undoubtedly 198:22	vesting 63:19
72:10 76:2 100:9,12	true 74:9,17 90:22	157:2 158:19 159:23	unfavorable 46:10	vet 75:22
101:3 122:15 168:19	99:19 127:16 128:24	162:19 166:15 167:24	unfortunate 194:3	vet 75.22 vetting 74:14
175:2 204:18	174:6 193:17 194:24	170:2 171:7 192:23	unfortunately 82:3	viable 134:1
topics 10:13 14:1,11	truly 8:14	198:13	153:18	Vice 45:3
15:3 98:3	trump 96:22	types 5:21 56:4,7 58:3	uniformly 188:11	view 16:5 38:19 62:7
total 178:1	trumps 81:11	59:22 61:7,15 81:14	unintended 79:18	71:5,7 72:6 81:11
totality 192:23	trusted 68:6	81:18 105:4,13	187:9	82:8 84:3,11 88:7
totally 46:6 69:15	truth 185:24	126:13 130:11 148:21	unique 19:9 111:19	89:7 112:25 113:1
103:18 127:6 150:11	try 15:3 18:9 26:15,17	151:3 159:11 166:23	United 31:3 49:3	130:19 148:12 151:17
169:12	58:17 79:16 84:15	175:12 191:21 196:4	unpopular 104:15	154:18 192:8 196:18
touch 23:14 35:2 82:12	91:16 143:12 146:25	typically 36:8 44:10	unusual 117:19	203:13
101:4,11	196:20 198:2,4	51:13 71:8 98:11	urge 101:22	viewed 71:8 113:21
touched 97:19 182:3	trying 18:8 26:23 58:19	148:15 157:25 205:2	urging 18:18	viewpoint 43:24 142:1
tough 198:24 201:18	59:23 69:14 70:13	205:13,14	use 20:8 40:20 43:16	142:2
toughening 183:1	79:17 113:20 115:16	200110,11	45:11,12,19 47:2 48:2	views 10:7,13 13:4,10
track 91:1	134:16 135:5 139:15	U	51:19 63:25 64:14,18	13:25 14:3 20:17,20
trade 76:10	140:17 143:9 149:5	ultimate 23:23	65:5,8 73:20,24 78:15	28:24 41:25 112:11
tradeoff 67:17,18	165:11 169:18 198:9	ultimately 87:1 164:1	79:16,21 94:10 120:2	205:10
traditional 103:4	198:10	Uminski 2:13 66:1,2,2	127:10 131:22 133:21	violate 81:23 195:10
Traditionally 16:7	turn 13:19 25:16 42:24	100:4,5,5	136:1 138:10,12	violated 97:1
trained 60:22	70:4 71:14 100:18	unable 178:23	170:20 171:9,14	violating 96:14 195:10
transaction 73:12 79:9	110:8 112:14 123:16	unanimity 129:22	183:13 184:14	virtually 131:6
84:3,4 86:25 87:1	155:17,19 180:3	175:9 204:19	useful 17:1 29:6,13	virtue 186:1
92:17,17 93:7,10,16	turnaround 194:20	unanswered 203:13	207:3	vis-a-vis 148:1 190:9
93:23,24 108:21	turned 54:23 106:10	unbiased 113:22	users 155:24	vital 75:21 174:21
111:1 125:17,20,22	154:8	137:19	uses 112:22 136:3,6	176:12,23 178:8
127:2 130:5 141:8,10	Turner 2:16 24:2,3,8	unclaimed 167:23	169:2	voice 21:25
165:18 179:8,9,10	25:23 27:3 33:1,2	underlying 66:15	usually 33:9 37:2 43:25	volunteers 98:13
197:24,24	40:19 42:3,4 52:25	116:17	156:9,10	vote 9:9 28:4 150:5
transactions 41:16	53:1,12,14 68:25 69:1	undermine 72:19	utility 48:23 108:13	voted 10:14
52:15,24 85:20	69:5 108:22,23	underneath 190:3	U.S 3:11 109:19 163:19	votes 9:6
100:14 101:7 107:11	113:18 136:9,10	understand 6:4 14:23	176:16,17	
110:23,25 113:3	149:16,17 153:6,7	14:25 23:21 35:7		W
141:4,16 162:10	155:3 166:2,3 169:11	44:12 57:11 58:17	V	wait 113:9 169:23
169:1,15,19,19 189:6	189:13,14 205:12	70:18 84:2 85:15	vacuum 150:12	walk 64:21
191:22 194:14 197:1	turning 6:24 55:16	93:24 117:13 126:4	vague 131:22	Wall 9:13
197:4,6,18	109:23	126:10 132:25 133:1	valid 123:22	Walter 3:6 86:5,6
transaction-based	twice 87:10	133:4,5 135:5 138:20	validity 144:21	98:21,22 162:4,5
		,	.	/ - · /-

Walters 2:14 19:23,24	140:19,20,20 171:11	118:10 121:7 130:25	working 26:20 37:13	yield 144:7
36:20,21,21 94:22,23	171:12,12 179:2,3,3	139:3 143:14 159:14	48:25 120:16 164:22	yonder 58:6
94:23 104:22,23	193:4,5,5 200:24,25	167:12 168:16 170:10	173:21,23 174:8	York 32:10
120:5,6 124:22,23	200:25 206:8,9	170:11 177:9 181:19	202:5	Young 3:5 25:20 150:1
131:14,15 160:24,25	Webcast 22:1	182:22 183:10 186:5	works 33:16 116:20,22	1 oung 5.5 25.20 150.1
167:5,6 180:18,19	weekly 149:1	187:2,6,7 189:5 192:9	122:1 125:14,18,22	Z
184:7,8 202:14,15	week's 9:13	193:25 195:16,19	129:5,5 205:6	zero 42:23 68:4
203:21,22,23	weigh 76:25	200:16 204:17	world 31:4 65:10 79:16	ZY 135:5
want 6:1,3,10,15 13:25	weight 85:14	whatsoever 86:25	79:16 108:8 127:5	21 155.5
	Weinberger 3:5 25:18	whichever 131:9	142:21 148:22 158:13	0
14:13 15:4,17,25 21:24 27:1 36:17	0	177:22		
	25:19,20 38:15,16	white 70:19	175:18,21 176:18	02 4:25
39:4 44:7 45:8 46:23	63:6,7 91:8,9 99:4,5		194:12 196:19	1
49:10 51:7 56:25	107:7,8 111:11,12	wide 78:12 171:3 181:9	worldwide 35:3 36:25	
59:18 62:8,23,23	116:14,15 125:10,11	wider 132:12,14	world's 199:5	1,000 42:13 55:19
65:17 68:11 77:21	126:17,20 134:23,24	wild 58:6	worrisome 59:5	108:8
78:10 79:22 82:4,4	135:21 156:1,2 164:9	WILLIAM 2:2	worry 83:14	1:00 15:10 97:25
83:8 91:24 93:2,2	164:10 196:5,6 201:8	willing 67:10 69:23	worrying 83:15	1:03 98:5
94:16 95:5 96:4 98:9	201:18 203:11,12	willingness 7:12 12:9	worse 44:19 164:21	10 15:14 61:6 130:10
99:7 105:20,21	welcome 4:8 12:6 13:17	207:9	worst 41:21	160:16
119:16,21 123:23	144:24	window 199:11	worth 40:13 129:7	10:02 1:15 4:2
129:15 131:12,16	well-respected 51:10	wink 10:2	wouldn't 47:23,24 48:1	100 123:16 153:11
132:17,19 138:19	183:16	wisdom 7:13	94:5 130:12 136:16	1001 1:18
146:17 149:2 167:3	well-served 28:12,19	wisely 84:17	138:13 167:22 168:1	101-3 21:11 206:10
168:1 171:8 182:22	went 37:16 48:19 59:1	wish 161:20 182:15	187:17,22 194:4,9	1120 197:21
187:10,17 188:20	115:16 117:14	197:1 203:24 206:9	wow 201:18	12:12 98:5
199:1 201:1 203:12	weren't 43:1 47:9 71:2	207:10	wrap 55:11,11 143:9	14 1:14
206:22	192:2	witness 115:12 119:2,2	wrapped 103:15	140 108:8 142:17
wanted 29:5 38:11	we'll 14:11,19 23:18	won 69:3	write 196:11 198:23	175:17
49:25 50:13 52:3	45:20 48:13,14,15	wonderful 7:6 10:13	199:17	15 15:14 61:6,6 130:10
77:16 92:23 111:12	51:5 52:1 61:22	woodwork 153:25	writing 24:5 179:13	193:11
138:7 140:20 143:17	68:19 72:9,10 91:8	word 52:1 66:7,10	written 18:17 27:25	15,000 53:18
164:10	94:7 123:17,18	132:3	wrong 27:9 106:3	15-minute 168:8
wanting 166:12 186:17	141:12 154:13 162:2	words 111:15 119:23	123:11 129:13 135:18	16 31:9
wants 34:9 71:12 79:21	165:6 192:11	138:22	170:9 192:5	16B 149:24
95:12 112:19 200:22	we're 10:22 14:1,8,13	work 4:19 6:2,2,21	wrongly 98:24	16th 1:18
Washington 1:20	15:6,8,8,10,15,17	10:4,7 16:16 24:17	wrote 26:9	1800 42:7 43:5,9,17
wasn't 28:3 34:2 55:16	20:18 23:13 27:15	26:23 27:8 32:25		
154:9 191:7,9	39:1,23,25 43:24 44:2	33:7 42:22 43:8,9,16	<u> </u>	2
way 21:6 33:19 39:22	50:22 58:11 63:1	44:5,7,11,23 47:23	X 126:14	2 7:24 52:18 66:24
51:18 58:5 67:4 71:7	64:11,15 68:14 69:14	51:5 54:15,15,18,20		147:13
75:24 77:25 78:5	79:3,25 81:3 83:6	54:22,23,24 55:8,12	Y	2:45 15:12
84:17 101:8 113:8	91:5 96:23 103:14	56:17 57:10 59:16	Y 126:15,15	20 52:7 61:6 130:10
116:23 118:1 122:1	111:14 114:4 121:1	62:4,12 64:25 66:17	yeah 20:14 61:18 82:2	200 86:9
127:25 129:4,16	125:7 126:22 134:16	70:2 73:9 76:14	113:24	2000 11:16 26:2
131:9 138:24 163:16	137:2 138:2 140:11	79:20 91:13 92:12,14	year 9:22 24:22 41:14	2001 9:18
164:25 170:25 177:13	141:11 145:10 163:22	92:19,21 94:8 96:15	41:14,17,23 44:19	2002 9:21 11:14 42:18
187:3 197:14 207:8	166:20 167:6 168:13	99:11 106:17 117:9	45:4 67:9 87:4 117:8	2002/2003 22:18
ways 8:16 33:3 91:4	169:19 173:3 176:13	117:15 118:14 120:17	169:23 177:14,17,20	2003 4:21 16:21 42:18
wears 40:9	176:13 194:19 198:8	135:4 136:4 138:4	177:22 179:15 184:13	20036 1:20
weaved 205:4	198:14,24 204:3	149:19,23 163:17	194:16 198:16 201:25	2004 1:14
web 197:12	207:5	164:18,19,25 169:8	201:25 202:1,2	230 195:2
Webb 3:8 20:25 21:1,1	we've 9:16 10:17 40:22	171:2 172:1,1,7	years 12:15 44:9 45:5	25 45:5
39:13,14,14 48:14	42:4 43:19 44:5	173:16 186:17 191:6	52:7,7 85:13 100:2	28 134:7
51:25 52:2,2 87:7,8,8	45:16 50:20 69:9	192:20 196:3,4 202:6	134:7 189:16 193:11	
87:12 99:17,18,18	75:10 101:19 103:9	202:7	194:4	3
114:3,4 135:22,23,23	109:4 113:8 117:4	worked 34:5 94:6	year-end 46:19	3,000 53:19 55:5
L	1		1	

Page	26
------	----

3:00 168:9		
2.59 1.15 207.11		
3:58 1:15 207:11		
30 9:24 33:22		
300 54:2		
3000 42:8		
31 43:7 47:1		
311 171:16		
4		
4 67:5		
4:30 15:13		
40 123:8		
42 9:22		
461 42:21		
-101 12.21		
5		
		1
5-0 10:14		
50 71:19 123:9,13		1
132:7 140:21,24		
		1
141:15		1
500 42:6,20,21 43:10		
43:13,15 55:19		
51-to-49 71:19		1
51/49 71:21		
55 9:22		
550 43:15		
6		
6 110:19 112:7		
7		
70,000 36:24		
72 9:19		
12 9.19		
		1
		1
		1
		1
		1
		1
		1